Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked for a construction company, Performance Contractors (Performance). She sued under Title VII alleging sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the construction company. On appeal Plaintiff argued that when Performance prevented her from working at elevation because she was a woman, it effectively demoted her, which amounts to an adverse employment action. Second, Plaintiff argued that her hostile-work environment claim survives summary judgment because Performance knew (or should have known) about the severe or pervasive harassment, and because Performance is not entitled to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Third, she argues that a reasonable jury could find that Performance retaliated against her for opposing conduct that she reasonably believed would violate Title VI.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded concluding that Plaintiff raised genuine material fact issues on each claim. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was suspended and later fired because of her rejection of other employees’ harassment. Further, the court held that Performance was not entitled to summary judgment because reasonable jurors could find that Plaintiff was kept on the ground because she was a woman, and that she otherwise would have been allowed to work at elevation. Moreover, there is a material fact issue about whether Performance effectively implemented its anti-harassment policy. View "Wallace v. Performance Contractors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a captain in the Barstow Fire Protection District. The City of Barstow fired him for criminal and perjurious acts, for willful refusal to comply with official orders, and for setting a poor professional example for his subordinates, as well as for other charges no longer at issue. Plaintiff appealed through nonbinding advisory arbitration. Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the superior court. The superior court, exercising its independent judgment as to the City’s findings of misconduct, granted the writ in part and denied it in part   The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment of the superior court with directions to deny Plaintiff’s petition for writ of administrative mandate and to enter judgment for the City of Barstow. The court held that the trial court erred by remanding this case for the City to reconsider Plaintiff’s discipline. The court held that the evidence demonstrated a lack of credibility, reliability, and trustworthiness and were a reasonable basis for the City’s decision to sustain termination. View "Griego v. City of Barstow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment in favor of his employer, Ecolab, Inc. Plaintiff sued Ecolab under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA; Lab. Code, Section 2698 et seq.) alleging Ecolab improperly calculated the overtime due on a nondiscretionary bonus paid to Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. Ecolab successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground its formulation of the overtime payment comported with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). On appeal, Plaintiff argued California authorities require a different method of calculation and supersede federal authority in this instance because California provides greater protection to employees like him.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that having exercised the independent judgment the Supreme Court compels, it is not persuaded Ecolab was required to use the exact formulation presented in the section 49.2.4 example to calculate a percentage-based bonus such as the one Plaintiff received. Ecolab demonstrated Plaintiff would have been paid the same amount whether Ecolab used the section 49.2.4 formula as applied to percentage bonuses or the CFR 778.210 formula, so long as the calculation did not include overtime on overtime. View "Lemm v. Ecolab" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the company alleged to be a deceased worker's employer and dismissing this vicarious liability case, holding that the court of appeals erred.An oilfield worker was involved in a fatal accident as he was driving to the oilfield drilling site after completing personal errands. At issue was whether the court of appeals erroneously relied upon the "special mission" exception in declining to apply the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for negligence arising from employee travel to and from work. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a personal trip for groceries does not fall within the special mission exception to the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for an employee's negligent acts while the employee travels to and from work. View "Cameron International Corp. v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a long-time teacher in the Evergreen School District #114 (District) in Vancouver, Washington. Before the 2019–2020 school year began, he attended two days of teacher training and brought with him a MAGA hat. The question, in this case, is whether the First Amendment was violated when a principal told Plaintiff he could not bring his Make America Great Again (MAGA) hat with him to teacher-only trainings on threat of disciplinary action and when the school board affirmed the denial of the teacher’s harassment complaint filed against the principal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. The panel first concluded that Plaintiff was engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment because the undisputed facts demonstrated that his MAGA hat conveyed a message of public concern, and he was acting as a private citizen in expressing that message. The record failed to establish, however, that the school district’s Chief Human Resource Officer, took any adverse employment action against Plaintiff, and for this reason, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against that defendant failed as a matter of law.   