Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this action brought against Troy University, an accredited, four-year state university with several campuses in Alabama and an office in Fayetteville, North Carolina, alleging various tort claims arising out of his employment and termination, holding that Troy University explicitly waived its sovereign immunity.Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Troy University and two individual defendants asserting, among other things, claims for wrongful discharge from employment in violation of public policy and negligent retention or supervision of an employee. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on sovereign immunity, citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019), which established that states are required to recognize sovereign immunity of other states as a matter of constitutional law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) Troy University explicitly waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in North Carolina; and (2) therefore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's suit against Defendants. View "Farmer v. Troy University" on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew Shouse was terminated from his employment as a captain of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO, the Department, or respondent), following an administrative hearing. Findings on the record reflected petitioner engaged in improper sexual relationships with subordinates under his command, misappropriated county equipment and electronic mail for his personal use, was insubordinate in violating a direct order prohibiting him from contacting any person with whom he had had a personal relationship during the pendency of the investigation, and unbecoming conduct discrediting the Sheriff’s Department. Following an administrative appeal, the findings were sustained. Petitioner petitioned for writ of mandate seeking review of his dismissal, and, upon denial of that petition, he appealed. The sole legal issue presented was whether petitioner’s rights pursuant to the Public Safety Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBRA) were violated where the investigation into his alleged improper conduct was not completed within one year of discovery. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Shouse v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Travelers Indemnity Company appeals the judgment entered after the superior court denied Travelers’ petition for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the Insurance Commissioner’s decision that certain agreements relating to workers’ compensation insurance policies issued to Adir International, LLC were unenforceable. Travelers contended that Adir’s lawsuit in the trial court, which included a request for a declaratory judgment the agreements were void, barred the Commissioner, under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, from exercising jurisdiction while that lawsuit was pending. Travelers also appealed the post-judgment order granting Adir’s motion for attorney fees, contending attorney fees were not authorized.   The Second Appellate Division affirmed the order and judgment denying Travelers’s petition. The court explained that the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction doctrine does not apply in this context to proceedings pending before the trial court and an administrative agency; and, in any event, it was reasonable and consistent with the primary jurisdiction doctrine for the trial court to defer to the Commissioner’s determination of the validity of the agreement at issue. In addition, because Adir’s administrative claim fell within the agreement’s attorney fee provision, the court affirmed the post-judgment order awarding Adir attorney fees. View "The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Lara" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decisions of the lower tribunals resolving Claimant's permanent total disability (PTD) claim in his favor after denying his petition to reopen his occupational pneumoconiosis permanent partial disability (OP PPD) claim for further evaluation, holding that the lower tribunals erred in part.At issue in the instant consolidated appeals were Claimant's attempt to reopen his OP PPD claim for further evaluation and his claim for permanent total disability (PTD) due to his various impairments. While Claimant's PTD claim was still being litigated, he unsuccessfully filed two petition to reopen his OP PPD claim. The lower tribunals denied Claimant's reopening petitions but awarded him PTD. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) W. Va. Code 23-4-16(e) does not preclude reopening of a permanent disability claim because another permanent disability claim is pending; and (2) the lower tribunals were not clearly wrong in determining that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled. View "Delbert v. Murray American Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying a motion for summary judgment filed by Adam Goodman and Paul Underwood (collectively, Petitioners) in this personal injury case arising from an accident in which Blake Auton was injured, holding that the allegations against Petitioners were those of pure negligence, which were barred by workers' compensation immunity.In its order denying summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Goodman was action within the scope of his employment while he was driving a garbage truck that backed over Auton and that additional discovery was required relating to Underwood's actions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction for the circuit court to grant summary judgment to Petitioners, holding (1) Petitioners were both clearly acting in furtherance of their employer's business when the accident occurred; and (2) therefore, workers' compensation immunity barred the cause of action and entitled Petitioners to summary judgment. View "Goodman v. Auton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Clay County Development Corporation (CCDC) in regard to Petitioners' claims of discrimination in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code 5-11-2 and -9, and breach of an implied employment contract, holding that the circuit court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) as used in the Act, ancestry means discrimination based on some characteristic like race, ethnicity, or national origin that is passed down by lineal descendants, and in the context of employment, familial status is not included among the groups entitled to protection under the Act; and (2) the circuit court did not err in its finding that Plaintiffs were at-will employees and as such could be terminated for any non-discriminatory reason. View "Keener v. Clay County Development Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims against the U.S. Attorney General because she failed an allegedly discriminatory physical-fitness test that was a condition of her federal employment and was told to either retake the test, resign, or be fired. She resigned. The district court dismissed her complaint for lack of Article III standing, finding that her resignation did not constitute an “adverse employment action” that could serve as the basis of either claim.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings. The court held that the district court inappropriately intertwined its standing analysis with the merits. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered financial and job-related injuries in fact that are fairly traceable to the government’s action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. View "Jane DiCocco v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the determination of the district court that Plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III to bring this action alleging a violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148 et seq. but vacated the federal district court's judgment dismissing this case, holding that remand was required for a determination as to whether remand to state court was appropriate.Plaintiffs, who worked as delivery drivers for a service provider for FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., brought this action alleging that their supervisor told them he was withholding part of their weekly pay for tax remittance to federal and state tax authorities and that he never sent the deducted amounts to those tax authorities. Plaintiffs sued FedEx for violating the Wage Act in Middlesex County Superior Court. FedEx invoked diversity jurisdiction and removed the action to federal district court, which dismissed the case on that basis that Plaintiffs lacked standing. The First Circuit remanded the case to the district court, holding that while Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing remand was required for the district court to order supplemental briefing on whether remand to state court was appropriate. View "Plazzi v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Employer and dismissing Employee's claims alleging age discrimination and retaliation against a protected activity, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.After he was terminated, Employee brought this action stating that the grounds for his firing were pretextual. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, dismissing Employee's complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment to Employer on Employee's age discrimination and retaliation claims; and (2) did not err in denying Employee's evidentiary motions. View "Dusel v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Nathaniel Sheehan lost his job during the COVID-19 pandemic. He applied for and began receiving unemployment benefits. This appeal arose out of the Idaho Department of Labor’s (“IDOL”) later determination that Sheehan was: (1) ineligible for unemployment benefits; and (2) required to repay the benefits he had already received. Sheehan represented himself throughout this case. He appealed these decisions to the Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”), claiming he had received misleading instructions concerning notice from IDOL. The Commission dismissed his appeal and later denied his motion for reconsideration. Sheehan then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. "While Sheehan presents a poignant story rife with compelling circumstances, we are bound to follow the rules and law of jurisdictional authority." The Court affirmed the Idaho Industrial Commission. View "Sheehan v. Sun Valley Company" on Justia Law