Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Bishop’s School (the School) terminated Chad Bishop’s (Bishop) employment as a teacher after it became aware of a text exchange between Bishop and a former student. Bishop filed a lawsuit asserting a breach of contract claim against the School and defamation claims against the School and Ron Kim, the Head of the School, based on the termination letter they sent to Bishop and a statement Kim made that was published in the student newspaper. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the first amended complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) as well as a demurrer. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the defamation claims but denied it as to the contract claim against the School. The court also overruled the School’s demurrer to the contract claim. Bishop appealed the anti-SLAPP ruling. On cross-appeal, the School challenged the court’s order denying anti-SLAPP protection for the contract claim. The School also sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain its demurrer to the contract claim. After review, the Court of appeal concluded: (1) defendants did not meet their burden to show that Bishop’s allegations regarding the termination letter, which supported the defamation claim, or the termination itself, which supported the contract claim, involved protected activity; (2) defendants met their burden to show that Kim’s statement was protected activity, and Bishop failed to show that the defamation claim as based on that activity had minimal merit; and (3) without having filed a writ petition, there was no basis for the School to seek writ relief from the court’s order overruling its demurrer ruling on the contract claim. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order and remanded the matter with directions. View "Bishop v. The Bishop's School" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders entered by the district court on review of the Human Rights Commission's (HRC) final agency decision regarding Plaintiff's sexual discrimination claims against Defendant, her former employer, holding that the district court erred in part.The hearing officer found discrimination and awarded Plaintiff $415,786. The HRC affirmed the finding of discrimination and slightly altered the hearing officer's damages calculations, resulting in an increase in the overall award. The district court upheld the finding of discrimination but concluded that the HRC's use of a four-year cap for front pay damages was arbitrary and capricious, thus increasing Plaintiff's front-pay damage award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in affirming the determination that Plaintiff was exposed to a hostile and abusive work environment and was subjected to sexual harassment and retaliation; (2) erred in reversing the HRC's front-pay damage award; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in its determination of Plaintiff's attorney fee award. View "Norval Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement contracts with CoreCivic to incarcerate detained immigrants in 24 facilities across 11 states. Plaintiffs, detained solely due to their immigration status and neither charged with, nor convicted of, any crime, alleged that the overseers of their private detention facilities forced them to perform labor against their will and without adequate compensation in violation of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“California TVPA”), various provisions of the California Labor Code, and other state laws.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order denying a petition for panel rehearing and, on behalf of the court, a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an opinion (a) amending and superceding the panel’s original opinion and (b) affirming the district court’s order certifying three classes. The panel held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in certifying a California Labor Law Class, a California Forced Labor Class, and a National Forced Labor Class. The panel held that, as to the California Forced Labor Class, Plaintiffs submitted sufficient proof of a classwide policy of forced labor to establish commonality. The panel agreed with the district court that narrowing the California Forced Labor Class based on the California TVPA’s statute of limitations was not required at the class certification stage. Further, the panel held that, as to the National Forced Labor Class, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs presented significant proof of a classwide policy of forced labor and that common questions predominated over individual ones. View "SYLVESTER OWINO, ET AL V. CORECIVIC, INC." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the summary judgment entered in the business and consumer docket in favor of Employee on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment after the trial court concluded that Employer failed to comply with the state's wage payment and minimum wage laws, holding that the trial court did not err.At issue was whether the trial court erred in concluding that Employer violated the State's wage payment laws when it permitted Employee's paycheck to be deposited into a bank account controlled by "cybercriminals" who had stolen Employee's username and password to the online portal where she designated payroll information. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where there was no dispute of material fact that Employer did not deposit Employee's wages into her bank account, Employee was entitled to summary judgment because Employer failed to "pay" her, thus violating Maine's wage payment laws. View "Dorsey v. Northern Light Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer, Marsden Building Maintenance, L.L.C., alleging wage discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Marsden. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her wage discrimination claim. Plaintiff also argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Marsden on her sex discrimination claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that on the record, Marsden has met its burden to prove the pay differential between Plaintiff and her male counterparts was based on a factor other than sex. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff offered no evidence to support her sex discrimination allegation. Plaintiff took issue with how Marsden’s operations manager conducted himself in the role of operations manager. But none of the evidence she presented supports a reasonable inference that his decision to fire her is “more likely than not” explained by an intent to discriminate against her on the basis of her sex. View "Maria Mayorga v. Marsden Building Maintenance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pursued a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004 against Defendants Premier Valley, Inc. (doing business as Century 21 MM) and Century 21 Real Estate LLC, to enforce civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the operative complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff appealed. The appeal involved issues of statutory interpretation with regard to the following question: What is the applicable test or governing standard for determining whether a real estate salesperson is an “employee” or an “independent contractor” for purposes of the Labor Code’s wage and hour provisions? The resolution of this question turned on interpreting recently enacted Labor Code section 2778, subdivision (c)(1), and other provisions incorporated therein.