Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) affirming the denial of Appellant's request for benefits related to her injury, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency's decision.On May 3, 2019, Appellant, a sales associate at Flaming Gorge Harley-Davidson, was moving a motorcycle when her back grabbed and her legs felt weak. On May 6, Appellant was standing in her kitchen and turning slightly to the left when she felt excruciating pain. Appellant filed a claim with the Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division for benefits related to her May 6 injury. The Division denied Appellant her requested benefits. The OAH and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the law does not require OAH to reference the "second compensable injury" rule in its decision; and (2) there was substantial evidence to support OAH's conclusion that Appellant failed to prove her May 6 injury was caused by the May 3 injury. View "Boylen v. State, ex rel., Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division modifying the order of Supreme Court by granting Plaintiff summary judgment on his claim brought under N.Y. Labor Law 241(6), holding that the section 241(6) claim must be dismissed.Plaintiff was struck by a power buggy while working at the World Trade Center Transportation Hub construction site owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority). Plaintiff filed this action against the Port Authority, bringing claims under N.Y. Labor Law 241(6) and N.Y. Labor Law 200(1). Supreme Court granted the Port Authority summary judgment on the section 200(1) claim but denied summary judgment on the section 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division modified by granting Plaintiff summary judgment on the section 241(6) claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 12 NYCRR 23-9.9(a) does not set forth a concrete specification sufficient to give rise to a non-delegable duty under section 241(6). View "Toussaint v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J." on Justia Law

See is a law-enforcement officer for the Illinois Gaming Board, which often hires State Police officers. As a union representative, See expressed concern that the Board’s promotion policies gave State Police employees unfair advantages. See then began to exhibit signs of paranoia. He complained to Board management that his supervisor was spreading malicious rumors about him to intimidate and scare him. He said that his wife was “seriously afraid” that the State Police would harm them. Management became concerned about his mental stability and placed him on administrative leave pending an examination of his fitness for duty. A few weeks later See passed the examination and returned to work.See filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), section 12112, by requiring him to undergo a medical examination without a job-related justification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Even if See established a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendants offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing him on leave and requiring a fitness-for-duty examination: they were genuinely concerned about his mental health. See presented no evidence that this reason was pretextual. See is an armed law enforcement officer, so the possibility of mental instability posed a serious public-safety concern the examination was job-related and consistent with business necessity. View "See v. Illinois Gaming Board" on Justia Law

Nancy Michaels worked for more than one year as a Data Processing Manager II (DPM II) before her employer, California’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), voided her appointment at the direction of the State Personnel Board (SPB). After the SPB issued a decision rejecting Michaels’s appeal of the voiding of her appointment, she filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court. The superior court found that Michaels had served more than one year in her position and directed the SPB to vacate its decision. CalPERS appealed, contending: (1) because Government Code section 19257.5 did not define the date of “appointment,” that term had to refer to when a new hire starts working in a new position for a state employer; (2) interpreting Government Code section 18525 to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance of a employment offer “undermines California’s civil-service law;” (3) the trial court’s definition of “appointment” date yielded an “absurd result” that conflicted with the SPB’s constitutional mandate to ensure uniform application of state civil service law; (4) the application of offer-and-acceptance principles derived from contract law “introduces uncertainty” into the state civil service hiring process; and (5) Michaels was not prejudiced by having her DPM II position voided. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined that the express language of section 18525 defined the term “appointment” to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance. As to CalPERS’s contentions regarding the wisdom of using the dates of offer and acceptance for determining the start of the one-year limitations period for voiding an appointment, the arguments concerned considerations of policy that were better addressed to the Legislature. As to CalPERS’s prejudice argument, the Court concluded its two contentions lack merit: (1) even if Michaels had notice of the possibility that her position would be voided, that notice did not allow CalPERS to act in an untimely manner; and (2) CalPERS’s assertion that Michaels could not avail herself of the statutes governing the limitations period for voiding an appointment would render the governing statutes a mere nullity. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Michaels v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order to strike the notice it received pursuant to W. Va. Code 55-7-13d regarding Respondent's belief that some or all of the fault in the matter should be assigned to the Monongalia County Commission, holding that Petitioner was entitled to the writ.Respondent was employed by the County Commission when he was injured his work. After resolving his workers' compensation claim Respondent sued Petitioner for further compensation. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the motion at issue. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to strike the notice, concluding that fault could not be assigned to the County Commission, and, alternatively, that Petitioner failed to allege deliberate intention on the part of the County Commission. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the circuit court committed clear error in ruling that the County Commission could not be named as a nonparty defendant under W.Va. Code 55-7-13d; and (2) section 55-7-13d did not require Petitioner to meet the deliberate-intention standard in order for fault to be assigned to the County Commission. View "State ex rel. March-Westin Co. v. Honorable Phillip D. Gaujot" on Justia Law

