Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Joanne Allison, a former registered nurse, filed a class action lawsuit against her former employer, Dignity Health, alleging unpaid work, meal period, and rest break violations. She sought class certification for registered nurses at three Dignity hospitals since June 1, 2014. Allison's expert claimed that time records showed over 70% of shifts had noncompliant meal periods. She also argued that work-issued communication devices interrupted rest breaks, violating labor laws.The trial court initially granted partial class certification, finding common questions suitable for class treatment, including the legality of Dignity's premium request requirement and the impact of communication devices on breaks. However, Dignity later moved to decertify the class, citing post-certification discovery that revealed significant variations in nurses' experiences and practices, undermining the manageability of class-wide adjudication.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering new evidence from post-certification depositions, which showed varied reasons for noncompliant meal periods, such as personal preferences and mistakes. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to disregard the Steiner survey due to methodological flaws and potential biases, which rendered it unreliable for proving class-wide liability.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decertification order, agreeing that individualized inquiries predominated over common questions, making class treatment unmanageable. The court also noted that the evidence did not support a uniform practice of requiring nurses to carry work phones during breaks, further complicating the rest break claims. Thus, the order decertifying the class was affirmed. View "Allison v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Santoasha Harris endured five years of sexual harassment at her job with the City of Milwaukee. When she reported the harassment in 2017, the City separated her from the harasser, conducted an investigation, compelled the harasser’s resignation, and restored Harris to her position within a month. Harris sued the City, alleging it knew about the harassment for years, failed to act, and retaliated against her for reporting it. Due to Harris’s bankruptcy filing, her estate was substituted as the plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that Harris’s Estate had not shown the City unreasonably failed to prevent the harassment or that she suffered a tangible employment action as a consequence of reporting it. The court found no evidence supporting the Title VII and Section 1983 claims against the City.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the evidence did not support the claims of quid pro quo harassment, hostile work environment, or retaliation under Title VII. The court found that Harris did not suffer a tangible employment action and that the City acted promptly and reasonably once the harassment was reported. Additionally, the court found no basis for employer liability under Section 1983, as there was no evidence of intentional discrimination by the City. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find for the Estate on its claims against the City. View "Bankruptcy Estate of Harris v City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Darren Markley sued his employer, US Bank, in federal court, alleging age discrimination under federal law and wrongful termination under Colorado state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of US Bank on the federal claim and dismissed the state law claim without prejudice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Markley did not appeal the dismissal of the state law claim or request the district court to reconsider it under diversity jurisdiction, despite knowing that diversity jurisdiction existed.Markley then filed his state law claim in the Denver District Court. US Bank removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and moved to dismiss the claim, arguing claim preclusion. The district court granted the motion, holding that Markley could have pursued his state law claim in the original federal lawsuit by asserting diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that his failure to do so precluded him from bringing the claim in a new case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit held that claim preclusion applied because Markley could have litigated his state law claim in the prior federal lawsuit by asserting diversity jurisdiction. The court emphasized that a final judgment on the merits in the earlier action, which included the resolution of the federal claim, precluded Markley from bringing the state law claim in a new lawsuit. The court also found that the district court did not violate the party presentation principle by addressing the issue of diversity jurisdiction, as it was within the court's power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law. View "Markley v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a nurse, the plaintiff, and her former employer, the defendant hospital. The plaintiff alleged that her termination was in retaliation for her complaints about safety issues. She brought five claims for relief, but only three statutory claims went to the jury: whistle-blower retaliation, unlawful retaliation, and unlawful employment practice. The jury found in favor of the defendant on the first two claims and in favor of the plaintiff on the third claim. The trial court entered a general judgment reflecting these verdicts.The defendant appealed the general judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a "cat's paw" jury instruction, which allowed the jury to impute the bias of the plaintiff's coworkers to the defendant. The Court of Appeals agreed that the instruction was improper and reversed and remanded for a new trial. The trial court then vacated the general judgment and ordered a retrial of all three claims, including those on which the defendant had prevailed. The defendant appealed this order, but the Appellate Commissioner dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case to determine whether the trial court's order was appealable under ORS 19.205(3). The court concluded that, after the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the general judgment, there was no longer a general judgment in place. Therefore, the trial court's order determining the scope of the retrial was not an order made "after a general judgment" and was not immediately appealable under ORS 19.205(3). The orders of the Court of Appeals were affirmed. View "Crosbie v. Asante" on Justia Law

