Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Two labor unions, each with a collective bargaining agreement covering the same maintenance and repair work at a Seattle shipping terminal, both claimed the right to this work when the terminal was modernized and reopened. The employer, SSA Terminals, was contractually obligated to both the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) to assign the work to their members. When the work was assigned to ILWU, IAM threatened to strike. To resolve the conflict, SSA Terminals invoked the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provision allowing the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to determine which union should be awarded the work in such jurisdictional disputes.The NLRB conducted a hearing under Section 10(k) of the NLRA and awarded the disputed work to IAM, finding that employer preference, skills, efficiency, and past practice favored IAM. After the decision, ILWU filed a grievance and won an arbitration award against SSA Terminals, arguing that the employer had not adequately defended ILWU’s contractual rights. In response, IAM and SSA Terminals filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that ILWU’s actions were intended to coerce the employer to reassign the work, violating Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA. The NLRB’s administrative law judge and the Board found that ILWU had violated the Act and rejected ILWU’s defense that its actions were permissible work-preservation activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the “work-preservation” defense recognized in National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen’s Association does not apply to unfair labor practice charges under Section 8(b)(4)(D) for failing to respect the Board’s resolution of a jurisdictional dispute. The court overruled its prior contrary precedent and enforced the NLRB’s order. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION" on Justia Law

An employee was injured at work when she fell onto a vendor’s cart and received workers’ compensation benefits from her employer. She also pursued a negligence claim against the vendor responsible for the cart and settled that claim for $295,000. The settlement did not specify the allocation between types of damages. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that one-third of the settlement was for pain and suffering, which is not recoverable in workers’ compensation, and the rest duplicated the workers’ compensation benefits she received. The ALJ calculated the employer’s right to subrogation by reducing the duplicative portion of the settlement by the employee’s attorney fees (40%) and legal expenses, then allowed the employer to immediately recover the benefits it had paid and to receive a credit against future benefits.The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed most of the ALJ’s decision but found a mathematical error in how legal expenses were deducted. The Board clarified that the employer must cover its pro rata share of both attorney fees and legal expenses from the amount available for subrogation, and remanded for correction. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, held that the employer could only begin recovering benefits once the amount it had paid exceeded its share of the employee’s legal fees and expenses, relying in part on prior case law interpreting an earlier version of the statute.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that under KRS 342.700(1), as amended in 2018, an employer’s responsibility for legal fees and expenses is to be subtracted from the duplicative portion of the settlement before subrogation. The employer is entitled to immediate reimbursement for benefits already paid, and a credit for future benefits, after this reduction. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the Board’s opinion, remanding for correction of the ALJ’s calculation. View "K-VA-T FOOD STORES, INC. V. BLACKBURN" on Justia Law

Several employees of Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc. sued their employer, seeking prevailing wages under the Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) for certain repair and replacement work they performed pursuant to a contract between Veolia and the Springfield Water and Sewer Commission. That contract was authorized by a 1997 Massachusetts Special Act, which provided that work falling within "the construction and design of improvements" remained governed by the PWA. The disputed work occurred during the contract’s second stage, which involved ongoing operation, maintenance, repair, and replacement of wastewater facilities.After both sides moved for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled for Veolia. The court concluded that the employees’ work did not fall under "construction and design of improvements" as used in the Special Act and, relying on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s (SJC) decision in Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc., determined that the structure of the procurement scheme made the PWA inapplicable to the service contract as a whole. The employees appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, reviewing the case, certified two questions regarding Massachusetts law to the SJC. The SJC clarified that "construction and design of improvements" in the Special Act is broader than the PWA’s definition of “construction” but does not include ordinary repairs or maintenance. The SJC also held that the Special Act was not incompatible with the PWA and that Metcalf was not controlling. Based on the SJC’s answers, the First Circuit held that the district court’s summary judgment for Veolia could not stand, reversed the order, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine which, if any, of the employees’ tasks fell within the statutory phrase. View "Nicholls v. Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc." on Justia Law

