Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

An insurer, Arrowood Indemnity Company, entered run-off in 2003, ceasing to issue new policies but continuing to manage existing claims, including workers' compensation for a Scully Signal Company employee who sustained a second work-related injury in 2001. Arrowood sought second-injury reimbursements from the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, which reimburses insurers for a portion of workers' compensation benefits paid to employees with exacerbated injuries. Arrowood and the Trust Fund settled in 2009, with Arrowood receiving reimbursements until 2013.The Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) began denying Arrowood's reimbursement requests in 2015, citing a precedent that insurers in run-off, who no longer collect and transmit employer assessments to the Trust Fund, are ineligible for reimbursements. Arrowood's subsequent complaint in Superior Court was dismissed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the dismissal, directing Arrowood to seek administrative review. The DIA administrative judge and the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board upheld the denial, leading Arrowood to appeal to the Appeals Court.The Appeals Court reversed the Board's decision, ruling that the statutory language of the Massachusetts workers' compensation act does not preclude insurers in run-off from receiving second-injury reimbursements. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted further appellate review and agreed with the Appeals Court. The Court held that the plain language of the act does not exclude insurers in run-off from reimbursement eligibility and that the statutory scheme supports this interpretation. The Court reversed the Board's decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Arrowood Indemnity Company v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund" on Justia Law

Melissa Myers, an instructional aide at an elementary school in the Sunman-Dearborn Community Schools, took FMLA leave at the end of the 2017-2018 school year due to grief from her husband's death. Upon returning for the 2018-2019 school year, she exceeded her paid leave days within the first two months. The school principal, Kelly Roth, warned her about her attendance, leading Myers to resign and subsequently sue the school district and Roth for violations of the FMLA, ADA, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that Myers was neither eligible for FMLA leave nor had a qualifying condition in the weeks before her resignation. Additionally, she did not notify the school district of her intent to take statutory leave. The court also rejected her "anticipatory retaliation" theory due to insufficient evidence. The ADA claim failed because Myers did not experience an adverse employment action, and her working conditions were not objectively intolerable to constitute constructive discharge. The equal-protection claim was dismissed for lack of proof of differential treatment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Myers did not meet the eligibility requirements for FMLA leave, lacked evidence of a serious health condition, and failed to provide sufficient notice of intent to take FMLA leave. The court also found no evidence of constructive discharge under the ADA, as her working conditions were not intolerable, and there was no imminent threat of termination. Lastly, the equal-protection claim was dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. View "Myers v. Sunman-Dearborn Community Schools" on Justia Law

John Ledford, an employee of Jenway Contracting, Inc., died from a fall while working. He was survived by his adult, non-dependent daughter, Summer Ledford. Unable to receive death benefits under Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act, Summer filed a wrongful death claim against Jenway under Maryland’s Wrongful Death Act.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County dismissed Summer’s complaint, agreeing with Jenway that the Workers’ Compensation Act limits employer liability to injured workers and their dependents, barring Summer’s claim. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision bars non-dependent adult children from pursuing wrongful death claims against a deceased employee’s employer. The court found that the Act’s exclusivity provision, which limits employer liability to the Act’s specified compensation, applies broadly and does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, maintaining that compliant employers are immune from such wrongful death suits. View "Ledford v. Jenway Contracting" on Justia Law

Two hospitals in Tennessee, Saint Francis Hospital and Saint Francis Hospital-Bartlett, sued Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company, claiming that Cigna routinely underpaid them for emergency services provided to Cigna members. The hospitals, which are out-of-network providers for Cigna, argued that Cigna had a quasi-contractual obligation to pay the reasonable value of their services based on federal and state laws requiring hospitals to treat emergency patients and insurers to cover emergency care.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee dismissed the hospitals' claims. The court found that the hospitals' complaint did not meet the pleading standards of Rule 8, that Tennessee common law did not support their claims, and that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Sixth Circuit held that neither federal law (specifically the Affordable Care Act) nor Tennessee law imposed a duty on Cigna to pay the full value of out-of-network emergency services. The court noted that the ACA's requirement for insurers to provide "coverage" for emergency services did not mean that insurers had to pay the full cost. The court also found that Tennessee common law did not support the hospitals' claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, as there was no contractual or statutory duty for Cigna to pay the full value of the services.The Sixth Circuit concluded that the hospitals' claims failed because they could not establish that Cigna had a legal obligation to pay more than what was stipulated in its contracts with its members. The court did not address the ERISA preemption issue, as the dismissal was affirmed on other grounds. View "AMISUB (SFH), Inc. v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A group of current and former employees of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. alleged that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regarding wages for tipped workers. They sought preliminary certification for a collective action to include all servers in states where Cracker Barrel attempts to take a tip credit over the last three years. Cracker Barrel objected, arguing that notice should not be sent to employees who are subject to arbitration agreements or to out-of-state employees with no ties to Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary certification and approved notice to the proposed group, including employees who might have entered into arbitration agreements and out-of-state employees. The court decided to reserve judgment on the arbitration issue until the second stage of proceedings and concluded that nationwide notice was permissible based on the participation of one Arizona-based plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in following the two-step procedure for preliminary certification. It also held that where the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement are in dispute, the district court is not required to determine the arbitrability of absent employees' claims before authorizing notice. However, the Ninth Circuit joined other circuits in holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California applies to FLSA collective actions in federal court. This means that for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court must assess whether each opt-in plaintiff's claim is sufficiently connected to the defendant's activities in the forum state. The court vacated the district court's order authorizing nationwide notice and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HARRINGTON V. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC." on Justia Law

