Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent Stephany Connelly was a passenger in a vehicle driven by co-worker Freya Trezona during the course and scope of their employment when Trezona negligently caused the accident, injuring Connelly. Because workers’ compensation benefits did not fully redress Connelly’s injuries, she made a claim for bodily injury and uninsured motorist (UM) benefits with her own insurance carrier and with Trezona’s carrier. Both companies denied the claim, contending Connelly’s sole remedy lay with the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. Connelly filed suit seeking a declaration that both policies provided coverage. The parties agreed the dispute turned on the interpretation of the phrase “legally entitled to recover” found in the UM statute. The trial court ruled in favor of Connelly, and the court of appeals concurred the phrase was legally ambiguous. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the phrase unambiguous: the amount a plaintiff is “legally entitled to recover” under a UM provision of an insurance policy is the amount for which the plaintiff has secured a judgment against the at-fault defendant. Because the Act prevents Connelly from ever becoming “legally entitled to recover” from Trezona under the facts of this case, the Court reversed the trial court. View "Connelly v. Main Street America Group" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Unitil Service Corporation and dismissing the complaint brought by the Department of Labor (DOL) seeking overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act's (FLSA) for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week for dispatchers and controllers (collectively, Employees) employed by Unitil, holding that the district court erred.In entering its judgment, the district court concluded that Employees were administrative, exempt from the FLSA, and thus not entitled to overtime pay because their "primary duty" was "directly related" to the general business operations of Unitil Service's customers. On appeal, Unitil argued that Employees were exempt administrative employees under federal law and, as such, were not entitled to overtime payments. The First Circuit vacated the judgment below, holding that the district court improperly did not apply a "relational" analysis comparing the business purpose of Unitil and/or its customers to the primary duty of Employees. View "Walsh v. Unitil Service Corp." on Justia Law

At its production plant in Baton Rouge, the Exxon Mobil Corporation requires prospective operators to pass an extensive, multi-pronged training program. If they don’t, they’re fired. Plaintiff didn’t pass his tests, so Exxon let him go. Plaintiff then sued Exxon, insisting he wasn’t fairly trained by staff because he’s black. The district court disagreed and dismissed his suit. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that, first, the district court ignored genuine factual disputes and, second, erroneously ruled that he waived his inadequate training theory.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling for different reasons. The court explained that Plaintiff cannot rely on an inadequate training theory. Exxon provided Plaintiff with a handbook detailing the polypropylene unit’s processes and equipment, and scheduled time each workweek for him to study. Exxon also assigned him a trainer, an operator with twenty years of experience, who went over the handbook in detail with him. Thus, because his training—and more importantly, his opportunities—paralleled his classmates, his program necessarily couldn’t be inadequate. Without proper training, no terminated trainee is qualified for the position he was training for. Plaintiff satisfied his burden to show he was qualified for the position of operator trainee, the position he was fired from. However, Plaintiff cannot genuinely allege Exxon failed to train him, so he cannot satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework. View "Rahman v. Exxon Mobil" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirming and adopting the ALJ's final award denying Appellant's claim for benefits from the Second Injury Fund, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in affirming the ALJ's denial of Appellant's post-hearing motions to reopen the record and submit additional evidence.Before the ALJ issued her final award, the Supreme Court decided Cosby v. Treasurer of Missouri, 579 S.W.3d 202 (Mo. banc 2019), which reached a different interpretation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.3 than that reached by the court of appeals in Gattenby v. Treasurer of Missouri, 516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. App. 2017). Before the ALJ's final award, Appellant filed a motion to reopen the record for a supplemental hearing based on Cosby. The ALJ overruled the motion and issued her award. The Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's motions to reopen the record and submit additional evidence. View "Weibrecht v. Treasurer of Mo. as Custodian of Second Injury Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Desert Regional Medical Center, Inc. (DRMC) appealed trial court orders denying DRMC’s first amended petitions to compel nurses Leah Miller, Lynn Fontana, and Renita Romero (Respondents) to arbitrate their labor claims alleging rest and meal break violations by DRMC. DRMC contended the trial court erred by denying its petitions to compel arbitration and failing to stay Respondents’ individual claims until after completion of arbitration of a separate proceeding initiated by Respondents’ union (the California Nurses Association) on behalf of all nurses employed by DRMC in California. DRMC argued the trial court erred in denying DRMC’s petitions to compel arbitration based on a finding DRMC waived the right to arbitrate. DRMC argued the issue of waiver had to be determined by the arbitrator, not the trial court, and, even if the court has jurisdiction to decide waiver, there was insufficient evidence to support its finding of waiver. DRMC further contended Respondents were estopped from arguing waiver because Respondents’ Union was responsible for DRMC’s delay in petitioning to compel arbitration and agreed, in a separate proceeding, to arbitrate the Union’s group grievance. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected DRMC’s contentions and affirmed the order denying DRMC’s amended petitions to compel arbitration and request for a stay. View "Desert Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

