Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The issue in this case revolves around which union—the International Association of Machinists (“IAM”) or the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (“ILWU”)—is entitled to represent the mechanic workforce at the Ben Nutter Terminal in Oakland, California.For many years, the Terminal’s mechanics were represented by the IAM. In 2015, Everport Terminal Services, Inc., took over the Terminal’s operation and decided to hire a new workforce. As a member of the multi-employer Pacific Maritime Association (“PMA”), Everport was party to a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the PMA and the ILWU. As Everport read that agreement, it required Everport to prioritize ILWU applicants in hiring its new mechanics and to recognize the ILWU as their representative. Everport therefore gave qualified ILWU applicants first choice of the available mechanic positions, filling the remaining vacancies with applicants from the Terminal’s existing, IAM-represented workforce.The NLRB found that Everport had unlawfully discriminated against the Terminal’s incumbent mechanics on the basis of their IAM affiliation; that it had violated its statutory obligation to recognize and bargain with the incumbent mechanics’ chosen union, the IAM; and that it had prematurely recognized the ILWU as the representative of the Terminal’s mechanics. The NLRB also found the ILWU had unlawfully demanded and accepted recognition from Everport. In its order, the Board did not dispute—or even engage with— Everport’s reading of the PMA-ILWU agreement, instead dismissing it as a “red herring.”The D.C. Circuit held that the NLRB's action was arbitrary, granted Everport's petition for review, and vacated the NLRB's order. View "Everport Terminal Services Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In July 2017, Jeremy Thornhill said that he had injured his back while working. He sought workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, Walker-Hill and its insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois (collectively, Employer/Carrier), but the Employer/Carrier denied that Thornhill had sustained a compensable injury. Ultimately, the parties agreed to compromise and settled pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 71-3-29 (Rev. 2021). Thornhill submitted the settlement to the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission for approval. After examining the application, the Commission approved the settlement and dismissed Thornhill’s case with prejudice. Pursuant to the settlement, Thornhill signed a general release,” which reserved his right to pursue a bad faith claim. Believing he had exhausted his administrative remedies, Thornhill filed a bad faith suit against the Employer/Carrier. The Employer/Carrier moved to dismiss, arguing that Thornhill had not exhausted administrative remedies—and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction—because the Commission never made a factual finding that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court granted the motion on that basis. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that Thornhill indeed exhausted his administrative remedies and that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear his bad faith claim. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court’s decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thornhill v. Walker-Hill Environmental, et al." on Justia Law

In this class action, participants in a drug and alcohol recovery program alleged the program assigned them to work for defendant Hendren, a private company that paid the program for their services. Plaintiffs alleged the defendants failed to pay them the required minimum wage. The district court held that plaintiffs were employees and granted them relief. Defendant appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the fact that the work Plaintiffs performed as participants in a court-ordered recovery program benefited Hendren did not make the program participants employees of either the program or Hendren. Thus, because Plaintiffs were not employees, they were not entitled to relief. View "Mark Fochtman v. Hendren Plastics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of a general contractor based on the general contractor's statutory immunity under S.D. Codified Laws 62-3-10, holding that the circuit court properly concluded that workers' compensation was the sole remedy available to Appellant.Plaintiff received a work-related injury at a construction site where his employer was a subcontractor. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from his employer and then filed a negligence claim against the construction project's general contractor. The general contract subsequently amended its answer to assert statutory immunity under section 62-3-10. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the general contractor, concluding that the general contractor remained potentially liable for workers' compensation under S.D. Codified Laws 62-3-10 and, because of the exclusivity provisions of section 62-3-2, workers' compensation was Plaintiff's sole remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment for JM. View "Ries v. JM Custom Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court determining that the procedures leading to the dismissal of Petitioner from the City of Rawlins Fire Department violated Petitioner's right to due process and ordering her to be reinstated with back pay, holding that the Rawlins Fire Department Civil Service Commission's decision terminating Petitioner's employment was supported by substantial evidence in accordance with law.The Commission concluded that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was "sufficient and established" pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 15-5-112(b) because Petitioner violated Civil Service Commission Rules 21.3 and 2.7 and ordered Petitioner's employment be terminated. In so concluding, the Commission explicitly rejected Petitioner's argument that she was denied due process. The trial court reversed, finding that Petitioner's due process rights were violated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner was afforded due process prior to her discharge by the Commission; and (2) the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "City of Rawlins v. Schofield" on Justia Law

