Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued his former employer, the Maryland Military Department, and related entities, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court dismissed Holloway’s complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim and reversed the dismissal of his unlawful termination and retaliation claims. The court reasoned that to state a claim for unlawful termination, a Title VII plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that his employer discharged him because of his race. Here, Plaintiff alleged facts crucial to raise the inference of a Title VII violation “above a speculative level.”   Next, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. The court held that Plaintiff’s claim passes muster at the pleading stage.   However, the court held that Plaintiff failed to state a claim that he was subject to an abusive or hostile work environment based on his race or protected activity. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that one episode of yelling and pounding the table is sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish an abusive environment. View "Charles Holloway v. State of Maryland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an office services and facilities management company, refused to bargain with a labor union based on its position that the union was not a "properly certified representative of its employees." In turn, the union filed a claim with the NLRB, claiming that Petitioner violated the NLRA by refusing to bargain in good faith. The NLRB found in the union's favor.The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, rejecting Petitioner's argument that the prosecution was ultra vires. Petitioner claimed that President Biden's removal of the NLRB General Counsel was unlawful and that his replacement lacked authority to bring the complaint against Petitioner. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that no provision of the NLRA protects the General Counsel of the NLRB from removal.The Fifth Circuit then rejected the merits of Petitioner's claim, finding that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the NLRB's decision. Thus, the court granted NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Exela Enterprise Solutions v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified by the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia seeking to clarify the application of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) when the plaintiff's employing entity does not meet the WVHRA definition of "employer," as set out in W. Va. Code 5-11-3(d).Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against her former employer alleging violations of the WVHRA and other claims. Defendant removed the case to federal district court and moved for dismissal of the WVHRA claim on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to allege that Defendant satisfied the numerosity portion of the WVHRA definition of "employer." The district court denied the motion. Thereafter, the court ordered that a question of law be certified. The Supreme Court answered that an entity that does not meet the WVHRA's definition of employer may not be potentially liable to its own employee as a "person," as defined in W. Va. Code 5-11-3(a), for an alleged violation of W. Va. Code 5-11-9(7). View "Pajak v. Under Armour, Inc." on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) entered an order that Defendant committed multiple unfair labor practice violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. Sections 158(a)(1) and (5), including failure to bargain in good faith for a successor CBA, withholding relevant bargaining information, unlawfully declaring an impasse and unilaterally implementing altered terms and conditions of employment. With one dissenting member, the Board also concluded that Defendant unlawfully threatened and terminated ten workers who engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage. In opposition to the order, Defendant made several arguments including that the dissenting board member correctly concluded that the ten employees terminated for an unauthorized work stoppage were not engaged in collective activity protected by Section 7 and therefore the terminations did not violate Section 8(a)(1).   The Eighth Circuit granted enforcement of the Board’s Order finding that Defendant committed multiple unfair labor practice violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. The court agreed with the Board that Defendant failed to establish that the Union’s Section 9(a) right to be the ten employees’ exclusive bargaining representative made their spontaneous work stoppage -- a concerted attempt to question their terms and conditions of employment -- unprotected activity under Emporium Capwell.  Further, the court found that Defendant failed to preserve certain issues by challenging the special remedies before the Board, either in its objections to the ALJ’s recommended remedies or by a motion for reconsideration when the Board added the reimbursement remedy. View "NLRB v. Noah's Ark Processors, LLC" on Justia Law

Employee Christie Mitchell appealed a summary judgment order in favor of NBT Bank, N.A. regarding its policy of deducting her overtime compensation from her commissions so that she was never paid more than gross commissions regardless of how many hours she worked in a week. She contended the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) required the bank to pay her entire gross commissions plus overtime wages. Because the FLSA contained no such requirement, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. NBT Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Fast Food Workers Committee and Service Employees International Union, sought review of the NLRB’s (“Board”) approval of the settlement agreements between the Board’s General Counsel on the one hand, and McDonald’s and a group of McDonald’s franchisees on the other. Amongst Petitioners' many objections, their primary concern is the agreements’ failure to determine whether McDonald’s is a joint employer with its franchisees. Another significant objection is directed to the participation of one of the Board’s Members in this