An employer has an affirmative duty to provide employees with a safe place to work. This duty does not include ensuring that an off-site meeting place for coworkers and business associates like an employee's private residence is safe from third party criminal harm.The Court of Appeal granted the writ petition challenging the trial court's order denying summary judgment and directed the trial court to enter a new and different order granting summary judgment. In this case, a young man suffering from a mental health condition suddenly fired a handgun at family members and guests inside his family home. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Colonial and Defendant Holaday for personal injury damages, alleging negligence claims stemming from their injuries. The court concluded that Colonial owed no duty to protect plaintiffs because Colonial did not control Holaday's home. Furthermore, Colonial owed Plaintiff Dominguez no duty to protect based on the employer-employee relationship. Finally, the Rowland factors counsel against imposing a duty to protect; plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress against Colonial fails as a matter of law as there are no triable issues (1) Colonial knew or reasonably should have known that the young man posed a danger to plaintiffs—his deadly misconduct was unforeseeable, and (2) Colonial had no ability to control him; and respondeat superior liability is inapplicable here as a matter of law. View "Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of tipped employees at Nusret, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), challenging Nusret's compensation scheme. Plaintiffs alleged that from November 1, 2017, through January 18, 2019, the restaurant paid them less than the required federal minimum and overtime wages and forced them to participate in an illegal tip pool with non-tipped employees.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Nusret's mandatory 18% "service charge" is not a tip under the FLSA and associated regulations and could lawfully be used to offset Nusret's wage obligations under the FLSA. The court agreed with the district court that the mandatory service charge was a bona fide service charge and not a tip because it was a compulsory charge for service, and the decision to pay it—and the amount to pay—were not determined solely by the customer. The court declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of Nusret. View "Compere v. Nusret Miami, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful termination suit as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Plaintiff's claims stemmed from allegations that UtiliQuest promised him that if he convinced all of his fellow employees to "sign away" their union rights, they would each receive a ten percent raise. However, plaintiff ended up being the only one with the raise. After confronting UtiliQuest of the breach in promise, he was terminated. Plaintiff alleged several California state law claims relating to his termination.The panel concluded that plaintiff's arguments are subject to Garmen preemption, concluding that the risk of interference with the Board's jurisdiction was sufficient to outweigh the state's interest in plaintiff's claims; the Board could consider plaintiff's advocacy for his fellow coworkers as concerted activity; and the Board could arguably consider plaintiff as an employee, rather than a supervisor. The panel also concluded that plaintiff's wage and hour claims were subject to claim preclusion in light of the California Superior Court's settlement judgment, which was entitled to full faith and credit. View "Moreno v. UtiliQuest, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a panel of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the Kansas Workers Compensation Fund on the Fund's collateral action against Trademark, Inc., holding that there was no error.After Juan Medina received a workplace injury he sought compensation from his direct employer under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-501 et seq. Because the employer did not carry workers compensation insurance, Medina impleaded the Fund to obtain benefits. Thereafter, an ALJ awarded compensation to Medina, and the Fund paid Medina benefits. The Fund then filed this action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-532a against Trademark, the general contractor for whom Medina's employer was acting as a subcontractor at the time of the injury. The district court granted summary judgment to the Fund and denied attorney fees. The court of appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts correctly interpreted section 44-532a as allowing the Fund to pursue an action against Trademark; but (2) the Fund was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc." on Justia Law