Baro was an ESL teacher for Waukegan Community School District in 2019 when she signed a union membership form—a contract to join the union that represents teachers in the District. The form authorized the District to deduct union dues from her paychecks for one year. Baro alleged she learned later that she was not required to join the union. She tried to back out of the agreement. The union insisted that her contract was valid. The District continued deducting dues from her paychecks.Baro filed suit, arguing that the dues deduction violated her First Amendment rights under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Janus: decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Baro voluntarily consented to the withdrawal of union dues. The enforcement of a valid private contract does not implicate her First Amendment rights. The “First Amendment protects our right to speak. It does not create an independent right to void obligations when we are unhappy with what we have said.” View "Baro v. Lake County Federation of Teachers Local 504, IFT-AFT" on Justia Law

O’Brien worked at Forum, a think tank, from 2016-2020. She served as its controller and was responsible for human resources tasks. In 2019, O’Brien sued Forum, its President, and its Director (Roman). She alleged a hostile work environment under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Trial testimony indicated that Roman had made sexual advances toward O’Brien and other female employees. In Title VII cases where no tangible adverse employment action was taken, an employer may escape liability by raising an affirmative defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities provided The district court held that O’Brien was not entitled to a jury instruction that this defense is unavailable where the harasser functions as the alter ego or proxy of the employer.The Third Circuit upheld a verdict against O'Brien. Although the affirmative defense is not available in an "alter ego" situation, the district court’s refusal to so instruct the jury here was harmless because the jury found that O’Brien was not subjected to sexual harassment. The existence of an affirmative defense was therefore irrelevant. View "O''Brien v. The Middle East Forum" on Justia Law

Jaludi worked at Citigroup. After he reported company wrongdoing, he was demoted, transferred, and (in 2013) terminated. He claims Citigroup blacklisted him from the financial industry. In 2015, Jaludi sued Citigroup for retaliation under both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and RICO. The district court sent his claims to arbitration. Jaludi appealed the arbitration order. In early 2018, while that appeal was pending, he filed an administrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor, adding one new allegation that, in late 2017, a headhunter had stopped returning his calls. In 2019, the Third Circuit remanded, holding that he was not required to arbitrate his Sarbanes-Oxley claims.On remand, the district court dismissed, finding his administrative complaint untimely. Though Sarbanes-Oxley required an administrative complaint within 180 days of the retaliatory conduct, he had waited more than two years after the last incident. Jaludi argued that the court should have granted him leave to amend because the 2017 allegation that he added in his administrative complaint happened fewer than 180 days before that complaint, making it timely. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although neither filing the administrative complaint after the statute of limitations had run nor suing before exhausting his administrative remedies was jurisdictional under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Jaludi’s delay in filing justified the dismissal. View "Jaludi v. Citigroup & Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs first worked for Tesla through staffing agencies. When Tesla offered them employment, effective August 2, 2017, most of the plaintiffs electronically signed offer letters, including an arbitration provision, “any and all disputes, claims, or causes of action, in law or equity, arising from or relating to your employment, or the termination of your employment, will be resolved, to the fullest extent permitted by law by final, binding and confidential arbitration.” A complaint under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code 12900) alleged that the plaintiff and other Black workers “suffered severe and pervasive harassment.”The trial court partially granted Tesla's motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the arbitration clauses required the plaintiffs to arbitrate disputes that arose on or after 8/2/17 while claims based on alleged wrongs before 8/2/17 are not within the scope of the agreements. The trial court denied the motion to the extent that the plaintiffs sought a public injunction. The court of appeal affirmed. The court properly declined to mandate arbitration of the request for a public injunction. Injunctions sought under FEHA may be considered “public injunctions.” The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 2022 (Viking River) does not preempt the California rule prohibiting waiver of the right to seek such injunctions. View "Vaughn v. Tesla, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant both work for the State of Iowa. Plaintiff is a urologist at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics; Defendant is a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law. After Defendant criticized Plaintiff’s expert testimony in a case unrelated to this one, Plaintiff sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant retaliated against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on multiple grounds, including that Plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that Linder’s conduct was under color of state law.  Plaintiff argues that his complaint contains ample facts that together plausibly allege that Defendant acted under color of state law. These include that Defendant (1) identified himself as a state employee when he criticized Plaintiff in the newspaper articles, (2) relied on “the prestige of his official position with [UI] to gain credibility with his audience,” and (3) “used the instrumentalities and resources of the State of Iowa to facilitate his retaliatory conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to plead adequately that Defendant’s retaliatory actions were under color of state law. Contrary to Plaintiff’s insistence, our case law is clear that a state employee, merely by publicly identifying himself as such, does not act under color of state law. Further, even assuming that a public university professor acts in his official capacity or within the scope of his employment when he comments on public affairs, it would not necessarily follow that he acts under color of state law. View "James Brown v. Marc Linder" on Justia Law