Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Fulfer, while making a delivery, exited his truck and stepped down into a nine-inch-deep pothole, resulting in serious personal injuries. He was working for Ruan Logistics Corporation (“RLC”), which was contracted as a transportation and cargo-hauling provider by Sorrento Lactalis, Inc. (“SLI”). Fulfer filed a personal injury action against SLI seeking damages based on premises liability and negligence. SLI moved to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c), arguing that it was immune from a tort action because it was a statutory employer of Fulfer, meaning that Idaho’s Workers’ Compensation laws provided Fulfer’s exclusive remedy. In response, Fulfer argued that an exception to the exclusive remedy rule applied. The district court determined Fulfer’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because he: (1) failed to comply with Idaho’s notice pleading requirements by not addressing statutory employer immunity; and (2) failed to allege specific facts required for establishing an exception to the exclusive remedy rule based on the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Gomez v. Crookham Co., 457 P.3d 901 (2020), which was controlling at the time. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Fulfer’s complaint without prejudice and later denied Fulfer’s motion to reconsider and for leave to file a second amended complaint. Fulfer appealed. The Supreme Court determined the district court erred in dismissing Fulfer’s first amended complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because it satisfied Idaho’s pleading requirements. Further, the Supreme Court concluded the exception to the exclusive remedy rule in I.C. 72-209(3) applied to direct and statutory employers. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fulfer v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc." on Justia Law

Neurosurgeon Donald Blaskiewicz, M.D. went to work for the Spine Institute of Idaho (the “Spine Institute” or the “Institute”) in 2018. The Spine Institute entered into a Professional Services Agreement (the PSA) with Blaskiewicz containing a non-compete clause, contractually proscribing Blaskiewicz from practicing medicine within fifty miles of the Spine Institute’s office (with an explicit exception for Caldwell) for a period of eighteen months, should his employment with the Spine Institute be terminated for any reason. Pursuant to the PSA, Blaskiewicz had two ways to avoid the non-compete clause: he could either get permission from the Spine Institute to practice medicine within the proscribed area, or he could pay the Spine Institute $350,000 in “liquidated damages.” The PSA also required any disputes to be resolved by arbitration. Less than a year and a half after hiring Blaskiewicz, the Spine Institute terminated his employment. Blaskiewicz filed suit in district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the non-compete clause was unenforceable. The district court concluded that the non-compete clause was against public policy and void as a matter of law, and granted summary judgment in favor of Blaskiewicz. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, finding the district court did not cite or analyze the statutes governing non-compete agreements in Idaho. The Court concluded there were genuine issues of material fact such that summary judgment was inappropriate as to whether the non-compete provision was void as a matter of public policy or otherwise enforceable. View "Blaskiewicz v. Spine Institute of Idaho" on Justia Law

Before her retirement, Plaintiff was employed by the Oregon Health Authority, and SEIU was the exclusive representative for her bargaining unit. Plaintiff never joined SEIU, but the State deducted union dues from her salary and remitted the dues to SEIU. Plaintiff alleged that SEIU forged her signature on a union membership agreement. Plaintiff demanded that the State and SEIU stop the dues deductions and return the withheld payments. After she retired, Plaintiff filed this action against State defendants and SEIU, alleging several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief against all defendants for lack of jurisdiction and her claims for retrospective relief against Service Employees International Union Local 503 (“SEIU”) for failure to allege state action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Because jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the panel first considered whether it could entertain Plaintiff’s claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants. As to Plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief for violation of her First Amendment rights, the panel concluded that her fear of future harm was based on a series of interferences that were too speculative to establish a “case or controversy” for the prospective relief she sought.   Plaintiff’s theory that potential future unauthorized dues deductions chilled the exercise of her First Amendment rights was also too speculative to establish standing. The panel concluded that she lacked any concrete interest in her future wages or her right to be free from compelled union speech that were threatened by the alleged lack of procedural safeguards. View "JODEE WRIGHT V. SEIU LOCAL 503, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an individual provider (“IP”) of in-home care for her disabled son. Under Washington law, IPs are considered public employees for the purpose of collective bargaining, and they are represented by Service Employees International Union 775 (“SEIU”). Plaintiff did not join the union, but on two occasions the State withheld dues from her paycheck.