Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a black woman who worked for Lincare, Incorporated. She sued her former employer under Title VII, claiming that she suffered from a racially hostile work environment and that Lincare both failed to address the situation and retaliated against her when she complained. She also sued for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lincare. On appeal, Plaintiff contended that summary judgment was improper on her Title VII claims for a hostile work environment and unlawful retaliation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming that Plaintiff suffered from severe or pervasive harassment, Lincare cannot be liable under Title VII because it took prompt remedial action. Aside from one remark, Plaintiff could not remember any use of the N-word in the office after she made her reports to HR. Nor does she identify a single racially insensitive comment that occurred after the offending parties received final warnings. In short, Lincare “acted swiftly in taking remedial measures, and the harassment ceased.” Because of its prompt and effective response, Lincare cannot be liable under Title VII for creating a hostile work environment.   Further, the court explained, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s working conditions were impacted, only that the plan opened up the possibility of further action (which never occurred). An employment decision is not an adverse action if it does not objectively worsen the employee’s working conditions. View "Hudson v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law

Adanna Car Wash Corporation (Adanna) appealed from the superior court’s dismissal of its trial de novo appeal from the Labor Commissioner’s award of back wages and other damages in favor of Adanna’s former employee, Respondent. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Adanna failed to post with the trial court an appeal bond required by section 98.2. Adanna contended that it, in fact, had complied with section 98.2, pointing to a surety bond that it had posted earlier under a different Labor Code provision, section 2055. The section 2055 undertaking is required of all car wash owners as a condition of operating a car wash business.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, holding that it agreed with the trial court that the section 2055 bond was not the appeal bond required under section 98.2. The court reasoned that the signature of Adanna’s insurer’s attorney is nowhere to be found. Execution by the surety is a prerequisite for a valid bond in an action or proceeding. Ultimately, the court held that a section 2055 car wash bond is not an appeal bond under section 98.2 subdivision (b). Because exhibit A to Adanna’s notice was not an appeal bond, Adanna failed to file the requisite undertaking per section 98.2, subdivision (b). The superior court lacked jurisdiction over the Adanna’s de novo appeal, and Respondent’s motion to dismiss was properly granted. View "Adanna Car Wash Corp. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a longtime employee of the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”), commenced this action against DEQ, claiming that it paid her less than it paid a male employee with the same position doing equal work, in violation of the Equal Pay Act. The district court entered summary judgment against Plaintiff, concluding that she lacked evidence to demonstrate that any higher-paid male employee was doing work “virtually identical” to the work she was doing. Indeed, the court explained that the record showed that the male employee whom Plaintiff had identified as a comparator was doing different and more complex work than she was, such that she could not show that she was paid less for equal work.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiff could not establish that she and the male employee performed “equal work.” To be sure, Plaintiff and the male employee performed similar work. But the differences in the actual work performed and the level of complexity involved were significant enough that their work cannot be fairly described as “substantially equal” or “virtually identical,” as required to establish a claim under the Equal Pay Act. View "Elizabeth Polak v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

After completing an orientation program for newly licensed nurses, Bragg was denied a full-time position at Community Hospital, which is operated by Munster. Community transferred her to Hartsfield, another Munster facility, where her pay was lower. Bragg, who is Black, alleged that, during her orientation, after being race-matched to patients, she complained and was subsequently treated differently. Bragg asserts that another supervisor played sexually explicit rap music at the nurses' station when Bragg was present, making graphic hand gestures. Bragg felt this was targeted at her. When white nurses were present, the supervisor played pop and country music. The supervisor allegedly laughingly called a Black patient’s amputated limb a “skinny, brown stick.” Bragg thought that another supervisor made an inappropriate reference to lynching when an oxygen line got wrapped around a Black patient’s neck, stating“let’s not have a hanging.” Bragg claims that all three supervisors gave her poor evaluations and blamed her for problems that were not her fault. Bragg sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that Bragg’s reports of racial insensitivity are typical of the challenges Black women face in the workplace. Bragg’s evidence would not allow a trier of fact to conclude that Community denied her a full-time position and transferred her for impermissible reasons, rather than for its stated concern about deficiencies in her performance. View "Bragg v. Munster Medical Research Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was terminated from her employment as a Revenue Officer at the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for assessed Unauthorized Access of Taxpayer Data (“UNAX”) offenses. After unsuccessfully pursuing an internal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint, Plaintiff brought suit against the Treasury Secretary in the United States District Court for the Central District of California alleging that her termination was based on impermissible criteria of age and national origin in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, respectively. The district court granted summary judgment to the Treasury Secretary on the grounds that Plainitff: (1) failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination; and (2) failed to show that the IRS Management’s proffered reasons for terminating her were pretext for age or national origin discrimination.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel wrote that at step one of the legal framework for a discrimination action, the district court found that none of Plaintiff’s evidence established a prima facie case of age discrimination. The panel agreed with the district court that most of Plaintiff’s evidence comprised “circumstantial evidence”—her superior’s alleged exaggeration of her offenses, assignment of menial tasks, selection of draconian penalties. The panel held, however, that the record was not devoid of direct evidence of age discrimination. The panel was satisfied that the record taken as a whole supported Plaintiff’s prima facie case of age discrimination. The panel held that the Secretary’s proffered reasons for its action was sufficient. View "JOAN OPARA V. JANET YELLEN" on Justia Law

Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc., engaged in an extensive back-and-forth to attempt to accommodate Plaintiff Susan Norwood. Yet Plaintiff still sued, alleging Defendant failed to immediately tell her that it approved a possible accommodation and formally offer it to her. The Tenth Circuit found the law imposed no burden on employers to immediately tell employees of approved possible accommodations or to formally offer them those accommodations, rather than informally asking if they would satisfy an employee. Besides challenging Defendant’s good faith during the interactive process, Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision to exclude expert testimony and draw certain inferences in granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Finding no error in the district court judgment entered in UPS' favor, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Norwood v. United Parcel Service" on Justia Law

The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) challenges a rule governing the elections in which employees vote on whether to be represented by a union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) promulgated the 2019 Rule without notice and comment, asserting that it falls within the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) exception. The NLRB argues that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), mandates direct review from the Board to the circuit court. The Board also asserts that, even if the district court had jurisdiction, it erred in holding that five challenged provisions of the Rule fall outside the APA’s procedural exception. The AFL-CIO cross-appeals, arguing that the 2019 Rule as a whole is arbitrary and capricious and that the provision concerning ballot impoundment specifically is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.   The DC Circuit held that the statutory provision for direct review in federal appellate courts of NLRB orders regarding unfair labor practices did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over rules that are exclusively concerned with representation elections, as is the 2019 Rule. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that none of the five challenged provisions comes within the procedural exception; the court held that two of them do. Those two are rules of agency procedure, so were validly promulgated without notice and comment. The court affirmed the district court’s invalidation of the rules regarding the eligible employee-voters list, the timeline for certification of election results, and election-observer eligibility. The AFL-CIO’s challenge to the 2019 Rule as arbitrary and capricious fails. View "American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Ed Davis sued the City of Montevallo ("the City") claiming that the City was in breach of contract because, in terminating his employment with the City, it failed to follow certain discharge procedures set out in an employee handbook it had issued to him. The City responded by arguing it was not required to follow the handbook's procedures because Davis was an at-will employee. After entertaining motions for summary judgment from both sides, the trial court ruled in favor of the City. Davis appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the City. "The Handbook was an offer for a unilateral contract, which Davis accepted by continuing his employment with the City. Because the Handbook constitutes a unilateral contract, we reverse the trial court's denial of Davis's motion for partial summary judgment and direct the trial court on remand to determine whether, in fact, the City violated the Handbook's terms." View "Davis v. Montevallo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court that affirmed the decision of the Nebraska State Personnel Board upholding the termination of Scott Mollring's employment as a teacher for the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Mollring argued that the district court erroneously determined that because he had not completed two calendar years of employment at the time of his dismissal, he was a probationary employee who could be terminated without cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that "two years" under Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-845 means two calendar years, and cause was not required; and (2) the court correctly determined that Mollring was still in the probationary period and that his employment could be terminated without cause. View "Mollring v. Neb. Dep't of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Michael has worked for FCA for more than two decades. In 2014 he married Becky, also a veteran FCA employee at the company’s Kokomo, Indiana transmission plant. In 2017 they submitted medical certifications from their healthcare providers to take intermittent leave from work under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, for periodic flare-ups of anxiety, depression, and back pain (Michael) and irritable bowel syndrome (Becky). At the end of that year, FCA’s outside FMLA administrator notified the company that they had 21 common days of FMLA absence and an additional 27 days on which their partial-day leave requests overlapped. FCA opened an investigation. Neither Michael nor Becky could explain why they had requested FMLA leave on so many of the same dates and times. FCA suspended both for providing false or misleading information in connection with their FMLA leave requests.In a suit alleging interference with FMLA rights and retaliation, the district judge granted FCA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that the suspension was not based on an honest suspicion of FMLA abuse. View "Michael Juday v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law