Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint in this case for failure to state a claim, holding that an employee discharged after testing positive at work based on recreational marijuana use does not have a common-law tortious discharge claim.Plaintiff was terminated from his employment based on a positive test result for marijuana. Plaintiff brought this complaint arguing that he did not use marijuana in the twenty-four hours before that shift and that his use complied with Nevada's recreational marijuana laws. The district court dismissed the complaint. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether adult recreational marijuana use qualifies for protection under Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.333. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that because federal law criminalizes the possession of marijuana in Nevada, marijuana use is not lawful in the state and does not support a private right of action under Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.333. View "Ceballos v. NP Palace, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal presents the question of whether the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) may order an employer to reimburse a union for legal fees incurred during the contract bargaining process. The Ninth Circuit held that it may, and granted the NLRB’s petition for enforcement of its compliance order.The Board found that the employer engaged in unusually aggravated misconduct sufficient to warrant more than a traditional remedy, and ordered the employer to reimburse the union for the costs and expenses the union incurred during collective bargaining sessions. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Board’s findings and enforced its orders in full. The parties could not reach an agreement on the total amount the employer should be required to pay in remedies, and in July 2018, the Regional Director for NLRB Region 27 issued a compliance specification detailing how much the employer owed.The court rejected the employer’s argument that D.C. Circuit precedent established that the Board lacked the power to order the reimbursement of legal fees. The court held that the D.C. Circuit’s opinions were specifically limited to the context of litigation, and they did not bar the award at issue here. The National Labor Relations Act grants the Board broad discretion to impose remedies for unfair labor practices. The court held that the award of legal fees, in this case, was exactly the sort of remedy that courts have upheld as within the Board’s statutory remedial authority. View "NLRB V. AMPERSAND PUBLISHING, LLC" on Justia Law

After IAC signed an Employment Agreement with Roston making him its CEO, the relationship soured. Roston disagreed with his employer about the value of his stock appreciation rights. He became the CEO of Bluecrew, another affiliate of IAC’s parent company, but the employment relationship deteriorated until Roston was terminated. His former employers later discovered that Roston had retained a company laptop, documents, and confidential data. The companies sought declarations that Roston was not entitled to more payments based on the stock appreciation rights and was not wrongfully terminated and alleged breach of contract.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint by an Illinois district court, citing the forum non conveniens doctrine. The district court balanced the relevant public interest factors reasonably and noted little local Illinois interest. The Employment Agreement stated that it “shall be governed by and construed under and in accordance with the internal laws of the State of California without reference to its principles of conflicts of laws. Any such dispute will be heard and determined before an appropriate federal court located in the State of California in Alameda County … each party hereto submits itself and its property to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the foregoing courts with respect to such disputes. Roston had filed suit in Alameda County Superior Court, alleging wrongful termination. View "IAC/InterActiveCorp v. Roston" on Justia Law

In 2016, Thompson was accepted a position as the Education Unit Supervisor for the Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth and their Families (DSCYF) with a one-year probationary period. Thompson’s predecessor, Porter, successfully contested her termination. In 2017, Thompson was informed that Porter would be reinstated as Education Supervisor and that Thompson would become the Transition Coordinator. DSCYF did not permit Thompson to pursue a grievance. Thompson worked as the Transition Coordinator for several weeks, then had emergency surgery in May 2017. Thompson’s probationary period was set to end in July 2017. Unbeknownst to Thompson, her probationary period was extended. Thompson returned to work in October 2017. DSCYF demoted Thompson to a teaching position. Thompson was not allowed to contest the demotion. Thompson lacked the necessary special education certifications for her new position. Porter recommended in April 2018 that Thompson be terminated for failure to obtain special education certifications. Thompson filed a grievance. Thompson was terminated from DSCYF on July 2, 2018.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Thompson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of her due process rights. As a former probationary employee at DSCYF, Thompson did not have a protected property interest in her employment. Thompson’s claim under the Delaware Whistleblowers’ Protection Act was dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment precluded the claim. View "Thompson v. State of Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth and their Families" on Justia Law

