Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Kinsella, working for Baker, suffered work-related knee injuries that left him unable to work for three years. He received disability benefits. In 2016, his physician deemed him fit to work in sedentary jobs. Martinez, in human resources, helped him look for appropriate jobs at the company. Kinsella submitted an ADA Reassignment Request. Martinez indicated that Baker had 30 days to look for jobs and that failure to timely find alternative work would result in termination. After that period expired, Martinez suggested Kinsella apply for a dispatcher job. Kinsella failed to apply on time, despite an extension. He applied the next day but did not follow up. A non-disabled employee was hired.Kinsella received a termination letter, citing failure to apply for a position. Kinsella responded, attaching a receipt confirming his application. After investigation, Baker began the process of reinstating Kinsella'a status. Eventually, negotiations broke down.In 2018, Kinsella filed a claim that the EEOC dismissed as untimely. Kinsella sued, alleging failure-to-accommodate, discriminatory discharge, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. An arbitrator granted Baker summary judgment. Kinsella asked the district court to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by requiring illegitimate elements of proof. The court reinstated and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kinsella misconstrues the arbitrator’s statements concerning a lack of evidence showing discriminatory intent. They were part of attributing fault on both sides for a breakdown in the interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation. View "Kinsella v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Northrop laid off workers in 2012 and did not provide them all with severance benefits. Its Severance Plan provides that a laid-off employee regularly scheduled to work at least 20 hours a week will receive severance benefits if that employee “received a cover memo, signed by a Vice President of Human Resources.” The plaintiffs, who did not receive this “HR Memo,” filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001– 1461.The parties agreed to have a magistrate resolve the case, 28 U.S.C. 636(c). After the suit was certified as a class action, the district judge resumed control at Northrop's request, finding that the increased stakes constituted “good cause” for withdrawing the reference. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, ruling that the Plan gives the HR Department discretion to choose who gets severance pay.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first finding no abuse of discretion in the withdrawal of the reference order. The Plan makes the receipt of severance benefits contingent on the receipt of an HR Memo, which the class members did not get. Welfare-benefit plans under ERISA—unlike retirement plans—need not provide for vesting, and the terms of welfare-benefit plans are entirely in the control of the entities that establish them. When making design decisions, employers may act in their own interests and may include a discretionary component. Rights under ERISA are not subject to estoppel. The plan itself—not past practice—always controls. View "Carlson v. Northrop Grumman Severance Plan" on Justia Law

After years of what the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) viewed as unsatisfactory teaching performance by a certificated teacher, LAUSD served the teacher with a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and a Statement of Charges, which included notice that the employee was suspended without pay. The teacher brought and prevailed on a motion for immediate reversal of suspension (MIRS) and thus received pay during the pendency of the dismissal proceedings. LAUSD ultimately prevailed in those proceedings. LAUSD then sought a writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court seeking to set aside the order granting the MIRS and to recoup the salary payments it had made to the teacher during the pendency of the proceedings. The trial court denied the writ, holding that the MIRS order is not reviewable. The court also ruled (1) LAUSD cannot recover the payments to the teacher under its cause of action for money had and received and (2) LAUSD’s cause of action for declaratory judgment is derivative of its other claims. The trial court entered judgment against LAUSD in favor of the teacher.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that LAUSD has failed to show that in adding the MIRS procedure, the Legislature intended school districts to be able to recover payments to subsequently dismissed employees. The court wrote that if LAUSD believed such recovery should be permitted through judicial review of MIRS orders or otherwise, it should address the Legislature. View "L.A. Unified School Dist. v. Office of Admin. Hearings" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the underlying case or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration under section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), holding that Defendants were not entitled to reversal.Plaintiffs, who distributed Defendants' baked goods along routes in Massachusetts, brought this action alleging that Defendants misclassified them as independent contractors and seeking unpaid wages, overtime compensation, and other damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration under the FAA. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Plaintiffs fell within the FAA's section 1 exemption from the FAA's purview "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) two of Defendants' arguments were waived; and (2) Defendants were not entitled to relief on the merits of their remaining arguments. View "Canales v. CK Sales Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the continuing validity of the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity, adopted in Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944 (1996). This case presented the issue of whether Louisiana law recognized a cause of action for claims asserted against an assistant district attorney (“ADA”), who, during the plea and sentencing phase of a prosecution, misrepresents, either directly or by omission, a victim’s preference as to the sentence to be imposed upon a defendant, and thereafter, attempts to conceal this alleged misconduct. A secondary question concerned whether a cause of action could be maintained against the district attorney (“DA”) who employed the ADA, under a theory of vicarious liability or for employment-related claims. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Knapper and further found that, under the circumstances of this case, both the ADA and the DA were entitled to immunity. The Court thus found that the lower courts erred in overruling the defendants’ peremptory exception of no cause of action. View "Jameson v. Montgomery, et al." on Justia Law

