Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Several employees of the City and County of San Francisco who joined the city’s retirement system at age 40 or older and later retired due to disability challenged the method used to calculate their disability retirement benefits. The city’s retirement system uses two formulas: Formula 1, which provides a higher benefit if certain thresholds are met, and Formula 2, which imputes service years until age 60 but caps the benefit at a percentage of final compensation. Plaintiffs argued that Formula 2 discriminates against employees who enter the system at age 40 or above, in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).Initially, the San Francisco City and County Superior Court sustained the city’s demurrer, finding the plaintiffs had not timely filed an administrative charge. The California Court of Appeal reversed that decision, allowing the case to proceed. After class certification and cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found triable issues and held a bench trial. At trial, plaintiffs presented expert testimony based on hypothetical calculations, while the city’s expert criticized the lack of actual data analysis and highlighted factors such as breaks in service and purchased credits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s post-trial decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove intentional age discrimination or disparate impact under FEHA. The court found substantial evidence that Formula 2 was motivated by pension status and credited years of service, not age. The plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient because it relied on hypotheticals rather than actual data showing a disproportionate adverse effect on the protected group. The appellate court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend the complaint, finding no reversible error. The judgment in favor of the city was affirmed. View "Carroll v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

Thomas Cole brought suit against his former employer, Foxmar, Inc., alleging unlawful retaliation in violation of the Vermont Occupational Safety and Health Act (VOSHA) and the Vermont Earned Sick Time Act (VESTA). At trial, a jury found in Cole’s favor on both claims, initially awarding him over $3 million in damages, including punitive damages. However, after the District Court determined the punitive damages were excessive and ordered a new trial on damages, the second jury awarded Cole $55,000 in compensatory damages and no punitive damages. Cole then sought attorney’s fees under the relevant Vermont statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont found Cole entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees but imposed two across-the-board reductions: a twenty-five percent reduction for what it deemed excessive hours billed by Cole’s attorney, and a further thirty percent reduction based on the perceived disproportionality between the attorney’s fees requested and the damages ultimately awarded. This resulted in a total fee award significantly lower than Cole’s request. Cole appealed, arguing that both reductions were improper and that the overall award was unreasonably low.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the twenty-five percent reduction for excessive hours was within the District Court’s discretion and consistent with Vermont law. However, the court concluded that the thirty percent reduction based on proportionality between fees and damages was not permitted under Vermont law, which does not require fee awards to be proportional to damages in cases involving fee-shifting statutes like VOSHA and VESTA. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the District Court’s fee award and remanded the case for recalculation of a reasonable fee consistent with Vermont law. View "Cole v. Foxmar, Inc." on Justia Law

Orlando Rodriguez, while employed as a mechanic, suffered significant head and brain injuries in November 2016. His employer’s insurer, administered by Illinois Midwest Insurance Agency, accepted the injuries as work-related. Beginning in September 2018, Rodriguez’s treating physician repeatedly requested home health care services in six-week increments, which Illinois Midwest generally approved, sometimes after utilization review. In September 2019, a new request for home health care was denied by a utilization review physician, and the denial was communicated to all relevant parties.Rodriguez challenged the denial by seeking an expedited hearing before a workers’ compensation judge. The judge found Rodriguez was entitled to ongoing home health care, reasoning that Illinois Midwest could not terminate the treatment without substantive medical evidence of a change in condition. The judge concluded the utilization review decision was “moot” due to Rodriguez’s ongoing need and relied on Patterson v. The Oaks Farm (2014) 79 Cal.Comp.Cases 910. Illinois Midwest petitioned for reconsideration, but the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) affirmed the judge’s decision, again relying on Patterson and finding no evidence of changed circumstances.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, following legislative reforms in 2004 and 2013, disputes over medical necessity for requested treatments must be resolved through the statutory utilization review and independent medical review processes, not by the WCAB or courts, even for ongoing or continual treatment. The court rejected Patterson’s contrary rule for post-2013 injuries, finding no statutory exception for ongoing treatment. The court annulled the Appeals Board’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Illinois Midwest Insurance Agency, LLC v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