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims against Public Partnerships LLC (“PPL”) and Public Consulting Group, Inc. (“PCG”) (collectively “private defendants”), and the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Washington Governor Inslee and Secretary Strange of the Department of Social and Health Services (collectively “state defendants”), in Plaintiff’s action alleging that Defendants violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and engaged in the willful withholding of her wages in violation of state law.   The panel held that Plaintiff did not have standing to bring any claims for prospective relief. The panel further held that, although the district court erred in holding that PPL and PCG were not state actors, Plaintiff had not alleged facts sufficient to support a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim or a claim for violation of state law. Plaintiff alleged that PPL and PCG violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights because they deprived her of her liberty interest under the First Amendment without adequate procedural safeguards. The panel held that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish that PPL and PCG can be considered state actors for the purpose of her 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. Plaintiff met both parts of the two-prong test for determining whether state action exists. View "CINDY OCHOA V. PUBLIC CONSULTING GROUP, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mobilize the Message provides political campaigns with doorknockers and signature gatherers, which it purports to hire as independent contractors. Plaintiff Moving Oxnard Forward is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making the government of Oxnard, California, more efficient and transparent and in the past have hired signature gatherers as independent contractors. Plaintiffs claimed that the California law violates the First Amendment because it discriminates against speech based on its content by classifying their doorknockers and signature gatherers as employees or independent contractors under the ABC test while classifying direct sales salespersons, newspaper distributors, and newspaper carriers under Borello.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction which sought to restrain the California Attorney General from applying California’s “ABC test,” codified in California Labor Code Section 2775(b)(1) to classify Plaintiffs’ doorknockers and signature gatherers as either employees or independent contractors. The panel accepted that classification of their doorknockers and signature gatherers as employees might impose greater costs on plaintiffs than if these individuals had been classified as independent contractors, and that as a result they might not retain as many doorknockers and signature gatherers. Such an indirect impact on speech, however, does not violate the First Amendment. Section 2783 does not target certain types of speech. Unless an occupational exemption exists, the ABC test applies across California’s economy. Thus, Plaintiffs were not unfairly burdened by application of the ABC test to their doorknockers and signature gatherers. View "MOBILIZE THE MESSAGE LLC, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

While he was consulting on an environmental project for the U.S. Army Reserve Command, Plaintiff believed he was required to prepare an environmental assessment in a manner that violated federal law. Plaintiff was terminated after reporting the suspected illegality to the client and his supervisor at SpecPro. Plaintiff brought statutory and common law claims of retaliation and wrongful termination in a California state court action that was removed to federal court. Plaintiff alleged his employment was terminated in violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act, Cal. Labor Code Section 1102.5(b), (c).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff’s former employer, SpecPro Professional Services, LLC, on Plaintiff’s retaliation and wrongful termination claims. The panel first addressed the district court’s determination that Olaintiff’s disclosures to his supervisor were not actionable because the supervisor was not “a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance.” Second, the panel held that several state court appellate courts have held that disclosures to wrongdoers are protected under section 1102.5(b). The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment order on section 1102.5(b) retaliation claim. Because his claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy was derivative of his retaliation claim, the panel also reversed the grant of summary judgment on that claim. View "AARON KILLGORE V. SPECPRO PROFESSIONAL SERVICES" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Cariene Cadena and similarly situated employees (Appellants) are employed by Customer Connexx LLC (Connexx) to operate a call center in Las Vegas, Nevada. Appellants’ primary responsibilities are to provide customer service and scheduling to customers over a “softphone,” operated only through their employer-provided computers.