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court concluded that the applicable test for the purpose at hand is the test set forth in Unemployment Insurance Code sections 650 and 13004.1, as incorporated in Business and Professions Code section 10032, subdivision (b), which is itself incorporated in Labor Code section 2778, subdivision (c)(1). The trial court reached the same conclusion and applied the correct test in ruling on the Defendants’ demurrer.   The court held that under Labor Code Section 2778(c)(1), Plaintiff is an Independent Contractor as a matter of law. Further, the court held that Labor Code Section 2778(c)(1) is constitutional. Finally, the court found that Plaintiff’s separate employment agreement for his sales manager position is not relevant for purposes of his representative PAGA cause of action. View "Whitlach v. Premier Valley, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Sharlene Allen was a former employee of the San Diego Convention Center Corporation (SDCCC). After SDCCC terminated Allen, she filed a class action lawsuit against SDCCC alleging various violations of the California Labor Code. The trial court largely sustained SDCCC’s demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that the corporation was exempt from liability as a government entity. The court, however, left intact one claim for untimely payment of final wages under Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203,1 and derivative claims under the Unfair Competition Law and the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Allen then moved for class certification for her surviving causes of action. The trial court denied the motion based on Allen’s concession that her claim for untimely final payment was not viable because it was derivative of the other claims dismissed at the demurrer stage. Allen appealed the denial of the motion for class certification, which she claimed was the "death knell" of her class claims and thus, the lawsuit. She argued the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer was incorrect because SDCCC did not establish as a matter of law that it was exempt from liability. In response, SDCCC argued Allen’s appeal should have been dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order. Alternatively, SDCCC contended the trial court’s order sustaining its demurrer was correct, and the subsequent denial of class certification should be affirmed. The Court of Appeal rejected SDCCC’s assertion that the order was not appealable. However, the Court agreed that class certification was properly denied by the trial court and affirmed the order. View "Allen v. San Diego Convention Center Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants - several public school officials, the Town of Chelmsford, and the local school committee - and dismissing the First Amendment retaliation and state law claims brought by Plaintiff - a public school teacher and former president of her local teachers' union - holding that there was no error.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated her First Amendments rights and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11H by retaliating against her in reaction to her union advocacy efforts while she was president of the Chelmsford Federation of Teachers, a local chapter of the American Federation of Teachers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the district court's summary judgment ruling or two other rulings from the pleading and discovery stages of this case. View "Salmon v. Lang" on Justia Law

Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company denied Plaintiff’s claim for long-term disability benefits after concluding that she was not “Totally Disabled” as defined by her disability insurance plan. Plaintiff brought an under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B), arguing that the denial of benefits violated that Act. After conducting a bench trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, the district court awarded judgment to Plaintiff. Reliance appealed, arguing that courts in the Fourth Circuit are required to resolve ERISA denial-of-benefits cases via summary judgment and that the district court erred in dispensing with this case through a bench trial. Reliance also argued that this Court must review the district court’s legal conclusions.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court first held that because the plan at issue here did not require objective proof of disability, the court rejected Reliance’s contention that Plaintiff’s claim fails for the lack of such evidence. Further, the court wrote that the record supports the district court’s determination that Plaintiff’s disability was not limited to a “specific locale.” Accordingly, the court agreed that Plaintiff was “totally disabled” under the terms of the plan. View "Anita Tekmen v. Reliance Standard Life Ins." on Justia Law

A Mississippi trial court dismissed David Saunders’s claims against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) based on judicial estoppel because Saunders did not list these claims in his prior Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Until December 2010, Saunders served as football operations coordinator at the University of Mississippi. From January 2011 to October 2014, Saunders worked as an assistant football coach for the University of Louisiana. Based on Saunders’s alleged rule violations while at each institution, the NCAA conducted separate investigations and enforcement proceedings against both schools. The NCAA concluded Saunders had violated NCAA rules while at Louisiana. As punishment, the NCAA issued a show-cause directive to any NCAA member institution that may want to employ Saunders in an athletics position from January 2016 to January 2024. Saunders retained an attorney to represent him in NCAA proceedings. The attorney insisted financial strain prevented Saunders from traveling to defend himself personally. After a second show-cause directive, Saunders and his attorney discussed suing the NCAA, but at that time he did not pursue a lawsuit. Months later, Saunders filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy averring he had no claims against third parties. Saunders received a bankruptcy discharge in July 2018. Almost two years later, Saunders sued the NCAA: it was not until another football coach sued the NCAA, and made it past the summary judgment stage, that Saunders believed he had an actual shot at taking on the NCAA in court. The NCAA simultaneously filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment. In both, it asserted Saunders’s claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because Saunders had not disclosed these claims against the NCAA in his 2018 bankruptcy proceedings. The court ruled that Saunders’s claims against the NCAA belonged to Saunders’s bankruptcy estate, so the bankruptcy trustee was substituted as the real party in interest and plaintiff in the action. Further, while judicial estoppel did not bar the trustee from pursuing these claims for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, Saunders himself was barred by judicial estoppel from pursuing his claims against the NCAA, including the declaratory-relief claim abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred for two reasons: (1) the trial judge erred by estopping Saunders from pursuing this type of declaratory relief; and (2) it was error for the trial court to presume Saunders should be estopped based on his mere knowledge of the facts giving rise to his claims against the NCAA, coupled with his failure to list these claims on his bankruptcy schedule. View "Saunders v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law