A company sponsored a health benefit plan for its employees, which was administered by another entity. An employee under this plan, referred to as Patient AA, sought medical treatment from several out-of-network providers. Before providing care, these providers contacted the plan administrator to confirm the reimbursement rate. The administrator’s employees orally stated that reimbursement would be at the usual, customary, and reasonable (UCR) rate, a standard commonly used in the industry. Relying on these assurances, the providers treated Patient AA. When they later sought payment, they were reimbursed at a much lower rate, calculated according to Medicare rates, not the promised UCR rate.The providers sued both the employer and the plan administrator, asserting state-law claims for negligent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel based on the oral statements about reimbursement. The action began in California state court but was removed to federal court and transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The district court agreed, applying the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the claims “related to” the ERISA plan and were thus preempted. The district court also denied the providers’ post-judgment request for leave to amend their complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, under its precedent in Cromwell, ERISA expressly preempts state-law negligent-misrepresentation and promissory-estoppel claims by third-party healthcare providers when those claims are based on oral assurances regarding the terms of coverage or reimbursement under an ERISA-governed plan. The district court’s dismissal with prejudice was upheld. View "Laurel Hill Mgmt. Servs., Inc v. La-Z-Boy Inc." on Justia Law

Support staff who worked at a psychiatric hospital in Louisiana operated by Acadia-affiliated entities allege that, while they were provided with nominal meal breaks, they were functionally required to remain on call due to company policies and ethical obligations. As a result, they claim they were not properly compensated for this time. The plaintiffs, a former nurse supervisor and a former mental health technician, brought suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees. Their claims included violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Louisiana state-law torts, specifically unjust enrichment and conversion.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana certified both an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the state-law claims. Acadia sought interlocutory review of the class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with Acadia’s appeal challenging both the collective and class certification decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the FLSA collective action certification at this stage, as Rule 23(f) provides for interlocutory review only of class certification orders, not collective actions. The court declined Acadia’s request to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction because the legal standards and issues between the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class were not sufficiently intertwined. Turning to class certification, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court. It held that the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority were satisfied based on the plaintiffs’ “on-call” theory, which presented common questions suitable for classwide adjudication. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s certification of the Rule 23 class, dismissed the appeal regarding the collective action, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hamm v. Ochsner-Acadia" on Justia Law

A former Chief Financial Officer of a clinical drug development company was terminated shortly after experiencing a domestic violence incident and requesting limited accommodations at work. She alleged that her supervisor sidelined her, assigned her diminished responsibilities, and ultimately terminated her for reasons related to her gender and experience as a domestic violence victim. After her termination, she initially filed an arbitration demand asserting discrimination and harassment based on national origin and her status as a domestic violence victim. During discovery in the arbitration process, she uncovered evidence suggesting her mistreatment was motivated by sex. She then withdrew from arbitration and filed suit in state court, asserting sex discrimination and hostile work environment claims.The employer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act and related federal law preempted any state procedural rules allowing withdrawal from arbitration. The district court ruled that, although state procedural rules were preempted, the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) gave the plaintiff the right to invalidate the arbitration agreement and proceed in court based on plausible allegations of sexual harassment. The district court found that the plaintiff did not know of her sexual harassment claim when she initiated arbitration and had not waived her rights under the EFAA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the EFAA allows plaintiffs to elect to proceed in court once they discover a sexual harassment claim, even if they initially pursued other claims in arbitration, so long as they did not intentionally relinquish a known right. The court further found the plaintiff plausibly alleged a sex-based hostile work environment claim under California law and thus under the EFAA. View "DING V. STRUCTURE THERAPEUTICS, INC." on Justia Law

In August 2021, a teacher was indefinitely suspended from his position within the District of Columbia Public Schools, allegedly without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. The teacher subsequently filed a pro se lawsuit in federal court against the Mayor of the District of Columbia and two public school officials. He claimed a violation of his procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted separate claims under District of Columbia law.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the teacher’s section 1983 claim, reasoning that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies available under the District’s Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA). Since the federal claim was dismissed, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the local law claims and dismissed them as well.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that, under Supreme Court precedent—especially Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida—and its own prior decisions, exhaustion of state or District of Columbia administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a section 1983 claim in federal court, unless Congress expressly imposes such a requirement. The court found that neither the CMPA nor any federal statute required exhaustion in this context. Thus, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the section 1983 claim and vacated the dismissal of the local law claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. The appellate court emphasized that only Congress, not local law or judicial interpretation, may impose exhaustion requirements for section 1983 actions in federal court. View "Mpoy v. Burst" on Justia Law

