Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

East Bay Drywall, LLC was a drywall installation business that hired on a per-job basis. Once a builder accepts East Bay’s bid for a particular project, East Bay contacts workers -- whom it alleged to be subcontractors -- to see who is available. Workers are free to accept or decline East Bay’s offer of employment, and some workers have left mid-installation if they found a better job. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether those workers were properly classified as employees or independent contractors under the Unemployment Compensation Law, which set forth a test -- commonly referred to as the “ABC test” -- to determine whether an individual serves as an employee. On June 30, 2013, East Bay, a business registered as an employer up to that point, ceased reporting wages to the Department of Labor and Workforce Development. Consequently, an auditor for the Department conducted a status audit that reviewed the workers East Bay hired between 2013 and 2016 to determine whether they were independent contractors, as defined by the ABC test. The auditor ultimately found that approximately half of the alleged subcontractors working for East Bay between 2013 and 2016 -- four individuals and twelve business entities -- should have been classified as employees. The Department informed East Bay that it owed $42,120.79 in unpaid unemployment and temporary disability contributions. The Supreme Court was satisfied that all sixteen workers in question were properly classified as employees, but it remanded the case back to the Department for calculation of the appropriate back-owed contributions. View "East Bay Drywall, LLC v. Department of Labor and Workforce Development " on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court entering summary judgment to Defendants and dismissing this complaint brought by Plaintiff, the former general counsel for Chicago State University, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings.Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several University defendants alleging that the University fired him in retaliation for reporting a potential conflict of interest in violation of the First Amendment and Illinois's State Officials and Employees Ethics Act and that Defendants violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by not paying him severance pay. The district court entered summary judgment for Defendants. The Seventh District affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's actions fell outside the Ethics Act and that Plaintiff's speech lacked protection under the First Amendment. View "Cage v. Harper" on Justia Law

In this putative class action filed shortly after two fatal crashes of new Boeing 737 MAX airliners led to a worldwide grounding of those planes and a halt to production, resulting to a significant drop in the value of Boeing stock, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that there was no error.At issue was The Boeing Company's employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and whether Boeing plan fiduciaries' delegation to an independent outside fiduciary the selection and management of investment options for the ESOP protected the company and company insiders from liability for the plan's continued offering of Boeing stock as an independent option for employees before and during the time when the Boeing stock dropped. Plaintiffs argued that Boeing's continuous concealment of material facts relating to the 737 MAX jets caused the price of the stock to be artificially inflated and that Defendants should disclosed the safety issues to the public immediately. The district court dismissed the action. The Seventh District affirmed, holding that the delegation of investment decisions to an independent fiduciary meant that Boeing did not act in an ERISA fiduciary capacity in connection with the continued investments in Boeing stock. View "Burke v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked at the University of Arkansas-Pulaski Technical College (“UAPTC”). In April 2018, Plaintiff requested and received leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to care for her mother who had cancer. After being notified that her position would be eliminated in an upcoming reorganization she applied for a different position. The hiring committee led by Defendant interviewed Plaintiff and five other candidates. After the interview, the committee hired another applicant to whom Defendant had given a more favorable interview score.   Plaintiff sued the Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas, members of the Board of the Trustees in their official capacities, the hiring committee director in his official and individual capacities, and UAPTC. Among other claims, she alleged that the hiring committee director violated the FMLA by discriminating and retaliating against her.   The district court denied the summary-judgment motion in relevant part, rejecting the hiring director’s qualified immunity defense on the ground that “qualified immunity is not available to defendants on an FMLA claim.” The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The court explained that the district court’s rejection of the hiring director’s qualified-immunity defense was based on a misreading of our statement in Darby v. Bratch. The court construed the statement in Darby about qualified immunity to mean that the FMLA clearly established the violative nature of the particular conduct in that case, not that qualified immunity can never be available on an FMLA claim. View "Rebecca Sterling v. Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a woman with severe autism, and her mother, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Menards. Plaintiff's mother, who was also a plaintiff in the suit, arranged to have a job coach help Plaintiff obtain employment. However, despite the coach being willing to help Plaintiff through her orientation, Menards did not allow the coach to be present. After orientation, Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement without the opportunity to show it to her job coach. Ultimately, Plaintiff was terminated and filed this case.Menards moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied Menards' request, resulting in this appeal.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the fact Plaintiff's mother was appointed as Plaintiff's conservator did not necessarily mean that Plaintiff lacked the ability to enter into the contract. However, the court held that the record was not sufficiently developed to determine whether the facially valid contract was revocable under the void contract defense. Thus, the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Mary Triplet v. Menard, Inc." on Justia Law

