Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) Cash Handlers are supervised by Foreworkers. A labor agreement describes the selection of Foreworkers by an Evaluation Committee, comprised of three union representatives and three management representatives. Eight criteria, with assigned point values, are used. Each qualified applicant takes a written test and completes an oral interview with the Committee.In 2014, Plaintiffs sued BART alleging racial discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by not promoting them to Foreworker in favor of less experienced non-African-Americans. Under a 2016 settlement, Plaintiffs released their employment-related claims; BART paid them a certain sum, admitting no liability. In the following years, the Evaluation Committee appointed four new Foreworkers; each had received the highest total point scores. No Plaintiff was promoted. Plaintiffs again sued BART under FEHA, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact race discrimination.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of BART. There was evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for not promoting Plaintiffs (selection process scores). Plaintiffs failed to submit evidence that BART’s stated reason for not promoting them was untrue or that racial bias against African-Americans drove the promotion decisions. Plaintiffs did not present evidence of a statistically significant disparity between the percentage of qualified African-American applicants for the Foreworker position and the percentage of African-Americans promoted to Foreworker. View "Arega v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, surgeon Aram Bonni sued his employers, defendants Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center and St. Joseph Hospital of Orange, as well several other related entities and physicians (collectively, the Hospitals) for retaliation under California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5. Bonni alleged he made whistleblower complaints, which caused the Hospitals to retaliate against him by, among other things, suspending his medical staff privileges and initiating peer review proceedings to evaluate his privileges. In response, the Hospitals filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing Bonni’s retaliation cause of action arose from the peer review proceedings, which were protected activity, and that his claims had no merit. The trial court agreed and granted the motion in its entirety. Bonni appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding Bonni’s retaliation claim did not arise from protected activity. The California Supreme Court then granted review, determining Bonni’s retaliation cause of action was composed of 19 distinct retaliation claims. Of these claims, it found eight arose from protected activity while the remainder did not. It remanded the matter back to the Court of Appeal to determine whether Bonni had shown a probability of prevailing on those eight claims. On remand, the appellate court concluded Bonni has not met the requisite burden because the eight claims at issue were all precluded by the litigation privilege. Based on this finding and the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the Hospitals’ anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The trial court was directed to enter an order granting the motion as to the eight claims at issue and denying it as to the remaining retaliation claims. View "Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System" on Justia Law

Uronis’ former co-worker, Messenger, filed a putative Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action against Cabot and another company on behalf of himself and other employees similarly situated, alleging that the companies jointly employed the employees and failed to pay them required overtime pay. Uronis, as a similarly situated employee who had yet to file a consent to join the collective action, was a putative member of the Messenger action. Uronis applied for a position with Cabot’s subsidiary, GDS. Cabot and GDS were aware Uronis was a putative member of, and anticipated witness in, the Messenger action, and that he was about to file his consent to join. A GDS manager sent Uronis a text message stating that although Uronis was qualified for the position he applied for, Cabot declined to hire him or any other putative members of the Messenger action “because of” that lawsuit.The FLSA prohibits discrimination against an employee because the employee has engaged in protected activity 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3), including having “testified” or being “about to testify” in any FLSA-related proceeding. The district court dismissed Uronis’ suit, reasoning that being “about to testify” requires being “scheduled” or subpoenaed to do so. The Third Circuit reversed. The FLSA “about to testify” language protects employees from discrimination because of an employer’s anticipation that the employee will soon file a consent to join a collective action. View "Uronis v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

With the agreement of her supervisor, Johar, a salesperson, left work for about a week to care for a terminally ill relative. While she was away her employer (SWS) decided she had quit. Upon her return, SWS stated business was slow and gave her no new sales appointments. Johar sought unemployment benefits, citing a “temporary layoff.” SWS denied laying Johar off. While conceding that she left with her supervisor’s approval, SWS claimed that Johar’s failure to provide a return date or otherwise communicate with her supervisor while she was away amounted to a voluntary quit. The Employment Development Department agreed, found Johar ineligible for unemployment benefits, ordered reimbursement of benefits improperly paid, and imposed a penalty for willful misrepresentation. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB) affirmed.After Johar sought judicial review, CUIAB confessed error for failing to consider new evidence discovered by Johar while the administrative appeal was pending. The court dismissed the case without reaching the merits. The court of appeal reversed. Johar was entitled to relief on the existing record. She left her job in emergency circumstances with the employer’s approval, thus for good cause; an employee who leaves work for good cause is presumed to have not voluntarily quit. SWS’ evidence did not establish that Johar positively repudiated her obligation to return in clear terms. View "Johar v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 4117.11(B)(7) does not violate the First Amendment, holding that the statute's prohibition on inducing or encouraging targeted picketing in connection with a labor-relations dispute violates the First Amendment.Section 4117.11(B)(7) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employee organization or public employees to "induce or encourage any individual in connection with a labor relations dispute to picket the residence or any place of private employment of any public official or representative of the public employer.” The common pleas court in this case rejected a constitutional challenge to the statute, ruling that section 4117.11(B)(7) was a valid, content-neutral time, place and manner limitation on speech. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the law was a form of expressive-activity suppression that was irreconcilable with First Amendment protections. View "Portage County Educators Ass'n for Developmental Disabilities v. State Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Defendants are OS Restaurant Services, LLC and Bloomin’ Brands, Inc. Plaintiff worked there as a server. Plaintiff sued, alleging Defendants regularly failed to give Plaintiff her full uninterrupted rest periods, and that Defendants wrongfully terminated Plaintiff in retaliation.   