Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

McIntosh, employed by the Department of Defense, was responsible for approving travel expenses for government contracts. McIntosh, on several occasions refused to approve invoices and refused to provide contract information to her coworkers. Her supervisor, Boswell, informed McIntosh that her actions amounted to a “refus[al] to perform [her] job requirements.” McIntosh filed grievances, alleging that she was being forced to disclose unauthorized information and was harassed. The agency investigated and denied McIntosh’s grievances. McIntosh took sick leave for the day of her scheduled performance review, before Boswell’s retirement. Boswell requested medical documentation. McIntosh returned to work after Boswell retired. Cohen became her supervisor. Upon her return, McIntosh submitted a letter from her doctor, stating that she “should be excused from work due to illness from 3/22/2017 through 3/24/2017.” Employee Relation determined that the documentation was not acceptable. McIntosh never provided additional documentation but reiterated her grievances and requested reassignment. She declined to speak to Cohen and went home. Cohen placed McIntosh on paid leave and issued a Notice of Proposed Removal. The deciding official, Van Winkle, sustained the removal.The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, finding that the Department would have removed McIntosh even absent her protected whistleblowing activity. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Board’s administrative judges are improperly appointed principal officers under the Appointments Clause and that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s decision. View "McIntosh v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jane Doe was the founder and owner of a company called House of Lync, which was purchased by defendant SoftwareONE Inc. As part of the acquisition, plaintiff was offered a position with defendant as “Head Solutions Sales, Skype for Business,” which she accepted. At the time, plaintiff was 49 years old. Nine months later, defendant hosted a “National Sales Kick-off” event in Cancun, Mexico. Plaintiff attended, and felt the event was “full of outlandish behavior.” Plaintiff refused to participate, and later complained to the president of defendant’s American division. Beginning shortly after the event, defendant received complaints about plaintiff, including her “demeaning manner, withholding of important information, bullying, humiliation, and other unacceptable behaviors.” Defendant reassigned plaintiff to a new position: “Global Alliances and Practice Development Leader, Skype for Business.” About six months after plaintiff’s reassignment, Jason Cochran, defendant’s director of technical solutions told plaintiff, during an after-work event, that defendant “is a guy’s club,” plaintiff was “never going to make it” working for defendant, and called plaintiff a “bitch.” After plaintiff complained, defendant’s human resources manager investigated, “coached” Cochran, and informed plaintiff that defendant did not condone this behavior. A few months later, defendant purchased another company similar to plaintiff’s. Defendant then terminated plaintiff, citing poor performance and redundancy. Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging her firing was discriminatory and retaliatory. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1) plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case for discrimination or retaliation; (2) defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff; and (3) plaintiff could not show defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. The trial court granted defendant’s motion and entered judgment for defendant. In moving for a new trial, plaintiff argued, among other things, that even absent evidence of pretext, her claims could and should have survived summary judgment because she made a sufficient showing of retaliatory intent. The trial court agreed and granted plaintiff’s motion. Defendant timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision overturning summary judgment. View "Doe v. Software One" on Justia Law

Abbey Dickerson appealed to the Judicial Department Personnel Board of Review (“Board”) after she was terminated by the Eighteenth Judicial District (“District”). As required by the Personnel Rules, the Board appointed an attorney (who happened to be a retired court of appeals judge) to serve as the hearing officer on her case. Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer changed the disciplinary action to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The District then appealed to the Board, but the Board affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. Because the District remained concerned about Dickerson’s suitability to return to her position, however, it sought review of the Board’s final order by filing a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim in Denver district court. The question presented by this case for the Colorado Supreme Court asked whether the Board was either a “governmental body” or a “lower judicial body” within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), such that its decision to affirm, modify, or reverse a disciplinary action could be challenged in district court. The Supreme Court held that the Personnel Rules precluded district court review of a final order by the Board. View "Colorado Judicial Dept. 18th Judicial District" on Justia Law

The Cincinnati Citizen Complaint Authority investigates alleged police misconduct and usually interviews the relevant officers, complainants, and other witnesses. Officers are required to participate in such investigations. An officer may bring a union representative to the interview. The Authority video records the interviews. Sergeant Hils, the President of the Union, claims that Authority Investigator Ekeke, in recording an officer’s interview, selectively turned off the recording when the officer made exculpatory statements. Another time, he alleges, Ekeke “threatened” an officer before the interview. Hils tried to record an interview of Officer Knapp, whom he represented. The Authority instituted a policy, prohibiting officers or their representatives from recording the interviews.Hils and affected officers sued, alleging violations of their free-speech rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The union filed an unfair labor practices charge, which led to a partial settlement agreement. The city agreed to record all future interviews. The district court held that the settlement agreement mooted the selective-recording claims and that the First Amendment does not include a right to record a government investigation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The policy satisfies rational-basis review. The Authority has legitimate interests in maintaining order and fairness during its interviews by ensuring the ongoing interviews are not selectively broadcasted, by ensuring the integrity of the investigation, by protecting the subjects of the investigation from unfair and precipitous public criticism, and by trying to prevent other subjects of the investigation from hearing prior interviews. View "Hils v. Davis" on Justia Law

