Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Mwande Serge Kpiele-Poda ("Employee") was injured at a wellsite while repairing a conveyor that activated and crushed his legs. While Employee's Workers' Compensation claim was still pending, he filed a petition asserting negligence and products liability against his employers, two wellsite operators, and the manufacturers and distributors of the conveyor. Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. was named in the body of the petition but omitted from the caption. After the statute of limitations period expired, Employee amended his petition to add Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. as a defendant in the petition's caption. A second amended petition added other parties. Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. moved to dismiss arguing the claim was time-barred because the amended petition did not relate back to the first petition. Employee's employers also moved to dismiss arguing the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act and Oklahoma precedent precluded employees from simultaneously maintaining an action before the Workers' Compensation Commission and in the district court. The district court granted each dismissal motion and certified each order as appealable. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained and consolidated Employee's separate appeals, holding: (1) the district court erred when it dismissed Employee's action against Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc. as time-barred; and (2) the district court properly dismissed Employee's intentional tort action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Kpiele-Poda v. Patterson-UTI Energy, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the superior court granting Stephen Witham's motion for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal and dismissed Witham's appeal as untimely, holding that Witham's notice of appeal was untimely.At issue was the decision of the Board of Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy adopting a hearing officer's recommended decision to revoke Witham's certificate of eligibility as a law enforcement officer. The superior court affirmed the decision. Witham filed a notice of appeal together with a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. The court granted Witham's motion for an extension. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order and dismissed Witham's appeal as untimely, holding that the lower court erred in granting Witham's motion for an extension under the circumstances. View "Witham v. Bd. of Trustees of Me. Criminal Justice Academy" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Civil Service's (DCS) unilateral implementation of application fees for promotional and transitional civil service exams was not a term and condition of employment, as defined in N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 201(4), and therefore, the State had no obligation to negotiate those fees under the Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 200 et seq.The State offers the subject exams to provide qualified State employees an opportunity to seek other public employment. For at least ten years, DCS waived the application fees for employees represented by Respondents to take the exams. In 2009, DCS began assessing fees for the exams but did not collectively bargain with Respondents regarding the imposition of the fees prior to taking the action at issue. Respondents filed improper practices charges with the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging that by unilaterally imposing the fees the State violated Civil Service Law 209-a(1). PERB determined that the subject was mandatorily negotiable and that the State's past practice of not charging such fees was enforceable. The Appellate Division dismissed the State's ensuing petition seeking to annul PERB's determinations. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that PERB's determination conflicted with Civil Service Law 201(4) and this Court's precedent. View "State v. New York State Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Before the parties arrived at the 2016 labor agreement at issue, the Company’s benefit plan offered bargaining-unit employees a tax-advantaged defined contribution plan under Internal Revenue Code Section 401(k)—a “401(k)” for short. When the Company upgraded its retirement-benefit offering in 2018, the Union brought the unfair labor practice charge at issue here. The Union claimed that the Company unilaterally modified the parties’ collective bargaining agreement by “implementing a 401(k) contribution matching structure other than that specifically negotiated and memorialized in the CBA [Collective Bargaining Agreement].” The parties dispute which of the two documents—with different 401(k) terms—reflects their final and binding agreement   The Company asserted, and the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) determined that the binding agreement is September 16, 2016, Memorandum of Agreement, as a hand signed by Company and Union bargaining representatives. The Union asserts that a different contract document, as typed up and circulated to the parties almost a year later, is the one that binds. 
