Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

For more than two decades, San Benito County provided health insurance benefits for its employees under the Public Employees’ Medical Hospital Care Act (PEMHCA), which requires a participating county to pay retiree health insurance benefits at the same contribution rate it pays to active employees. In 2017, the county ceased providing benefits under PEMHCA and reduced the health insurance benefit contribution for Medicare-eligible retirees. Retired county employees claimed that the county’s actions violated an implied promise that, upon their retirement, they would receive “fully paid” lifetime retiree health insurance benefits, with premium contributions equal to those paid for active employees.The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in considering inadmissible evidence to ascertain legislative intent and in failing to apply the presumption against finding an implied vested right in the absence of a clear manifestation of legislative intent to contractually bind the county. The trial court considered evidence beyond the legislative record, including the testimony of former members of the county’s board of supervisors and other former county employees regarding their knowledge and understanding of the county’s provision of retiree health insurance benefits. The plaintiffs’ admissible evidence does not support a finding of an implied vested right. View "Rose v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

Christopher Ross, a former prosecutor with the Riverside County District Attorney’s office (DA’s Office), sued the County of Riverside for whistleblower retaliation and disability discrimination after the DA’s Office allegedly demoted him and refused to accommodate medical issues in response to Ross raising concerns that the DA’s Office was prosecuting an innocent man for murder. During a deposition, the former district attorney who preceded then-District Attorney Paul Zellerbach, Rodric Pacheco, testified about a conversation he had with the district attorney who succeeded Zellerbach, Mike Hestrin. Pacheco testified that he and Hestrin shared the view that Zellerbach was one of the most unethical attorneys they had encountered as prosecutors. Ross subpoenaed Hestrin for a deposition about his communications with the unidentified County lawyers, as well as regarding advice Hestrin provided to Ross in Hestrin’s capacity as an official in the prosecutors’ union in which Ross was a member. The County moved to quash the subpoena, which the trial court granted. The trial court found Hestrin’s alleged communications with the unidentified County lawyers were irrelevant to Ross’s retaliation and discrimination claims, and that Ross could obtain evidence regarding his union rights from other sources. Ross sought a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to enter a new order denying it. The Court of Appeal denied the petition as it related to evidence concerning Hestrin’s role counseling Ross regarding his union rights. The Court granted the petition as it related to alleged requests by the unidentified County lawyers that Hestrin alter his testimony regarding Zellerbach’s ethical character. “[A]lthough we agree with the trial court that the testimony is irrelevant to the merits of Ross’s substantive claims against the County, the testimony is relevant to Zellerbach’s credibility, and he will likely be a material trial witness. Testimony showing the unidentified County lawyers attempted to suppress or alter a witness’s testimony about the credibility of a material witness is also relevant to show the County’s consciousness of guilt.” View "Ross v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were six citizens of Mexico who were recruited to work as “Animal Scientists” at Funk Dairy in Idaho under the “TN Visa” program for “professional” employees established under the North American Free Trade Agreement. When Plaintiffs arrived at the dairy, they were instead required to work primarily as general laborers. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants’ bait-and-switch tactics violated applicable federal statutory prohibitions on forced labor by, among other things, abusing the TN Visa program in order to coerce Plaintiffs to provide menial physical labor.Defendants conceded that all Plaintiffs believed that their ability to remain lawfully in the U.S. depended on their continued employment at Funk Dairy. The court concluded that in light of that concession and its obligation, a reasonable jury could find that Funk Dairy knowingly obtained Plaintiffs’ labor by abusing the TN Visa process in order to exert pressure on Plaintiffs to provide labor that was substantially different from what had been represented to them and to federal consular officials.The court held that Funk Dairy’s conduct violated provisions of 18 U.S.C. Chapter 77, prohibiting forced labor and trafficking of persons into forced labor. Plaintiffs, therefore, asserted triable causes of action under the civil suit provision of Chapter 77, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1595(a). The court held that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ federal claims, it also reversed the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under state law. View "CESAR MARTINEZ-RODRIGUEZ V. CURTIS GILES" on Justia Law

Rickel, a Fire Protection Specialist at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, was Assistant Chief of Training, responsible for determining training requirements, reviewing training records, and ensuring that firefighters’ certifications were current. Rickel applied for the Deputy Fire Chief position. Fire Chief Brusoe selected Gray. Rickel questioned the promotion and Gray’s candor in his application, asserting that several unidentified candidates had been promoted without required credentials. Gray responded that Rickel should update the training records. Rickel questioned Gray’s authority as his supervisor and claimed that his position did not require him to do so. Chief Brusoe informed Rickel that Gray was his supervisor. Gray instructed Rickel to update the records and documented that such a task was within his job description. The due date passed. The Executive Officer of Naval Air Station Jacksonville confirmed that the task was within Rickel’s responsibilities. Rickel did not respond to requests for status updates nor did he complete the work. Gray undertook the project, noting that it took 16.5 hours.Chief Brusoe proposed to remove Rickel for failure to follow instructions. Rickel appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging unlawful retaliation for his protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that Rickel had engaged in protected whistleblowing activity, which was a contributing factor in the removal decision but that the agency had proven “by clear and convincing evidence that it would have removed [Rickel] even in the absence of his protected activity.” View "Rickel v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the comprehensive remedial scheme provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., for recovery of damages when an employer violates the federal overtime law, 29 U.S.C. 207, precludes an employee from alternatively pursuing remedies under the wage act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148, for the untimely payment of overtime wages due solely pursuant to the FLSA.Plaintiffs, employees of Defendant, brought this action alleging violations of the FLSA for failure to pay overtime wages, violations of the wage act for failure to pay the FLSA overtime wages in a timely manner, and violations of federal and state minimum wage laws. The motion judge allowed summary judgment as to Defendant's liability under the federal overtime law and wage act. After a trial, the trial judge awarded damages. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the trial judge's trebling of damages pursuant to the wage act was error; (2) the jury instructions for the calculation of overtime wages under the FLSA contained a methodological error; and (3) Defendant's remaining claims lacked merit. View "Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, LLC" on Justia Law

