Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Musker v. Suuchi, Inc.
Rosalyn Musker worked in sales for Suuchi, Inc., which sells software subscriptions to apparel manufacturers. In addition to her base salary, Musker was eligible for commissions under Suuchi’s Sales Commission Plan (SCP). In March 2020, Suuchi decided to sell Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) on a commission basis due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Musker generated approximately $34,448,900 in gross revenue by selling PPE. The parties disputed whether her 4% commission was based on gross or net revenue and whether these commissions were considered "wages" under the Wage Payment Law (WPL) or excluded as "supplementary incentives."The trial judge dismissed Musker’s WPL claims, holding that her PPE commissions were not "wages" under the WPL. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that the commissions were "supplementary incentives" and not "wages" under the WPL. Musker appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. The Court held that under the WPL, "wages" are defined as "direct monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis." The Court concluded that compensating an employee by paying a "commission" for "labor or services" always constitutes a wage under the WPL. Therefore, a "commission" cannot be excluded from the definition of "wages" as a "supplementary incentive."The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, vacated the trial judge’s order dismissing Musker’s WPL claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court clarified that Musker’s PPE commissions are "wages" under the WPL, regardless of whether they are based on gross or net revenue, and that receiving a base salary does not turn "commissions" into "supplementary incentives." View "Musker v. Suuchi, Inc." on Justia Law
Del Rio v. Amazon.com.DECE, LLC
Three former employees of Amazon filed a class action complaint seeking payment for straight-time and overtime wages under Connecticut’s wage laws for time spent undergoing mandatory security screenings after clocking out. The employees argued that this time should be compensable under state law. Amazon required employees to pass through security screenings when exiting the secured area of their fulfillment centers, but not upon entry. The screenings involved metal detectors and varied based on the personal belongings employees carried. Employees were not compensated for the time spent in these screenings.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of Amazon, dismissing the employees' complaint. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, which held that time spent in mandatory security screenings is not compensable under federal law. The employees appealed the decision and moved to certify a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the applicability of Connecticut’s wage laws to their case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the question of whether Connecticut’s wage laws require compensation for time spent in mandatory security screenings is unresolved. The court decided to certify this question to the Connecticut Supreme Court for a definitive resolution. Additionally, the court asked the Connecticut Supreme Court to address whether a de minimis exception applies to such compensable time and, if so, what amount of time is considered de minimis. The Second Circuit reserved its decision and dismissed the employees' motion to certify as moot, pending the Connecticut Supreme Court's response. View "Del Rio v. Amazon.com.DECE, LLC" on Justia Law
Theisz v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
The plaintiff, Matthew Theisz, was assaulted by an MBTA bus driver with a known history of anger management issues and prior violent incidents. The MBTA had hired, promoted, and retained the driver despite his problematic behavior, including a previous assault on a passenger and an arrest following a confrontation with a police officer. On the day of the incident, Theisz, lost and frustrated, attempted to get the driver's attention, leading to a violent altercation where the driver severely beat him, resulting in a traumatic brain injury.The Superior Court denied the MBTA's motion for summary judgment, which argued that it was immune from liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA), specifically G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j). The MBTA contended that the claim was based on a failure to prevent harm by a third person. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial, and the MBTA sought further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that § 10 (j) does not provide immunity to the MBTA for its own negligence in hiring, promoting, retaining, and supervising the bus driver. The court held that the MBTA's affirmative act of placing the driver in a public-facing position, despite his known violent tendencies, materially contributed to the harm suffered by Theisz. The court also reaffirmed that § 10 (c) of the MTCA, which provides immunity for intentional torts, does not shield the MBTA from liability for its own negligent supervision and retention of the driver. The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Theisz v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority" on Justia Law
Stirling v. North Slope Borough School District