A former employee of a county health department brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that her employer discriminated against her based on her night blindness, retaliated against her for requesting an accommodation, and failed to accommodate her asthma. She had been promoted to a position requiring some nighttime driving, which became increasingly difficult due to her night blindness. Later, she was reassigned to a shift that required her to work alone at night at a location she considered unsafe, and she raised concerns about both her vision and personal safety. She also experienced a severe asthma flare-up when she temporarily lost access to her medication, which affected her ability to work.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee dismissed her constitutional claims but allowed her ADA claims to proceed to trial. At trial, the jury found in her favor on all three ADA claims: failure to accommodate her asthma, discrimination based on her night blindness, and retaliation for requesting an accommodation. The county moved for judgment as a matter of law at several points, arguing that her conditions did not qualify as disabilities under the ADA and that the evidence was insufficient, but the district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The appellate court held that the jury reasonably found that both night blindness and asthma could qualify as disabilities under the ADA, given the broad and individualized inquiry required by the statute and its amendments. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff on all ADA claims. View "Edwards v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn." on Justia Law

A company that manufactures emergency-use auto-injectors terminated a senior technician after she certified that a probationary employee completed five on-the-job training (OJT) tasks in a single day. The company alleged that this certification was fraudulent and did not comply with its training policies, as the forms lacked supporting documentation and the employee did not demonstrate proficiency. The technician, a qualified trainer, filed a grievance through her union, arguing that it was common practice on her shift to conduct and certify multiple OJTs in one day and that supervisors were aware of these practices.An arbitrator reviewed the grievance under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the company and the union. The arbitrator found that the company failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the technician’s actions were intentionally fraudulent or falsified. The arbitrator also noted that the company’s staffing shortages and established practices contributed to the situation and drew an adverse inference against the company for not calling key supervisors as witnesses. The arbitrator ordered the technician’s reinstatement with back pay and benefits. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the union, affirming the arbitrator’s award.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo for legal conclusions and for clear error on factual findings. The Eighth Circuit held that the arbitrator acted within his authority in interpreting ambiguous terms in the CBA, such as “dishonesty,” and in considering past practices. The court also found that the arbitrator’s adverse inference and allocation of the burden of proof were permissible. Finally, the court concluded that reinstating the technician did not violate any well-defined and dominant public policy. The judgment affirming the arbitrator’s award was affirmed. View "Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 688" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a black woman, worked as a Supervisory Medical Support Assistant at the Kansas City Veterans Administration (KCVA). After her supervisor, Angela Frey, was hired, the plaintiff alleged that Frey harassed her from the outset. The plaintiff was eventually assigned to a different position outside her original office and retired from the KCVA over a year later. She claimed that Frey discriminated against her based on race, retaliated against her for complaining about racial discrimination, created a racially hostile work environment, and constructively discharged her.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the KCVA. The district court found that the plaintiff’s allegations regarding denial of training, a negative performance review leading to reassignment, and interference with a job application in Florida were either too vague, unsupported by evidence, or based on inadmissible hearsay. The court also determined that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of discriminatory intent or a causal link between any protected activity and adverse employment actions. Additionally, the court concluded that the incidents described did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment or constructive discharge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support her claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, or constructive discharge under Title VII. The court emphasized that speculation and conclusory statements were insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial and that the conduct alleged did not meet the legal threshold for actionable discrimination or harassment. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Sherman v. Collins" on Justia Law

