The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Spurwink Services, Inc. on the claim filed by Sydney and Patricia TerMorshuizen for overtime pay pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 26, 664, holding that interruptions to "sleep time" are not compensable under section 664. The TerMorshuizens worked as a therapeutic couple at Spurwink's day and residential treatment program for children and adolescents with significant emotional and behavioral needs. The TerMorshuizens, who lived in the residence with the children, brought suit seeking overtime wages, arguing that, while Spurwink paid them for sleep time interruptions, they were entitled to payment for other client interruptions that prevented them from sleeping, regardless of whether those interruptions actually required direct client interaction. The trial court granted summary judgment for Spurwink on the grounds that Spurwink's sleep time compensation policy was in compliance with federal law and was reasonable as a matter of law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in (1) applying section 29 C.F.R. 785.23 to determine whether sleep time constitutes compensable work time; and (2) determining that Spurwink's sleep time policy was reasonable as a matter of law. View "TerMorshuizen v. Spurwink Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dr. Robert Paxton reviewed claims for disability benefits for the Department of Social Services, where he worked. This dispute arose after the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that compensation Paxton received as part of a bonus program would not be considered when calculating his future pension benefit. He appealed a judgment denying his petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging a decision by the Board of Administration of CalPERS upholding this interpretation. The trial court’s conclusion that the bonuses Paxton earned were for performing additional services outside his regular duties, and thus not appropriate for consideration when calculating his pension benefit, was supported by substantial evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Paxton v. Bd. of Admin., CalPERS" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the State has waived sovereign immunity under the Georgia Torts Claims Act (“GTCA”), for Thomas McConnell’s tort action; and, (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that McConnell’s complaint failed to state a claim. In September 2012, the Georgia Department of Labor created a spreadsheet containing the name, social security number, home telephone number, email address, and age of 4,757 individuals over the age of 55 in Cherokee, Cobb, and Fulton counties who had applied for unemployment benefits or other services administered by the Department, including McConnell. Almost a year later, a Department employee inadvertently sent an email with the spreadsheet attached to approximately 1,000 recipients without the permission of the individuals whose information was included in the spreadsheet. 2014, McConnell filed a complaint against the Department on behalf of himself and a proposed class of all individuals whose information was contained in the spreadsheet, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts. The complaint alleged that, as a result of the Department’s negligent disclosure of McConnell’s and the other proposed class members’ personal information, they were required to place freezes and alerts with credit reporting agencies, close or modify financial accounts, and closely review and monitor their credit reports and accounts for unauthorized activity. The complaint further alleged that McConnell and others whose information had been disclosed incurred out-of-pocket costs related to credit monitoring and identity protection services and suffered adverse impacts to their credit scores related to the closure of credit accounts. The Department moved to dismiss, ruling that sovereign immunity barred the lawsuit because the GTCA did not waive the State’s immunity for the type of “loss” that McConnell alleged. McConnell appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, pretermitting a decision on sovereign immunity and addressing only the trial court’s ruling that each count of the complaint failed to state a claim. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. View "Georgia Department of Labor v. McConnell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Patrick Barber's second appeal in this case raised an issue of first impression for the Court of Appeal's review. Upon remand from Barber’s first appeal (Barber I), defendant-respondent, the California State Personnel Board (SPB), awarded Barber a lump sum back pay award, which resulted in Barber incurring increased income tax liability. SPB denied Barber’s motion for recovery for increased tax liability. The trial court upheld SPB’s decision and denied Barber’s petition for writ of mandamus. Barber appealed the denial of his writ petition and motion for increased tax liability recovery, contending he was entitled to recover damages for incurring increased tax liability because his increased tax liability was caused by real party in interest and respondent, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) improperly terminating his employment. Barber argued awarding him such relief was consistent with the remedial statutory purpose of Government Code section 19584,2 of making an improperly terminated employee whole by restoring the employee to the financial position he or she would otherwise have occupied had employment not been wrongfully interrupted. The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding Barber was not entitled to increased tax liability recovery under section 19584 or to such recovery as equitable relief, because such relief was not statutorily authorized. View "Barber v. CA State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The panel followed the reasoning in its en banc decision EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), and held that Title VII does not bar compulsory arbitration agreements and section 1981 claims are arbitrable. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that plaintiff's section 1981 claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration. View "Lambert v. Tesla, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was eliminated as part of a reorganization from his job of nearly 30 years, he filed suit against DC Water, alleging claims under various federal and D.C. civil rights statutes. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DC Water, holding that petitioner's Americans with Disabilities Act and DC Human Rights Act claims were time-barred; plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing his Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims; it was within the district court's discretion to conclude that further discovery on plaintiff's only potentially viable claim—the one brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981—was unwarranted, given the lack of detail in plaintiff's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) declaration; and summary judgment on plaintiff's section 1981 claim was appropriate given the record before the district court. View "Haynes v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing this action filed by a public employee union seeking to enforce a collective bargaining agreement entered into with the Iowa Board of Regents, holding that the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) acted within its statutory authority in promulgating Iowa Admin. Code R. 621-6.5(3), which has the force of law, and that the district court correctly applied rule 621-6.5(3) to hold the parties had no enforceable collective bargaining agreement (CBA) without the Board's vote to ratify it. The Board moved for summary judgment on the union's action to enforce the CBA, relying on rule 621-6.5, which requires the Board to meet to vote to accept a tentative voluntary agreement ratified by the union before the contract becomes effective. The union argued that the agency rule was invalid because it imposed a ratification requirement not included in Iowa Code 20.17(4). The district court upheld the validity of the agency rule and dismissed the union's enforcement action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) rule 621-6.5(3) is valid; and (2) therefore, no enforceable agreement was reached without the requisite vote by the Board to approve the CBA. View "Service Employees International Union, Local 199 v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court interpreting the 2017 amendments to Iowa Code chapter 20, the Public Employment Relations Act, limiting the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining and the matters an arbitrator may consider if the dispute enters binding arbitration, holding that the Iowa Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and the district court correctly interpreted the amendments. A union sought a declaratory order from PERB and then judicial review of the declaratory order seeking to clarify certain provisions in the amendments. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming PERB's decision, holding (1) "base wages" under Iowa Code 20.9(1) means the floor level of pay for each job before upward adjustments such as for job shift or longevity; and (2) the term "past collective bargaining agreement" in the context of Iowa Code 20.22(10)(b)(1) allows an arbitrator to consider the existing collective bargaining agreement but not ones that came before. View "United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Iowa Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment against the State enforcing a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the State and a public employee union, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and correctly ruled that the State had not withdrawn its offer before the union's acceptance and ratification resulted in an enforceable CBA. The State moved to dismiss or stay the action in favor of administrative proceedings pending at the Public Employment Relations Board arguing no contract was formed after the union accepted the State's pending offer and the union membership voted to ratify the terms . The district court denied the State's motion and then granted the union's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State failed to preserve its argument that Iowa Admin. Code R. 621-6.5(3) requires the State to vote to ratify after the union vote; (2) the union's ratification resulted in an enforceable CBA; and (3) the district court's rulings rejecting the primary-jurisdiction and exhaustion doctrines were correct. View "UE Local 893/IUP v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs' claim that the 2017 amendments to Iowa Code chapter 20, the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA), violate the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution, holding that the 2017 amendments withstood the constitutional challenges. The 2017 amendments resulted in new classifications that made many public employees lose significant statutory bargaining rights compared to other public employees with ostensibly similar jobs. A public employee union and some of its members filed this action against the State and the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) seeking injunctive and declaratory relief alleging that the amendments violated the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution and their right to freedom of association. The district court dismissed the action on summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislative classifications are not so overinclusive or underinclusive as to be unconstitutional and that the amendments do not violate constitutional rights of freedom of association. View "AFSCME Iowa Council 61 v. State" on Justia Law