Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff a former bus driver for Defendant Maine-Endwell Central School District (the “School District”), appealed the dismissal of his complaint by the district court. Plaintiff contends that the School District violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for speech he purports to have made in his capacity as a union leader. In his complaint, however, Plaintiff merely alleged that he had argued with a School District mechanic – and later, a few School District officials – over the frequency with which bus safety issues should be reported. He did not allege that the School District’s existing policy permitted unsafe buses to remain on the roads, nor did he allege that daily reporting would improve public safety.   The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint, holding that Plaintiff failed to allege that he engaged in speech protected under the First Amendment. The court explained that the specific details of Plaintiff’s complaint suggest that Plaintiff’s arguments with fellow School District personnel were had in his capacity as a School District employee, not as a private citizen. Plaintiff’s primary argument to the contrary boils down to a series of assertions that he was speaking in his capacity as a union official. But even assuming these assertions are entitled to be assumed true, the court has expressly rejected any categorical rule that when a person speaks in his capacity as a union member, he speaks as a private citizen Accordingly, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not support a plausible inference that he spoke as a citizen, or that he spoke on a matter of public concern. View "Shara v. Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist.," on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court upholding the trial court's determination affirming the decision of the Board of Review of The Employment Security Appeals Division that tattoo services are part of the usual course of business of a body art and piercing business for purposes of the statutory ABC test used to determined whether an individual is an employee for purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-222 et seq., holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a business that provides body piercing and body art services, argued on appeal that the Board acted unreasonably and arbitrarily in holding it liable for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions after concluding that the offering of tattoo services was within Plaintiff's usual course of business. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence existed to support the Board's determination that tattoo services were within Plaintiff's "usual course of business" for purposes of part B of the ABC test. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-222(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II). View "Vogue v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act" on Justia Law

This ERISA case presented the Fifth Circuit with three questions:1.) Whether the Department of Labor’s self-labeled “advisory opinion” is reviewable “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act;2.) Whether the Department’s action is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law; and3.) Whether the district court issued the appropriate relief.Answering the first two questions in the affirmative, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s vacatur of the agency action but vacated and remanded the district court’s injunction for further consideration in light of this opinion. View "Data Marketing Partnership v. LABR" on Justia Law

Innovel hired Diakon to take furniture from warehouses to customers’ homes. Plaintiffs, two of Diakon's drivers, were citizens of Illinois who drove out of Innovel’s Illinois warehouses and made deliveries to customers in Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri. They signed “Service Agreements” that classify the drivers as independent contractors yet include detailed expectations for the drivers, covering uniforms, business cards, truck decals, and how to perform deliveries and installations. The Agreements select Virginia law to govern the parties’ relations and authorize Diakon to deduct fees and penalties from the drivers’ pay for truck rental fees, insurance, workers’ compensation coverage, damaged merchandise, and customers’ refused deliveries.Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Diakon misclassified them as independent contractors when they were employees under Illinois law. Illinois courts apply a three-part test to determine employee status, which is more likely to classify workers as employees than is Virginia law, which would treat the plaintiffs as contractors. The Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act allows deductions from pay only if the employee consents in writing at the time of the deduction.The district judge certified a class but ruled in favor of Diakon. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiffs’ claims arise from their work in Illinois, not from their contracts. The Illinois Act governs payment for work in Illinois regardless of what state’s law governs other aspects of the parties' relations. View "Timothy Johnson v. Diakon Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Technology Credit Union (TCU) sought a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) (Code Civ. Proc., 527.81) restraining Rafat and protecting TCU’s employee, M.L., claiming that Rafat had made a credible threat of violence against M.L. M.L.’s declaration, described a single encounter between her and Rafat at TCU, during which Rafat “became visibly angry and became aggressive towards” her, made a video recording of her “without her consent,” “made several rude and inappropriate statements questioning [her] mental competency,” repeatedly refused her request to stop recording, and “forced a pen and paper back towards [her] and demanded that [she] write down his number.” M.L. believed that Rafat “will come back and seek [her] out” because Rafat “frequently visits” TCU. Rafat admitted that he made a video recording of the interaction, which he posted on his YouTube channel, but denied M.L.’s other claims and denied that he made a credible threat of violence.The court of appeal reversed the entry of a WVRO. The evidence is insufficient to show that Rafat made a credible threat of violence. Rafat’s conduct was rude, impatient, aggressive, and derogatory; he had a history of using aggressive language, including making offensive remarks. However, the only threats he made were litigation and complaints to a federal agency. His actions toward M.L. consisted of berating her, complaining to her supervisor, and posting an accurate video of their interaction on YouTube. View "Technology Credit Union v. Rafat" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resigned from his employment as a surgeon with Mayo Clinic (“Mayo”) after an internal committee recommended his termination following an investigation into allegations of his misconduct. Plaintiff sued Mayo and his supervisor, alleging discrimination and reprisal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mayo and the supervisor.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Plaintiff argues Mayo’s recommendation to terminate his employment was based on his race, religion, and national origin. Because Said does not offer direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff must create a sufficient inference of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive summary judgment.   Here, Plaintiff claims another similarly situated former employee, who also received complaints, from Mayo received preferential treatment. The court concluded that even if Plaintiff was similarly situated to the other employee, the court concluded that Plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude he received disparate treatment from the other employee. The court further explained that the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that Mayo believed Plaintiff was guilty of making unwelcomed advances toward female coworkers and of other misconduct. Said fails to “create a real issue as to the genuineness of” Mayo’s perceptions. Finally, regarding Mayo’s reporting of Plaintiff’s resignation to the State Board, as already discussed, the record demonstrates Mayo believed it was required to report Plaintiff’s termination to the State Board because Plaintiff resigned during an open investigation into his misconduct. Thus, Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence showing this was a pretext for retaliatory intent. View "Sameh Said v. Mayo Clinic" on Justia Law