An employee at a Home Depot store in New Brighton, Minnesota, wrote “BLM” (Black Lives Matter) on their required work apron as a symbol of solidarity against prejudice and racism. This occurred in the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder, which had sparked significant civil unrest in the Minneapolis area, including near the store. The store had experienced incidents of racial tension among employees, complaints about discriminatory conduct, and vandalism of a Black History Month display. Management directed the employee to remove the “BLM” message, citing company policy prohibiting political messages unrelated to workplace matters on uniforms. The employee refused, insisting the message was necessary to support coworkers of color, and subsequently resigned.After resigning, the employee filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that Home Depot violated Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by prohibiting the display of “BLM” on aprons. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the complaint, finding that the display was not concerted activity protected by Section 7, as it was not coordinated among employees and had only an indirect relationship to workplace issues. The NLRB reversed the ALJ, holding that the refusal to remove the “BLM” message was protected concerted activity, and that Home Depot’s enforcement of its dress code and constructive discharge of the employee violated Section 8(a)(1). The Board ordered Home Depot to reinstate the employee with back pay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Home Depot had established “special circumstances” justifying its enforcement of the dress code policy at this location and time, given the heightened tensions and safety concerns following local unrest. The court vacated the NLRB’s order and remanded for further proceedings, declining to address other issues. View "Home Depot U.S.A. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Lisa Azorit-Wortham worked as a flight attendant for Alaska Airlines in March 2020. She tested positive for COVID-19 after flying on eight flights, including four transcontinental trips, during a period when neither passengers nor crew wore masks. Azorit-Wortham claimed she contracted the virus due to her work-related travel and sought workers’ compensation benefits, arguing that her illness qualified as an “occupational disease” under Washington’s Industrial Insurance Act.After the Department of Labor and Industries approved her claim, Alaska Airlines appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA), where an administrative law judge determined her illness did not meet the definition of an occupational disease. The BIIA affirmed this decision. Azorit-Wortham then appealed to the Pierce County Superior Court, where a jury was instructed on both the definition of “occupational disease” and the traveling employee doctrine, which extends coverage to employees while traveling for work. The jury found in her favor.Alaska Airlines appealed, and the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the traveling employee doctrine does not apply to occupational diseases and that the jury instruction on this doctrine was erroneous and prejudicial. The case was remanded to the trial court.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the traveling employee doctrine does apply when an employee contracts an occupational disease while traveling for work. The Court found that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on this doctrine and that the instruction did not alter the statutory definition of “occupational disease.” The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address whether substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. View "Azorit-Wortham v. Department of Labor and Industries" on Justia Law

A shift supervisor at a coffee shop in Ann Arbor, Michigan, led efforts to organize a union at her workplace. She was a prominent organizer, engaging in various activities such as wearing union buttons, speaking to customers about unionization, and attending a labor board hearing. Several months into the campaign, she was terminated by her employer, who cited her violation of a company policy requiring at least two employees to be present in the café. The supervisor had left a barista alone at the store at the end of her shift without notifying management, which the company claimed was the reason for her discharge.After her termination, Workers United filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that the discharge was motivated by anti-union animus. An Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the union, concluding that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual and that the discharge was unlawfully motivated. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision and expanded the remedy, ordering the employer to compensate the supervisor not only for lost earnings and benefits but also for any “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms” resulting from the discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case on the NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s finding that the supervisor’s discharge was motivated by anti-union animus and thus constituted an unfair labor practice. However, the court determined that the NLRB exceeded its statutory authority under the National Labor Relations Act by awarding compensation for “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms” beyond lost earnings and benefits. The court granted enforcement of the unfair labor practice finding but vacated the expanded remedy and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

Paul D. Russell, a civilian employee at the Irwin Army Community Hospital in Fort Riley, Kansas, alleged that his female supervisor, Major Tamara Tran, discriminated against him and other male employees, creating a hostile work environment based on gender. Russell cited several incidents, including gender-segregated meetings, differential treatment in access to the supervisor, public criticism, changes to his job title, exclusion from leadership communications, and an attempt to appoint a less qualified female employee as acting chief during Tran’s maternity leave. An internal Army investigation found that Tran had discriminated on the basis of gender, violating Army policy, but cleared Russell of any wrongdoing.After exhausting administrative remedies, Russell filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, claiming a violation of Title VII due to a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Army, finding that Tran’s actions, while motivated by gender bias, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to meet the legal standard for a hostile work environment under Title VII. The court noted that the internal investigation’s findings did not address the required severity or pervasiveness analysis.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Russell argued that the district court applied an overly stringent standard in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, but the Tenth Circuit held that Muldrow did not alter the established requirement that hostile work environment claims must show conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive. The Tenth Circuit also found that Russell had waived his argument regarding the weight of the internal investigation report. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the severity or pervasiveness standard remains controlling for hostile work environment claims under Title VII. View "Russell v. Driscoll" on Justia Law