A school principal used the school's printer after hours to create a coaster as a retirement gift for a friend. The coaster design contained the School District's official logo but altered the District's motto in a disrespectful manner. A custodian took pictures of the coaster, which were shared on social media, leading to public outrage. The principal left the community the next day. The District proposed to terminate him for incompetence and violating anti-harassment policies. After a brief pretermination hearing, the District terminated the principal. The principal appealed, and the Board upheld the termination following an additional hearing.The principal then appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed his termination. The court found that the District had grounds to terminate the principal due to substantial noncompliance with District rules and regulations and that the community's reaction to the coaster was reasonable. The court also rejected the principal's free speech arguments, stating that his speech was not protected under the First Amendment. The court acknowledged that the pretermination hearing process was flawed but deemed the error harmless due to the subsequent post-termination hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the Board had a reasonable basis to terminate the principal for incompetency under AS 14.20.170(a)(1) due to his inability to perform his duties effectively after the incident. The court also concluded that the principal's termination did not violate his free speech rights under AS 14.20.095 or the First Amendment. However, the court found that the pretermination hearing process did not provide sufficient due process, as the principal was not informed of his right to call witnesses. The court affirmed the termination but reversed the superior court's decision denying back pay, awarding back pay through the date of the Board's post-termination hearing decision. View "Stirling v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law
Perez v. Rose Hills Company
Elizabeth Perez, a former employee of Rose Hills Company, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, alleging violations of California wage-and-hour laws. The complaint did not specify the amount in controversy or the frequency of the alleged violations. Rose Hills removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows removal if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case to state court, stating that Rose Hills did not meet CAFA’s $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement. The district court found that Rose Hills failed to provide evidence justifying its assumed violation rate, which was used to calculate the amount in controversy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a removing defendant under CAFA is permitted to rely on reasonable assumptions based on the plaintiff’s complaint to calculate the amount in controversy. The court found that Rose Hills’ approach, which included assumptions about the violation rate tethered to the language of the complaint, was reasonable. The district court erred by requiring Rose Hills to provide evidence supporting its assumed violation rate.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to evaluate whether Rose Hills’ violation-rate assumption was a reasonable interpretation of the complaint. The court emphasized that assumptions need not be proven with evidence if they are reasonable interpretations of the complaint’s allegations. View "Perez v. Rose Hills Company" on Justia Law
Quality Custom Distribution Services LLC v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 710
A collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters Union and Quality Custom Distribution guaranteed that the top 80% of senior employees would receive at least 40 paid hours per week. During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Starbucks stores in or near Chicago closed or reduced their hours, resulting in senior employees averaging only 30 hours a week. The Union demanded that the employer make up the difference, but the employer refused, citing an exception for Acts of God.The dispute was taken to an arbitrator, who ruled in favor of the Union. The arbitrator determined that while epidemics might be considered Acts of God, the reduction in work was primarily due to the Governor of Illinois' orders, which were not Acts of God. The employer then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to nullify the arbitrator's decision. The district court judge declined to nullify the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that as long as the arbitrator interprets the contract, the award must stand. The arbitrator had interpreted the contract's "Act of God" clause, concluding it did not cover the Governor's orders. The court emphasized that judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to ensuring the arbitrator interpreted the contract, not whether the interpretation was correct. The court also noted that the employer's conduct in the litigation process imposed unnecessary costs and ordered the employer to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. View "Quality Custom Distribution Services LLC v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 710" on Justia Law
ExxonMobil v. National Labor Relations Board
ExxonMobil Technology and Engineering Company (Exxon) operates a research facility in New Jersey where approximately 165 employees are represented by the Independent Laboratory Employees Union (the Union). The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Exxon and the Union expired in May 2018. During negotiations for a new CBA, disputes arose over Exxon’s personal time off (PTO) policies and paid parental leave (PPTO). The Union wanted to restore a policy allowing supervisors to review PTO requests and sought eight weeks of PPTO for its members. Exxon refused to negotiate on these issues, citing concerns over inconsistencies and potential grievances.An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Exxon violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain in good faith on the supervisor PTO review issue, retaliating against the Union for past grievances, and suggesting that employees would receive PPTO if they decertified the Union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) initially reversed the ALJ’s findings in a 2020 decision. However, it was later discovered that a Board member involved in the decision had a conflict of interest, leading the NLRB to vacate the 2020 decision and reconsider the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in vacating the 2020 decision due to the conflict of interest. The court also upheld the NLRB’s findings that Exxon refused to bargain in good faith on the supervisor PTO review issue and retaliated against the Union for past grievances. Additionally, the court supported the NLRB’s conclusion that Exxon unlawfully suggested employees would receive PPTO if they left the Union. The court denied Exxon’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-petition for enforcement of its order. View "ExxonMobil v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law
