Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Nitkin, a Nurse Practitioner, worked in an MLH hospital. During team meetings, the Lead Doctor would sometimes discuss inappropriate sexual topics and his substance misuse and would ask team members about their personal lives, including dating and traumatic experiences. Nitkin also recounted that the Lead Doctor made her feel uncomfortable in private; he never propositioned her for a date or stated that he wanted to have sexual relations with her. Nitkin reduced her work hours and reported his conduct. After an investigation, MLH removed the Lead Doctor from his director role and assigned Dr. Tyson. Nitkin still had to work occasionally with the Lead Doctor.Shortly after telling Tyson that she did not want to work with Lead Doctor, Nitkin received a new job offer and decided to resign. Tyson, however, indicated that Nitkin had divulged confidential information by telling him that she filed a complaint against the Lead Doctor, which was a terminable offense. According to Nitkin, she was told that, if she was terminated for violating policies, her new employer would be informed but that she could avoid that outcome by making her resignation effective immediately. Nitkin did so.Nitkin filed suit, alleging hostile work environment on the basis of sex and retaliation, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted MLH summary judgment on Nitkin’s hostile work environment and wrongful termination claims but denied it on her retaliation claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Nitkin did not demonstrate that the harassment was severe or pervasive. View "Nitkin v. Main Line Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Clark County Association of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees (CCASAPE)'s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging a so-called "teacher lottery," holding that the district court properly rejected CCASAPE's interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 388G.610.CCASAPE, a school administrators' union, filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief alleging that Clark County School District (CCSD) violated section 388G.610 by implementing a policy under which certain teachers were unilaterally assigned to local school precincts without the consent of each precinct. The district court denied relief because CCASAPE failed to demonstrate that any assignment was inconsistent with statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complained-of policy did not run afoul of section 388G.610 because it was implemented to ensure compliance with collective bargaining agreements and allow for as much selection authority as the school district held. View "Clark County Ass'n of School Administrators v. Clark County School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the administrative and circuit court decisions ordering Appellant to repay $14,080 in Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits that Appellant had received under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), holding that the circuit court erred.After Congress passed the CARES Act creating a temporary, state-administered PUA benefits program for unemployed individuals, Appellant, a self-employed individual who owned a small bed and breakfast, applied for PUA benefits after becoming unemployed "as a result of COVID-19[.]" The Department of Labor and Regulation, Reemployment Assistance Division determined Appellant was eligible for PUA benefits and issued a series of payments totaling $14,080. Later, however, the Department determined that Appellant was not eligible for benefits because she was "not considered unemployed" under any of the bases listed in the CARES Act. The Department then ordered Appellant to repay the PUA benefits. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALJ erred in applying the causation standard in the Self-Employment Rule and further erred in concluding that Appellant was ineligible for PUA benefits. View "Bracken v. Dep't of Labor & Regulation, Reemployment Assistance Division" on Justia Law

Nordby served as an administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration. He was also a First Lieutenant in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the Army Reserve. From January-May 2017, Nordby was activated under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) to perform military service in the Army Reserve; he conducted basic training for new Judge Advocates in Georgia and Virginia. Federal employees who are absent from civilian positions due to military responsibilities and who meet the requirements listed in 5 U.S.C. 5538(a) are entitled to differential pay to account for the difference between their military and civilian compensation.The agency denied Nordby’s request for differential pay, reasoning that those called to voluntary active duty under section 12301(d) are not entitled to differential pay. The Merit Systems Protection Board rejected Nordby's argument that he was called to duty under section 101(a)(13)(B)— “any [] provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress” and that his activation was “during a national emergency” because the U.S. has been in a continuous state of national emergency since September 11, 2001. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Nordby failed to allege any connection between the training and the ongoing national emergency that resulted from the September 11 attack. View "Nordby v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Defendants hired Plaintiff as a nanny. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment. They hoped Plaintiff would release potential claims against them in exchange for a severance payment. Defendants asked a friend (who ran a nanny placement service and had helped hire Plaintiff) to propose this to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not sign the proposed severance agreement. Instead, she brought wage-and-hour claims against Defendants. Following discovery, Plaintiff amended her complaint to add a claim for defamation. She based her defamation claim on statements Defendants made to the intermediary during the negotiations over severance. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. They argued that the allegedly defamatory statements were made in anticipation of litigation. They moved to strike not only the new defamation allegations but also the entire complaint. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion and required the Defendants to pay some of Plaintiff’s attorney fees.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Defendants did not show that Plaintiff’s defamation claim was based on activity protected by the anti-SLAPP law. The court explained that Defendants appealed to the entire SAC. They did so even after the trial court correctly found the motion frivolous as to most of Plaintiff’s SAC. Defendants informed the trial court that “the appeal is going to be of every cause of action.” Defendants were thereby able to obtain a full stay of the action in the trial court, even though the appeal was frivolous as to most of the action. If Defendants had appealed as to only the defamation cause of action, Plaintiff might have had the opportunity to argue for permission to continue discovery. View "Nirschl v. Schiller" on Justia Law

