Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Walmart, Inc. ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision awarding Dianna Hixson temporary total disability (TTD) compensation on the basis of State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 119 N.E.3d 386 (Ohio 2018), holding that Klein applies prospectively only.Before the Supreme Court issued Klein, the Commission awarded Hixson TTD compensation. After Klein was released, Walmart, Hixson's former employer, filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the termination of Hixson's TTD compensation after the date notified Walmart of her retirement. The court of appeals granted the writ, concluding that the Commission abused its discretion by awarding TTD compensation for the period following Hixson's retirement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Klein does not apply retroactively and should be applied prospectively only. View "State ex rel. Walmart, Inc. v. Hixson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that couriers who deliver goods from local restaurants and retailers are transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce such that they are exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Plaintiffs, who worked as couriers for Defendants making deliveries in the greater Boston area, filed suit in a Massachusetts state court on their own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated couriers, alleging that Defendant had misclassified them as independent contractors rather than employees and that they were entitled to employee benefits and protections under Massachusetts law. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs were not exempt from the FAA, compelled arbitration of the dispute, and dismissed the lawsuit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in compelling arbitration and dismissing the underlying complaint. View "Immediato v. Postmates, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the district court’s dismissal of her amended complaint filed against her former employer, the United States Department of the Army. Appellant alleged that she experienced a hostile work environment due to race-based harassment from a co-worker and retaliation by her supervisors through both discrete acts and a retaliatory hostile work environment.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s discrete-act retaliation claim but vacated its dismissal of her race-based hostile work environment and retaliatory hostile work environment claim. The court explained that Appellant has stated a prima facie case. The court wrote that an “employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience,” but the consistent (even if not constant) conduct Appellant alleged plausibly qualifies as materially adverse. The court further wrote that it agreed that Appellant failed to allege a non-speculative link between her Title VII claim and her non-selection. View "Marie Laurent-Workman v. Christine Wormuth" on Justia Law

Correctional officers at the Michigan federal prison typically work eight-hour shifts. Prison shifts are scheduled in advance; hospital shifts are scheduled differently because they arise only when an inmate is transferred to a hospital for care. Since the need for hospital shifts varies, supervisors create hospital shifts as needed. They use a list of correctional officers who volunteered to be contacted about these shifts, which provide overtime pay. It takes about 20 minutes to drive from the prison to each local hospital; prison shifts and hospital shifts are currently staggered by one hour. Officers claimed that under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Office of Personnel Management regulations, the prison must compensate them for the travel time between a prison shift and a hospital shift, where these shifts are back-to-back and the hospital shift is voluntary. They asserted that this travel time is a “principal activity,” travel during a “continuous workday,” or other “hours of work,” for which the FLSA mandates compensation.The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. Travel between a regular prison shift and an immediately following voluntary hospital shift is not a principal activity; it does not occur during either shift or during a “continuous workday.” View "Bridges v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court entering summary judgment for Employer and dismissing Employee's class action claiming that Employer violated the Missouri Prevailing Wage Act by failing to pay its employees the prevailing wage for work performed on properties in Kansas City, Missouri, holding that a genuine dispute existed, precluding summary judgment.Employee, individually and on behalf of a class of all similarly situated, filed a petition alleging that Employer violated the State's prevailing wage act and minimum wage law. The circuit court sustained Employer's motion for summary judgment as to all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the record supported two plausible but contrary inferences as to whether Employee was employed "on behalf of any public body engaged in the construction of public works" within the meaning of the Prevailing Wage Act; and (2) therefore, a genuine dispute of material fact existed, barring summary judgment. View "Brockington v. New Horizons Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss this lawsuit brought by Plaintiff under the Utah Sales Representative Commission Payment Act for allegedly failing to pay commissions it owed to her, holding that the Act's writing requirement is not a precondition for recovery.In her complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant violated the Act by failing to pay commissions for sales that she made while working as a commissioned sales agent for the company. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because there was no signed writing there could be no recovery under the Act. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the plain text of the Act, the writing requirement is not a prerequisite for a sales representative to sue a principal under the Act; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in granting Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "Williamson v. MGS By Design, Inc." on Justia Law

