Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Stephen Lowery, a heavy equipment operator in the logging industry, filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer, Galen Kuykendall Logging, and its surety, Associated Loggers Exchange. Lowery claimed that his work caused a new occupational disease at the L3-4 level of his spine, distinct from his previous L5-S1 injury. Kuykendall Logging argued that Lowery's L3-4 condition was a continuation of his prior degenerative disease, which began in 1992.The Idaho Industrial Commission initially found that Lowery failed to prove his L3-4 injury resulted from an accident but concluded it was a compensable occupational disease. The Commission determined that Lowery's L3-4 condition arose independently from his previous L5-S1 issues and was aggravated by his work as a shovel logger. The Commission awarded Lowery medical and time loss benefits but denied permanent partial impairment or disability benefits. Kuykendall Logging filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Lowery's occupational disease manifested while he was employed by another company, Evergreen Timber.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the Commission's findings were supported by substantial evidence, including expert opinions that Lowery's L3-4 condition was a new occupational disease caused by his work. The Court also agreed that Lowery's occupational disease manifested on or after June 19, 2019, while he was employed by Kuykendall Logging. The Court found that Lowery complied with the notice and limitation requirements and that the Nelson doctrine did not preclude his recovery. Finally, the Court held that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by retaining jurisdiction and holding a second hearing to determine Lowery's last injurious exposure. View "Lowery v. Kuykendall" on Justia Law

The City of Great Falls unilaterally revised its drug and alcohol policy in 2019, expanding the scope of employees subject to random testing and imposing stricter penalties without negotiating with the affected labor unions. The unions filed unfair labor practice complaints, alleging that the City's actions violated the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act (MPECBA). The Montana Board of Personnel Appeals (MBPA) consolidated the complaints and referred them to a hearing examiner, who ruled in favor of the unions, concluding that the City's unilateral policy changes constituted unfair labor practices.The City did not file exceptions to the hearing examiner's proposed decision, which became the final agency decision by default. Instead, the City petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the hearing examiner's decision involved purely legal questions that should be reviewed by the court. The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, dismissed the petition, citing the City's failure to exhaust administrative remedies by not seeking final agency review.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the City's failure to exhaust the final agency review remedy provided by MPECBA and the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) precluded judicial review. The Court clarified that there is no jurisprudential exception to the exhaustion requirement for purely legal or constitutional questions in the context of MAPA contested case proceedings. The City's petition for judicial review was thus correctly denied and dismissed. View "Great Falls v. Assoc. of Firefighters" on Justia Law

The case involves Sunder Energy, LLC (Sunder), a solar sales dealer, and its former employee, Tyler Jackson, along with several other defendants. Sunder sought to enforce restrictive covenants against Jackson, who had joined a competitor, Solar Pros LLC, and allegedly recruited Sunder employees to the new company. The restrictive covenants were part of Sunder's operating agreement, which Jackson signed without negotiation or full understanding of its terms.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware denied Sunder's motion for a preliminary injunction to enforce the restrictive covenants. The court found the covenants unenforceable for two reasons: they originated from an egregious breach of fiduciary duty by Sunder's principals, and they were facially unreasonable. The court also declined to "blue pencil" the covenants to make them reasonable, citing the overbroad and oppressive nature of the restrictions. Additionally, the court ruled that Utah law governed Sunder's tortious interference claim against Jackson's new employers, which effectively dismissed that claim under Utah law.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision in part and reversed it in part. The Supreme Court agreed that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in refusing to blue pencil the restrictive covenants, given the lack of negotiation, minimal consideration, and the overbroad nature of the covenants. The Supreme Court also upheld the application of Utah law to the tortious interference claim. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery's ruling that the operating agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law, stating that such a determination exceeded the scope of the preliminary injunction stage and should await a complete factual record. View "Sunder Energy, LLC v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Ali Bahreman, a flight attendant for Allegiant Air, challenged the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Allegiant and the Transport Workers Union (Union). The CBA required employees to either pay union dues or agency fees to maintain seniority-based bidding privileges for work schedules. Bahreman chose not to pay any fees and subsequently lost his bidding privileges. He argued that this arrangement violated the Railway Labor Act (RLA) by coercing employees to join the Union, deviating from the employment-termination remedy, and breaching the Union's duty of fair representation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment in favor of Allegiant and the Union. The court found that the CBA did not violate the RLA's anti-coercion provision, as it did not induce employees to join the Union. The court also held that the RLA does not prohibit collective bargaining agreements with terms other than those explicitly permitted by the Act. Additionally, the court determined that the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation, as it enforced the CBA equally among all members of the bargaining unit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the RLA does not prohibit a collective bargaining agreement that conditions seniority-based bidding privileges on the payment of union dues or agency fees. The court found that the CBA did not induce union membership, as it treated union members and nonmembers alike regarding payment requirements. The court also concluded that the CBA's terms were permissible under the RLA and that the Union did not act arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith in enforcing the agreement. View "Bahreman v. Allegiant Air, LLC" on Justia Law

