Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the judgment of the trial court against a hospital based on violations of the Labor Code and the Unfair Competition Law, holding that the lower court correctly found that claim preclusion did not bar this suit.A nurse sued the staffing agency that arranged for her to work at at a hospital based on violations of the Labor Code and the Unfair Competition Law. The parties settled. Thereafter, the nurse sued the hospital based on the same alleged violations. The hospital argued that the first judgment precluded the nurse from bringing the second suit. The trial court concluded that the hospital was not in privity with the staffing agency for claim preclusion purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hospital was not entitled to benefit from claim preclusion. View "Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the court of appeals that Claimant's long drive in a commercial truck was not an unusual or extraordinary activity in comparison to the ordinary activities people perform in their nonworking, everyday lives and vacated the conclusion that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Claimant's "super obesity" was a preexisting condition, holding that Claimant was entitled to benefits.At the end of a three-day drive from Utah to California, Claimant was diagnosed with a blood clot in his left leg, which caused blood clots in his lungs. Claimant could not return to work and sought workers' compensation. Employer disputed the claim, arguing that his injuries were caused by his "super obesity" and that super obesity should be considered a preexisting condition under the circumstances. The ALJ granted benefits, concluding that Claimant had satisfied the Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729. P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), test for legal causation. The Labor Commission Appeals Board reversed, concluding that Claimant's work activities were not unusual or extraordinary under Allen. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Claimant's drive to California was an unusual activity; and (2) therefore, Claimant showed legal causation. View "JBS Carriers v. Hickey" on Justia Law

In 2020, while wildfires swept through portions of Sonoma County, close to many homes, Sheriff Essick met with the County Board of Supervisors, fire officials, and members of the public in a streamed town hall meeting. Essick provided updates on an evacuation strategy and fielded questions from the public. When asked whether evacuated residents might be permitted to reenter mandatory evacuation zones to feed pets and animals left behind, Sheriff Essick refused to grant such permission, citing safety concerns. Sheriff Essick’s subsequent communications led to a harassment complaint. An independent investigator, Oppenheimer, conducted an inquiry and prepared a written report. A newspaper requested that the county release the complaint, the report, and various related documents) California Public Records Act (CPRA), Gov. Code 6250). The trial court denied Essick's request for a preliminary injunction barring the report's release. The court of appeal affirmed. The court rejected arguments that the Oppenheimer Report should be classified as confidential under CPRA exemptions for “peace officers” “personnel records,” or reports or findings relating to a complaint by a member of the public against a peace officer The county is not estopped from releasing the Oppenheimer Report nor bound to keep the results of the investigation confidential. Nothing in the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights explicitly grants or mentions confidentiality from CPRA requests, Sonoma County is not Essick's “employing agency.” View "Essick v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

Patricia Allen appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission’s (the “Commission”) decision denying unemployment benefits. Allen was employed by Partners in Healthcare, Inc., doing business as North Canyon Medical Center (“NCMC”), between February 5, 1999, and May 8, 2020. On May 8, 2020, the CEO of NCMC and the HR director met with Allen to discuss her job performance. Allen was presented with a performance improvement plan (“PIP”), which outlined examples of Allen’s poor job performance and identified expectations for improving her performance. It was explained to Allen that if she wanted to forego the PIP, she could sign a severance agreement. Allen was then presented with a proposed severance agreement. Allen asked if she could discuss her options with her husband, but was pressed to make her decision then and there. The CEO told Allen that he thought it was in her best interest to take the severance package. Allen decided to forgo the PIP and took the severance agreement. After separating from NCMC, Allen filed an unemployment claim with the Idaho Department of Labor (“IDOL”). NCMC’s response to the Idaho Department of Labor was prepared by the Idaho Hospital Association (“IHA”), NCMC’s third-party administrator. IHA’s human resources director identified Allen’s reason for separation as “Fired/Discharged” and indicated Allen did not receive any compensation after her separation. IDOL determined Allen was eligible for unemployment benefits. NCMC’s HR director appealed the IDOL decision; IDOL sent NCMC and Allen a hearing notice on whether Allen quit voluntarily and, if so, whether she quit for good cause or was discharged for misconduct in connection with her employment. Following the hearing, the appeals examiner issued a written decision that denied Allen unemployment benefits. The examiner also found that Allen did not follow the grievance procedures to report her issues with her supervisor prior to quitting. In reversing the Commission’s decision, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the Commission erred in failing to analyze whether the PIP was a viable option that would have allowed Allen to continue working. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Allen v. Partners in Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought the action against her former employer Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc. (“Brookdale”), pursuant to California’s Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) Cal. Lab. Code sections 2698-2699.5, allow aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of themselves, the state, or other employees. Plaintiff and Brookdale agreed to a settlement. Appellant who was a plaintiff in an overlapping PAGA case against Brookdale, filed a motion to intervene in Plaintiff’s action to object to the PAGA settlement.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to intervene, and dismissed her appeal of the district court’s approval of the PAGA settlement between Plaintiff and Brookdale. The court held that Appellant was not a party to Plaintiff’s case and could not appeal the approval of the PAGA settlement.   The court first considered whether Appellant was entitled to intervene in Plaintiff’s case as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The court held that Appellant’s motion for intervention as a matter of right failed at the fourth and final prong of the Wilderness Society v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011), test, which requires that an applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the action. Appellant needed to make a compelling showing to demonstrate inadequate representation. The court concluded she failed to make this required showing. As a non-party to this action, Appellant had no right to appeal the district court’s approval of the PAGA settlement. View "CAROLYN CALLAHAN V. BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING CMTY." on Justia Law

