Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Cromer, formerly a “managing loan officer” for Union Home Mortgage, agreed to several restrictive covenants, including that he would “not become employed in the same or similar capacity” with a competitive entity. Cromer left Union and started working for Homeside Financial as a “non-producing” branch manager. Union sought a preliminary injunction to enforce Cromer’s restrictive covenants, citing the 2016 Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1836; the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act; the non-compete, confidentiality, and nonsolicitation covenants; the contractual duty of loyalty; and the common law duty of loyalty. Against Homeside, Union alleged tortious interference with business relationships and with contracts.The district court issued an injunction—without any time limitation—prohibiting Cromer, and anyone acting in concert, from “competing with Union Home.” The Sixth Circuit vacated. The injunction failed to satisfy the specificity requirements of FRCP 65(d)(1), was overbroad, and was otherwise improperly granted under the standard for preliminary injunctions. The broad prohibition covers any form of competition, irrespective of Cromer’s employer, job title, or duties, and created an inherent risk that the scope of the injunction exceeds the Agreement that the parties signed. The district court also failed to consider whether the non-compete covenant is reasonable and thus enforceable. View "Union Home Mortgage Corp. v. Cromer" on Justia Law

Supor, a construction contractor, got a job on New Jersey’s American Dream Project, a large retail development, and agreed to use truck drivers exclusively from one union and to contribute to the union drivers’ multiemployer pension fund. The project stalled. Supor stopped working with the union drivers and pulled out of the fund. The fund demanded $766,878, more than twice what Supor had earned on the project, as a withdrawal penalty for ending its pension payments without covering its share, citing the 1980 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), amending ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1381. Under the MPPAA, employers who pull out early must pay a “withdrawal liability” based on unfunded vested benefits. Supor claimed the union had promised that it would not have to pay any penalty. The Fund argued that the statute requires “employer[s]” to arbitrate such disputes. Supor argued that it was not an employer under the Act.The district court sent the parties to arbitration, finding that an “employer” includes any entity obligated to contribute to a pension plan either as a direct employer or in the interest of an employer of the plan’s participants. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding the definition plausible, protective of the statutory scheme, and supported by three decades of consensus. View "J Supor & Son Trucking & Rigging Co., Inc. v. Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics sued the Iowa Board of Regents (“Board”), alleging state law claims. The Board removed the case to federal court after the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a Fair Labor and Standards Act (“FLSA”) claim.The Board argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the FLSA claim because the Board has sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that FLSA overtime isn’t guaranteed for Board of Regents employees. And because its own pay agreements don’t separately provide FLSA overtime standards, the Board hasn’t consented to private accountability to those standards. A private cause of action cannot work as express consent to suits under the FLSA itself. Iowa courts retain the doctrine of constructive waiver of sovereign immunity.Further, though the University of Iowa system may benefit from the Board’s immunity at times, the University lacks independent authority to abrogate it. Finally, the court remanded for the district court to consider whether the legal consequences of the hospital’s policies can be attributed to the Board. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Melinda Myers v. Iowa Board of Regents" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the proper measure of damages for the private right of action for Wage Act violations under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 150 when the employer pays wages after the deadlines provided in the aCt but before the employee files a complaint is treble the amount of the late wages, not trebled interest.When Plaintiff was discharged from her employment with the City of Methuen the City owed her almost $9000 for accrued vacation time. While the Act required the City to pay this amount to Plaintiff on the day of her termination the City did not pay her until three weeks later. One year later, the City paid Plaintiff an amount representing the trebled interest for the three weeks between Plaintiff's termination and the payment of Plaintiff's vacation pay. Plaintiff subsequently brought this lawsuit. The superior court judge concluded that Plaintiff was only entitled to treble interest for the three-week delay in receiving her vacation pay. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding that late-paid wages are "lost wages" for purposes of the Wage Act. View "Reuter v. City of Methuen" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court entering summary judgment against a group of jockeys who demanded higher wages and refused to rice and vacated the orders permanently enjoining the work stoppage and imposing $1,190,685 in damages, holding that the district court erred in granting Plaintiffs an injunction and summary judgment.Plaintiffs, an association of horse owners and the owner of a racetrack, brought this action against the jockeys and their spouses who refused to race, alleging that Defendants engaged in a group boycott in violation of federal antitrust law. The district court granted an injunction, concluding (1) the jockeys were independent contractors and had acted in concert to restrain trade, and (2) the jockeys could not benefit from the labor-dispute exemption because of their independent contractor status. