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A disinterested observer could not reasonably conclude that the Commission violated SEC Rule of Practice 900(a). Although Rule 900(a) sets timelines by which the Commission would ideally adjudicate cases, the permissive language of the text could not lead an employee to reasonably conclude that failing to meet such aspirational guidelines would amount to a "violation." Plaintiff petitioned for review of the Board's decision affirming the ALJ's determination that plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). After plaintiff was fired from his position at the SEC, plaintiff claimed that his supervisor terminated him in reprisal for raising concerns about his section's alleged chronic inefficiency. The Second Circuit held that the ALJ did not err in rejecting plaintiff's Rule 900(a) claim and that the ALJ more than adequately explained why an employee in plaintiff's position could not have reasonably concluded that Rule 900(a) was violated. Because the ALJ did not actually analyze plaintiff's claims that he made protected disclosures when he raised concerns that Adjudication violated Rule 900(b), the court remanded the issue to the ALJ. Finally, the court declined to address plaintiff's claims of evidentiary and discovery error. Accordingly, the court denied in part, granted in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flynn v. SEC" on Justia Law

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Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.140, which allows for assessment of attorney fees in a private cause of action for recovery of unpaid wages, explicitly recognizes a private cause of action for unpaid wages, and accordingly, Nev. Rev. Stat. chapter 608 provides a private right of action for unpaid wages. Petitioner filed a class-action complaint against real party in interest Terrible Herbst Inc. alleging, among other causes of action, failure to compensate for all hours worked, failure to pay overtime, and failure to timely pay all wages due and owing, all in violation of various provisions of Chapter 608. All of Petitioner’s Chapter 608 claims also referred to Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.140. The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Chapter 608 claims on the basis that no private right of action exists. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for extraordinary relief and instructed the district court to vacate its order dismissing Petitioner’s claims, holding that Petitioner has and properly stated a private cause of action for unpaid wages. View "Neville v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants in this employment discrimination action. Plaintiff, a former employee of the Town of Lincoln School Department, filed a complaint against the Town of Lincoln, Lincoln School Committee, and the Town’s Finance Director, alleging that she was discriminated against because she advocated for education services for her disabled son, who was a student in the Lincoln school system. The case went to trial. After both sides rested, the trial justice granted Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that Lincoln’s actions were retaliation for Plaintiff’s advocacy efforts for her son. View "Azar v. Town of Lincoln" on Justia Law

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David Skillin brought a Private Attorneys General Act lawsuit against his former employer Rady Children's Hospital of San Diego (Rady) for alleged violations of the California Labor Code. Skillin claimed Rady made unauthorized payroll deductions from his wages, resulting in higher than desired contributions to his retirement plan. He also claimed Rady issued inaccurate wage statements by failing to show the amounts deducted for retirement "on written orders of the employee." The trial court granted summary judgment in Rady's favor, concluding Skillin's claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The court found preemption under ERISA section 514(a); it did not, however, find preemption under ERISA section 514(e), which applied to state laws that "directly or indirectly prohibit or restrict the inclusion in any plan of an automatic contribution arrangement." The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding Skillin's claims were preempted under subdivision (a) of section 514 and plainly preempted under subdivision (e) of that same section. View "Skillin v. Rady Children's Hospital-San Diego" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal from the district court’s order dismissing the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services Labor Standards Appeals Division (WFS) from Appellant’s petition for review of a WFS hearing examiner’s decision denying Appellant’s request for damages on his claim that the Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC) discriminated against him based upon his advanced age. The district court granted WFS’s motion to dismiss, concluding that WFS was not a proper respondent to the petition for review. Several months later, the district court denied Appellant’s motion to amend his petition for review to substitute or join DOC as respondent in the action, ruling that it had no jurisdiction to act on Appellant’s motion to amend because the case was finally resolved upon WFS’s dismissal. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over this matter because the district court’s order dismissing WFS was final and appealable. View "Schmitz v. State, Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law

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Indiana law previously provided that, when school districts needed to reduce their teaching staffs, tenured teachers that were qualified for an available position had a right to be retained over non-tenured teachers. A 2012 amendment eliminated that right and orders school districts to base layoff choices on performance reviews without regard for tenure status. Madison Consolidated Schools relied on the new law to lay off Elliott, a teacher who earned tenure 14 years before the new law took effect, while it retained non-tenured teachers in positions for which Elliott was qualified. Elliott, who had been elected as president of his union, sued, claiming that the amendment violated the Contract Clause when applied to him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in Elliott’s favor. The statute, not the annual contracts, granted Elliott his contractual tenure rights, which became enforceable the year Elliott earned tenure. A decrease in job security necessarily impairs his rights under that contract. The change substantially disrupted teachers’ important and reasonable reliance interests. Improving teacher quality and public-education outcomes are important public interests of the highest order but even important goals and good intentions do not justify this substantial impairment of the tenure contract for already-tenured teachers. View "Elliott v. Board of School Trustees of Madison Consolidated Schools" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Quincy, Massachusetts, the former employer of Plaintiff, on Plaintiff’s federal and pendent state claims of employment discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The First Circuit held (1) because Plaintiff was unable to rebut the City’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its actions with evidence of pretext and discriminatory motive; (2) the record lacked evidence showing that the City retaliated against Plaintiff; and (3) Plaintiff did not meet her burden to show she was constructively discharged. View "Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy, Massachusetts" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit denied Thomas G. Gallagher, Inc.’s petition for review challenging a final order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission that affirmed a fine levied against Gallagher, a Massachusetts-based employer, that was imposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for two violations of OSHA workplace health and safety standards. In its petition for review, Gallagher challenged only the determination that Gallagher had constructive knowledge with respect to the serious violations for which OSHA cited Gallagher. The First Circuit denied the petition for review with respect to the order regarding both the first and second items of the citation, holding that Gallagher’s challenge to the constructive knowledge analysis could not succeed. View "Thomas G. Gallagher, Inc. v. Acosta" on Justia Law

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Appellant Dr. Robert Fettgather appealed a trial court order denying his petition for writ of administrative mandamus. His petition challenged the revocation of his license to practice psychology by Respondent California Board of Psychology. The trial court denied Fettgather’s petition on the ground that the only relevant inquiry before the Board was whether Fettgather failed to comply with an order for an examination under Business and Professions Code section 820. The trial court also found that “[t]he evidence in the record unquestionably establishes that petitioner failed to submit to the examination that had been ordered in this case.” Fettgather argued he should have been permitted to challenge the merits of the section 820 order before he was required to comply with it. He also argued that revocation of his license pursuant to section 821 for his failure to undergo a section 820 examination was unlawful. After review, the Court of Appeal held the Board was not required to show good cause for a section 820 order nor was a licensee entitled to challenge the basis for the order before submitting to the required examination. "It follows that the question of good cause supporting such an order is not relevant to a revocation of Fettgather’s license for noncompliance with the section 820 order. This strikes the appropriate balance between the public and private interests." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Fettgather v. Board of Psychology" on Justia Law

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Dennis Current appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission decision that determined he was ineligible for unemployment benefits based on willful underreporting of his earnings to the Idaho Department of Labor (“IDOL”). IDOL discovered wage discrepancies between the amount reported by Current and the amount reported by his employer, Wada Farms Partnership for two weeks in March 2016. On appeal, Current disputed that he “willfully” misrepresented his wages. Finding "substantial and competent evidence" supported the Commission's finding, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Current v. Dept of Labor" on Justia Law