Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims for sexual harassment and retaliation against the City of Houston. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the repeated viewing of a private, intimate video of plaintiff by two senior firefighters. While the court agreed that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to plaintiff's retaliation claim, the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that no genuine issue exists as to her sexual harassment claim and that summary judgment for the City was appropriate.In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff, a woman, is a member of a protected class and that she experienced unwelcome harassment; the harassment was based on sex and thus based on plaintiff's status as a member of a protected class; plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive and hostile work environment; and the conduct was objectively offensive to plaintiff and affected a term or condition of her employment. The court also concluded that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether the City knew or should have known about the harassment, and thus can be held liable. View "Abbt v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the superior court affirming the decision of the Board of Review for the North Carolina Department of Commerce adopting the decision of the appeals referee ruling that Frank Lennane was disqualified for unemployment benefits, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether Lennane's leaving work was attributable to his employer, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 96-14.5(a), to avoid disqualification for unemployment benefits. The lower courts affirmed the administrative decision that Lennane was disqualified for unemployment benefits because he failed to show good cause attributable to the employer for leaving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while Lennane left work for good cause, he failed to satisfy his burden to show that his leaving work was "attributable to the employer" as a matter of law. View "In re Lennane" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in concluding that more than 220,000 former State employees (the Retirees) possessed no vested rights within the meaning of the Contracts Clause to the benefit of lifetime enrollment in any particular premium-free health insurance plan, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the Retirees had obtained a vested right protected under the Contracts Clause.After the General Assembly enacted a statute eliminating Retirees' option to remain enrolled in the plan of their choice, the Retirees argued that the State had undertaken a contractual obligation to provide them with the option to remain enrolled in the premium-free preferred provider organization health insurance plan that allocated eighty percent of the costs of health care services to the insurer and twenty percent to the insured for life. The trial court entered partial summary judgment for Retirees. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court correctly determined there were no genuine issues of material fact relating to whether Retirees possessed a vested right protected under the Contracts Clause. View "Lake v. State Health Plan for Teachers & State Employees" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Medical Commission Panel denying Appellant's application for additional benefits and an increase to her impairment rating, holding that the Medical Panel's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.In 2014, Appellant suffered a workplace injury. In 2019, Appellant applied for additional benefits, including surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, and an increase to her impairment rating. The Medical Panel denied both requests, determining (1) Appellant's carpal tunnel syndrome was not related to her workplace injury, and (2) Appellant's claim for an increased impairment rating was unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Medical Panel's ultimate determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "Reichenberg v. State, ex rel., Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against defendant Roark-Whitten Hospitality 2 (RW2) seeking relief for what the EEOC alleged were unlawful employment practices by RW2 on the basis of race, color, national origin, and retaliation. Those unlawful employment practices allegedly occurred after RW2 purchased and began operating a hotel in Taos, New Mexico in 2009. The aggrieved employees were all employed at the hotel prior to RW2’s purchase, and were all either terminated or constructively discharged at some point after the purchase. After the action was initiated, the EEOC filed amended complaints seeking to add as defendants two additional entities, Jai Hanuman, LLC (Jai), which purchased the hotel from RW2 in 2014, and SGI, LLC (SGI), which purchased the hotel from Jai in 2016. The district court dismissed the EEOC’s claims against SGI on the grounds that the EEOC failed to adequately allege a basis for successor liability against SGI. As for RW2 and Jai, the district court, acting pursuant to a motion for civil contempt filed by the EEOC, entered default judgment against them and then conducted a hearing on the issue of damages. After conducting that hearing, the district court dismissed the EEOC’s claims against Jai on the grounds that the EEOC failed to adequately allege a basis for successor liability against Jai, and it ordered RW2 to pay compensatory damages to the EEOC in the total amount of $35,000. The EEOC appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in dismissing its claims against defendants SGI and Jai; and (2) the district court erred in awarding only $35,000 in compensatory damages for the eleven aggrieved individuals. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the EEOC’s claims against defendant SGI, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the EEOC’s claims against defendant Jai, reversed the district court’s damage award against defendant RW2, and remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Roark-Whitten Hospitality, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that the grounds on which the trial court relied in entering the preliminary injunction had become moot.Plaintiffs were five Arkansas residents who had been receiving pandemic-related unemployment benefits through Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, and Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation prior to the State's termination of its participation in these programs. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Defendants - Governor Asa Hutchison and Arkansas Division of Workforce Services Director Charisse Childers - lacked the authority under Ark. Code Ann. 11-10-312 to terminate the State's participation in the programs. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to reengage in the terminated programs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the grounds for the preliminary injunction had been rendered moot by the General Assembly's passage of Act 1 of the First Extraordinary Session of 2021. View "Hutchinson v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ruled that Cree, Inc. did not unlawfully discriminate against Derrick Palmer based on his conviction record by rescinding its job offer, holding that Cree sufficiently established that the circumstances surrounding Palmer's prior convictions for domestic violence substantially related to the circumstances of the offered position.In 2013, Palmer was convicted for committing eight crimes of domestic violence against his live-in girlfriend. Palmer later applied to work for Cree as an Applications Specialist. Cree offered Palmer the job subject to a background check, which revealed Palmer's 2013 convictions. Cree then rescinded its offer of employment. Palmer subsequently filed a discrimination complaint. The Labor and Industry Review Commission concluded that the domestic crimes at issue did not substantially related to the Applications Specialist job, and therefore, Cree discriminated against Palmer when it rescinded its job offer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Cree met its burden to establish a substantial relationship between the circumstances of Palmer's convicted offenses and the circumstances of the Applications Specialist position; and (2) therefore, Cree did not unlawfully discriminate against Palmer based on his conviction record. View "Cree, Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission" on Justia Law