Crozer owns healthcare companies that operate as wholly owned subsidiaries: Prospect, employs professionals working at hospitals; CCMC, is a hospital and hired Abdurahman as an emergency medical resident. Abdurahman signed new-hire paperwork, including an at-will employment agreement with Crozer and an arbitration agreement with Prospect. Several weeks later, Abdurahman signed a residency agreement with CCMC. Dr. Jacobs was an employee of Prospect, working as CCMC’s Director of Toxicology and supervised Abdurahman. Abdurahman alleged that Jacobs sexually harassed her; Jacobs claimed the opposite and informed CCMC Human Resources that Abdurahman had assaulted her. The dispute escalated until Abdurahman was fired.Abdurahman filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the EEOC, alleging defamation and discrimination under Title VII, Title IX, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. She subsequently filed suit against CCMC and Jacobs. The district court denied a motion to compel arbitration. The Third Circuit affirmed. Abdurahman signed an arbitration agreement with Prospect, not CCMC. That agreement cannot stretch to govern Abdurahman’s employment with CCMC. The court noted that the corporations are sophisticated entities that drafted the forms. View "Abdurahman v. Prospect CCMC LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant La’Tonya Ford worked at Jackson National Life Insurance (“Jackson”) for about four years. During her time there, Ford allegedly suffered sex- and race-based discrimination; faced retaliation for complaining about her treatment; endured a hostile work environment; and was constructively discharged. After she left Jackson for another job, Ford sued the company for (1) discrimination; (2) retaliation; (3) hostile work environment; and (4) constructive discharge. Jackson moved for summary judgment; the district court granted Jackson’s motion and dismissed all of Ford’s claims. Ford now appeals, urging us to reverse the court on each claim. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her discrimination claim. But it reversed in part the dismissal of her retaliation claim; her hostile-work-environment claim; and her constructive-discharge claim. View "Ford v. Jackson National Life, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding plaintiff Elba I. Falto De Roman only nominal damages against the Municipal Government of Mayguez and against its mayor, Jose Guillermo Rodriguez, on her complaint filed after was terminated from her position without having been afforded a due process hearing, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this action alleging, among other things, that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by terminating her without a hearing. After a trial on the issue of whether Plaintiff was entitled to damages as a result of not receiving a hearing, the jury found Defendants not liable for damages and awarded nominal damages of $1 in favor of Plaintiff. The district court denied Plaintiff's subsequently-filed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff waived her challenge to the district court's denial of her motion for judgment; and (2) Plaintiff did not meet the high bar for a new trial. View "Falto-de Roman v. Municipal Government of Mayaguez" on Justia Law

Northshore Mining Company filed a petition for review of a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) order stating that Northshore had failed to maintain the walkway in good condition after an employee was injured in 2016. The order attributed the violation to Northshore’s reckless disregard of and unwarrantable failure to comply with the walkway-maintenance mandatory standard. In addition, MSHA designated the violation as “flagrant.” Commission’s conclusions on reckless.The Secretary cross-petitioned for review of the Commission’s conclusions on the flagrant designation and individual liability. The Eighth Circuit denied Northshore’s petition on the issue of the company's reckless disregard and unwarrantable failure and granted the Secretary’s cross-petition for review of the Commission’s conclusions on the flagrant designation and individual liability. View "Northshore Mining Company v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Canyon County employed William Hartman as a heavy equipment operator at the Pickles Butte landfill in Nampa, Idaho, from 2012 until 2017. In February 2017, Hartman reported to Canyon County’s Human Resources Office that a female co-worker was being sexually harassed. The next month, Hartman, who was an army veteran, told both the director of the landfill, David Loper, and his immediate supervisor that he was taking narcotics prescribed to him for chronic pain. Canyon County requested Hartman provide, by a set deadline, medical documentation confirming his prescription and verifying that his use of narcotics would not adversely impact his ability to safely operate equipment. Hartman stated he was attempting to obtain the documentation, but he failed to provide it within the requested timeframe. On April 28, 2017, Loper sent Hartman a “Notice of Intent to Terminate,” informing him that his employment with Canyon County would be terminated effective May 2, 2017. The notice stated that pursuant to Rule 11.04 of the Canyon County Personnel Manual and “I.C. § 72-1701 et. seq. [sic],” Hartman could request a good faith hearing concerning the termination within two days of receiving the letter. Prior to Hartman’s receipt of the notice, Canyon County paid Hartman the balance of his accrued leave. Hartman did not request a good faith hearing. Hartman filed a notice of tort claim with Canyon County on July 27, 2017, alleging he had been unlawfully terminated. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on August 3, 2017. On November 28, 2018, Hartman filed a complaint against Canyon County, alleging: (1) disability-based discrimination in violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”); and (3) unlawful termination in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). Hartman later voluntarily dismissed his USERRA claim. After considering the parties’ supplemental briefing the district court issued a written decision, granting Canyon County’s motion for summary judgment. Finding that the district court erred in its grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hartman v. Canyon County" on Justia Law