The court explained that the Labor Code mandates an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action brought for the nonpayment of wages if any party requests attorney fees at the initiation of the action. Here, the trial court awarded Plaintiff $280,000 in attorney fees under section 218.5, and the employer appealed the award. The Second Appellate District affirmed the award of attorney fees   In the court’s original opinion, the court held that an action brought for failure to provide rest breaks or meal periods is not an action brought for the nonpayment of wages. The court also held that a plaintiff could not recover penalties for waiting time and wage statement violations based on claims of rest break and meal break violations, and so could not recover attorney fees based on those penalties.   In Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held otherwise. That court concluded that “extra pay for missed breaks constitutes ‘wages’ that must be reported on statutorily required wage statements during and paid within statutory deadlines when an employee leaves the job. After the issuance of its opinion, the Supreme Court transferred this case to the Second Appellate District with directions to reconsider its opinion in light of Naranjo. Having done so, the court affirmed the award of attorney fees. View "Betancourt v. OS Restaurant Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Downing, an African-American woman, had significant sales experience when she was hired in 2002 by Abbott. In 2009 she became one of four Regional Sales Managers. Abbott came under financial pressure in 2012 and reduced its workforce. Downing’s new director, Farmakis, included detailed criticisms in Downing’s 2013 review. Downing and another employee reported to Abbott’s Employee Relations Department that Farmakis was discriminating based on race and gender. Farmakis was coached to improve his management style. Throughout 2013, Abbott’s business faltered, resulting in layoffs and realignment of its sales teams. Abbott placed Downing on a performance improvement plan, the last step before termination. Downing then retained counsel and gave notice that she intended to file discrimination claims. Abbott cut Downing’s stock award in 2014. Downing filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC. Abbott had another reduction in force in 2015. All four Regional Sales Manager lost their jobs when that position was eliminated. Farmakis was also terminated. Abbott invited Downing to apply for the position of Regional Commercial Director. Abbott did not select Downing or Farmakis and ultimately hired an African-American man.Downing filed suit under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of Abbot, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings, the exclusion of Downing’s expert witness, the jury instructions, the testimony of her former manager, and the sufficiency of the evidence for her disparate-impact claim. View "Downing v. Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Steven Rodgers, a correctional sergeant employed by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), appealed the denial of his writ petition seeking to set aside the State Personnel Board’s (SPB) decision to reduce his salary by 10 percent for two years as a penalty for an incident that occurred in July 2017 while he was supervising a contraband surveillance watch shift at Pelican Bay State Prison. Rodgers argued the factual findings the SPB adopted after his administrative hearing were: (1) not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) significantly different from those alleged in the notice of adverse action (NOAA), and as a result, SPB’s decision violated his due process right to notice of the charges against him. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with his second contention and therefore reversed the decision. View "Rodgers v. State Personnel Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Daniel Barufaldi, appealed a superior court dismissal of his complaint against defendant the City of Dover. Plaintiff was first hired as the Director of Economic Development for the Dover Business and Industry Development Authority (DBIDA) for a fixed term from March 2009 through February 2012. As a condition of his employment with DBIDA, plaintiff was required to waive participation in the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS). After his initial term of employment expired in 2012, plaintiff was reappointed for one-year extensions until 2017. In 2017, the City created a new Director of Economic Development position and appointed plaintiff to the position. Prior to executing a new employment agreement, plaintiff asked the Dover City Manager if he would now be eligible to participate in the NHRS. The Dover City Manager informed plaintiff that he was not eligible for enrollment in the NHRS because his employment contract was for “a fixed time period.” Around March 2020, plaintiff contacted the NHRS to inquire about his eligibility for enrollment. In July 2020, the NHRS notified the City that it was obligated to enroll plaintiff in the NHRS. The City subsequently enrolled plaintiff in the NHRS prospectively. Thereafter, the plaintiff submitted a “request for cost calculation to purchase service credit” because of “employer enrollment oversight.” The NHRS administratively reviewed the request and determined, pursuant to RSA 100-A:3, VI(d)(1), plaintiff was partially at fault for the failure to be enrolled in the NHRS following his appointment in 2017 as Director and, therefore, ineligible to purchase service credit. It also determined that DBIDA was not an NHRS participating employer and that plaintiff’s employment contract with DBIDA waived any right to participate in the NHRS. In a letter dated August 4, 2020, the NHRS notified plaintiff of its determination and informed him that he had 45 days in which to appeal the administrative decision by requesting a hearing before the agency. Plaintiff did not request such a hearing but, instead, filed a complaint in superior court. Plaintiff contended to the New Hampshire Supreme Court appealing dismissal of his case that the trial court erred in concluding that: (1) declaratory judgment was not an available theory of relief; and (2) plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Barufaldi v. City of Dover" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-101 to 48-1,117 barred the claim of an employee of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services that the Department violated the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1101 to 48-1125, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the employee's NFEPA action.Plaintiff was injured while participating in mandated self-defense training and sought and received workers' compensation benefits from the time she was injured. After Plaintiff was unable to find a position with the Department that would accommodate her physical restrictions she brought this action against the Department for wrongful termination on the basis of her disability, in violation of NFEPA. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department on the basis of the exclusivity provisions of the Act barred Plaintiff's NFEPA claim as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff's NFEPA claim. View "Dutcher v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Services" on Justia Law