Milhem applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits, alleging that several conditions limited her ability to work. Milihem, age 38, had completed three years of college and had previously worked as a canvasser, receptionist, portrait photographer, and graphic designer. A vocational expert concluded that the evidence supported limiting Milhem’s work to that which can be learned in 30 days or less, that Milhem could stand or walk for at least two hours in an eight-hour workday, and that Milhem “could make judgments commensurate with functions of simple, repetitive tasks”; such an individual could not perform Milhem’s past work, but could work as a router, price marker, and cafeteria attendant, of which there were approximately 53,000, 307,000, and 63,000 jobs in the national economy, respectively. Changing the exertion level to sedentary, the expert testified, would include the work of an addresser, table worker, or document preparer, of which there were approximately 19,000, 23,000, and 47,000 jobs in the national economy, respectively.Based on this testimony, and “considering [Milhem’s] age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,” the ALJ found that there were a significant number of jobs that Milhem could perform, so Milhem was not under a qualifying disability. The district court upheld that determination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A reasonable person would accept 89,000 jobs in the national economy, a figure supported by substantial evidence, as a significant number. Other circuits have accepted similar numbers as significant. View "Milhem v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought unpaid overtime wages for the period between January 1, 2015, and February 1, 2016, during which a Department of Labor rule entitling homecare workers to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was temporarily vacated. The district court conditionally certified a putative collective consisting of In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) providers who worked overtime during this period.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor of Los Angeles County Department of Social Services and denying partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs. Reversing in part and remanding, the panel held that the County was a joint employer, along with care recipients, of IHSS providers, and thus could be liable under the FLSA for failing to pay overtime compensation.   The panel held that, notwithstanding differences between the IHSS program operating in Los Angeles County today and the programs analyzed in Bonnette, the County was a joint employer of Plaintiffs, in light of the economic and structural control it exercised over the employment relationship. The panel directed the district court, on remand, to grant partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the issue of whether the County was a joint employer of IHSS providers.   Further, the panel held that the district court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to the County on the issue of willfulness and denying partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on the issue of liquidated damages. The panel held that a determination of willfulness and the assessment of liquidated damages are reserved for the most recalcitrant violators. View "TRINA RAY, ET AL V. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this action brought against Troy University, an accredited, four-year state university with several campuses in Alabama and an office in Fayetteville, North Carolina, alleging various tort claims arising out of his employment and termination, holding that Troy University explicitly waived its sovereign immunity.Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Troy University and two individual defendants asserting, among other things, claims for wrongful discharge from employment in violation of public policy and negligent retention or supervision of an employee. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on sovereign immunity, citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019), which established that states are required to recognize sovereign immunity of other states as a matter of constitutional law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) Troy University explicitly waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in North Carolina; and (2) therefore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's suit against Defendants. View "Farmer v. Troy University" on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew Shouse was terminated from his employment as a captain of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO, the Department, or respondent), following an administrative hearing. Findings on the record reflected petitioner engaged in improper sexual relationships with subordinates under his command, misappropriated county equipment and electronic mail for his personal use, was insubordinate in violating a direct order prohibiting him from contacting any person with whom he had had a personal relationship during the pendency of the investigation, and unbecoming conduct discrediting the Sheriff’s Department. Following an administrative appeal, the findings were sustained. Petitioner petitioned for writ of mandate seeking review of his dismissal, and, upon denial of that petition, he appealed. The sole legal issue presented was whether petitioner’s rights pursuant to the Public Safety Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBRA) were violated where the investigation into his alleged improper conduct was not completed within one year of discovery. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Shouse v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Travelers Indemnity Company appeals the judgment entered after the superior court denied Travelers’ petition for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the Insurance Commissioner’s decision that certain agreements relating to workers’ compensation insurance policies issued to Adir International, LLC were unenforceable. Travelers contended that Adir’s lawsuit in the trial court, which included a request for a declaratory judgment the agreements were void, barred the Commissioner, under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, from exercising jurisdiction while that lawsuit was pending. Travelers also appealed the post-judgment order granting Adir’s motion for attorney fees, contending attorney fees were not authorized.   The Second Appellate Division affirmed the order and judgment denying Travelers’s petition. The court explained that the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction doctrine does not apply in this context to proceedings pending before the trial court and an administrative agency; and, in any event, it was reasonable and consistent with the primary jurisdiction doctrine for the trial court to defer to the Commissioner’s determination of the validity of the agreement at issue. In addition, because Adir’s administrative claim fell within the agreement’s attorney fee provision, the court affirmed the post-judgment order awarding Adir attorney fees. View "The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Lara" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decisions of the lower tribunals resolving Claimant's permanent total disability (PTD) claim in his favor after denying his petition to reopen his occupational pneumoconiosis permanent partial disability (OP PPD) claim for further evaluation, holding that the lower tribunals erred in part.At issue in the instant consolidated appeals were Claimant's attempt to reopen his OP PPD claim for further evaluation and his claim for permanent total disability (PTD) due to his various impairments. While Claimant's PTD claim was still being litigated, he unsuccessfully filed two petition to reopen his OP PPD claim. The lower tribunals denied Claimant's reopening petitions but awarded him PTD. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) W. Va. Code 23-4-16(e) does not preclude reopening of a permanent disability claim because another permanent disability claim is pending; and (2) the lower tribunals were not clearly wrong in determining that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled. View "Delbert v. Murray American Energy, Inc." on Justia Law