Connie Grabowski, a second-grade teacher for the South Bend Community School Corporation, was involved in an incident where a student, S.J., caused her to trip and fall. Grabowski filled out a worker’s compensation accident report form, naming S.J., who was the grandson of a school board member. Following this, the school conducted an investigation into Grabowski’s conduct, placed her on administrative leave, and offered her a last-chance agreement, which she declined, leading to her resignation.Grabowski filed a lawsuit for wrongful termination, alleging that the school retaliated against her for indicating an intent to file a worker’s compensation claim. The trial court denied the school’s motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found in favor of Grabowski, awarding her $600,000 in damages. The school appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motions for judgment on the evidence.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that there was no evidence that the school discharged Grabowski solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability. The court emphasized that Grabowski’s own theory of the case was that the school’s actions were motivated by the desire to protect the board member’s grandson, not solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability. Therefore, the jury’s verdict could not stand, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the school corporation. View "South Bend Community School Corporation v. Grabowski" on Justia Law

Two corrections officers, Nicole McDaniel and Matthew Davis, filed a class-action lawsuit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC), seeking compensation for time spent in correctional facilities before and after their shifts. They argued that these pre- and post-shift activities, such as passing through security and obtaining equipment, are integral to their principal activities and should be compensable under Wisconsin regulations. The DOC employs approximately 5,000 corrections officers across 37 prisons, all of whom are required to complete these activities, though the specifics and duration may vary.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court certified the class, finding that the plaintiffs made a plausible argument for compensation and met the statutory requirements for class certification, including commonality, typicality, predominance, and superiority. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the class would lose on the merits because the pre- and post-shift activities were not compensable, thus failing the commonality and typicality requirements.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified that a court should not consider the merits of the underlying claim when assessing class-certification requirements. The court determined that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in certifying the class. The Supreme Court held that the common question of whether the pre- and post-shift activities are compensable predominates over individual issues and that a class action is a superior method for resolving the controversy. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "McDaniel v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Miller Plastic Products Inc. fired Ronald Vincer in March 2020, during the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic. Vincer had expressed concerns about the company's pandemic protocols and its operating status, believing it was not an essential business. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that Vincer’s termination violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it was motivated, at least in part, by his protected concerted activity.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and that his termination was motivated by his protected activity. The ALJ also disallowed testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage of the proceeding. Miller Plastic petitioned for review of the Board’s order, and the Board cross-applied for enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and was a motivating factor for his termination. The court also agreed with the ALJ’s decision to disallow testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage, noting that such evidence is typically considered during compliance proceedings.However, the court found that the NLRB failed to adequately address certain evidence related to Miller Plastic’s affirmative defense that it would have fired Vincer even absent his protected conduct. The court remanded the case to the Board to address the significance of that evidence. The court denied Miller Plastic’s petition for review in part and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement in part, affirming the finding that Vincer was terminated because of his concerted activity. View "Miller Plastic Products Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Pamela Edwards, owner of Allure Salon in Starkville, Mississippi, was diagnosed with cancer in 2019 and passed away in 2022. After her death, her husband, Jimmy Edwards, sought payment from her life insurance policy with Guardian Life Insurance. Guardian denied the claim, stating the policy had been canceled because the number of insured employees at Allure dropped to one, triggering their right to cancel the policy. Jimmy Edwards was unaware of the policy until informed by the insurance agent, Debbie Jaudon, who also did not receive a cancellation notice from Guardian.Jimmy Edwards sued Guardian in the Northern District of Mississippi, bringing claims under Mississippi common law and arguing that ERISA entitled him to recover benefits. Guardian moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that ERISA governed the plan and preempted the common-law claims. The district court granted Guardian’s motion, and Jimmy Edwards appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that ERISA applied to the Allure policy, as the salon technicians were considered employees under federal common law. The court found that Guardian had waived its right to cancel the policy by continuing to accept premium payments for 26 months after the right to cancel vested. The court held that Guardian could not avoid its obligation to pay the claim after accepting premiums for such an extended period. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of James Edwards. View "Edwards v. Guardian Life Insurance" on Justia Law

Junius Joyner, III, an African-American male, was hired by a legal staffing agency, Mestel & Company (Hire Counsel), and assigned to work at Morrison & Foerster LLP in Washington, D.C. He worked on the merger of Sprint Corporation with T-Mobile U.S., Inc. from July to December 2019. Joyner alleged several incidents of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment, including delayed work assignments, derogatory comments, and harassment by coworkers. He also claimed wrongful discharge under D.C. law, asserting he was terminated after reporting potential antitrust violations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Joyner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Joyner did not provide sufficient facts to support his claims of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The court also dismissed his wrongful discharge claim under D.C. law, concluding that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joyner’s federal claims, agreeing that Joyner failed to plausibly allege that his treatment was racially motivated or that the work environment was sufficiently hostile. The court found that Joyner’s allegations did not meet the necessary standard to infer racial discrimination or a hostile work environment. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment on the wrongful discharge claim, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this claim and remanded it with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Joyner v. Morrison and Foerster LLP" on Justia Law

In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law