Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs here—proposed class representatives of former employees of various Burger King franchisees—plausibly alleged that Burger King and its franchisees engaged in “concerted action” in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district court, though, dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint on the basis that Burger King and its franchisees constituted. A single economic enterprise and were not capable of the concerted action that a Section 1 violation requires.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the complaint plausibly alleged concerted action. The court explained that the No-Hire Agreement removes that ability and also prohibits the hiring of any Burger King employee for six months after they have left another Burger King restaurant. In this way, the No-Hire Agreement “deprive[s] the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking [about hiring], and therefore of actual or potential competition.” For this reason, the court wrote, that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the No-Hire Agreement qualifies under Section 1 of the Sherman Act as “concerted activity,” and the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that aspect of a Sherman Act Section 1 violation. View "Jarvis Arrington, et al v. Burger King Worldwide, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of his complaint -- which alleges whistleblower protection and discrimination claims relative to his employment at the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (the “DEA” or the “Agency”) -- for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the whistleblower protection claims, and the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims. However, the court remanded the case to the district court so that it may consider in the first instance whether it possesses subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Appellant’s discrimination claims.   The court explained that Appellant points out that if an IRA appeal cannot serve as the basis for a mixed case, then an employee alleging both WPA claims and discrimination claims would be required to pursue those claims separately. But because the MSPB cannot consider an employee’s discrimination allegations as part of his IRA appeal, his WPA claims and his discrimination claims are, by necessity, already bifurcated.   Lastly, Appellant argues that even if he failed to allege a mixed case, the district court should still have considered his discrimination claims. However, the district court considered only whether Appellant’s discrimination claims were properly before it as part of a mixed case, not whether it could adjudicate the Title VII claims independently of the other claims. Accordingly, remand is necessary for the district court to decide in the first instance whether it may address the merits of Appellant’s Title VII claims. View "Robert Zachariasiewicz, Jr. v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a local delivery driver for Cintas Corporation. That means he picked up items from a Houston warehouse (items shipped from out of state) and delivered them to local customers. Lopez does not want to arbitrate his claims against Cintas. He says that he is exempt from doing so because he belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.   The Fifth Circuit partially affirmed the district court’s ruling finding that Plaintiff is not a “transportation worker” under Section 1 of the FAA. However, because Plaintiff's unconscionability challenge to his employment agreement must be decided in arbitration, the court vacated and remanded for that claim to be dismissed without prejudice to be considered in arbitration in the first instance.   The court explained that unlike either seamen or railroad employees, the local delivery drivers here have a more customer-facing role, which further underscores that this class does not fall within Section 1’s ambit. As a result, the transportation-worker exemption does not apply to this class of local delivery drivers. Further, because unconscionability under Texas law is a challenge to the validity, not the existence, of a contract, that challenge must be resolved by an arbitrator. Thus, the court held that the district court erred in resolving the merits of Plaintiff’s unconscionability claim. View "Lopez v. Cintas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendant, Plaintiff's former employer, on her wrongful discharge claims brought under the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA), Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-905(1), holding that genuine issues of material fact remained.After Plaintiff was discharged from her employment she brought this action alleging that Defendant discharged her without good cause, as defined by Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-903(5), and in violation of Defendant's own personnel policy. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the wrongful discharge claims on the ground that the damages elements of those claims failed as a matter of law because Plaintiff failed reasonably to mitigate her claimed damages by seeking comparable full-time employment after her discharge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the causation of damages element of Plaintiff's asserted wrongful discharge claims. View "Timpano v. Central Mont. District Six Human Resources Development Council, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to multiple instances of racial harassment and other discrimination during two periods of employment with the defendant Oakland Living Center, Inc. (“OLC”). According to Plaintiff, she was compelled to resign for good in the summer of 2018 after repeatedly being called racial slurs by the six-year-old son of an OLC supervisor and others (collectively “Defendants”).   Plaintiff contests the district court’s award of summary judgment to OLC on her hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings on the claims against OLC.   The court explained that in considering all of the circumstances, the fact that the three n-word incidents were perpetrated by a six-year-old boy does not preclude a finding that those incidents are sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter Plaintiff’s conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment. Accordingly, the court rejected OLC’s contention that it is entitled to summary judgment for lack of an adequate showing on the third element of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.   Further, here, the record indicates that OLC failed to provide reasonable procedures for complaints of workplace harassment. OLC has produced no evidence that it had any harassment reporting policy in July and August 2018, when the three n-word incidents occurred. In these circumstances, a reasonable jury could charge OLC with constructive knowledge of all three n-word incidents. View "Tonya Chapman v. Oakland Living Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, firefighters with California’s Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, for the last ten years of their careers served as executive officers for the union. During that time, the plaintiffs were on full-time leave from their firefighting positions but remained Cal Fire employees. Neither took any holidays off during their tenure as union officers. They believed their positions to be “365 days a year, 24 hours a day.” No one at Cal Fire expressed any concern that they were not using any holiday credits. Cal Fire “cashed out” their holiday leave credits by issuing checks, whether the plaintiffs wanted that or not. The cash-outs were not reported to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) as income to be included in pension calculations.After the plaintiffs. retired, the union asked CalPERS to include the amounts they received in the cash-outs when calculating their final compensation, part of the formula on which pension benefits are based. CalPERS concluded the buy-downs were not “compensation earnable” under the Public Employees’ Retirement Law. (Gov. Code 20630(b), 20636). An ALJ and CalPERS’s board agreed. The court of appeal reversed. The plaintiffs’ holiday cash-outs were special compensation and must be included in calculating their pensions. View "Hale v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff made contributions to a 401(k) plan during her employment at Honeywell International Inc. She originally designated her husband, Defendant, as the sole beneficiary in the event of her death. The parties later divorced and in the marital termination agreement (MTA), they agreed that Plaintiff will be awarded, free and clear of any claim on the part of Defendant’s, all of the parties’ right, title, and interest in and to the Honeywell 401(k) Savings and Ownership Plan. Plaintiff submitted a change-of-beneficiary form to Honeywell. She, however, did not comply with a requirement.   Plaintiff died in 2019 and Honeywell paid the benefits to Defendant. The personal representative of Plaintiff’s estate sued Honeywell for breach of fiduciary duty, and Defendant for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and civil theft. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Honeywell and reversed summary judgment for Defendant on the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims.   The court explained that even if the Plan gave the administrator discretion to accept Plaintiff’s defective Form, it is not an abuse of discretion to act in accordance with plan documents. ERISA directs administrators to “discharge [their] duties . . . in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.” Thus, because Honeywell followed plan documents in rejecting Plaintiff’s defective change-of-beneficiary form and distributing benefits, the breach of fiduciary duty claim fails. Further, even if the MTA were ambiguous, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff and Defendant intended for the MTA to waive his beneficiary interest in the 401(k). View "Robert Gelschus v. Clifford Hogen" on Justia Law

