Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

An employee at a substance abuse treatment provider alleged that a coworker subjected him to unwanted sexual advances, including sending explicit messages and images, visiting his home uninvited, and making lewd gestures. These actions occurred while the employee was on leave, and none took place at the workplace or during work hours. The employee reported the conduct to his employer’s acting program director and human resources representative. He was told that nothing could be done because the conduct occurred offsite. The HR representative also made a social media post and a sarcastic comment that the employee interpreted as mocking his complaint. The employee, distressed by the employer’s response and the prospect of further interaction with the coworker, resigned shortly after returning to work.The Superior Court of Kern County sustained the employer’s demurrer to the employee’s second amended complaint, dismissing claims for sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, among others. The court found that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently work-related to be actionable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and that the employer’s response did not constitute an adverse employment action or constructive discharge. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while the coworker’s conduct was not sufficiently work-related to be imputed to the employer under FEHA, the employer’s response to the employee’s complaint—specifically, its failure to act and the HR representative’s mocking conduct—could support a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The court also found that the claim for failure to prevent harassment was viable, as it depended on the underlying harassment claim. However, the court affirmed dismissal of claims for discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, finding insufficient allegations of adverse employment action or employer knowledge of employee unfitness. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Two former employees of a fire alarm and sprinkler company provided fire alarm testing and inspection services on public works projects in New York. They alleged that their employer failed to pay them the prevailing wages required by New York Labor Law § 220, which mandates that workers on public works projects receive at least the prevailing rate of wages. The contracts between the employer and various public entities included clauses that either disclaimed the applicability of prevailing wage laws, were silent on the issue, or referenced prevailing wage rates. Many contracts also contained a provision shortening the statute of limitations for any action against the company to one year.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted partial summary judgment in favor of the employer on all prevailing wage-related claims. The court found that: (1) the contracts did not expressly promise to pay prevailing wages; (2) the one-year contractual limitations period barred the claims; and (3) fire alarm testing and inspection work was not covered by § 220’s prevailing wage requirement. The court also dismissed related quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims and later approved a class action settlement on other claims, with the prevailing wage claims reserved for appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, based on a 2009 New York State Department of Labor opinion letter and relevant precedent, fire alarm testing and inspection work is covered by § 220, entitling the plaintiffs to prevailing wages. However, the Second Circuit found New York law unsettled on whether a promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract (even if not expressly stated) and whether a contractual one-year limitations period is enforceable against workers’ third-party beneficiary claims. The court therefore certified these two questions to the New York Court of Appeals for resolution. View "Walton v. Comfort Systems" on Justia Law

An employee of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), represented by her union, was the subject of two union grievances: one alleging improper performance evaluations and another alleging bullying by her supervisor. While these grievances were pending, the employee also filed a separate lawsuit in federal district court, asserting claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation, based on some of the same underlying events.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to WMATA, holding that the settlement agreement reached between WMATA and the union in the grievance process barred the employee’s Title VII lawsuit. The district court interpreted the settlement as an unambiguous release of all claims related to the grievances, including those raised in the federal lawsuit, and therefore did not address the merits of the Title VII claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the settlement agreement resolved only the union’s contractual grievance claims under the collective bargaining agreement and did not extend to the employee’s independent statutory claims under Title VII. The court emphasized that the agreement’s language was limited to the union grievances and did not reference the pending Title VII lawsuit or purport to waive those claims. The court also noted that any waiver of Title VII rights would require clear and unmistakable language, which was absent here. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. WMATA" on Justia Law