Further, any violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by the principal was clearly established where longstanding precedent held that concern over the reaction to controversial or disfavored speech itself does not justify restricting such speech. For these reasons, the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the principal. View "ERIC DODGE V. EVERGREEN SCHOOL DISTRICT #114, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation approving Claimant's request for benefits, holding that there was no error.Claimant injured her shoulder and necker while working for Employer. While Employer and Insurer initially paid Claimant benefits, her claim for surgery and additional benefits was subsequently denied. Claimant filed a petition seeking a hearing on her claims. Thereafter, the Department approved Claimant's request for benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Claimant's work injury was a major contributing cause of her impairment and need for treatment; and (2) there was no error in the Department's findings concerning medical opinion testimony or causation. View "News America Marketing v. Schoon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Robert Parsons worked for Defendant-respondent Estenson Logistics, LLC (Estenson) , and Estenson paid its employees weekly. Estenson’s pay period ran from Sunday through the following Saturday. It paid its employees on the second Monday after the end of the pay period, which was nine calendar days after the end of the pay period. If Monday was a holiday, it paid its employees on Tuesday, which was 10 calendar days after the end of the pay period. California Labor Code section 204(d) provided that wages for employees who are paid weekly were deemed timely if paid “not more than seven calendar days following the close of the payroll period.” What happens if the seventh calendar day falls on a Saturday? Parsons argued the wages had to be paid on that Saturday. Estenson argued the wages could be paid the following Monday, because Code of Civil Procedure section 12a provided that weekends were holidays, and further provided, “If the last day for the performance of any act provided or required by law to be performed within a specified period of time is a holiday, then that period is hereby extended to and including the next day that is not a holiday.” The trial court agreed with Estenson, and granted summary judgment in its favor on a wage and hour claim brought by Parsons. To this, the Court of Appeal also agreed, and thus affirmed. View "Parsons v. Estenson Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) granting in part and denying in part Petitioner's motion for summary judgment, holding that the WCC erred in part.At issue on appeal was whether the WCC erred when it ruled that the aggregate wages of Petitioner, a disabled worker, calculated at the time of injury, are used to determine Petitioner's permanent partial disability (PPD) benefit rate regardless of Petitioner's actual wage loss at maximum healing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WCC erred by ruling that Petitioner's PPD indemnity benefit rate was aggregated from both of her time-of-injury employments when she was only precluded from one employment upon reaching maximum medical improvement. View "Barnhart v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) that Respondent was entitled to workers' compensation benefits, holding that Respondent was not entitled to relief on his claims on appeal.A licensed psychologist diagnosed Respondent, a former deputy sheriff for Carlton County, with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A compensation judge ruled that Respondent was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because a subsequent psychological evaluation requested by the County resulted in a diagnosis of major depressive disorder but not PTSD. The WCCA reversed, holding (1) under Minn. Stat. 176.011, subd. 15(e), deputy sheriffs are entitled to a presumption that PTSD is an occupational disease if they present a diagnosis of PTSD, regardless of whether their employer offers a competing diagnosis; and (2) Respondent was entitled to the benefit of the presumption that he had a compensable occupational disease, and the County failed to rebut the presumption. View "Juntunen v. Carlton County" on Justia Law

An elementary school nurse who unsuccessfully attempted to save the life of a choking child sought workers’ compensation benefits for mental health problems she attributed to the incident. She argued that she suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to exposure to the child’s bodily fluids and resulting risk of disease and to the mental stress of the incident. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied her claims, concluding that her exposure to bodily fluids was not a sufficient physical injury to trigger a presumption of compensability and that the mental stress of the incident was not sufficiently extraordinary or unusual to merit compensation. The Board was most persuaded by the opinion of the employer’s medical expert that the nurse’s mental health problems were the result of a pre-existing mental health condition and were not caused by the incident. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court found: (1) the Board failed to recognize the link between exposure to bodily fluids and mental distress over the risk of serious disease, which under Alaska precedent was enough to establish a presumption that the mental distress is compensable; and (2) the Board failed to consider the particular details of the child’s death and the nurse’s involvement when it concluded as a general matter that the stress of responding to a choking incident at school was not sufficiently extraordinary to merit compensation for mental injury. However, because the Board found in the alternative that the incident was not the cause of the nurse’s mental health problems, and because both the Commission and the Alaska Supreme Court had to respect the Board’s credibility determinations and the weight it gave conflicting evidence, the denial of benefits was affirmed. View "Patterson v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District" on Justia Law