Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Eleni Gavriiloglou brought this action against her former employer and its alleged alter egos. She asserted, among other things: (1) individual claims for damages based on Labor Code violations; and (2) a representative claim for civil penalties for Labor Code violations under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Gavriiloglou had signed an arbitration agreement, so the trial court compelled her to arbitrate her non-PAGA claims and stayed her PAGA claim while she did. The arbitrator found that the alleged Labor Code violations had not occurred. The trial court then granted judgment on the pleadings against Gavriiloglou on her PAGA claim, ruling that the arbitrator’s findings established that she was not an “aggrieved employee” within the meaning of PAGA, and therefore that she lacked standing to bring a PAGA claim. Gavriiloglou appealed, contending: (1) the trial court erred by denying her petition to vacate the arbitration award; and (2) the trial court erred by ruling that the arbitration award barred her PAGA claim. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court properly denied the motion to vacate the arbitration award. However, the Court also held that the arbitration did not bar the PAGA claim because Gavriiloglou was acting in different capacities and asserting different rights. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Gavriiloglou v. Prime Healthcare Management" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a secretary for the Navy. In 2017, Plaintiff filed a charge alleging that a Navy contractor, had subjected her to a hostile work environment. In 2018, the Navy issued a final decision concluding that Plaintiff failed to prove that the contractor harassed her. On appeal, the EEOC agreed with the Navy’s conclusion, but it raised two distinct claims that Plaintiff had not charged. A motions panel denied Plaintiff’s motion in full and granted the Navy’s motion as to the first three claims.   On appeal, the relevant question was whether the employee may pursue a retaliation claim in court without first exhausting it before the Navy. The DC Circuit affirmed the order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, holding that an employee may not pursue the relevant claim without first exhausting it before the Navy. Here, Plaintiff failed to present her retaliation-by-disclosure claim to the Navy before filing a lawsuit. The court explained that the fact that the EEOC told Plaintiff she had a right to sue does not change this analysis. The EEOC itself recognizes that an employee must describe in her charge “the action(s) or practice(s) that form the basis of the complaint.” View "Katrina Webster v. Carlos Del Toro" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against Comprehensive Print Group LLC and its subsidiary American Pacific Printers College, Inc. for pregnancy and gender and sex-and-gender-based harassment in violation of FEHA; interference with her leave rights and retaliation for attempting to exercise those rights under the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (PDLL) and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA); failure to prevent harassment, discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.   Respondent Los Angeles Superior Court, in a terse order, granted Malloy’s employers’ motion for change of venue, concluding venue was proper only in Orange County. The Second Appellate District disagreed and granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate and order respondent superior court to vacate its order granting the motion for change of venue and to enter a new order denying the motion, permitting Petitioner’s case to proceed in Los Angeles County.   The court reasoned that none of the real parties presented any evidence in the trial court disputing those allegations that Petitioner always worked from Orange County and would have been immediately required to return to the company’s Orange County office if she had not been fired. Further, Petitioner’s cause of action for interference with her PDLL rights—and, therefore, all her causes of action arising from the same set of operative facts— was properly filed in Los Angeles County. View "Malloy v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”) order deeming Agar Livestock, LLC (“Agar”), a category one statutory employer of Jason Eldridge under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Act. Agar appealed the order, arguing it was not a category one statutory employer because it was “merely a broker that locates livestock trucks available to transport livestock for shippers.” According to Agar, it did not contract for services from Eldridge’s employer, Meissen Trucking (“Meissen”). In its decision, the Commission disagreed and found that, based on the parties’ contractual relationship, Agar had contracted for services from Meissen. Finding that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Eldridge v. Agar Livestock, LLC" on Justia Law

In this employment matter, Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant and respondent Foster Poultry Farms LLC (Foster Farms), on her claims of discrimination based on disability and race/national origin, and retaliation, under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and Labor Code section 1102.5. The principal issue on appeal is whether a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination under Labor Code section 132a has res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in the instant action.   The Fifth Appellate district reversed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was based on giving collateral estoppel effect to the WCAB decision. The court that Foster Farms is not entitled to summary adjudication, based on application of the collateral estoppel doctrine, on Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in an interactive process. Foster Farms’ argument that summary adjudication is warranted, in light of the WCAB decision, on Plaintiff’s remaining claims for failure to take all reasonable measures to prevent discrimination under FEHA, retaliation for asserting FEHA rights, and retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, is unavailing. View "Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC" on Justia Law