A brewing and bottling company in Puerto Rico sought to expand its operations and required a continuous, 24/7 work schedule. However, its existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union representing its employees limited work to five days and forty hours per week, generally excluding weekends. During negotiations for a successor CBA, the employer attempted to impose a six-day work schedule, contrary to the active CBA, and later placed the union president on unpaid leave after he exceeded his annual paid union leave hours. The union president had not requested additional unpaid leave, and the employer had not previously enforced this provision in a similar situation. The union filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unfair labor practices.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the employer committed three unfair labor practices: retaliating against the union president for protected activities, unilaterally changing a mandatory subject of bargaining by placing him on unpaid leave without a request, and implementing its final offer on work schedules without reaching a good-faith impasse. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. The employer then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, while the NLRB sought enforcement of its order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NLRB’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and not reversible error. The court denied the employer’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The main holdings were that the employer’s actions constituted adverse employment actions motivated by anti-union animus, that the employer unlawfully changed a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that it improperly implemented its final offer without a good-faith impasse or an overall breakdown in negotiations. View "Compania Cervecera de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A long-serving postal employee applied for two higher-level postmaster positions in New Hampshire. At the time of her applications, she was 58 years old and had significant experience. For the first position, she was interviewed by her supervisor but was not selected; instead, a 36-year-old man was chosen, with the supervisor citing his greater relevant experience. Several months later, she applied for a second position, was again interviewed by the same supervisor, and was again passed over in favor of a man, this time 53 years old. During the second interview, the supervisor remarked that the office had never had a female postmaster and questioned whether the applicant had the energy for the job. The applicant believed she was denied both promotions due to her age and sex, and she pursued administrative remedies before filing suit.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire granted summary judgment to the employer, the United States Postal Service, on all claims. The court found that the employer had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions and that no reasonable jury could find those reasons to be pretextual. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to both the age and sex discrimination claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the summary judgment decision de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the age discrimination claims, holding that the plaintiff had waived any argument for a more lenient causation standard and that, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, no reasonable jury could find pretext. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim related to the first promotion. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim regarding the second promotion, finding that the supervisor’s comments during the interview created a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext and discriminatory motive. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Warner v. Steiner" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term employee of a brewery, suffered two work-related back injuries, the second of which led to significant physical restrictions. The brewery accommodated him with light duty work for a period, but when such work was no longer available, he was placed on leave and later participated in a transitional work program. The plaintiff requested the creation of a new position to accommodate his restrictions, which the brewery declined. After his restrictions were lifted, he returned to his original position. During his employment, the plaintiff also applied unsuccessfully for other internal positions and was later suspended following allegations of inappropriate workplace conduct. He was offered a choice between a last chance agreement and a severance package, ultimately declining both and leaving the company.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust or timely exhaust administrative remedies for certain claims, and for others, lacked evidence to establish pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court’s findings regarding the adequacy of his EEOC charge and the sufficiency of his evidence for disability and age discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, as it was neither explicitly included in his EEOC charge nor reasonably related to the facts alleged, and was also untimely. The court further held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case or pretext for his remaining ADA, state law disability, and age discrimination claims. The court also found that the plaintiff forfeited his Title VII and motion for reconsideration arguments by failing to adequately brief them. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed in full. View "Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc." on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Defense Logistics Agency in Hawaii, who had served in the National Guard and developed post-traumatic stress disorder, alleged that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. After a series of workplace incidents, the agency suspended him indefinitely, citing concerns about his access to sensitive information. The employee claimed that the agency failed to provide reasonable accommodations and improperly deemed him a direct threat.The employee filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, which eventually led to a final agency decision (FAD) against him. The agency transmitted the FAD and related documents electronically using a secure system, but made several errors in providing the necessary passphrase to decrypt the document. As a result, the employee’s attorney was unable to access the FAD for several weeks, despite repeated requests for assistance and clarification. The attorney finally received an accessible, decrypted copy of the FAD by email on December 5, 2022. The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 88 days later. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary of Defense, finding the complaint untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the initial electronic transmission, and denied equitable tolling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the 90-day limitations period for filing suit under the Rehabilitation Act did not begin until the attorney received effective notice of the agency’s decision, which occurred when he received the decrypted FAD on December 5. Alternatively, the court held that equitable tolling was warranted because the attorney diligently sought access to the FAD and was prevented by extraordinary circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "ASUNCION V. HEGSETH" on Justia Law

