Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Fischer, a Pennsylvania resident and former FedEx security specialist, brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Fischer alleged FedEx misclassified her and other security specialists as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime rule and underpaid them. Two former FedEx employees, Saunders, from Maryland, and Rakowsky, from New York, submitted notices of consent, seeking to join Fischer’s collective action. Saunders and Rakowsky both worked for FedEx in their home states but, other than FedEx’s allegedly uniform nationwide employment practices, have no connection to Pennsylvania related to their claims. The district court did not allow these opt-in plaintiffs to join the suit, reasoning that, as would be true for a state court, the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over FedEx with respect to their’ claims.On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit noted a division among the circuits and held that in an FLSA collective action in federal court where the court lacks general personal jurisdiction over the defendant, all opt-in plaintiffs must establish specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to their individual claims. In this way, the specific personal jurisdiction analysis for an FLSA collective action in federal court operates the same as it would for an FLSA collective action, or any other traditional in personam suit, in state court. The out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs here cannot demonstrate their claims arise out of or relate to FedEx’s contacts with Pennsylvania. View "Fischer v. Federal Express Corp" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) modified its regulations governing the maximum hours that commercial motor vehicle operators may drive or operate within a certain timeframe. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a labor union representing commercial truck drivers, and three national nonprofit organizations petitioned for review. They argued that the Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious for failing to grapple with the safety and driver health consequences of changes to record-keeping rules for short-haul commercial vehicle drivers and break requirements for long-haul drivers.   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the modifications to the hours-of-service rules were sufficiently explained and grounded in the administrative record. The court explained that the Administration not only directly tackled the issue of driver health but also reasonably explained why the health benefits estimated in the 2011 Rule would continue under the modified 30-minute break rule. That met the APA’s requirements. View "Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMCSA" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the United States Army and dismissing Gerald Swain's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., alleging disability discrimination, holding that there was no error.As a civilian employee at an Army installation in Illinois, Swain asked for and received several accommodations for his physical limitations. Swain later brought this lawsuit against the Army, alleging failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Army. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Army met its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. View "Swain v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of an employee's widow in this insurance dispute, holding that the employee did not lose life insurance coverage under his employer's group policy after he developed a brain tumor that disrupted his usual work.Plaintiff, the employee's widow, submitted a statement to Insurer claiming approximately $1 under her late husband's life insurance policy. Insurer denied the claim. Plaintiff then sued, alleging wrongful denial of benefits under section 502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3). The insurance company denied life insurance coverage on the grounds that the employee's coverage under the policy had lapsed. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because the policy language invoked by Insurer in this case was less than clear the rule that ambiguous terms in an insurance policy should be read in favor of coverage applied; and (2) the employee was covered at the time of his demise. View "Ministeri v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer, Wood Ranch USA, Inc. (Wood Ranch) for compensatory and punitive damages on nine different causes of action. Wood Ranch moved to compel arbitration. The trial court granted the motion and stayed the pending court proceedings. Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s prior order compelling arbitration. Invoking sections 1281.97 and 1281.99, Plaintiff argued that Wood Ranch’s late payment of its share of the initiation fees constituted a material breach of the arbitration agreement.   The trial court granted the motion, and the Second Appellate District affirmed the court’s order vacating its earlier order compelling arbitration between the parties in this case. The appeal presents a question of first impression: Are these provisions preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)? The court held that they are not because the procedures they prescribe further—rather than frustrate—the objectives of the FAA to honor the parties’ intent to arbitrate and to preserve arbitration as a speedy and effective alternative forum for resolving disputes.   The court explained that Sections 1281.97 and 1281.99 undeniably single out arbitration insofar as they define procedures that apply only to arbitrated disputes. But that they are arbitration-specific is not sufficient to warrant preemption by the FAA. Further, these sections in this case do not interfere with the FAA’s first goal of honoring the parties’ intent. Moreover, applying these sections, in this case, does not interfere with the FAA’s second goal of safeguarding arbitration as an expedited and cost-efficient vehicle for resolving disputes. View "Gallo v. Wood Ranch USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Current and former Minnesota state employees brought an action seeking damages for money deducted from their paychecks by unions that represented their local bargaining units. Although the Supreme Court held the deduction practice unlawful in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), the district court determined that the unions acted in good faith reliance on state statutes and existing judicial precedent. Accordingly, the court ruled that the unions were entitled to a defense to liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and dismissed the employees’ claims.   The employees appealed arguing that there is no good-faith defense to liability for damages under Section 1983. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgments. The court explained because the unions collected fair-share fees under Minn. Stat. Section 179A.06 at a time when the procedure employed had been deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court, their reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable, and they are entitled to a good-faith defense. Even if subjective intent were deemed relevant, the employees have pleaded no facts to support a plausible inference that the unions collected these fees in subjective bad faith. The good-faith defense thus bars the employees’ claims for damages. View "Eric Brown v. AFSCME" on Justia Law