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Port Authority, a municipal bus and light-rail operator, required its uniformed employees to wear face masks. Initially, Port Authority was unable to procure masks for all its employees, so they were required to provide their own. Some employees wore masks bearing political or social-protest messages. Port Authority has long prohibited its uniformed employees from wearing buttons “of a political or social protest nature.” Concerned that such masks would disrupt its workplace, Port Authority prohibited them in July 2020. When several employees wore masks expressing support for Black Lives Matter, Port Authority disciplined them. In September 2020, Port Authority imposed additional restrictions, confining employees to a narrow range of masks. The employees sued, alleging that Port Authority had violated their First Amendment rights.The district court entered a preliminary injunction rescinding discipline imposed under the July policy and preventing Port Authority from enforcing its policy against “Black Lives Matter” masks. The Third Circuit affirmed. The government may limit the speech of its employees more than it may limit the speech of the public, but those limits must still comport with the protections of the First Amendment. Port Authority bears the burden of showing that its policy is constitutional. It has not made that showing. View "Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85 v. Port Authority of Allegheny County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Reginald Martin named truck driver Rodney Thomas, his employer Greer Logging, LLC, and its insurer National Liability and Fire Insurance Company as defendants in this personal injury case. Plaintiff alleged he and defendant Thomas were involved in a collision: Thomas was operating a 2016 Peterbilt tractor truck owned by Greer Logging and was backing into a driveway. Plaintiff alleged that following the accident he suffered from several injuries including head/facial contusions, multiple broken ribs, a fractured sternum, an open fracture of the tibial plateau, an open comminuted fracture of his left patella, and open wounds of the left leg, knee, and ankle. At issue in this motion for partial summary judgment was whether a plaintiff could pursue both a negligence cause of action against an employee for which the employer was vicariously liable, and a direct claim against the employer for its own negligence in hiring, supervision, training, and retention as well as a negligent entrustment claim, when the employer stipulated that the employee was in the course and scope of employment at the time of the injury. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could maintain both claims even if the employer has stipulated to the course and scope of employment. The Court therefore reversed the partial summary judgment in favor of the employer which dismissed the claims asserted directly against it, and remanded to the district court. View "Martin v. Thomas et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant, the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 13 (the Union), in which the Court denied the Town of North Providence's petition to vacate an arbitration award and granted the Union's motion to confirm the award, holding that the arbitrator so imperfectly executed his authority that he did not provide a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter, as required under R.I. Gen. Laws 28-9-18(a)(2).This action arose from a dispute between the Union and the Town regarding the effect of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing the employment relationship between the Town and the Town's police officers. The arbitrator found in favor of the Union, and the superior court granted the Union's motion to confirm the award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitrator's award failed to draw its essence from the contract, manifestly disregarded relevant portions of the CBA, and produced completely irrational results. View "Town of North Providence v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 13" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying arbitration requested by two unions - the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union and the United Steelworkers Local 12203 (collectively, Union) - on behalf of former two employees of the Boston Gas Company (Company) as to their claims for pension benefits, holding that this matter called for arbitration.The Union represented the two members in filing grievances regarding their underpaid pensions. The Union submitted the grievances to the Joint Pension Committee, which was unable to resolve the dispute. The Union subsequently sought arbitration over the grievances, but the Company refused to arbitrate. The First Circuit reversed, holding that it was up to an arbitrator, not a court, to determine the matters at issue in this case. View "United Steelworkers v. National Grid" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit asserting race-based discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the suit for failure to state a claim.Plaintiffs represented a putative class of employees employed by Whole Foods and Amazon who were disciplined for wearing face masks with the message "Black Lives Matter." In their lawsuit, Plaintiffs alleged that the manner in which their employers enforced a previously unenforced dress code policy constituted race-based discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not adequately plead claims for racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. View "Frith v. Whole Foods Market, Inc." on Justia Law