Intervenor Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. (“Browning-Ferris”) operates a recycling plant in Milpitas, California, where it employs about 60 workers. Browning-Ferris contracts with Leadpoint Business Services (“Leadpoint”), which provides BrowningFerris with approximately 240 additional recyclery workers. Petitioner Sanitary Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 350, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the “Union”) filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) to represent Leadpoint’s recyclery workers, asserting that Browning-Ferris and Leadpoint are joint employers of Leadpoint’s workers.   The Union petitioned the DC Circuit to vacate two of the NLRB’s recent orders, in which the Board declined to hold Browning-Ferris to be a joint employer under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”). The DC Circuit granted the Union’s petition. The court explained that the Board failed to establish that Browning-Ferris represented the kind of clear departure from longstanding and settled law that the agency said justified its retroactivity conclusion. Further, the court wrote that the Board erred in holding that there was “no variation or explanation” of the joint-employer test in Browning-Ferris I that would not result in manifest injustice. The Board failed to explain how it would be a manifest injustice for the Board to consider all of those factors here in light of the agency’s assertion in its 2020 rulemaking that it had previously considered reserved and indirect control in assessing joint-employer status. View "Sanitary Truck Drivers v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Helen Jordan, a nurse who was formerly employed by the predecessor to the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, challenged in the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) the decision of a magistrate that she was not entitled to disability benefits under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA). In 1995, plaintiff was working for defendant’s predecessor when she was injured during an altercation with a patient. Plaintiff was prescribed opioid medication to treat leg and back pain that she said resulted from the 1995 injury, and she used the opioid medication continuously after the incident and became dependent upon it. Plaintiff began receiving disability benefits under the WDCA in 1996. In 2015, plaintiff underwent an independent medical examination at defendant’s request pursuant to MCL 418.385. The doctor who conducted the examination concluded that any disability experienced by plaintiff was not the result of the 1995 incident, and defendant subsequently discontinued plaintiff’s benefits. Plaintiff applied for reinstatement of her benefits under the WDCA. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the agency record was too incomplete to facilitate “meaningful” appellate review: “Despite the MCAC’s conclusion, whether the experts agreed that plaintiff had a limitation of her wage-earning capacity in work suitable to her qualifications and training was not clear from the record.” Therefore, the Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred by deciding this case as a matter of law because further administrative proceedings were needed. View "Jordan v. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

The San Diego City Attorney brought an enforcement action under the Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. (UCL), on behalf of the State of California against Maplebear Inc. DBA Instacart (Instacart). In their complaint, the State alleged Instacart unlawfully misclassified its employees as independent contractors in order to deny workers employee protections, harming its alleged employees and the public at large through a loss of significant payroll tax revenue, and giving Instacart an unfair advantage against its competitors. In response to the complaint, Instacart brought a motion to compel arbitration of a portion of the City’s action based on its agreements with the individuals it hires ("Shoppers"). The trial court denied the motion, concluding Instacart failed to meet its burden to show a valid agreement to arbitrate between it and the State. Instacart challenged the trial court’s order, arguing that even though the State was not a party to its Shopper agreements, they were bound by its arbitration provision to the extent they seek injunctive relief and restitution because these remedies were “primarily for the benefit of” the Shoppers. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court’s order. View "California v. Maplebear Inc." on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and dismissing Plaintiff's claims that the FAA violated Title VII by retaliating against her for filing a formal complaint of religious discrimination, holding that a reasonable juror could conclude that retaliatory animus influenced Defendant's decision-making and proximately caused Plaintiff's termination.Plaintiff violated the FAA's alcohol and drug policy when she was arrested for an alcohol-related offense. By self-reporting her infraction, Plaintiff avoided disciplinary action if she completed a rehabilitation plan supervised by the FAA. Plaintiff objected on religious reasons to the plan's requirement that she attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and complained of religious discrimination, even after the FAA approved her participation in an alternate recovery program. The district court concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish a causal link between the formal complaint and her termination and granted summary judgment to the FAA. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that, under the causation standard for federal-sector retaliation claims, a reasonable juror could conclude that retaliatory animus influenced the FAA's decision-making and proximately caused Plaintiff's termination. View "Huff v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an emergency medical resident, began working for Crozer Chester Medical Center (“CCMC”). Plaintiff signed an at-will employment agreement with CMCC and an agreement to arbitrate with Prospect Health Access Network (“Prospect”), a company that employs professionals working at hospitals. After Plaintiff was involved in a dispute with a supervisor at CMCC, who also was an employee of Prospect, Plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against CMCC. CMCC moved to compel arbitration.The district court denied CMCC's motion to compel arbitration and CMCC appealed.On appeal the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff's agreement to arbitrate any disputes between herself and Prospect did not extend to disputes involving CMCC. View "Dina Abdurahman v. Prospect CCMC LLC" on Justia Law