Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The San Diego City Attorney brought an enforcement action under the Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. (UCL), on behalf of the State of California against Maplebear Inc. DBA Instacart (Instacart). In their complaint, the State alleged Instacart unlawfully misclassified its employees as independent contractors in order to deny workers employee protections, harming its alleged employees and the public at large through a loss of significant payroll tax revenue, and giving Instacart an unfair advantage against its competitors. In response to the complaint, Instacart brought a motion to compel arbitration of a portion of the City’s action based on its agreements with the individuals it hires ("Shoppers"). The trial court denied the motion, concluding Instacart failed to meet its burden to show a valid agreement to arbitrate between it and the State. Instacart challenged the trial court’s order, arguing that even though the State was not a party to its Shopper agreements, they were bound by its arbitration provision to the extent they seek injunctive relief and restitution because these remedies were “primarily for the benefit of” the Shoppers. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court’s order. View "California v. Maplebear Inc." on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and dismissing Plaintiff's claims that the FAA violated Title VII by retaliating against her for filing a formal complaint of religious discrimination, holding that a reasonable juror could conclude that retaliatory animus influenced Defendant's decision-making and proximately caused Plaintiff's termination.Plaintiff violated the FAA's alcohol and drug policy when she was arrested for an alcohol-related offense. By self-reporting her infraction, Plaintiff avoided disciplinary action if she completed a rehabilitation plan supervised by the FAA. Plaintiff objected on religious reasons to the plan's requirement that she attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and complained of religious discrimination, even after the FAA approved her participation in an alternate recovery program. The district court concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish a causal link between the formal complaint and her termination and granted summary judgment to the FAA. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that, under the causation standard for federal-sector retaliation claims, a reasonable juror could conclude that retaliatory animus influenced the FAA's decision-making and proximately caused Plaintiff's termination. View "Huff v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an emergency medical resident, began working for Crozer Chester Medical Center (“CCMC”). Plaintiff signed an at-will employment agreement with CMCC and an agreement to arbitrate with Prospect Health Access Network (“Prospect”), a company that employs professionals working at hospitals. After Plaintiff was involved in a dispute with a supervisor at CMCC, who also was an employee of Prospect, Plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against CMCC. CMCC moved to compel arbitration.The district court denied CMCC's motion to compel arbitration and CMCC appealed.On appeal the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff's agreement to arbitrate any disputes between herself and Prospect did not extend to disputes involving CMCC. View "Dina Abdurahman v. Prospect CCMC LLC" on Justia Law

Grant Bauserman, Karl Williams, and Teddy Broe, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, brought a putative class action in the Michigan Court of Claims against the Unemployment Insurance Agency, alleging that the Agency violated their due-process rights, and that the Agency also engaged in unlawful collection practices. Plaintiffs, who were all recipients of unemployment compensation benefits, specifically alleged defendant had used an automated fraud-detection system, the Michigan Integrated Data Automated System (MiDAS), to determine that plaintiffs had received unemployment benefits for which they were not eligible and then garnished plaintiffs’ wages and tax refunds to recover the amount of the alleged overpayments, interest, and penalties that defendant had assessed without providing meaningful notice or an opportunity to be heard. Among other remedies for this constitutional violation, plaintiffs sought monetary damages. Although the Michigan Supreme Court had never specifically held that monetary damages were available to remedy constitutional torts, the Court now held that they were. “Inherent in the judiciary’s power is the ability to recognize remedies, including monetary damages, to compensate those aggrieved by the state, whether pursuant to an official policy or not, for violating the Michigan Constitution unless the Constitution has specifically delegated enforcement of the constitutional right at issue to the Legislature or the Legislature has enacted an adequate remedy for the constitutional violation. Because enforcement of Const 1963, art 1, § 17 has not been delegated to the Legislature and because no other adequate remedy exists to redress the alleged violations of plaintiffs’ rights, we agree that plaintiffs have alleged a cognizable constitutional-tort claim for which they may recover money damages and we agree with the lower courts that defendant was properly denied summary disposition.” View "Bauserman v. Unemployment Insurance Agency" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court upholding the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) finding that Todd Moats's condition prevented him from returning to his previous job but nonetheless denying his application for benefits, holding that substantial evidence supported that determination.Moats's peripheral neuropathy caused him to leave his job as a forklift operator and apply for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income through the Social Security Administration. The ALJ denied benefits, determining that, although Moats suffered from impairments that prevented him from returning to his forklift position, he could still perform a number of jobs available throughout the national economy. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision; and (2) the ALJ satisfied his duty to investigate and develop the relevant facts. View "Moats v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint that the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) discriminated against him based on his age and disability in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Rehabilitation Act, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted.A committee overseeing a training center at which Plaintiff taught voted to demote Plaintiff from his instructor position, citing ethical concerns that arose when Plaintiff's son was accepted to the training program. Plaintiff brought this complaint, alleging violations of the ADEA and Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment for TVA. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding (1) where a jury could infer that Plaintiff's supervisor used the ethical concern as a pretext to convince the other members of the committee to demote him, summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADEA and Rehabilitation Act claims was unwarranted; and (2) the district court incorrectly dismissed Plaintiff's retaliation claim. View "Bledsoe v. Tennessee Valley Authority Board of Directors" on Justia Law