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the labor-dispute exemption applied in this case; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in granting Plaintiffs and injunction and summary judgment. View "Confederacion Hipica de Puerto Rico v. Confederacion de Jinetes Puertorriqueños, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, served in the Intelligence Division. When a new captain took over, he made personnel changes, including the transfer or detachment of 17 male officers and 5 female officers across the department. Two males and two females were transferred out of the Intelligence Division. Plaintiff was transferred to the Fifth District.Shortly after her transfer, Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. Around the same time, Plaintiff sought to transfer out of the Fifth District. The Captain made an informal request for Plaintiff’s transfer, but no formal request was ever made. Eventually, the following year, Plaintiff was transferred back into the Intelligence Division.Plaintiff filed gender discrimination and retaliation claim in state court. Defendants removed the case to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff’s transfer from the Intelligence Division to the Fifth District did not constitute an adverse employment action. Plaintiff’s pay and rank remained the same after the transfer. The transfer did not affect her future job prospects. An employee’s reassignment, absent proof of harm resulting from that reassignment, is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. View "Jatonya Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, State of Mo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a class-action lawsuit alleging that SC Data Center, Inc. (“SC Data”) committed three violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). The parties reached a settlement agreement. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), SC Data moved to dismiss the action. The plaintiff first alleged that SC Data took an adverse employment action based on her consumer report without first showing her the report. The court reasoned that the right to pre-action explanation to the employer is not unambiguously stated in the statute’s text. Next, the plaintiff asserts that SC Data obtained her consumer report without first obtaining an FCRA compliant disclosure form. The court found that plaintiff has not established that she suffered a concrete injury due to the improper disclosure. Finally, the plaintiff’s last claim asserts that she did not authorize SC Data to obtain a consumer report. She did authorize a company to conduct a criminal background search. The court found that plaintiff has not pleaded any facts demonstrating concrete harm—a prerequisite for Article III standing. As such, she lacks standing to pursue her failure-to-authorize claim. The court vacated the district court's orders. View "Ria Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case concerning the enforceability of a non-compete agreement the Supreme Court vacated the intermediate court of appeals' judgment on appeal and the circuit court's final order in favor of Lorna Gagnon with respect to her alleged breach of a non-solicitation clause as to one real estate agent but otherwise affirmed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact precluded summary judgment as to this issue.A non-compete agreement restricted Gagnon, a former employee of Prudential Locations, LLC, from establishing her own brokerage firm in Hawaii within one year after terminating her employment with Locations and from soliciting persons employed or affiliated with Locations. The Supreme Court held (1) the ICA erroneously failed to address whether the non-compete and non-solicitation clauses were ancillary to a legitimate purpose not violative of Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 480; (2) restricting competition is not a legitimate ancillary purpose; (3) to establish a violation of a non-solicitation clause, there must be evidence that the person subjective to the clause actively initiated contact; and (4) as to the non-compete clause, summary judgment was proper, but as to the non-solicitation clause, a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Gagnon actively initiated contact. View "Prudential Locations, LLC v. Gagnon " on Justia Law

Dr. Dubnow, a board-certified physician with more than 40 years of experience, was Chief of the Emergency Department at Lovell Federal Health Care Center (FHCC). In 2017, he diverted an ambulance transporting an infant to Lake Forest Hospital, located a few minutes away from the FHCC. Lake Forest has a Level-II trauma center and is staffed with pediatric specialists. The child was pronounced dead upon arriving at Lake Forest. The FHCC, a VA hospital, investigated Dubnow’s diversion decision. This investigation eventually resulted in his removal. A review board concluded that none of the grounds for his removal were supported but the final reviewing authority reversed the review board’s decision. The district court affirmed the VA’s removal decision.The Seventh Circuit vacated the removal. The VA failed to properly apply the deferential “clearly contrary to the evidence” standard when reviewing the board’s decision to overturn Dubnow’s removal; the decision was arbitrary. The relevant question was whether the diversion was appropriate; if so, Dubnow’s removal could not be sustained. To conclude that treating the patient at the FHCC was possible, or even appropriate, is not to conclude that diverting the ambulance to a better-equipped hospital was inappropriate. A “conclusion that there was ‘no need’ to divert the patient is two steps removed from the analysis” under 38 U.S.C. 7462(d). View "Dubnow v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs are “business development managers” tasked with persuading corporate customers to purchase vehicles for their fleets. The task often requires over 40 hours of effort per week, and the plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to overtime compensation. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs are covered by the administrative exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).Under the FLSA, employees who work over 40 hours per week are generally entitled to time-and-a-half overtime compensation. However, not all workers qualify, as the statute exempts employees working in “a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.” The plaintiffs contend that they do not meet the third prong of the exemption, which requires that they exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance. The court reasoned that a worker need not have “limitless discretion” or a total lack of supervision to qualify as an administrative employee. Further, the defendant pointed to ample evidence that the plaintiffs exercised discretion in their job pursuits. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment finding that the administrative exemption in the FLSA applies to the plaintiffs. View "Alicia Brown v. Nexus Business Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law