Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the compensation court denying James Spratt's request seeking to modify his workers' compensation award, holding that the compensation court erred in holding that it lacked the statutory to do so and, alternatively, that the principal of finality precluded relief.Spratt injured his back while working for Crete Carrier Corporation and received a workers' compensation award granting medical rehabilitation services for his lumbar back. Spratt subsequently requested that the compensation court modify the original award so that he may receive thoracic back treatment. The compensation court denied Spratt's request for modification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the compensation court erred in concluding that it lacked the power to modify the original award to treat Spratt's thoracic back; and (2) modification was not precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine. View "Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that, where a franchisee is an "individual performing any service" for a franchisor, the three-prong test set forth in the independent contractor statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B, applies to the relationship between a franchisor and the individual and is not in conflict with the franchisor's disclosure obligations under the "FTC Franchise Rule."Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that they were 7-Eleven employees and had been misclassified as independent contractors in violation of the independent contractor statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B. A federal judge granted summary judgment in favor of Eleven, concluding that the independent contractor statue does not apply to franchisee-franchisor relationships because there is a conflict because that statute and the FTC franchise Rule, 16 C.F.R. 436.1 et seq., a series of regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regarding franchises. The Supreme Judicial Court answered a certified question, holding that the independent contractor statute applies to the franchisor-franchisee relationship and is not in conflict with the franchisor's disclosure obligations set forth in the FTC Franchise Rule. View "Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in this civil rights action brought by plaintiff against his prior employer with one exception: the court reversed as to the hostile work environment claim. The court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, a single incident of harassment, if sufficiently severe, can give rise to a viable Title VII claim. In this case, the incident plaintiff has pleaded, that his supervisor directly called him a racial epithet containing the n-word in front of his fellow employees, states an actionable claim of hostile work environment. The court remanded for further consideration. View "Woods v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

In 1988, Pacifica voters approved Measure F, entitled “Firefighter Dispute Resolution Process Impasse Resolution Procedures: Minimum Wages and Benefits For Firefighters,” which prescribes procedures to be followed in the event of an impasse in labor disputes with Pacifica firefighters. Under this measure, absent other agreement, the top step salaries of fire captains in the city are to be set at an amount not less than the average for top step salaries of fire captains in five neighboring cities. After an impasse in negotiations occurred in 2019, the Pacifica Firefighters Association (PFFA) sought declaratory relief requiring the City to follow Measure F.The trial court denied the petition, finding Measure F preempted by state law, the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code section 3500, and an unlawful delegation of power. The court of appeal affirmed. Measure F is unenforceable as a usurpation of authority the Legislature granted exclusively to the city council in section 3505.7. View "Pacifica Firefighters Association v. City of Pacifica" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its prior opinion, denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.In the amended opinion, the panel affirmed the district court' s order denying qualified immunity to Police Chief James McElvain on plaintiff's First Amendment and Equal Protection disparate treatment claim. The panel stated that McElvain was profoundly mistaken in arguing that to state an equal protection claim, proof of discriminatory animus alone was insufficient, and plaintiff must show that defendants treated plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals. Rather, the panel held that the existence of a comparator is not a prerequisite to stating a disparate treatment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, plaintiff established a prima facie claim for disparate treatment and the record supported the conclusion that McElvain's articulated reasons for not promoting Ballou were pretextual.In regard to McElvain's argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim that she was retaliated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the panel cannot discern from the district court's order whether it has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to resolve that question, and thus the panel remanded to the district court to clarify its ruling. Finally, the panel concluded that plaintiff's speech opposing sex discrimination in the workplace was inherently speech on a matter of public concern and was clearly protected by the First Amendment. View "Ballou v. McElvain" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a truck driver (claimant) who sustained injuries while driving a truck that he leased directly from a trucking company, with restrictions that prohibited him from driving the truck for the use of any other company, was a “subject worker” within the meaning of ORS 656.027 such that the trucking company was required to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage for claimant’s injuries. SAIF and Robert Murray, the owner of Bob Murray Trucking (BMT), a for-hire carrier, sought review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the final order of the Workers’ Compensation Board: that claimant was a subject worker of BMT under the workers’ compensation laws and did not qualify for the exemption to “subject worker” status contained in ORS 656.027(15)(c). To this the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board’s final order. View "SAIF v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for an order prohibiting or delaying the formation of a collective bargaining unit composed of non-supervisory attorneys employed by the Louisville Metro Public Defender's Office, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to such an extraordinary remedy.Petitioner, a non-supervisory staff attorney employed by the Public Defender's Office, petitioned for an order prohibiting or delaying the formation of a collective bargaining unit composed of non-supervisory Public Defender's Office employees until the court could determined whether the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct permit attorneys to be members of a collective bargaining unit. The Supreme Court declined to grant relief, holding that these circumstances were not so rare and compelling as to merit a supervisory writ. View "Seadler v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the Workers' Compensation Board's decision reversing a decision by the Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) denying Carlye Harper's motion to reopen her workers' compensation claim to seek vocational rehabilitation benefits, holding that there was no error.Harper suffered a work-related injury to her back and lower extremities. After a hearing, an ALJ awarded permanent partial disability income benefits. Approximately sixteen months later, Harper sought to file an application for vocational rehabilitation services pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.710. The CALJ overruled the motion to reopen. The Board reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature intended section 342.710(3) to provide an independent ground for reopening, and claim preclusion did not bar adjudication of Harper's claim. View "Kindred Healthcare v. Harper" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case were employees at three separate carpet manufacturing facilities operated by defendant Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (Royalty), also known as Royalty Carpet Mills, LLC. They alleged representative claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), and class claims primarily based on purported meal and rest period violations. They sought premium pay under Labor Code section 226.7 for these violations and asserted derivative claims for waiting time and wage statement penalties, among others. The trial court initially certified two classes: one for employees that worked at a facility in Porterville (the Porterville class) and another for employees that worked in two separate facilities in Orange County (the Dyer/Derian class). Following the presentation of evidence at trial, the court decertified the Dyer/Derian class and entered judgment. The results were mixed and both sides appealed. The Court of Appeal agreed with three of Plaintiffs' six contentions: the court erred in failing to apply the relation back doctrine, in decertifying the Dyer/Derian class, and dismissing the PAGA claims as unmanageable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc." on Justia Law

Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law