Appellants are four Minnesota state employees who sued unions that represented their local bargaining units. The employees sought monetary relief based on the amount of so-called “fair-share” fees that were deducted from employee paychecks for the benefit of the unions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the unions.  On appeal, the employees argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the unions on each of the claims for retrospective relief.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the unions’ reliance on Section 179A.06 was objectively reasonable. It is an open question whether subjective intent is relevant to the defense, but the employees did not present a submissible case that the unions collected fair-share fees in subjective bad faith in any event. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the unions on these claims.   The unions prevailed on motions for summary judgment. The rules of civil procedure provide those costs “should be allowed to the prevailing party,” unless the court or a federal statute or rule directs otherwise. Further, the employees point to no authority that requires a district court to reduce an award of costs because a defendant opted to forgo a motion to dismiss and to file a dispositive motion only after developing a factual record. A defendant may choose how best to defend a lawsuit, and if the case is resolved in favor of the defense on a motion for summary judgment, then the defendant is presumptively entitled to costs. View "Linda Hoekman v. Education Minnesota" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a cross-complaint filed by Connor Callanan against Charles Menken, Steven Menken, and Grizzly Designs, LLC, dba Brotherly Love (collectively “the Menkens”) was a SLAPP suit subject to a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (known as the anti-SLAPP statute). The Menkens were “engaged in the research and development of various cannabis based products intended for marketing in the burgeoning cannabis market space.” Marino and Callanan owned and operated a business called UHSE Media LLC that provided media, marketing, and consulting services to the cannabis industry. In May 2019, the Menkens entered into an “oral agreement” with Marino and Callanan for such consulting services and agreed to pay them $30,000 each. The Menkens claimed that Marino and Callanan were independent contractors rather than employees. Marino and Callanan were “permitted” to live at the Menkens’ “business location” “as they deemed necessary” in order to do their consulting work, but they “were at all times free to come and go as they determined necessary and for their own purposes.” They began living and working at the Menkens’ business location in late May 2019. The Menkens contended “the substantial majority” of the work Marino and Callanan did on the farm was related to their independent media and consulting business, but that by November 2019, Marino and Callanan were failing to perform media and consulting services and were instead spending most of their time harvesting and processing cannabis. Marino and Callanan also began demanding sums of money “they believed they were entitled to under California’s wage and hour laws.” At this point, the parties’ relationship “became openly hostile” and Marino and Callanan (allegedly) set fire to a building that was used as an office and sleeping quarters, causing over $100,000 in damages. The Menkens contended Callanan’s cross-complaint was a SLAPP suit because it was filed in retaliation for a cross-complaint they filed against Callanan, and they filed a motion under section 425.16 seeking to strike it. The trial court granted the motion, and Callanan appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Callanan’s cross-complaint was not a SLAPP suit because none of his claims arose from the filing of the Menkens’ cross-complaint. View "Callanan v. Grizzly Designs, LLC" on Justia Law

First Data Technologies, Inc. (“First Data”), a credit and debit card processing company, employed Plaintiff as a call center representative. Plaintiff submitted a request pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) as a result of back pain she was experiencing from an automobile accident that occurred 15 days earlier. After a series of contested events, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against First Data with the EEOC, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Finding no evidence of an ADA violation, the EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of rights.   Plaintiff later filed a complaint in the district court and First Data moved to dismiss Cowgill’s FMLA retaliation claim as time-barred, as well as Plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim because Plaintiff’s failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of the ADA retaliation claim, as well as the grant of summary judgment as to the disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment because the court erred in holding that there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on the disability discrimination claim. The court explained that Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all inferences as the nonmovant, thus the court concluded that there is a genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff met First Data’s legitimate expectations. Further, the court found that Plaintiff satisfied the final requirement of her disability discrimination claim because a reasonable factfinder could conclude that First Data’s proffered explanation served as pretext for an impermissible consideration. View "Terri Cowgill v. First Data Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review in this case centered on whether California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.4 authorized the trial court to stay a plaintiff’s action on the basis of a pending arbitration to which the plaintiff was not a party. Ann Leenay brought an action against her former employer, Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC (Lowe’s), under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court granted a petition to coordinate her action with a number of other PAGA actions against Lowe’s. Lowe’s then moved to stay the coordinated actions under section 1281.4. Lowe’s based the motion on over 50 arbitration proceedings against it, but Leenay and the other plaintiffs in the coordinated actions were not parties in any of those arbitration proceedings. The trial court granted the motion to stay, and Leenay filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to vacate the order. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by granting the motion to stay. "[S]ection 1281.4 applies only when a court has ordered parties to arbitration, the arbitrable issue arises in the pending court action, and the parties in the arbitration are also parties to the court action. Under those circumstances, the court must stay the action (or enter a stay with respect to the arbitrable issue, if the issue is severable)." Those circumstances did not exist in this case. The Court therefore granted Leenay’s writ petition. View "Leenay v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law