The Board of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund (“the Fund”) sought to recover a delinquent exit contribution from Four-C-Aire, Inc., a former participating employer, under Section 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). 29 U.S.C. Section 1145. The Fund claims Four-C-Aire’s obligation arose under a collective-bargaining agreement (“the CBA”) between the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association Local Union No. 58 and the Central New York Sheet Metal Contractors Association, a multiemployer bargaining unit. According to the Fund, Four C-Aire signed on to this preexisting agreement while it was a member of the Contractors Association.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Four-C-Aire adopted the agreement by its conduct. The court held that even if Four-C-Aire had preserved the issue, it’s meritless. The record contains several iterations of the written trust documents, including those imposing the exit-contribution requirement. And the Fund’s Director of Operations verified each version of the document in a declaration to the district court. Further, the court wrote there is no evidence the trust documents are invalid. In sum, Four-C-Aire offers no reason why the court shouldn’t enforce the plain terms of the agreement and trust documents, as ERISA requires. View "Board of Trustees v. Four-C-Aire, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying Claimant's claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits from the Second Injury Fund, holding that the Commission appropriately found that Claimant was not permanently and totally disabled.Claimant filed an amended workers' compensation claim against Employer, alleging that his primary work-related injuries were "bilateral upper extremities" and asserting a claim against the Fund for PTD benefits due to a prior injury to his bilateral lower extremities. An administrative law judge denied PTD benefits, and the Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Claimant failed to carry his burden of persuasion in demonstrating that he was entitled to PTD benefits. View "March v. Treasurer of Missouri" on Justia Law

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in favor of National Railroad Passenger Corporation and other railroad companies, the Ninth Circuit held that, as to railroad employees, the federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act preempts California’s Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act, which requires employers to provide employees with paid sick leave that they may use for specified purposes.   RUIA provides unemployment and sickness benefits to railroad employees, and it contains an express preemption provision disallowing railroad employees from having any right to “sickness benefits under a sickness law of any State.” Looking at the plain meaning of the statutory text, the court concluded that the preemption provision broadly refers to compensation or other assistance provided to employees in connection with physical or mental well-being. The court concluded that RUIA’s statutory framework and stated purposes confirm the breadth of its preemptive effect.   The court found unpersuasive an argument by the California Labor Commissioner and union-intervenors that RUIA does not preempt the California Act as to railroad employees because the benefits the Act offers are different in kind than RUIA’s benefits. The court also found unpersuasive (1) an argument that RUIA should be interpreted as preempting only the kinds of state laws that existed at the time RUIA was amended to provide for sickness benefits; and (2) various textual arguments in support of a narrower interpretation of the preemption provision. View "NAT'L RAILROAD PASSENGER CORP. V. JULIE SU" on Justia Law

Manivannan asserts he is one of the leading materials scientists in the United States. He was hired by the federal Department of Energy (DOE) in 2005 and assigned to the National Energy Technology Laboratory. “Conflict best defined Manivannan’s time at the DOE”. He resigned following allegations of disturbing actions taken against an intern, with whom Manivannan allegedly had a sexual relationship. The allegations prompted an internal investigation and a state criminal prosecution for stalking.Manivannan has since filed several lawsuits relating to those events, including this action under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 2671–80, based on the agency’s disclosure of records to state prosecutors, its alleged negligence in conducting the internal investigation, and its refusal to return his personal property. A Magistrate dismissed those claims as precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. 1101 because they arose in the context of Manivannan’s federal employment. The Third Circuit reversed in part; a narrower inquiry is required. Under this inquiry, much of the conduct challenged by Manivannan, such as the internal investigation, still falls within the CSRA’s broad purview, but some conduct, such as the refusal to return property and cooperation in the state prosecution, does not. View "Manivannan v. United States Department of Energy" on Justia Law