Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Ostrowski worked for the Lake County Sheriff’s Department before a workplace injury left him permanently disabled. He now receives a monthly pension payment from the County. Lake County’s disability pension plan does not provide cost-of-living increases, while its pension plan for non-disabled retirees does. Ostrowski filed suit, arguing that the difference between the plans violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court held that Ostrowski’s suit was barred by a 2017 waiver that he signed while settling a “reasonable accommodation” claim against Lake County. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Ostrowski’s claims were not barred by the waiver, but failed on the merits; the court noted a general exclusion in the agreement for matters affecting Ostrowski’s pension. Retired and other former workers are not protected by Title I of the ADA and Ostrowski forfeited his arguments with respect to the Rehabilitation Act. Ostrowski’s Equal Protection claim qualified only for rational basis review. Lake County has a legitimate interest in providing pension plans that meet the differing needs of distinct groups; the cost-of-living adjustment is one of several relevant differences in the plans. The court reversed an award of fees and costs. View "Ostrowski v. Lake County, Indiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a floor supervisor at the Defendant hotel and casino. In 2015, Defendant required all employees to sign a new arbitration policy as a condition of employment. Plaintiff signed the new policy. The following year, Defendant fired Plaintiff after Plaintiff accepted counterfeit $100 bills during his shift. In 2019, Plaintiff obtained a right-to-sue letter from DFEH and brought causes of action under wrongful termination, age discrimination, retaliation and harassment.In 2020, Defendant responded to Plaintiff's claim, but failed to move to compel arbitration. However, on December 23, 2020, 13 months after Plaintiff filed his lawsuit, Defendant moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied Defendant's motion, finding that the 13-month wait prejudiced Plaintiff and that Defendant had waived its right to compel arbitration.The Second Appellate District reversed, finding Plaintiff's allegations of prejudice were insufficient. Waiver does not occur merely by participating in litigation; the case must reach the point of judicial litigation before a court will find a party waived the right to compel arbitration. The court also rejected Plaintiff's claim that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. View "Quach v. Cal. Commerce Club" on Justia Law

Defendant operates an acute care facility as well as a vocational and career-training program intended to help individuals facing barriers to employment find jobs. Disabled individuals who complete the program are eligible for job placement, possibly as janitors for Social Security Administration facilities. The Union sought to represent all janitors; however, Defendant objected, claiming that the janitors have a "rehabilitative" relationship and not an employment relationship. The NLRB determined the janitors are statutory employees. After a vote, the Union passed, but Defendant refused to recognize it.The Fourth Circuit held that the Board's determination that the janitors were statutory employees was supported by the evidence. Thus, the NLRB had jurisdiction to certify the Union and, by refusing to acknowledge the Union, Defendant violated labor laws. View "Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

National Western Life Insurance Company (NWL) appealed after a jury found the company liable for negligence and elder abuse arising from an NWL annuity sold to plaintiff-appellant Barney Williams by Victor Pantaleoni. In 2016, Williams contacted Pantaleoni to revise a living trust after the death of Williams’ wife, but Pantaleoni sold him a $100,000 NWL annuity. When Williams returned the annuity to NWL during a 30-day “free look” period, Pantaleoni wrote a letter over Williams’ signature for NWL to reissue a new annuity. In 2017, when Williams cancelled the second annuity, NWL charged a $14,949.91 surrender penalty. The jury awarded Williams damages against NWL, including punitive damages totaling almost $3 million. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed judgment, concluding that Pantaleoni was an independent agent who sold annuities for multiple insurance companies and had no authority to bind NWL. Williams petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, which transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal to consider the agency relationship in light of Insurance Code sections 32, 101, 1662, 1704 and 1704.5, and O’Riordan v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company, 36 Cal.4th 281, 288 (2005). After the appellate court issued its opinion on transfer from the California Supreme Court, both Williams and NWL filed petitions for rehearing on various grounds. Upon consideration of those petitions, the Court of Appeal “remain[ed] confident” its prior opinion was correct and reissued that opinion with minor modifications. The Court affirmed the judgment finding NWL liable for negligence and financial elder abuse. However, punitive damages assessed against NWL were reversed. View "Williams v. National Western Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a locomotive engineer, sued Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCSR”) for negligence after he sustained injuries in a railcar collision. The district court granted summary judgment to KCSR. Plaintiff argued that section 287.280.1, the civil-action provision, authorizes his civil action because KCSR failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance. KCSR responded that it is not liable because Plaintiff “was insured by his immediate . . . employer,” triggering the exemption from liability for statutory employers in section 287.040.3. According to Plaintiff, however, section 287.040.3 exempts KCSR from workers’ compensation liability only, not liability from civil actions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of KCSR. The court held that because Plaintiff was insured by his immediate employer, KCSR is not liable and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court reasoned that Missouri’s workers’ compensation statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 287.120.1, imposes liability on employers for workplace injuries. However, nowhere in section 287.040 does the text differentiate between workers’ compensation liability and civil liability. Accordingly, the court interpreted “liable as in this section provided” to mean “liable as an employer”; that is, liable as a statutory employer. Thus, KCSR’s potential liability, therefore, is liability “as in [section 287.040] provided,” so it enjoys the immunity from suit. View "Nathan Blanton v. KC Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner is an experienced airline pilot. When he was interviewing for a new position, he was asked to take a urine test. Unable to provide an adequate sample, Petitioner left the site. Under FAA guidelines, walking out before providing a drug test sample is considered a refusal. The potential employer reported Petitioner's refusal to the FAA. The FAA sought to revoke Petitioner's pilot and medical certifications. However, at a hearing in front of the National Safety Transportation Board, the Board agreed with the FAA in sustaining the refusal, but reduced Petitioner's sanction to a 180-suspension.The D.C. Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, finding that by walking out before providing a sufficient urine sample, Petitioner's conduct was properly considered a refusal. In so holding, the court noted that the trial court credited the FAA witnesses while questioning the veracity of Petitioner's testimony.The D.C. Circuit also granted the FAA's cross-petition, finding that the Board was required to defer to the FAA under these circumstances. View "Ydil Pham v. NTSB" on Justia Law