An employee of Royal Caribbean participated in the company’s retirement plan and invested in a series of target date funds managed by Russell. She, on behalf of a class, alleged that Royal Caribbean, as plan sponsor and fiduciary under ERISA, breached its duty of prudence by selecting and retaining the Russell Target Date Funds (TDFs) instead of alternatives like those from Vanguard or American Funds. The complaint highlighted that the Russell TDFs underperformed their peers and benchmarks, charged higher fees, and had features—such as a particular glidepath and asset allocation—that allegedly made them a poor fit for plan participants. Internal communications from Russell and Royal Caribbean raised concerns about the performance and cost of the Russell TDFs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment to Royal Caribbean. It reasoned that, in order to prove the investment was objectively imprudent, the plaintiff was required to present “apples-to-apples” comparator evidence—showing the Russell TDFs were worse than another fund with the same investment strategy and risk profile. The district court found that the plaintiff’s comparators, such as the Vanguard and American Funds TDFs, were not proper because they differed in strategy and structure from the Russell funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that an ERISA plaintiff is not always required to provide an “apples-to-apples” comparator to establish that an investment was objectively imprudent. The court explained that evidence of objective imprudence can be qualitative or quantitative, and the inquiry is context-specific, depending on all relevant facts and circumstances. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Russell Investments Trust Company" on Justia Law

An aluminum company had, through various collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), promised certain healthcare benefits to retirees, their spouses, and dependents. The agreements did not specify the duration of these benefits, but the company had been providing lifetime healthcare coverage to individuals who retired before June 1, 1993. In August 2020, the company announced it would transition these pre-1993 retirees to a new health reimbursement arrangement starting January 1, 2021, under which the company reserved the right to terminate benefits at any time. Over 3,000 affected individuals, including the widow of a former employee, challenged this change, alleging that it breached the CBAs and violated federal labor and benefits laws.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana certified a class of affected retirees and their eligible spouses and dependents. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment as to liability in favor of the plaintiffs, relying on judicial estoppel. The court found that the company was barred from arguing that benefits were not vested for life because it had previously taken the opposite position in earlier litigation. As a result, the district court declared that class members were entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits and issued a permanent injunction requiring reinstatement of the prior plan and allowing claims for expenses incurred since January 1, 2021.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s certification of the class under Rule 23(b)(2), finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment as to liability. The appellate court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply because the company’s prior statements in earlier litigation were not clearly inconsistent with its current position. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "Kaiser v Alcoa USA Corp." on Justia Law

The case centers on a group of plaintiffs who brought a lawsuit claiming that their employer's timekeeping system, which rounded employees’ clock-in and clock-out times to the nearest quarter-hour, resulted in underpayment of wages. The plaintiffs argued that this rounding practice systematically favored the employer and thus violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The employer maintained that its rounding policy was neutral and consistent with federal regulations, and that over time, the rounding did not systematically disadvantage employees.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the employer moved for summary judgment, contending that the evidence showed the rounding practice was neutral both on its face and in practice. The district court agreed, finding that the employer’s rounding system complied with the FLSA’s regulations, which permit rounding as long as it does not consistently favor the employer. The court concluded there was no genuine dispute of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the employer’s rounding policy was permissible under the FLSA, provided it was facially neutral and did not systematically undercompensate employees over time. The Seventh Circuit clarified that, although individual pay periods might see some employees gain or lose time, the system as a whole did not violate federal law when considered in the aggregate. The court’s holding confirms that time-rounding practices consistent with federal guidance, and that do not result in systematic underpayment, are lawful under the FLSA. View "Kim v Jump Trading, LLC" on Justia Law