Two individuals applied for jobs at a retail liquor store chain in Washington after a new state law required employers to include wage and benefit information in all job postings. Both applicants submitted their applications through a third-party website, Indeed.com, where the postings did not include the required pay information. One of the applicants also interviewed in person and discussed pay with the store manager but ultimately declined a job offer. Both individuals then filed a class action lawsuit, seeking statutory damages for the employer’s failure to comply with the disclosure requirements.The case was initially brought in King County, Washington. The employer argued that the plaintiffs were not the type of “job applicants” the law was intended to protect, asserting that only those with a genuine or “bona fide” interest in the job should be eligible for remedies. The parties disagreed on the meaning of “job applicant” under the Washington Equal Pay and Opportunities Act (EPOA). The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, faced with this dispute, certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court, asking what a plaintiff must prove to be considered a “job applicant” under the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that, under RCW 49.58.110(4), a person qualifies as a “job applicant” if they apply to a specific job posting, regardless of their subjective intent or whether they are a “bona fide” or “good faith” applicant. The court concluded that the plain language of the statute does not require proof of genuine interest in the position, and that the legislature intentionally omitted such a requirement. The court’s answer clarified that subjective intent is irrelevant for eligibility to seek remedies under the EPOA. View "Branson v. Washington Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC" on Justia Law

A small business that imports and sells shea butter hired an individual in 2017 to provide communication, marketing, and sales support, particularly focusing on social media. The individual worked under a contract that labeled her as an independent contractor, but after the contract expired, she continued to perform a mix of social media, event, and administrative tasks. She stopped working regularly for the business in September 2018. A dispute arose over unpaid wages, with the individual claiming she was owed for work performed, and the business asserting that she was paid for all work under the terms of the contract.The Office of Wage-Hour (OWH) initially determined that the business owed the individual back wages, liquidated damages, and a statutory penalty. The business appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), arguing that the individual was an independent contractor. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the individual was an employee, not an independent contractor, and awarded damages. On the first petition for review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the individual worked in both capacities—sometimes as an employee and sometimes as an independent contractor—and remanded for OAH to determine the hours worked in each capacity and adjust the damages accordingly. On remand, the ALJ used a percentage-based approach to allocate hours and payments between employee and independent contractor work, ultimately awarding the individual approximately $26,550 in unpaid wages and damages, plus a statutory penalty.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, reviewing the case again, affirmed the OAH’s amended final order. The court held that under the current D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, employees may pursue claims for disputed wages even if the employer paid conceded wages. The court also held that, due to inadequate recordkeeping by the employer, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to disprove the employee’s evidence regarding hours worked and payments received. View "Shea Yeleen Health & Beauty, LLC v. Office of Wage-Hour" on Justia Law

A former sales representative for a pharmaceutical company alleged that the company engaged in an aggressive campaign to market one of its drugs, Vraylar, for uses not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), specifically for substance abuse and major depressive disorder (MDD). The representative, who was responsible for promoting the drug to medical providers, claimed that the company trained its sales force to encourage off-label prescriptions and incentivized providers to prescribe Vraylar for these unapproved uses. He further asserted that he faced adverse employment actions, such as loss of promotion and increased workload, after raising concerns internally about the legality and compliance of these marketing practices.After the representative filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the government declined to intervene. The plaintiff then amended his complaint, dropping his direct fraud claim and proceeding solely on a theory of retaliation under 31 U.S.C. §3730(h). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff’s internal complaints to the company focused on regulatory noncompliance rather than fraud against the government, and thus did not put the employer on notice of protected activity under the FCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, to state a claim for FCA retaliation, an employee must plausibly allege that the employer was on notice that the employee was attempting to prevent fraud against the government, not merely regulatory violations. Because the plaintiff’s communications only referenced regulatory and policy concerns, and did not suggest government fraud, the court found the notice requirement unmet. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Lewis v AbbVie Inc." on Justia Law