After the enactment of AB 5 and the filing of Proposition 22 but before the effective date of AB 2257—Plaintiff filed suit against LPL Financial LLC under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). LPL is a registered broker-dealer and registered investment adviser registered with Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (‘FINRA’) and the Securities Exchange Commission. Plaintiff and all allegedly aggrieved individuals (the ‘Financial Professionals’) were ‘securities broker-dealers or investment advisers or their agents and representatives that are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. The parties stipulated that on its face, Labor Code Section 2750.3(i)(2) makes the exemption set forth in Section 2750.3(b)(4) retroactive, such that it would cover the entire proposed PAGA period in this action. However, Plaintiff claimed both of those sections are unconstitutional and thus unenforceable. The parties did not stipulate the results of these two tests—the ABC test versus the Borello test. LPL moved for summary adjudication. The trial court upheld the statute as constitutional.   The Second Appellate District affirmed and held that the challenged provisions are constitutional. The court explained that Plaintiff maintains the registration aspect of the exemption creates a nonsensically narrow classification. The court held that legislation may recognize different categories of people within a larger classification who present varying degrees of risk of harm and properly may limit regulation to those classes for whom the need for regulation is thought to be more important. Further, the court wrote that, unlike the situation with equal protection law, there may be a large divergence between state and federal substantive due process doctrines. View "Quinn v. LPL Financial LLC" on Justia Law

Employer, a temporary staffing company, hired Young as a temporary worker in 2013 and assigned Young to a temporary position at BOW. On Friday, August 16, Young had a telephone altercation with Employer’s representative, who claimed Young was verbally abusive. Young testified the representative “basically” told Young she was “fired” and “implied” the firing was from Employer, rather than the BOW assignment. A contemporaneous internal email characterized the representative's message to Young as being that she was not to return to BOW due to her threatening behavior. Young reported for work at BOW on Monday, August 19. Another Employer representative escorted her out. Young was paid on August 23, for work performed the week of August 12 and on August 30 for work performed on August 19, in accordance with Employer’s regular payroll schedule.Young sued. In 2021—after arbitration of Young’s individual claims and dismissal of her class claims, Young’s only remaining claim was for Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code 2699, PAGA) penalties based on Employer’s alleged failure to timely pay final wages to a discharged employee (Labor Code 201.3(b)(4)). The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment for Employer. Section 201.3(b)(4) applies when a temporary services employer discharges an employee from employment with the temporary services employer, not when that employer terminates an employee from a particular work assignment. Young failed to demonstrate a dispute of fact as to whether she was discharged from work with Employer. View "Young v. RemX Specialty Staffing" on Justia Law

Eberspaecher North America (“ENA”), is a company that manufactures car components with its headquarters in Novi, Michigan and six other locations across the country. An employee at one of these locations—ENA’s Northport, Alabama plant—complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) that he was fired for taking protected absences under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). An EEOC Commissioner charged ENA with discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), listing only the Northport facility in the written charge. The EEOC then issued requests for information on every employee terminated for attendance-related infractions at each of ENA’s seven domestic facilities around the nation. ENA objected to the scope of those requests. The district court ordered ENA to turn over information related to the Northport, Alabama, facility but refused to enforce the subpoena as to information from other facilities. The EEOC appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion. In the alternative, the EEOC contends that, even if the charge were limited to the Northport facility, nationwide data is still relevant to its investigation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order enforcing only part of the EEOC’s subpoena. The court explained the EEOC’s investigatory process is a multi-step process designed to notify employers of investigations into potentially unlawful employment practices. The court held that the EEOC charged only ENA’s Northport facility— which provided notice to ENA that the EEOC was investigating potentially unlawful employment practices only at that specific facility—and thus that the nationwide data sought by the EEOC is irrelevant to that charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eberspaecher North America Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was let go from her position at Brandstar Studios shortly after her father fell ill. Following her termination, Plaintiff sued Brandstar under the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted Brandstar summary judgment. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that Brandstar executives interfered with her rights under the FMLA. Second, she asserted that her termination constituted associational discrimination under the ADA. And finally, she claimed that the district court improperly weighed the evidence on summary judgment rather than construing the facts in her favor.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties agreed that Brandstar provided Plaintiff the leave she requested in her May 2 email and that she received full pay for those days. In fact, Plaintiff accidentally clocked in on her two days of requested leave, and Brandstar HR executives circled back weeks later to ensure that she corrected her timecard to reflect her requested leave. Thus, Plaintiff can’t demonstrate that she was harmed by Brandstar’s technical failure to notify her of her FMLA rights. Further, the court found that not only did Plaintiff fail to “request leave” in the May 6 email, but there’s also no indication that Brandstar “acquired knowledge” on its own that she wanted leave for an FMLA-qualifying reason. Moreover, the court found that the only evidence Plaintiff marshaled is the “temporal proximity” between her father’s acute onset decline and her termination—which isn’t enough to show pretext. View "Jessica Graves v. Brandstar Studios, Inc." on Justia Law

David Kutcka, Tammy Dejno, as personal representative of Austin Dejno’s estate, and Tammy Dejno, as wrongful death plaintiff (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appealed the dismissal of their negligence claims against Gateway Building Systems (“Gateway”). Plaintiffs argued the district court erred in concluding Gateway was Kutcka’s and Austin Dejno’s statutory employer entitling Gateway to immunity from suit under the workers’ compensation act. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Gateway, the general contractor, was not the statutory employer of its subcontractor’s employees, Kutcka and Dejno, entitling it to immunity under the exclusive remedy provisions of N.D.C.C. § 65-04-28, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kutcka, et al. v. Gateway Building Systems, et al." on Justia Law