The DC Circuit denied the Union’s petition for review. The court held that here the parol evidence of the parties' bargaining history allowed the Board to identify the Memorandum of Agreement as the final product of the parties’ negotiations and to conclude that the 401(k) term in the 2017 revised version of the Collective Bargaining Agreement contained an unenforceable unilateral mistake. View "District 4, Communications Workers of America (CWA), AFL-CIO v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), promulgated regulations (5 U.S.C. 5545(d) and 5343(c)(4)), to provide hazardous duty and environmental differential pay to federal employees. Current and former employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons filed suit, alleging that they were entitled to hazardous duty and environmental differential pay due to their “work [with] or in close proximity to objects, surfaces, and/or individuals infected with COVID-19 without sufficient protective devices.”The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of their claims for hazardous duty and environmental differential pay (plus related overtime, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs). For the plaintiffs to prevail, it is not enough that COVID-19 can readily be characterized as “unusual”—one of the requirements of the statutory provisions; their case depends on whether their allegations come within OPM’s existing regulations, which are not challenged and which delimit particular situations in which federal employees are entitled to hazardous duty and environmental differential payments. OPM has not addressed contagious-disease transmission outside certain situations within laboratories and jungle-work situations. Although OPM might be able to provide for differential pay based on COVID-19 in various workplace settings, it has not to date adopted regulations that do so. View "Adams v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant brought suit against Defendant-Appellee the City of Salem, Virginia, alleging that Salem failed to promote her based on her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Bandy sought a booking-coordinator position at the Salem Civic Center (the Center), but Salem passed her up and instead hired a significantly younger candidate. Following discovery, Salem moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding that no reasonable jury could find that Salem did not promote Plaintiff because of her age. The court explained that Plaintiff asserted that her employer preferred to hire “young men” and “stacked” the interview committee against her by excluding human resources representatives. These assertions amount to little more than speculation. Human resources remained involved in the hiring process and screened every applicant to ensure that they were minimally qualified. Moreover, Plaintiff was not even among the top three candidates for the position, and one of the candidates ranked ahead of her was, in fact, a woman older than her. Crucially, the evidence demonstrated that the interview committee hired the other employee over Plaintiff for a number of legitimate reasons: his job experience, particularly in promotion and marketing; higher education in sports, communication, and executive leadership; sales background; enthusiasm; and preparation. View "Tammy Bandy v. City of Salem, Virginia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate any disputes regarding the terms and conditions of her employment, but when a dispute arose, she filed a complaint in federal district court. The district court ordered plaintiff to take her claims to arbitration, and the arbitrator ruled in favor Michael Stores, Inc. Plaintiff argued that Michaels waited too long to move for arbitration and therefore waived its right to the arbitral forum.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. The panel held that the record did not establish that Michaels chose to forgo arbitration. Michaels repeatedly reserved its right to arbitration, did not ask the district court to weigh in on the merits, and did not engage in any meaningful discovery. Michaels did not actively litigate the merits of the case for a prolonged period to take advantage of being in court. Although Michaels did not immediately move to compel arbitration, its actions did not amount to a relinquishment of the right to arbitrate. View "TERESA ARMSTRONG V. MICHAELS STORES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part and affirming in part the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendant, a school district, in this employment dispute, holding that summary judgment was properly granted on all of Plaintiff's claims.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the suffered a hostile work environment and disparate treatment culminating in constructive discharge during her employment with Defendant. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on both claims. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that Plaintiff had "presented sufficient evidence of disparate-treatment age discrimination to withstand summary judgment[.]" The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment action in the form of constructive discharge. View "Henry v. Independent School District #625" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”), alleging that Amtrak suspended and subsequently terminated him based on his race in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. Following discovery, Amtrak moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Amtrak because Plaintiff failed to present a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Amtrak suspended and terminated him based on race. The court reasoned that Amtrak “considers insubordination a terminable offense due to its severity and adverse impact in the workplace.” As such, Plaintiff did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he satisfactorily performed his job duties. Further, Plaintiff did not show that he was treated differently than other similarly situated employees outside his protected class. View "Duncan Giles v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) employed Darren Markley as Vice President and Managing Director of Private Wealth Management at its Denver, Colorado location. Markley managed a team of wealth managers and private bankers, including Bob Provencher and Dave Crittendon, when issues arose in mid-2017. In violation of U.S. Bank policy, Markey provided Provencher a personal loan. Markley allegedly prevented Crittendon from “sandbagging” an investment. And members of Markley’s team, including Crittendon, accused Markley of giving Provencher commission credits for sales on which Provencher did not participate and had not met the clients. After an investigation, a disciplinary committee unanimously voted to terminate Markley’s employment. At no time during the investigation did Markley suggest the allegations against him were motivated by his age, but over a year later, Markley filed suit advancing a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and a wrongful discharge claim under Colorado law. U.S. Bank moved for summary judgment. As to the ADEA claim at issue in this appeal, the district court concluded Markley did not sustain his burden of producing evidence capable of establishing that U.S. Bank’s reason for terminating his employment was pretext for age discrimination. On appeal, Markley contended U.S. Bank conducted a “sham” investigation, and this established pretext. For two reasons, the Tenth Circuit rejected Markley’s assertion: (1) while an imperfect investigation may help support an inference of pretext, there must be some other indicator of protected-class-based discrimination for investigatory flaws to be capable of establishing pretext; and (2) even if deficiencies in an investigation alone could support a finding of pretext, Markley’s criticisms of the investigation were unpersuasive and insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find U.S. Bank’s reasons for termination pretextual. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Markley v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law