Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying a motion for summary judgment filed by Adam Goodman and Paul Underwood (collectively, Petitioners) in this personal injury case arising from an accident in which Blake Auton was injured, holding that the allegations against Petitioners were those of pure negligence, which were barred by workers' compensation immunity.In its order denying summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Goodman was action within the scope of his employment while he was driving a garbage truck that backed over Auton and that additional discovery was required relating to Underwood's actions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction for the circuit court to grant summary judgment to Petitioners, holding (1) Petitioners were both clearly acting in furtherance of their employer's business when the accident occurred; and (2) therefore, workers' compensation immunity barred the cause of action and entitled Petitioners to summary judgment. View "Goodman v. Auton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Clay County Development Corporation (CCDC) in regard to Petitioners' claims of discrimination in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code 5-11-2 and -9, and breach of an implied employment contract, holding that the circuit court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) as used in the Act, ancestry means discrimination based on some characteristic like race, ethnicity, or national origin that is passed down by lineal descendants, and in the context of employment, familial status is not included among the groups entitled to protection under the Act; and (2) the circuit court did not err in its finding that Plaintiffs were at-will employees and as such could be terminated for any non-discriminatory reason. View "Keener v. Clay County Development Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims against the U.S. Attorney General because she failed an allegedly discriminatory physical-fitness test that was a condition of her federal employment and was told to either retake the test, resign, or be fired. She resigned. The district court dismissed her complaint for lack of Article III standing, finding that her resignation did not constitute an “adverse employment action” that could serve as the basis of either claim.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings. The court held that the district court inappropriately intertwined its standing analysis with the merits. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered financial and job-related injuries in fact that are fairly traceable to the government’s action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. View "Jane DiCocco v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the determination of the district court that Plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III to bring this action alleging a violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148 et seq. but vacated the federal district court's judgment dismissing this case, holding that remand was required for a determination as to whether remand to state court was appropriate.Plaintiffs, who worked as delivery drivers for a service provider for FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., brought this action alleging that their supervisor told them he was withholding part of their weekly pay for tax remittance to federal and state tax authorities and that he never sent the deducted amounts to those tax authorities. Plaintiffs sued FedEx for violating the Wage Act in Middlesex County Superior Court. FedEx invoked diversity jurisdiction and removed the action to federal district court, which dismissed the case on that basis that Plaintiffs lacked standing. The First Circuit remanded the case to the district court, holding that while Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing remand was required for the district court to order supplemental briefing on whether remand to state court was appropriate. View "Plazzi v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Employer and dismissing Employee's claims alleging age discrimination and retaliation against a protected activity, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.After he was terminated, Employee brought this action stating that the grounds for his firing were pretextual. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, dismissing Employee's complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment to Employer on Employee's age discrimination and retaliation claims; and (2) did not err in denying Employee's evidentiary motions. View "Dusel v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Nathaniel Sheehan lost his job during the COVID-19 pandemic. He applied for and began receiving unemployment benefits. This appeal arose out of the Idaho Department of Labor’s (“IDOL”) later determination that Sheehan was: (1) ineligible for unemployment benefits; and (2) required to repay the benefits he had already received. Sheehan represented himself throughout this case. He appealed these decisions to the Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”), claiming he had received misleading instructions concerning notice from IDOL. The Commission dismissed his appeal and later denied his motion for reconsideration. Sheehan then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. "While Sheehan presents a poignant story rife with compelling circumstances, we are bound to follow the rules and law of jurisdictional authority." The Court affirmed the Idaho Industrial Commission. View "Sheehan v. Sun Valley Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Melissa Donovan appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU), based upon the court’s finding that no public policy considerations supported plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. From December 2016 until her resignation in November 2018, she served as Associate Dean of Faculty for Mathematics. In this role, her primary focus was oversight of faculty assignments and support for mathematics courses. In March 2018, faculty reviewed a mathematics course, MAT 136, due to concerns about the course’s design. That review revealed that instructors applied different grading schemes for the course, and that those differences were not being communicated to students. Specifically, some sections of MAT 136 employed a grading scheme that SNHU intended to phase out beginning in September 2018. In July 2018, plaintiff's supervisor emailed plaintiff identifying two students from a semester of MAT 136 who received failing grades, but, given the supervisor's assessment of certain irregularities in grading schemes, “had a case for passing.” Plaintiff refused to modify the students' grades, feeling the changes requests violated the school's grading policy and were unethical. In her claim for wrongful termination, plaintiff alleged she was admonished for declining to alter the grades, and subsequently retaliated against by the creation of a hostile work environment. On appeal of the summary judgment motion, plaintiff argued that the question as to whether public policy concerns supported her wrongful termination claim, which alleged that she was constructively discharged as a result of her refusal to alter the students' grades, should have been resolved by a jury and not the trial court, as a matter of law. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the court did not err because complaints about the application of internal grading decisions by a private university do not implicate public policy considerations necessary to support a wrongful termination claim. View "Donovan v. Southern New Hampshire University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer, Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (FSG), for disability discrimination and related causes of action under the Fair Employment & Housing Act. The same month Plaintiff filed this class action against FSG for Labor Code violations, which also included a claim under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.   The trial court in this action denied FSG’s motion, finding unconscionability permeated the arbitration agreement because it had a low to moderate level of procedural unconscionability and at least six substantively unconscionable terms, making severance infeasible. On appeal, FSG contends claim and issue preclusion required the trial court in this action to enforce the arbitration agreement.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that the arbitration agreement is permeated with unconscionability, and the court cannot simply sever the offending provisions. Rather, the court would need to rewrite the agreement, creating a new agreement to which the parties never agreed. Moreover, upholding this type of agreement with multiple unconscionable terms would create an incentive for an employer to draft a onesided arbitration agreement in the hope employees would not challenge the unlawful provisions, but if they do, the court would simply modify the agreement to include the bilateral terms the employer should have included in the first place. View "Mills v. Facility Solutions Group" on Justia Law

In 2017, Jeremy Thornhill said that he had injured his back while working. He sought workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, Walker-Hill and its insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois, but the Employer/Carrier denied that Thornhill had sustained a compensable injury. Ultimately, the parties agreed to compromise and settled pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 71-3-29 (Rev. 2021). Thornhill submitted the settlement to the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission for approval. After examining the application, the Commission approved the settlement and dismissed Thornhill’s case with prejudice. Pursuant to the settlement, Thornhill signed a general release, which reserved his right to pursue a bad faith claim. Believing he had exhausted his administrative remedies, Thornhill filed a bad faith suit against the Employer/Carrier; the Employer/Carrier moved to dismiss the case, arguing the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the Commission never made a factual finding that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court concurred it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that Thornhill had exhausted his administrative remedies and that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear his bad faith claim. The appeals court determined that “Thornhill exhausted his administrative remedies because he fully and finally settled his workers’ compensation claim against the Employer/Carrier, the Commission approved the settlement, and there is nothing left pending before the Commission.” To this, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed. The circuit court judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Thornhill v. Walker-Hill Environmental, et al." on Justia Law

Pursuant to Rule 8.548(b)(2) of the California Rules of Court, the Ninth Circuit requested that the Supreme Court of California decide the certified question presented below: Do non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals within the county jails and related custody facilities have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code in the absence of any local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for these individuals? View "ARMIDA RUELAS, ET AL V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, ET AL" on Justia Law