On August 4, 2014, Appellant Donna Javitz became the Director of Human Resources for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Her union-related responsibilities included participating in investigatory meetings for disciplinary matters involving union employees. In March 2015, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME” or “Union”) filed an unfair labor practice charge (“ULP Charge”) with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board against Luzerne County, raising allegations concerning Javitz’s conduct in two investigatory meetings. Paula Schnelly, an administrative assistant in the appellate division of the Luzerne County’s District Attorney’s Office and Union president, attended the investigatory meetings referenced in the ULP Charge as a representative for the Union members. Attached to the ULP Charge were documents in support of the allegations, among them were what appeared to Javitz to be transcripts of the investigatory meetings at issue. The highly detailed nature of the documents, as well as Javitz’s recollection that Schnelly did not take notes during investigatory meetings, gave rise to a suspicion on Javitz’s part that Schnelly recorded the investigatory meeting in violation of the Wiretap Act. Javitz took her concern to the Director of Administrative Services, David Parsnik. Together they took the matter to the Luzerne County District Attorney. The District Attorney stated that she would refer the matter to the Attorney General’s Office to investigate, as Schnelly’s employment in the District Attorney’s office created a conflict of interest. Javitz contended, she learned the County Manager, Robert Lawton, instructed the District Attorney to drop the matter. In October 2015, the Union and County settled the ULP Charge. A week later, Javitz was terminated from her position. Javitz filed suit in federal district court, naming Luzerne County, Lawton, and Parsnik as defendants. Her complaint raised federal and state claims, including a claim under the Whistleblower Law. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court related to the standard that a plaintiff must meet in order to establish a prima facie claim under Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law and whether the Commonwealth Court erred in its application of that standard. The Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court did so err. Its order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Javitz v. Luzerne Co., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying the Health and Human Services Commission's (HHSC) combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs' conduct was not protected by the Texas Whistleblower Act.Plaintiffs sued HHSC under the Act, alleging that they were terminated in retaliation for their good faith reports about violations of law by HHSC to various law enforcement agencies. HHSC responded by filing a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the plea and motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' reports of misconduct could not support a Whistleblower Act claim against HHSC. View "Tex. Health & Human Services Comm'n v. Pope" on Justia Law

On April 7, 2020, Matthew Wallace was hired by the Centreville Police Department, located in the Town of Centreville, Mississippi. In 2021, Wallace was dispatched with a Town of Centreville certified police officer, to a scene involving multiple juveniles riding all-terrain vehicles in the town limits. An altercation occurred; at some point during the altercation, Wallace went to the patrol unit to retrieve the police-issued pepper spray. Upon returning to the scene, Wallace released the pepper spray. Sometime following the incident, one of the juveniles and his mother filed charges against Wallace for simple assault on a minor. The issue presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered around a probable cause hearing pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28. Before the hearing, the State petitioned the circuit court to determine whether Wallace was entitled to a probable cause hearing, alleging Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer. At the hearing, the circuit determined that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing. Wallace moved the circuit court for a probable cause hearing for the same underlying incident. The circuit court denied the motion, finding, again, that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28. Wallace appealed. The Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer who is not certified pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 45-6-11(3)(a) is not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i). Further, the Court held Wallace was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i) because he was not a law enforcement officer as defined by Mississippi Code Section 45-6-3(c). View "Wallace v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint for malicious prosecution against his union, the local chapter, and several individuals associated with the union, holding that Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts for a court to conclude that the dismissal of his criminal case was a favorable termination.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the union's leadership accused him of misusing union funds after he publicly criticized the union's financial waste, leading to his indictment on two felony charges. The State successfully moved to retire the charges for one year, after which the charges were dismissed. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim on the basis that the retirement and dismissal of the criminal charges was not a favorable termination on the merits. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused; and (2) under this standard, Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39" on Justia Law

After being fired by his employer, Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC, Intervenor filed suit in federal district court, alleging that his termination reflected racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Anheuser-Busch filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration of Intervenor’s district court claims, asserting that at the time when he was hired, Intervenor had agreed to be bound by the company’s Dispute Resolution Policy. Intervenor disagreed that he was required to arbitrate his claims. After Anheuser-Busch asked the district court to compel arbitration, Intervenor filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, arguing that Defendant’s efforts to enforce its arbitration agreement contravened the collective bargaining agreement and constituted a unilateral change to the terms of Intervenor’s employment, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the Board’s order dismissing the complaint, vacated the decision of the Board, and remanded for consideration of whether enforcement of the Dispute Resolution Policy against Intervenor would violate the NLRA. The court held that the Board applied an erroneously narrow standard for determining whether Anheuser-Busch’s motion had an illegal objective. The court explained that on remand, the Board should instead determine whether the outcome sought by Anheuser-Busch’s motion— the compelled arbitration of Brown’s Title VII claims under the Dispute Resolution Policy—would violate the NLRA. If the Board decides that the answer to that question is “yes,” it should then order all relief that is appropriate based on Anheuser-Busch’s unlawful conduct. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 947 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law