decision. It is claimed that he should have been recused   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review, finding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in issuing its order approving the settlements and that Petitioners’ recusal argument was not properly presented.Petitioners argued that Board was arbitrary and capricious in approving the settlements, in light of the unions’ objections. The court held that the Board acted well within its discretion in approving the settlements, given the Board’s discretion to approve settlements and its careful and comprehensive analysis of the reasonableness of the settlements. Petitioners also contended that the Board’s order was invalid because a member should have recused himself. The court held that Petitioners’ did not meet their obligation to make clear that they were bringing a constitutional challenge before the NLRB and the court. View "Fast Food Workers Committee v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) against the Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund (“Administrators”), alleging gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant and Plaintiff appealed arguing that the district court’s ruling was erroneous.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Administrators. Plaintiff argued that the district court improperly required her to demonstrate that her proffered comparators were strictly identical. The court found that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not present evidence that any male physician shared characteristics that would render them similarly situated. Further, even if Plaintiff established a prima facie case, her claim would not succeed because she did not rebut Defendant’s non-discriminatory reasons for declining to renew her contract.   The court further affirmed summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could not establish that her protected conduct was the “but for” reason for the alleged adverse employment action.   Finally, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. The court found that although Plaintiff endured severe treatment by her supervisor, she did not establish that the treatment was based on her gender. View "Saketkoo v. Admin Tulane Educ" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of California to decide the certified questions:1.) If an employee contracts COVID-19 at his workplace and brings the virus home to his spouse, does California’s derivative injury doctrine bar the spouse’s claim against the employer?2.) Under California law, does an employer owe a duty to the households of its employees to exercise ordinary care to prevent the spread of COVID-19?A married couple alleged that the husband’s employer negligently allowed COVID-19 to spread from its worksite into the couple’s household. The Plaintiffs contend that the employer knowingly disobeyed the San Francisco Health Order (the “Health Order”) by transferring workers from an infected site to the husband’s job site in disregard of the Health Order’s policies. According to Plaintiffs, the husband was forced to work in close contact with employees from the infected job site and developed COVID-19 which he brought back home. His wife contracted COVID-10 and was hospitalized for a month and kept alive on a respirator.The employer claimed that California law does not recognize the couple’s cause of action. Specifically, the employer argued that the wife’s matter is barred by the derivative injury doctrine, and even if the doctrine does not apply, the employer did not owe her a duty of care. The court concluded that the case presents questions for the California Supreme Court to address. View "CORBY KUCIEMBA V. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC." on Justia Law

A Pan-Oceanic supervisor, Singh, asked Green to pick up a skid steer from Patten. Green saw that the equipment was not loaded properly, and asked that it be reloaded. Patten employees refused. Singh told Green to return with the equipment. In heavy expressway traffic, Green saw that the trailer was bouncing and stepped on the brakes. The trailer swung into McQueen's car, injuring him. Pan-Oceanic acknowledged that Green was its agent, acting within the scope of his agency. A jury ruled for McQueen against PanOceanic, but not against Green, and assessed damages of $163,227.45, finding that Pan-Oceanic had acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. The jury subsequently awarded $1 million in punitive damages.On appeal, the court held that, when a plaintiff is injured by a company’s employee in a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for direct negligence against the employer where the employer admits responsibility for the employee’s conduct under respondeat superior, concluding that the jury’s findings—that Green was not negligent but Pan-Oceanic acted with aggravated negligence—were legally inconsistent, The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the award. The trial court properly instructed the jury that Green claimed Pan-Oceanic was negligent for ordering Green to take the load on the highway after it knew or should have known, that it was unsafe and for failing to reject the load to prevent it from traveling on the highway. This liability did not depend on Green’s actions. The verdicts were not legally inconsistent. View "McQueen v. Green" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that separate schedule loss of use (SLU) awards for different injuries to the same statutory member are contemplated by N.Y. Work. Comp. Law **(WCL) 15 and that, when a complainant proves that the second injury, considered by itself without consideration of the first injury, has caused an increased loss of use, the claimant is entitled to an SLU award commensurate with that increased loss of use.At issue in these consolidated appeals was whether, under WCL 15, a claimant's SLU award must be reduced by the percentage loss determined for a prior SLU award to a different subpart of the same body member enumerated in section 15. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment below, holding that separate SLU awards for a member's subparts are authorized by statute. View "Johnson v. City of New York" on Justia Law