Deborah Dorr requested to reopen an unemployment appeal hearing that was to address Dorr’s appeal of the Idaho Department of Labor’s (“IDOL”) decision denying Dorr’s request to backdate her Pandemic Unemployment Assistance claim. After Dorr failed to appear at the hearing, IDOL dismissed her appeal and subsequently denied her request to reopen the hearing. Dorr appealed IDOL’s denial of her request to reopen, and the Idaho Industrial Commission (“the Commission”) affirmed. The Commission determined due process was satisfied and agreed with IDOL that Dorr’s own negligence was insufficient cause to reopen the hearing. Appealing pro se, Dorr petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for relief. The Supreme Court concluded Dorr’s briefing did not meet the standard for an appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) and as such, her arguments were forfeited. The Commission’s decision upholding the Appeal Examiner’s denial of Dorr’s request to reopen her appeal hearing was affirmed. View "Dorr v. IDOL" on Justia Law

Three independent contractors of Eastman Chemical Company were severely injured, one of them fatally, when a pump exploded during maintenance. Eastman moved to dismiss their state-law personal injury suits, contending that the contractors qualified as Eastman’s “statutory employees” under the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Law – which would mean that workers’ compensation was their exclusive remedy and that the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear their claims.   The district court agreed that Plaintiffs were Eastman’s “statutory employees” under the workers’ compensation law and dismissed their actions. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held their cases in abeyance pending the decision of South Carolina’s Supreme Court in Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 870 S.E.2d 156 (2021).   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling. The court explained that in Keene, when an employer makes a “legitimate business decision” to outsource a portion of its work, the contractors it hires to perform that work are not “statutory employees” for workers’ compensation purposes. 870 S.E.2d at 163. No party here contests that Eastman’s outsourcing of its maintenance and repair work was a “legitimate business decision.” It follows that the plaintiffs, independent contractors performing maintenance at the time of the 2016 pump explosion, were not statutory employees and may bring personal injury actions. View "Sallie Zeigler v. Eastman Chemical Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a tenured theology teacher at a Roman Catholic high school in Staten Island, appealed from the dismissal of his complaint against his labor union, the Federation of Catholic Teachers (the “FCT”), for allegedly breaching its duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (the “LMRA”), and for assorted violations under the New York State and New York City human rights laws. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s duty-of-fair representation claim with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), reasoning that the NLRA and LMRA are inapplicable to disputes between parochial-school teachers and their labor unions under NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded, as a matter of first impression, that Catholic Bishop does preclude Plaintiff’s duty-of-fair-representation claim, but that dismissal was warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, rather than for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The court also concluded that Plaintiff has abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of his state and municipal-law claims. View "Jusino v. Fed'n of Cath. Tchrs., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Balubhai Patel, DTWO & E, Inc. (DTWO), and Stuart Union, LLC (Stuart Union) (collectively, appellants) have been before this court numerous times in connection with a labor dispute with a former employee, Defendant, that resulted in two California Labor Commissioner orders (ODAs) in Defendant’s favor. The instant appeal challenges a superior court order forfeiting a bond Appellants had posted in an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the ODAs, as well as a judgment against them as bond principals.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the only bonds Appellants posted here were for the exact amount owed under the ODAs— not double or one and one-half times that amount. Thus, aside from the fact that, when Appellants posted the bonds, Appellants identified the bonds as undertakings related to their attempted section 98.2 appeal to the trial court, not an appeal with this court, the bonds were insufficient to stay the actions below based on the pendency of any appeal with this court. The trial court, therefore, did not lack jurisdiction based on the pendency of related appeals in this court.   Further, the court held that Appellants’ jurisdictional arguments misunderstand the relationship between bonds issued pursuant to section 98.2 and jurisdiction. The statute expressly contemplates a situation in which an attempted section 98.2 appeal has failed without there necessarily having been an adjudication on the merits or jurisdiction to hear a section 98.2 appeal, and the court is not only empowered but required to satisfy the relevant ODA from a bond posted under such circumstances. View "Patel v. Chavez" on Justia Law