Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Northshore Mining Company filed a petition for review of a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) order stating that Northshore had failed to maintain the walkway in good condition after an employee was injured in 2016. The order attributed the violation to Northshore’s reckless disregard of and unwarrantable failure to comply with the walkway-maintenance mandatory standard. In addition, MSHA designated the violation as “flagrant.” Commission’s conclusions on reckless.The Secretary cross-petitioned for review of the Commission’s conclusions on the flagrant designation and individual liability. The Eighth Circuit denied Northshore’s petition on the issue of the company's reckless disregard and unwarrantable failure and granted the Secretary’s cross-petition for review of the Commission’s conclusions on the flagrant designation and individual liability. View "Northshore Mining Company v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Canyon County employed William Hartman as a heavy equipment operator at the Pickles Butte landfill in Nampa, Idaho, from 2012 until 2017. In February 2017, Hartman reported to Canyon County’s Human Resources Office that a female co-worker was being sexually harassed. The next month, Hartman, who was an army veteran, told both the director of the landfill, David Loper, and his immediate supervisor that he was taking narcotics prescribed to him for chronic pain. Canyon County requested Hartman provide, by a set deadline, medical documentation confirming his prescription and verifying that his use of narcotics would not adversely impact his ability to safely operate equipment. Hartman stated he was attempting to obtain the documentation, but he failed to provide it within the requested timeframe. On April 28, 2017, Loper sent Hartman a “Notice of Intent to Terminate,” informing him that his employment with Canyon County would be terminated effective May 2, 2017. The notice stated that pursuant to Rule 11.04 of the Canyon County Personnel Manual and “I.C. § 72-1701 et. seq. [sic],” Hartman could request a good faith hearing concerning the termination within two days of receiving the letter. Prior to Hartman’s receipt of the notice, Canyon County paid Hartman the balance of his accrued leave. Hartman did not request a good faith hearing. Hartman filed a notice of tort claim with Canyon County on July 27, 2017, alleging he had been unlawfully terminated. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on August 3, 2017. On November 28, 2018, Hartman filed a complaint against Canyon County, alleging: (1) disability-based discrimination in violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”); and (3) unlawful termination in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). Hartman later voluntarily dismissed his USERRA claim. After considering the parties’ supplemental briefing the district court issued a written decision, granting Canyon County’s motion for summary judgment. Finding that the district court erred in its grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hartman v. Canyon County" on Justia Law

Vanegas, a Mexican citizen, was hired by Signet, a nationwide construction company, to work in the U.S. on an H-2A guestworker visa, which authorizes foreign workers to perform “agricultural” work in the U.S. on a temporary basis, if the proposed employer can show that there are too few domestic workers willing and able to do the work and that the use of guest-workers will not undercut local workers’ wages and working conditions, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a); 1188(a)(1). Vanegas was assigned to build livestock structures on farms in Wisconsin and Indiana. He routinely worked more than 40 hours a week, but Signet did not pay him extra for his overtime hours.He filed a complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and moved for conditional certification of a collective action on behalf of all Signet H-2A workers who were exclusively assigned to construction work. The district court dismissed, finding that Vanegas was an agricultural worker, exempt from FLSA’s overtime protections, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. Work falls within the FLSA agricultural exemption only if it is both “performed by a farmer or on a farm” and if it “does not amount to an independent business.” Regulations establish a fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether work performed on a farm is agricultural or is an independent business. Signet did not prove that the agricultural exemption applies. View "Vanegas v. Signet Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fired from his position as the Chief of Investigation of the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman (Parchman) about three months after he testified at a probable cause hearing on behalf of one of his investigators. Rogers sued the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), then-MDOC Commissioner, and MDOC’s Corrections Investigations Division Director, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on sovereign and qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.   The court explained that to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that the defendants violated a right that was not just arguable, but “beyond debate.” And he fails to “point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority that either answers the question Lane left open regarding sworn testimony given by a public employee within his ordinary job duties, or clearly establishes that Plaintiff’s testimony was outside his ordinary job duties as a law enforcement officer (or was otherwise protected speech). Nor does Plainitff point to record evidence demonstrating that his testimony was undisputedly outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities, as was his burden to do. View "Rogers v. Hall" on Justia Law

In March 2018, the officers were involved in the fatal shooting of a homeless man. The Oakland Police Department investigated the incident, concluding that the officers’ use of force was reasonable and complied with Police Department policy. The Chief of Police agreed. Separately, the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), the investigative body of the City’s civilian oversight Police Commission, investigated the incident and determined that the use of force was objectively reasonable. The Compliance Director disagreed with the Chief of Police and the CPRA, instead recommending termination of the officers for unreasonable use of force. After their termination, the officers sought a writ of mandate and declaratory relief in state court.The Ninth Circuit vacated, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court. The panel held that this was a case arising under state law that properly belonged in the state courts. Recognizing that under Section 1331, a case can “arise under” federal law in two ways, the panel determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both branches of federal question jurisdiction. First, the panel lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal cause of action branch because federal law did not create the causes of action asserted. The panel next held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the substantial federal question branch. View "FRANCISCO NEGRETE V. CITY OF OAKLAND" on Justia Law

The Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA) governs collective bargaining by employees of the District of Columbia government. It allows officers of the Metropolitan Police Department, like other D.C. government employees, to unionize and engage in collective bargaining. They have done so and are represented by the plaintiff in this case, the Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union (FOP). The police union contends that the statute violates equal protection principles, the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.   The DC Circuit rejected all the challenges concluding that the district court correctly concluded that the FOP’s constitutional claims lack merit. The FOP disputes that police accountability motivated the Council. The court explained that the legislature’s actual motive is “entirely irrelevant”; all that matters is whether there are “plausible reasons” to conclude that the statutory classification furthers a legitimate government interest.   The FOP next contends that section 116 violates the Bill of Attainder Clause. However, the court found that the union makes no serious effort to show that the Council acted beyond its discretion. And the court could discern no express or hidden intent to punish. Further, FOP contends that section 116 violates the Contract Clause. The court explained that retrospective laws violate the Contract Clause only if they “substantially” impair existing contract rights. Here, the union could not have reasonably expected to insulate itself from legal changes after the 2017 Agreement had expired by its terms. View "Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union v. DC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court reversing the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) awarding Plaintiff permanent partial disability benefits (PPD) after she injured her back and left hip while working as a registered nurse, holding that the district court did not err.The OAH awarded Plaintiff benefits after finding that she had made a tangible effort to seek suitable employment given her health, education, training, and experience. The district court reversed, finding that Plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that she actively sought work and did not present expert medical testimony showing she was incapable of working. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH decision was not supported by substantial evidence because Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no suitable work given her health. View "McBride v. State, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law

The case concerned the scope of the audit authority of a multi-employer employee benefit fund covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The New York State Nurses Association Benefit Fund (the “Fund”) sought an audit of the Nyack Hospital’s (the “Hospital’s”) payroll and wage records. The Hospital objected, claiming that the Fund had the authority to inspect only the payroll records of employees the Hospital identified as members of the collective bargaining unit. The district court held that the Fund was entitled to the records of all persons the Hospital identified as registered nurses but not to the records of any other employees.   The Second Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court reversed to the extent the district court granted the Hospital’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the Fund’s motion for summary judgment. To the extent the district court granted the Fund’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Hospital’s cross-motion for summary judgment, the court affirmed. The court held that the audit sought by the Fund was authorized by the Trust Agreement and that the Hospital did not present evidence that the audit constituted a breach of the Fund’s fiduciary duty under ERISA. Accordingly, the audit was within the scope of the Fund trustees’ authority under the Supreme Court’s decision in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559 (1985). View "New York State Nurses Association Benefits Fund v. The Nyack Hospital" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that, as to counts I-IV, Plaintiffs ran afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that count V failed due to a lack of standing.Appellants, approximately fifty members of a class of retired Rhode Island public employees, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging constitutional violations in the changes to Rhode Island's retirement benefits scheme (counts I-IV) and in a class action settlement agreement (count V) reached following litigation in state court, in which each appellant was a party. The district court dismissed the action, holding that Appellants' claims were barred by res judicata, a lack of Article III standing, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellants' due process, takings, and Contracts Clause claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (2) Appellants' First Amendment claims were nonjusticiable. View "Efreom v. McKee" on Justia Law

The federal district court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court. The federal court asked the Supreme Court to clarify the standards for equitable tolling in civil cases under Washington law. The underlying federal case involved a long-running dispute between a certified class of more than 25,000 Washington teachers (Teachers) and the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS). The federal district court determined that while the Teachers established a Fifth Amendment takings claim, the applicable statute of limitations on that claim lapsed several years before the Teachers filed this suit. The Teachers asked the federal district court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to allow the suit to proceed despite the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court answered the certified question by reiterating the four conditions it previously identified as necessary to justify equitable tolling of a statute of limitations in the civil context. Washington law allows equitable tolling of a statute of limitations in a civil suit when: (1) the plaintiff has exercised diligence; (2) the defendant’s bad faith, false assurances, or deception has interfered with the plaintiff’s diligent efforts; (3) tolling is consistent with (a) the purpose of the underlying statute and (b) the purpose of the statute of limitations; and (4) justice requires tolling the statute of limitations. View "Fowler v. Guerin" on Justia Law