O’Horo v. Boston Medical Center Corporation
Dr. Susan O'Horo, an interventional radiologist and Director of Quality and Safety at Boston Medical Center Corporation (BMC), alleged that she faced discriminatory and retaliatory actions at her workplace. She claimed that her efforts to report safety concerns, particularly regarding a colleague, Dr. Mikhail Higgins, were met with hostility and that she was ultimately forced to resign due to the intolerable work environment.In the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Dr. O'Horo filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B, and the Massachusetts Health Care Whistleblower Act (MHCWA). The defendants, including BMC, Boston University Medical Center Radiologists, Inc. (BUMCR), and Dr. Jorge Soto, moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended granting the motion, and the district court adopted this recommendation, dismissing all of Dr. O'Horo's claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Dr. O'Horo failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination or retaliation. The court found that the alleged adverse actions, such as the reassignment of her duties and the scheduling of reviews, did not constitute materially adverse employment actions. Additionally, the court concluded that the hostile work environment claim was insufficient as the workplace was not objectively hostile or abusive. The aiding and abetting claim under Chapter 151B was dismissed as it was derivative of the failed discrimination claims. Lastly, the court held that Dr. O'Horo did not establish a prima facie case under the MHCWA, as she failed to show that the actions taken against her were retaliatory. View "O'Horo v. Boston Medical Center Corporation" on Justia Law
Kuo v. Dublin Unified School Dist.
Catherine Kuo was killed while volunteering at a food distribution event organized by the Dublin Unified School District (DUSD). Her family and estate sued DUSD for negligence and premises liability, alleging failure to implement and communicate safety protocols. DUSD moved for summary judgment, arguing that Labor Code section 3364.5, which deems school volunteers as employees entitled to workers' compensation benefits, barred the plaintiffs' claims.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, granted DUSD’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that section 3364.5 applied, providing that workers' compensation was the sole remedy for any injury, including death, sustained by volunteers while performing their duties. The court found that the statute's plain language and legislative history supported this interpretation, and thus, it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the term "any injury" in section 3364.5 unambiguously includes fatal injuries. The court also determined that DUSD’s resolution, which declared volunteers entitled to workers' compensation benefits, satisfied the statutory requirement, even though it did not explicitly use the word "deemed." The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the statute did not apply because DUSD did not treat its volunteers as employees in practice, noting that the statute did not require such conduct.The appellate court concluded that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of DUSD, affirming that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs' claims. View "Kuo v. Dublin Unified School Dist." on Justia Law
Brown v. Conagra Brands, Inc.
Judy Brown, a biracial woman, was hired by Conagra Brands, Inc. in October 1997. After a workplace injury in 2015, she became disabled and filed a workers' compensation claim in 2017. Conagra temporarily transferred her to a different position as an accommodation and continued paying her at the higher rate until July 2020, when her work restrictions became permanent, and her pay was reduced. Following the death of a colleague, Conagra posted job openings, and Brown applied for a position but was not selected. She was assigned to less favorable shifts and subsequently filed discrimination charges. Brown was fired in December 2021 and sued Conagra, alleging race and disability discrimination, retaliation, and violation of Nebraska common law.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted Conagra’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Brown did not challenge the district court’s finding that her race and disability discrimination claims based on the July 2020 pay reduction were time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal, finding that Brown failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claims. Specifically, she did not provide enough details to infer race discrimination, did not plausibly allege a disability under the ADA or NFEPA, and did not establish a causal connection for her retaliation claims. Additionally, the court found that Brown did not state a plausible claim for common law unlawful retaliation, as she did not allege any immediate precipitating events or facts that could infer a causal nexus between her workers' compensation claim and the adverse employment actions. View "Brown v. Conagra Brands, Inc." on Justia Law