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant Customer Connexx LLC and remanded for further proceedings in a collective action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act by call center workers. The panel concluded that the district court correctly identified the workers’ principal duties as answering customer phone calls and scheduling appliance pickups. Agreeing with the Tenth Circuit, the panel held that the workers’ duties could not be performed without turning on and booting up their work computers, and having a functioning computer was necessary before the workers could receive calls and schedule appointments. Accordingly, turning on the computers was integral and indispensable to the workers’ duties and was a principal activity under the FLSA. It, therefore, was compensable.   The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment on the FLSA claim and remanded to the district court for consideration of whether time spent shutting down computers was compensable, whether the time spent booting up and down the computers was not compensable under the de minimis doctrine, and whether Connexx had no knowledge of the alleged overtime such that it was not in violation of the FLSA’s overtime requirements. View "CARIENE CADENA, ET AL V. CUSTOMER CONNEXX LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 imposes liability on employers who withdraw—partially or completely—from multiemployer pension funds. After a complete withdrawal, GCIU-Employer Retirement Fund’s (GCIU) actuary calculated MNG Enterprise’s (MNG) withdrawal liability using an interest rate published by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. On MNG’s challenge, an arbitrator found (1) that MNG could not be assessed partial withdrawal liability following a complete withdrawal, (2) that it had shown the interest rate used was not the best estimate of the plan’s experience, and (3) that GCIU properly included the newspapers’ contribution histories. The district court affirmed the arbitrator’s award, vacating and correcting only a typographical error on the interest rate.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s order affirming, except for a typographical error, an arbitrator’s award regarding the withdrawal liability. The panel held that the MPPAA directs the plan actuary to determine withdrawal liability based on “actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.” The panel held that the GCIU actuary’s use of the PBGC rate, without considering the “experience of the plan and reasonable expectations,” did not satisfy the “best estimate” standard. View "GCIU-EMPLOYER RETIREMENT FUND, ET AL V. MNG ENTERPRISES, INC." on Justia Law

Alicia Cochran appealed a circuit court order that granted her former employer, CIS Financial Services' motion for a preliminary injunction. CIS was engaged in the mortgage-origination business and employed Cochran as a branch loan originator. In June 2021, Cochran's supervisor at CIS, Randy Lowery, left his employment at CIS to accept a position with Movement Mortgage, LLC ("Movement"). Another CIS employee, Geremy Reese, also left CIS to work for Movement. CIS thereafter filed suit against Lowery and Reese. Among other things, CIS requested in its complaint injunctive relief against Lowery and Reese. Additionally, CIS filed that same day a motion for a preliminary injunction against Lowery and Reese. On August 31, 2021, Cochran resigned her position with CIS. CIS then amended its complaint to include Cochran and Movement as defendants. The only specific count that CIS asserted against Cochran in the amended complaint was one alleging breach of contract. Then CIS moved for the preliminary injunction against Cochran at issue here. On appeal, Cochran challenged the propriety of the circuit court's order granting CIS's motion for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the respective restraining provisions of her compensation agreement and nonsolicitation agreement were not enforceable against her. However, CIS moved to dismiss Cochran's appeal as moot, noting that, by its terms, the preliminary injunction expired after August 31, 2022. CIS argued that this appeal no longer presented a justiciable controversy and that the Alabama Supreme Court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The Supreme Court found the preliminary injunction challenged in Cochran's appeal expired by its own terms. Consequently, the Supreme Court lacked the power to grant Cochran relief from the preliminary injunction; therefore, this appeal was no longer justiciable and has become moot. The appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Cochran v. CIS Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Wesley Vincent and Defendant-appellee Ava Nelson were involved in a collision while working as coal-haul truck drivers at a mine in Campbell County, Wyoming. Vincent filed a personal-injury case in Wyoming federal district court. Following a two-week trial, a jury concluded that Nelson did not act with willful and wanton misconduct, and thus was not liable for Vincent’s damages. Vincent appealed, arguing the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings during trial, its denial of his pre-trial motion to compel the introduction of evidence regarding the mine’s financial interest in the litigation, and the denial of his motion for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Vincent v. Nelson" on Justia Law