Seventeen retired city employees who receive retiree health benefits through CalPERS under the city’s Medical After Retirement (MAR) plan filed suit. Five were union members before their retirement. The memorandums of understanding (MOU) and other benefits documents applicable to each of the bargaining units state: “ The City shall pay the PERS required Minimum Employer Contribution (MEC) per month on behalf of each active and retired employee who participates in the City’s health insurance plans.” The city pays the MEC to CalPERS and then deducts that amount from the retiree’s premium reimbursement owed under the MAR plan.Plaintiffs alleged the practice amounted to improper use of their MAR benefits, resulted in improper reductions of benefits, and violated Government Code section 228923 and the applicable MOUs. The city argued the complaint was barred by issue preclusion based on a 2017 administrative proceeding between the city and the union, following a union grievance. The trial court dismissed, based upon issue preclusion, stating: “[T]he emphasis is not on a concept of identity of parties but on the practical situation.” The court of appeal reversed, citing due process requirements. There is no basis for concluding that the plaintiffs should reasonably have expected to be bound by, or were even aware of, the union’s grievance proceeding. The city has not demonstrated that the claims are barred for failure to allege exhaustion of administrative procedures. View "Bullock v. City of Antioch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that her former employer violated the ADA by failing to accommodate her disability and instead terminating her from her human resources job after she underwent a bone biopsy surgery on her right shoulder and arm. The district court concluded that Plaintiff failed to plead a “disability” because she did not adequately allege that she had “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.” The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s employment discrimination action. The court concluded that Plaintiff pleaded facts plausibly establishing that she had a physical impairment both during an immediate post-surgical period and during an extension period in which her surgeon concluded that her injuries had not sufficiently healed to permit her to return to work. The court also found that the activities that Plaintiff pleaded she was unable to perform qualified as “major life activities,” which included caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, lifting, and working. Finally, the complaint adequately alleged that Plaintiff’s impairment substantially limited her ability to perform at least one major life activity. View "KAREN SHIELDS V. CREDIT ONE BANK, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission denying Plaintiff relief on her claim for disability compensation from Defendants, holding that there was no error.On appeal, the court of appeals held that Plaintiff's claim was not time-barred under N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-24 and thus reversed the Commission's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim based on a 2014 injury. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a determination as to whether Plaintiff suffered a compensable injury under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was not barred by section 97-24. View "Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decree of the appellate division of the workers' compensation court denying and dismissing Petitioner's petition for surviving-spouse compensation benefits and funeral expenses, holding that the going-and-coming rule did not preclude Petitioner's recovery.At issue was whether the exception to the going-and-coming rule as it was articulated in Branco v. Leviton Manufacturing Company, Inc., 518 A.2d 621 (R.I. 1986) precluded recovery of workers' compensation dependency benefits for the fatal injuries Petitioner's husband sustained while traveling from his employer's facility to a separate parking lot that was leased but not owned by the employer. The trial judge found that Petitioner's claim was not barred by the going-and-coming rule because the Branco exception applied. The appellate division vacated the decision below, finding that the going-and-coming rule barred Petitioner's claim. The Supreme Court quashed the decree below, holding that the Branco exception was applicable to the instant case. View "Phillips v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Rhode Island" on Justia Law