Cable technicians working for HD and Associates (HDA) alleged that they did not receive overtime pay, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Granting summary judgment to HDA, the district court ruled that the technicians and HDA were not covered by the FLSA and that even if they were covered, the technicians qualified for the bona fide commission exemption and thus were exempt from the overtime provisions. The technicians appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court held that HDA technicians are paid a bona fide commission and are exempt from FLSA overtime compensation requirements. The court explained that at issue is only whether HDA pays technicians a commission. Whether a payment is a commission for the purposes of this exception is a question of law that relies on how a payment works in practice, rather than what it is called.   Here, the commission paid is a percentage of the ultimate price passed onto Cox customers and the amount earned is tied to customer demand. Given the nature of cable repairs, the work does not lend itself to a standard workday and this payment system does not offend the purposes of the FLSA. The determining factor is thus whether the amount of income earned is decoupled from the time worked. Here, because compensation goes up or down by the number of work orders completed, not the number of hours worked, HDA technicians are paid a bona fide commission and are exempt from FLSA overtime requirements. View "Taylor v. HD and Associates" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Family Medicine Associates (FMA) and one of its members (together, Defendants) and dismissing this lawsuit alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and nonpayment of wages, holding that Plaintiff's claims on appeal were unavailing.Plaintiff, a licensed physician, brought this lawsuit against his former employer nearly three years after his employment relationship was terminated. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants' breached their oral promise of a partnership that was never committed to writing. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to put forth sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. View "Guldseth v. Family Medicine Associates LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, Cooperative, a Wisconsin-based governmental entity that services 35 public-school districts, hired Simon as an Alternative Program Lead Teacher at REACH Academy. Simon taught, managed paraprofessionals, developed integrated education plans, and communicated with parents, school districts, social workers, and law enforcement officials. In 2016, a student kicked a door into Simon’s head, which caused a concussion. Simon took Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave and was cleared to return to full-time work with no restrictions weeks later. Cooperative did not allow Simon to return to her previous position, having determined that doing so would present an “unreasonable risk.” Cooperative placed her in a support position with duties resembling those of a paraprofessional and requiring her to split her time between schools. Although Simon received the same salary and benefits in her new role, it involved significantly less responsibility, independence, and discretion.The district court found that Cooperative had violated the FMLA by not returning Simon to an equivalent position following her leave and that only declaratory—rather than injunctive—relief was appropriate based on Cooperative’s hiring trends, the unavailability of Simon’s previous role, and Simon’s new job elsewhere, and awarded Simon attorney’s fees of $59,773.62. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The FMLA’s use of the term “equitable relief” encompasses declaratory relief. Simon suffered prejudice from Cooperative’s failure to return her to an equivalent position. The district court did not err in finding that attorney’s fees were available under the circumstances. View "Simon v. Cooperative Educational Service Agency #5" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review centered on whether the First Amendment barred claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract against a defendant who, in an email to a law firm, described as “shockingly racist” a lawsuit filed by one of the firm’s partners in his personal capacity. The suit aimed to preserve a nearby high school’s “Indian” mascot. The partner, who claimed to have lost his position with the law firm because of the email, sued his detractor, contending that the characterization of his lawsuit was demonstrably false and pled four causes of action, including defamation and tortious interference with contract. The partner’s detractor, in response, contended her statements about the partner were opinions protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The Superior Court agreed with the detractor and dismissed the partner’s tort action. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court: the statements at issue did not on their face contain demonstrably false statements of fact, nor did they imply defamatory and provably false facts. "As statements concerning an issue of public concern, moreover, they are entitled to heightened First Amendment protection and cannot form the predicate of the plaintiff’s tort claims." View "Cousins v. Goodier" on Justia Law