Indiana University hired Palmer, who is Black, as a lecturer in Business Marketing in 2010. In 2013, Palmer inquired about his potential for early promotion to senior lecturer. His Department Chair said that it was rare for lecturers to apply for senior lecturer prior to their sixth year and suggested that Palmer wait. Palmer did not apply for early promotion. In 2016, IU promoted Palmer to senior lecturer. Palmer also served as Diversity Coach in the MBA program, for an additional $25,000 per year and a reduced course load; he resigned as Diversity Coach after the 2016–2017 school year. . In 2016, the Marketing Department hired Gildea, who is white, as a new lecturer and as Director of the Business Marketing Academy (BMA). Palmer complained that Gildea’s base salary nearly matched Palmer’s base salary. Palmer earned $98,750; Gildea earned $94,000, with no other lecturer or senior lecturer in their department earning over $90,000. Palmer also complained of discrimination.Palmer filed an EEOC charge, alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and subsequently filed suit. Palmer’s failure-to-promote claim is time-barred. His unequal pay claim fails on the merits. Palmer enjoyed higher pay than all of his colleagues, except Gildea, who is not a proper comparator. View "Palmer v. Indiana University" on Justia Law

Perez began work at Staples in 2011 and became a sales representative in 2015. Perez’s performance issues began five months later. His supervisor, Coha placed Perez on a “weekly activity plan.” Six months later Perez was still not meeting the company’s objectives, so Coha placed him on another plan. The two met weekly to discuss Perez’s work. In 2016, Staples divided its sales representatives into account managers, who targeted repeat local business and account developers, who targeted larger, multiple-location accounts with higher dollar amounts. Perez was classified as an account manager. Coha reassigned some of Perez’s accounts. Perez’s job performance continued to falter; he was placed on another plan. While Perez was on the plan, he served jury duty and voiced his discomfort with his company’s sale of a detergent banned in another state. In June 2016, Staples terminated Perez’s employment.Perez sued, alleging violations of the Illinois Jury Act and the Illinois Whistleblower Act, and common-law retaliatory discharge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Staples. Perez was terminated not in retaliation for protected activities but because of his poor sales production. Staples documented his poor performance before the detergent issue arose; no reasonable jury could conclude that Staples fired Perez because of his jury service. View "Perez v. Staples Contract & Commercial, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claims his former employer, the Transit Authority of the City of Omaha (“Metro”), discriminated against him based on his disability and retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity. Metro appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not disclose the witness as an expert and it only learned the witness was a LIMHP at her trial deposition. The court reasoned that under Rule 26, non-retained experts are subject to less stringent disclosure requirements than retained experts. Further, the contents of the witness’ testimony were disclosed at the beginning of the case. Plaintiff provided what he thought was accurate information at the time of initial disclosures. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the witness’s testimony because she testified as a treating practitioner only.The court affirmed the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on both the ADA and ADEA claims. Taken together, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s disability was a motivating factor in Metro terminating him. Finally, under the plain language of the ADA, the district court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees. View "John Gruttemeyer v. Transit Authority" on Justia Law

In this action for declaratory judgment the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the superior court denying Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment for Justin Araujo, the complainant in a proceeding before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, holding that the hearing justice erred.Araujo filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that Family Dollar, his employer, had discriminated against him on the basis of an illness. The parties entered into a settlement agreement that included a release. At issue was whether the release unambiguously constituted a waiver by Araujo of his right to pursue all claims he could make against Family Dollar. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Araujo, entering judgment declaring that the release did not cover Araujo's discrimination claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the release unambiguously precluded Araujo from pursuing a discrimination charge with the Commission. View "Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Araujo" on Justia Law

Defendant, Union Pacific, is a national rail carrier. Plaintiff, The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen ("BLET"), is a labor union representing Union Pacific engineers. Division 192 is the exclusive representative for Union Pacific employees around the area. An issue arose when an off-duty fistfight broke out during a union meeting between local division officers and an engineer. About two months after the fight, the engineer filed a complaint with Union Pacific, alleging that was threatened and assaulted by local division representatives in retaliation for taking extra shifts. The suspension of six union members effectively barred all of Division 192’s leadership from Union Pacific’s premises.BLET sued Union Pacific in federal court, alleging Union Pacific retaliated against the union for its shove policy. BLET argued the retaliation violated the section of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) prohibiting carrier interference with union activity.The court first found that federal courts have jurisdiction over post-certification disputes alleging that railroad conduct motivated by antiunion animus is interfering with the employees’ “choice of representatives.” Next, the court found that the facts support the determination that the union was likely to succeed in showing that the discipline was motivated by a desire to weaken the local division. Thus, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the union is likely to prevail in showing that Union Pacific’s suspension of effectively all the division’s elected representatives amounted to the prohibited interference under the RLA. View "BLET v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law