Three Anoka County residents sued a school district and teachers’ union about their union leave and reimbursement plan, alleging constitutional and statutory violations. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The residents appealed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that pleading jurisdiction requires only “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” while pleading the merits requires not just “a short and plain statement of the claim,” but one that “show[s] that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Here, the residents adequately alleged they are school district taxpayers and identified a “municipal action” contributing to their injury. Specifically, the school district spends tax revenues on the allegedly illegal action because the collective-bargaining agreement requires it to provide up to 100 days of paid leave, and the union does not fully reimburse that expense. Since the district court did not address the preliminary injunction factors, the common approach is to remand for the district court to conduct the full analysis in the first instance. View "Don Huizenga v. ISD No. 11" on Justia Law

In this tort suit brought against an employer by an employee the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying both parties' motions for summary judgment, holding that the court erred in denying the employer's motion for summary judgment.The employee in this case died after falling off the roof of a building he was working on for a subcontractor. After the employee's estate brought this tort action the employer moved for summary judgment, asserting that under S.D. Codified Laws 62-3-2, workers' compensation was the estate's exclusive remedy. In response, the estate argued that the exception to S.D. Codified Laws 52.-3-2 for intentional torts applied. The circuit court denied summary judgment for either party. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that there was no issue of material of fact in dispute on the question of whether the employer committed an intentional tort in this case. View "Althoff v. Pro-Tec Roofing, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiffs' hybrid breach of contract and fair representation claim, their Takings Clause claim, and their claim for declaratory relief, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Plaintiffs, five sergeants in the City of Cranston Police Department, brought this lawsuit against the City of Cranston, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301 (the Union), and Matthew Josefson. Plaintiffs were promoted to the rank of sergeant during the time period between Josefson's demotion and reinstatement and then, after Josefson's reinstatement, moved down one position in sergeant rank seniority. Plaintiffs brought suit, alleging several claims. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims failed. View "Barth v. City of Cranston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court issuing a permanent writ of mandamus in favor of Jim Swoboda, holding that the circuit court's decision was erroneous because Swoboda failed to establish that he was entitled to mandamus relief.Swoboda filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights against his employer and Armstrong Teasdale, LLP (the Law Firm), alleging retaliation, disability, and aiding and abetting as types of discrimination he faced in retaliation for participating in a discrimination case brought by another officer. The Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because there was no employer-employee relationship between Swoboda and the Law Firm. The circuit court issued a writ of mandamus finding that the Commission erred in dismissing the charge without first taking certain steps. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the issuance of mandamus relief was foreclosed where, rather than seeking to enforce a previously delineated right, Swoboda attempted to adjudicate whether his claim was permissible under applicable statutes. View "State ex rel. Swoboda v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the judgment of the Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board (ARB) affirming an administrative law judge's (ALJ) determination that BNSF Railway Company had a valid same-action affirmative defense to Plaintiff's retaliation claim, holding that substantial evidence supported the decision.Plaintiff, a train engineer, brought an administrative complaint with the Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA) alleging that BNSF, his employer, violated the Federal Railroad Safety Act by retaliating against him for raising safety concerns and refusing to engage in unsafe practices. OSHA dismissed the complaint. A Department of Labor ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim based on the statutory same-action affirmative defense. The ARB affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review, holding that substantial evidence supported the ARB's decision that the same-action defense applied to BNSF's discipline of Plaintiff. View "Brousil v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Administrative Review Board" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) decided that Constellium Rolled Products had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. Section 158(a)(1), (3), by suspending and terminating an employee for offensive conduct done in the course of protected Section 7 activity, 29 U.S.C. Section 157. On review, this DC Circuit court held that the Board had based its decision “upon substantial evidence” without “impermissibly depart[ing] from precedent without explanation,” but had failed to address the potential conflict between its interpretation of the NLRA and Constellium’s obligations under state and federal equal employment opportunity laws. On remand, the Board affirmed its earlier decision but used a different analytical framework to do so. Constellium argued that the Board has failed to reconcile the conflict upon which we remanded the case and challenges the Board’s most recent analysis.   The DC Circuit concluded that the Board sufficiently addressed the conflict between the NLRA and Constellium’s antidiscrimination obligations and reasonably found that Constellium terminated the employee in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. Section158(a)(1), (3). Accordingly, the court denied Constellium’s petition and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order. The court explained that an employer may defend against allegations that its act of discipline against an employee engaged in protected activity violated the NLRA by demonstrating that its motive was adherence to anti-discrimination laws. This approach addresses the potential conflict between the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA and Constellium’s obligations under state and federal equal employment opportunity laws. View "Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law