Karl Hansen sued Tesla, Inc., its CEO Elon Musk, and U.S. Security Associates (USSA), alleging retaliation for reporting misconduct at Tesla. Hansen, initially hired by Tesla, was later employed by USSA. He reported thefts, narcotics trafficking, and improper contracts at Tesla, and filed a report with the SEC. After Musk saw Hansen at the Gigafactory and demanded his removal, USSA reassigned Hansen, which he claimed was retaliatory.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada ordered most of Hansen’s claims to arbitration, except his Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) claim. The arbitrator dismissed Hansen’s non-SOX claims, finding no contractual right to work at the Gigafactory and no reasonable belief of securities law violations. The district court confirmed the arbitration award and dismissed Hansen’s SOX claim, holding that the arbitrator’s findings precluded relitigation of issues essential to the SOX claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that while an arbitrator’s decision cannot preclude a SOX claim, a confirmed arbitral award can preclude relitigation of issues underlying such a claim. The court found that the arbitrator’s decision, which concluded Hansen had no reasonable belief of securities law violations, precluded his SOX claim. The court also held that the arbitrator’s findings on Hansen’s state law claims had a preclusive effect, as they were confirmed by the district court. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Hansen’s complaint. View "Hansen v. Musk" on Justia Law

Participants in Deloitte LLP’s 401(k) retirement plan filed a class action lawsuit against the plan fiduciaries, alleging that they breached their fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by allowing excessive administrative and recordkeeping fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the fees were higher than those of comparable plans and that the fiduciaries failed to obtain lower fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the fees were excessive relative to the services provided. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint, deeming it futile as the proposed amendments did not cure the deficiencies in the original complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible inference that the defendants breached their duty of prudence. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not adequately compare the services provided by the plan to those of the comparator plans, nor did they provide context to show that the fees were excessive. The court also upheld the dismissal of the derivative claim for failure to monitor, as it was dependent on the primary claim of breach of fiduciary duty. View "Singh v. Deloitte LLP" on Justia Law

In 2015, Michael Shields, a mechanic for the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (RTA), injured his left shoulder. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation approved his claim for left shoulder strain. In 2017, Shields sought benefits for a related right shoulder injury, which the bureau denied. Shields then sued in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and in May 2022, a jury found him entitled to benefits for the right shoulder injury. The RTA appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on April 27, 2023.Following the appellate court's decision, Shields filed a motion on May 8, 2023, seeking $26,221 in appellate attorney fees or a remand to the trial court to determine the fees. The RTA opposed, arguing the motion was untimely and that Shields had waived the issue by not seeking fees earlier. The appellate court ruled in favor of Shields, allowing him to recover appellate attorney fees and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court held that a worker who prevails at trial in a workers’ compensation action may request attorney fees after obtaining an appellate judgment on the merits. The court emphasized that the workers’ compensation statute should be liberally construed in favor of employees and found no statutory requirement for the timing of such a request. The court dismissed the RTA's arguments regarding the timing and jurisdiction of the fee request and did not address the issue of fee caps, as it was not ripe for review. View "Shields v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation" on Justia Law

In April 2020, a nursing home decided to pay its employees bonuses in recognition of their efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic. These bonuses were temporary salary increases, which were gradually reduced over the next few months until salaries returned to almost original levels. The company did not notify the union representing its employees or provide an opportunity to bargain before implementing and scaling back the bonuses. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that the bonuses were wages subject to mandatory bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially found that the bonuses were gifts rather than wages and thus not subject to mandatory bargaining. The ALJ also found that the management rights clause in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) authorized the company's actions. However, the ALJ found the company violated the Act by failing to respond to the union's information request.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB's determination that the bonuses were wages tied to employment-related factors and constituted hazard pay, making them subject to mandatory bargaining. The court also agreed with the NLRB that the management rights clause did not survive the CBA's expiration and thus did not authorize the company's unilateral actions. The court denied the company's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement, including the make-whole remedy for affected employees and compensation for adverse tax consequences. The court also enforced the order regarding the company's failure to respond to the information request. View "Alaris Health at Boulevard East v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In 2021, New Jersey enacted the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), which prohibits employers from refusing to hire job applicants based on cannabis use. In 2022, a retailer rescinded a job offer to an applicant, Erick Zanetich, after he tested positive for cannabis. Zanetich filed a lawsuit claiming the retailer's action violated CREAMMA and public policy. He sought redress individually and on behalf of a putative class.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed both counts of Zanetich's complaint. The court found that CREAMMA does not imply a private remedy for violations of its employment protections and that New Jersey's public policy exception to at-will employment does not apply to job applicants. Zanetich appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit held that CREAMMA does not imply a private remedy for job applicants who fail drug tests for cannabis. The court applied New Jersey's modified Cort test and found that CREAMMA does not confer a special benefit on job applicants, there was no legislative intent to provide a private remedy, and implying such a remedy would not advance CREAMMA's purposes. Additionally, the court held that New Jersey's public policy exception to at-will employment, as established in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., does not extend to job applicants. The court also declined to certify the state-law issues to the New Jersey Supreme Court, finding no significant uncertainty or importance warranting certification. View "Zanetich v. WalMart Stores East Inc" on Justia Law

Dr. Tara Gustilo, an Asian American obstetrician-gynecologist of Filipino descent, was demoted from her position as Chair of the OBGYN Department at Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc. (HHS) in April 2021. Following her demotion, she filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently sued HHS, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), as well as a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment in favor of HHS, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the race discrimination, retaliation, and First Amendment claims. The court concluded that Dr. Gustilo failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and that there was no evidence she opposed an unlawful employment practice. Additionally, the court found no material fact dispute regarding whether the HHS Board considered her Facebook posts in its decision to demote her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, finding that there was a material fact dispute regarding whether the HHS Board ratified the MEC's decision and the basis for it, which included consideration of Dr. Gustilo's Facebook posts. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the posts were protected speech and to apply the Pickering balancing test.The court declined to review the district court's summary judgment rulings on the Title VII and MHRA claims at this time, as they are now interlocutory. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Gustilo v. Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc." on Justia Law