Manuel sued for wrongful termination after he was injured during the course of his employment with BrightView. The parties dispute whether Manuel’s employment was terminated in retaliation for his job injury or whether he failed to return to work due to federal immigration authorities questioning his eligibility to work in the United States. After Manuel objected to BrightView’s written discovery requests concerning his immigration status, BrightView obtained an order compelling Manuel to provide further responses to its discovery requests.The court of appeal vacated and directed the trial court to deny BrightView’s discovery motion. BrightView did not meet its burden, under Senate Bill No. 1818 (2002, codified, in part at Labor Code section 1171.5), to show that inquiry into his immigration status was necessary to comply with federal immigration law. Senate Bill 1818 declared that “[a]ll protections, rights, and remedies available under state law, except any reinstatement remedy prohibited by federal law, are available to all individuals regardless of immigration status who have applied for employment, or who are or who have been employed, in this state." A former employee’s status as an unauthorized worker is not a complete defense to a claim of wrongful termination. BrightView may not propound discovery inquiring into Manuel’s immigration status absent any showing of clear and convincing evidence that Manuel is seeking remedies for wrongful termination in violation of federal immigration law. View "Manuel v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law

Crosbie was hired by Gateway to help Highmark, a health insurance company, investigate fraud. While auditing Highmark’s network of doctors, Crosbie claims he discovered that some doctors had prior convictions for selling opioid prescriptions; others lacked required Medicaid licenses. He reported his concerns to Gateway's managers. They investigated but did not take any action. Crosbie kept pressing the issue. More than a year after his report. Crosbie’s coworker lodged a complaint that Crosbie had called her “Miss Piggy” and “oinked” at her. Gateway’s human-resources team investigated. An eyewitness corroborated the complainant’s story. Other people described past issues between Crosbie and the complainant.Gateway fired Crosbie. Crosbie sued Gateway and Highmark under the False Claims Act for retaliation based on his fraud reports. The employers replied that the people who had decided to fire Crosbie knew nothing about his reports and that they had good reason to fire him. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employers. Crosbie has not shown that the employers’ reason was a mere pretext for retaliation. View "Crosbie v. Highmark Inc" on Justia Law

In June 2021, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) promulgated an emergency temporary standard to mitigate the risk of COVID19 transmission in healthcare settings (“Healthcare ETS”). In December 2021, OSHA announced its intent to withdraw the Healthcare ETS while continuing to work on the permanent standard. National Nurses United and its co-petitioners (“the Unions”) seek a writ of mandamus compelling OSHA (1) to issue a permanent standard superseding the Healthcare ETS within 30 days of the writ’s issuance; (2) to retain the Healthcare ETS until a permanent standard supersedes it; and (3) to enforce the Healthcare ETS.The D.C. Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to compel OSHA to maintain the emergency standard put in place to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 in the healthcare setting. The decision rests squarely with OSHA. View "In re: National Nurses United" on Justia Law