Canada, a Black man, worked for Grossi for 10 years. Canada suffered from back problems and claims that Grossi prevented him from accessing Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) forms and harassed him when he tried to use FMLA leave. Osorio, Grossi’s director of human resources, testified that she “let [Canada] take his FMLA” leave. Canada sued, alleging race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the FMLA.Canada was terminated a month later. Grossi based the termination on text messages found on Canada’s cell phone. Grossi claims that Canada was using a locker on the shop floor which was designated as a company tool locker. While Canada was on vacation, Grossi cut the padlock off of his locker because the lockers needed to be moved. Osorio testified that she believed that the phone might have been a company phone and guessed the phone’s password. Osorio found text messages from a year earlier in which Canada appeared to have solicited prostitutes “while at work and clocked in.”The district court granted Grossi summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed, in part. An employer’s motivation for investigating an employee can be relevant to pretext. There is a “‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence,” which, taken as a whole and viewed in a light favorable to Canada’s case, could convince a reasonable jury that Canada was the victim of unlawful retaliation. There is also evidence that Grossi treated other employees more favorably. View "Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) Cash Handlers are supervised by Foreworkers. A labor agreement describes the selection of Foreworkers by an Evaluation Committee, comprised of three union representatives and three management representatives. Eight criteria, with assigned point values, are used. Each qualified applicant takes a written test and completes an oral interview with the Committee.In 2014, Plaintiffs sued BART alleging racial discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by not promoting them to Foreworker in favor of less experienced non-African-Americans. Under a 2016 settlement, Plaintiffs released their employment-related claims; BART paid them a certain sum, admitting no liability. In the following years, the Evaluation Committee appointed four new Foreworkers; each had received the highest total point scores. No Plaintiff was promoted. Plaintiffs again sued BART under FEHA, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact race discrimination.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of BART. There was evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for not promoting Plaintiffs (selection process scores). Plaintiffs failed to submit evidence that BART’s stated reason for not promoting them was untrue or that racial bias against African-Americans drove the promotion decisions. Plaintiffs did not present evidence of a statistically significant disparity between the percentage of qualified African-American applicants for the Foreworker position and the percentage of African-Americans promoted to Foreworker. View "Arega v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, surgeon Aram Bonni sued his employers, defendants Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center and St. Joseph Hospital of Orange, as well several other related entities and physicians (collectively, the Hospitals) for retaliation under California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5. Bonni alleged he made whistleblower complaints, which caused the Hospitals to retaliate against him by, among other things, suspending his medical staff privileges and initiating peer review proceedings to evaluate his privileges. In response, the Hospitals filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing Bonni’s retaliation cause of action arose from the peer review proceedings, which were protected activity, and that his claims had no merit. The trial court agreed and granted the motion in its entirety. Bonni appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding Bonni’s retaliation claim did not arise from protected activity. The California Supreme Court then granted review, determining Bonni’s retaliation cause of action was composed of 19 distinct retaliation claims. Of these claims, it found eight arose from protected activity while the remainder did not. It remanded the matter back to the Court of Appeal to determine whether Bonni had shown a probability of prevailing on those eight claims. On remand, the appellate court concluded Bonni has not met the requisite burden because the eight claims at issue were all precluded by the litigation privilege. Based on this finding and the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the Hospitals’ anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The trial court was directed to enter an order granting the motion as to the eight claims at issue and denying it as to the remaining retaliation claims. View "Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System" on Justia Law

Uronis’ former co-worker, Messenger, filed a putative Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action against Cabot and another company on behalf of himself and other employees similarly situated, alleging that the companies jointly employed the employees and failed to pay them required overtime pay. Uronis, as a similarly situated employee who had yet to file a consent to join the collective action, was a putative member of the Messenger action. Uronis applied for a position with Cabot’s subsidiary, GDS. Cabot and GDS were aware Uronis was a putative member of, and anticipated witness in, the Messenger action, and that he was about to file his consent to join. A GDS manager sent Uronis a text message stating that although Uronis was qualified for the position he applied for, Cabot declined to hire him or any other putative members of the Messenger action “because of” that lawsuit.The FLSA prohibits discrimination against an employee because the employee has engaged in protected activity 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3), including having “testified” or being “about to testify” in any FLSA-related proceeding. The district court dismissed Uronis’ suit, reasoning that being “about to testify” requires being “scheduled” or subpoenaed to do so. The Third Circuit reversed. The FLSA “about to testify” language protects employees from discrimination because of an employer’s anticipation that the employee will soon file a consent to join a collective action. View "Uronis v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

With the agreement of her supervisor, Johar, a salesperson, left work for about a week to care for a terminally ill relative. While she was away her employer (SWS) decided she had quit. Upon her return, SWS stated business was slow and gave her no new sales appointments. Johar sought unemployment benefits, citing a “temporary layoff.” SWS denied laying Johar off. While conceding that she left with her supervisor’s approval, SWS claimed that Johar’s failure to provide a return date or otherwise communicate with her supervisor while she was away amounted to a voluntary quit. The Employment Development Department agreed, found Johar ineligible for unemployment benefits, ordered reimbursement of benefits improperly paid, and imposed a penalty for willful misrepresentation. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB) affirmed.After Johar sought judicial review, CUIAB confessed error for failing to consider new evidence discovered by Johar while the administrative appeal was pending. The court dismissed the case without reaching the merits. The court of appeal reversed. Johar was entitled to relief on the existing record. She left her job in emergency circumstances with the employer’s approval, thus for good cause; an employee who leaves work for good cause is presumed to have not voluntarily quit. SWS’ evidence did not establish that Johar positively repudiated her obligation to return in clear terms. View "Johar v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law