Thomas McLamb, a dissident union member, was involved in a heated confrontation with Tiyaka Boone, an incumbent union official, during a union election campaign. McLamb made inflammatory comments that Boone interpreted as personal attacks, leading to a physical altercation where Boone struck McLamb. Another union official, Alma Williams, allegedly suggested to a manager that if Boone were terminated, McLamb should be as well. McLamb filed unfair labor practice charges against the union, claiming Boone's actions were retaliatory and Williams violated the duty of fair representation.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) dismissed McLamb's charges. The Board found that Boone's actions were motivated by personal animosity rather than retaliation for McLamb's protected union activities. It also concluded that Williams' comment was intended to seek leniency for Boone, not to punish McLamb. McLamb petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The Court of Appeals denied McLamb's petition. It held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB's conclusions. The court found that a reasonable employee would understand Boone's actions as a reaction to personal insults rather than union activities. It also agreed with the NLRB that Williams' statement was conditional and aimed at discouraging Boone's discharge, not seeking McLamb's termination. The court concluded that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation, as Williams' actions were not egregious enough to constitute bad faith. View "Thomas McLamb v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Salvatore Ziccarelli, a former employee of the Cook County Sheriff's Office, used intermittent FMLA leave to manage his PTSD. In 2016, after his condition worsened, he discussed taking block leave with the FMLA coordinator, Wylola Shinnawi, who allegedly warned him against using more FMLA leave. Ziccarelli took one more day of leave and then resigned. He filed a lawsuit alleging FMLA interference and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff's Office on both claims, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the interference claim for trial.At trial, the jury awarded Ziccarelli $240,000. The Sheriff's Office moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), arguing that Ziccarelli could not show prejudice from the alleged interference since he took an additional day of FMLA leave after the phone call. The district court granted the motion and conditionally granted a new trial, reasoning that Ziccarelli's post-call leave negated any reasonable inference of prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law, finding that the grounds for the Rule 50(b) motion were not properly presented before the verdict. However, the court affirmed the district court's alternative decision to grant a new trial, agreeing that the evidence did not support a finding of prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Ziccarelli v Dart" on Justia Law

Mary Ann Arnold worked for United Airlines from 1994 to 2020. She alleged age discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge after experiencing changes in her job responsibilities and being placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Arnold claimed these actions were due to her age and previous complaints about discrimination and harassment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of United Airlines on Arnold's claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The court dismissed her constructive discharge claim without prejudice, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Arnold did not provide sufficient evidence to show that she suffered adverse employment actions due to age discrimination. The court also found that her retaliation claim failed because the actions taken by United were not materially adverse and were not shown to be causally connected to her complaints. Additionally, the court held that Arnold did not demonstrate a hostile work environment based on age, as the incidents she described were not severe or pervasive enough to meet the legal standard. The court also upheld the dismissal of her constructive discharge claim due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees and independent contractors of White Oak Radiator Service, Inc., were injured while performing work at Enable Midstream Partners, LP's natural gas processing plant. The work involved removing and replacing amine and glycol coolers. During the work, a glycol surge tank ruptured, causing injuries. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking damages for their injuries.The trial court found that the claims of Joey Miller and Davy Dowdy against Enable sounded in tort rather than workers' compensation. The court awarded damages to Mr. Dowdy for injuries to his cervical spine and hearing loss, but found that White Oak bore a greater percentage of fault than assigned by the trial court. The trial court assigned 90 percent fault to Enable and 10 percent to White Oak. Enable appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was under the Louisiana workers' compensation laws and challenging the allocation of fault and damages.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and held that the manual labor exception under La. R.S. 23:1021 (7) does not apply to the employees and independent contractors of an independent contractor. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims against Enable sound in tort. The court found no manifest error in the trial court's award of damages to Mr. Dowdy for his cervical spine injuries and hearing loss. However, the court found that the trial court erred in the apportionment of fault and amended the judgment to assign 70 percent fault to Enable and 30 percent fault to White Oak. The trial court's judgment was affirmed as amended. View "McBride v. Old Republic Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Anthony Sullers, Sr., an African American elevator mechanic, filed a lawsuit against his union, the International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 2 (IUEC), alleging that the union breached its duty of fair representation in handling his claim of racial discrimination by his employer, ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corporation (TKE). Sullers and another employee were laid off, and while Sullers was without work, TKE hired a white mechanic. Sullers informed the union of his layoff and his belief that it was racially motivated. The union filed a grievance on his behalf but did not include allegations of racial discrimination. Sullers followed the union's advice to file a complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of IUEC. The court found that the union had fulfilled its duty of fair representation by obtaining the maximum remedy available for Sullers, including his reinstatement and backpay. The court also noted that Sullers had not requested the union to file a racial discrimination grievance and that the union's actions were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the union's decision to pursue the grievance as it did, rather than filing a racial discrimination grievance, was within its discretion and not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. The court also found that Sullers did not suffer harm attributable to the union's actions, as he was reinstated and received backpay. The court concluded that the union had properly represented Sullers and that he had not shown how he would have achieved a better outcome through arbitration. View "Sullers v. International Union Elevator Constructors, Local 2" on Justia Law