In 2017, Anderson began working as a Pre-Fund Underwriting Auditor for NLC, a residential mortgage lender. NLC randomly conducts internal post-funding audits. Anderson exhibited performance deficiencies. Her supervisor, Gourley, counseled her. Anderson received ongoing training. She also experienced health problems and exhausted all of her available sick days on an extended leave. When Anderson returned to work in January 2018, Gourley emailed her, having learned of additional performance issues, and requested that she complete more training. In February 2018, NLC uncovered more errors. In March, Anderson experienced more health issues and took leave (Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601). Anderson asserts Gourley made comments about Anderson’s being “sick a lot” and about needing “a full team. “ During her leave, NLC’s audit system flagged several more errors in Anderson’s loans. In May 2018, HUD notified NLC of additional errors and cited NLC. Gourley recommended that Anderson be terminated for poor performance. Days after Anderson returned to work, NLC terminated her employment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for NLC in Anderson’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and for interference and retaliation associated with her FMLA rights. Anderson did not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to either claim. View "Anderson v. Nations Lending Corp." on Justia Law

The case arose when four Micron Technology, Inc. employees filed a class action complaint against Micron in 2019, asserting violations of the Idaho Wage Claim Act. At the time, Micron had in place a compensation plan called the Incentive Pay Plan (IPP), in which eligible employees could earn yearly bonuses based on a number of performance metrics. The Employees alleged that the bonuses they received on November 23, 2018, for Micron’s 2018 fiscal year should have been greater. Micron moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Employees’ complaint was time-barred by Idaho Code section 45-614. Micron argued that section 45-614’s six-month statute of limitations applied to the Employees’ complaint because they sought “additional wages,” as opposed to “unpaid wages.” The district court granted Micron’s motion for summary judgment. The Employees timely appealed, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations applied. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Manning v. Micron Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

Blanchet sold Charter’s services door-to-door. Blanchet received Charter’s standard maternity leave, short-term disability benefits, and Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) benefits until September 2016, but, suffering from postpartum depression, requested additional leave. Blanchet exhausted FMLA leave, exhausted short-term disability leave, then had long-term disability leave through February 1, 2017, as an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), accommodation. Sedgwick, a third-party administrator, was responsible for all communications with employees who requested leave and customarily delayed paperwork long after initial verbal approvals. In February 2017, Sedgwick received a letter from Blanchet’s doctor, indicating that Blanchet was not capable of working. Blanchet requested accommodation through April 3. Sedgwick representatives reassured Blanchet that her application would be approved. On March 9, Blanchet received a termination letter “effective January 10, 2017.” She received an approval letter for extended leave 10 days later. The next day, Charter’s HR officer notified Sedgwick that the extension was approved.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Blanchet's ADA suit. Genuine issues of material fact remain regarding Blanchet’s disability discrimination claim. A reasonable juror could find that Blanchet would be otherwise qualified for her job after her medical leave accommodation and that Blanchet’s proposed accommodation was reasonable, given that Charter considered it reasonable. Charter did not "engage" with Blanchet concerning her accommodation request. View "Blanchet v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law