Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a United States Army veteran with disabilities, worked as a table games dealer at a casino operated by Harrah’s NC Casino Company in North Carolina. After being terminated and banned from the property, allegedly due to his emotional distress, veteran status, and health history, he was told he could be rehired after one year. When he reapplied, his job offer was rescinded, and he was denied rehire. The plaintiff claimed that his termination and subsequent denial of reemployment were the result of discrimination and retaliation based on his exercise of rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).After the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Harrah’s moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7), arguing that the Tribal Casino Gaming Enterprise (TCGE), a wholly owned entity of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, was the plaintiff’s true employer and a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. Because TCGE was protected by tribal sovereign immunity and could not be joined, the district court dismissed the complaint. The district court relied on a declaration from TCGE’s human resources vice president and prior case law to conclude that TCGE’s contractual and economic interests would be prejudiced by the litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of Rule 19 and found that it abused its discretion by determining that TCGE was a necessary party. The appellate court held that the record did not support the conclusion that TCGE’s presence was essential to afford complete relief or protect contractual interests, and that the district court’s analysis was speculative and unsupported. The Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Harrah's NC Casino Company, LLC" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, a county employer required its employees to either be fully vaccinated or undergo weekly COVID-19 testing. Employees could test at county facilities during work hours or use at-home test kits and count that time as work. Two employees objected to these requirements on religious grounds. One employee, Borgheiinck, asserted that mandatory vaccines and testing conflicted with her Christian beliefs about bodily autonomy. She was initially given unpaid leave as an accommodation, but the county later revoked this, citing undue hardship, and ultimately terminated her after not responding to her proposals for alternative work arrangements. The other employee, Colson, also objected on religious grounds. She was granted an exemption from nasal swab testing and allowed to use saliva tests, which she found intrusive and non-private, but she was not terminated.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed all claims, including those under Title VII. The plaintiffs sought leave to file a motion for reconsideration based on new legal precedent, but the court denied this request. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their Title VII claims and the denial of reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that Borgheiinck’s complaint did not sufficiently connect her religious beliefs to an objection to the testing policy, as required to state a plausible claim under Title VII. For Colson, the court held that she had not plausibly alleged that she suffered any adverse employment action, such as termination or unpaid testing time, since the county’s policy allowed testing during compensated time. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Title VII claims and its denial of leave to seek reconsideration. View "Colson v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

Two former employees of a financial services company, each a participant in the employer’s defined contribution retirement plan, sued the company on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated plan participants. They alleged that the company, as plan sponsor and fiduciary, breached its duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by selecting and retaining certain BlackRock LifePath Index Funds as investment options, which they claimed were imprudent and caused monetary losses to their individual plan accounts. The plaintiffs sought recovery of losses under ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 409(a).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss most of the claims, holding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a breach of fiduciary duty. It then certified a class of all plan participants and beneficiaries with investments in the BlackRock funds during the relevant period, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), finding that ERISA fiduciary-duty claims are inherently suitable for class treatment because they are brought on behalf of the plan and that allowing individual suits would risk inconsistent standards or impair interests of absent participants. The district court also found that the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) was satisfied.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and vacated the class certification order. The Fourth Circuit held that, in the context of a defined contribution plan, claims under ERISA § 502(a)(2) for monetary losses to individual accounts are inherently individualized and cannot be joined in a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1), which does not provide for notice or opt-out rights. The court also held that the claims failed to satisfy the commonality prerequisite because many class members did not experience the same injury. The district court’s order was thus reversed and vacated. View "Trauernicht v. Genworth Financial Inc." on Justia Law

A former employee brought a Title VII action against his previous employer, alleging that he suffered race-based harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination. After being fired in May 2022, he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice on June 2, 2023, which required him to file a lawsuit within ninety days, by August 31, 2023. The plaintiff attempted to retain an attorney, paying consultation fees twice, but the attorney was unresponsive for several weeks. Only a few days before the filing deadline, the attorney declined representation and advised the plaintiff to file pro se. The plaintiff quickly prepared his complaint and, with two days remaining, paid for guaranteed overnight delivery via the U.S. Postal Service. Due to delays caused in part by Hurricane Idalia, the complaint arrived at the district court after the ninety-day deadline.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia dismissed the lawsuit as untimely, finding that the plaintiff had not met his burden to show timely filing within the statutory period. The court considered, but rejected, the plaintiff’s explanation for the late filing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling because he pursued his rights diligently and extraordinary circumstances—specifically, the attorney’s delay and the effects of Hurricane Idalia—prevented timely filing. The court found no prejudice to the defendant from the brief delay. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the complaint should be deemed timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. View "Beazer v. Richmond County Constructors, LLC" on Justia Law

The case centers on a plaintiff who filed a Fair Labor Standards Act suit for unpaid wages and recordkeeping violations against his former employer. The plaintiff’s attorney, who neither resides nor holds an office near the courthouse, failed to appoint local counsel within the required timeframe due to a calendaring error. Pursuant to the district court’s local rule, a notice was issued warning that failure to comply could result in dismissal. After the deadline passed without compliance, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice, citing failure to prosecute or comply with court rules.Following the dismissal, the plaintiff promptly moved to reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), arguing that his attorney’s oversight constituted excusable neglect, and appointed local counsel. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff had not shown that dismissal without prejudice amounted to dismissal with prejudice, and cited prior Fifth Circuit cases as support. The plaintiff filed a second motion, distinguishing his case from the cited cases and again seeking relief, but the district court denied this motion as well, applying the same reasoning.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motions for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court erred by imposing a requirement that the plaintiff show dismissal without prejudice functioned as a dismissal with prejudice before granting relief under Rule 60(b). The Fifth Circuit clarified that neither Campbell v. Wilkinson nor Jones v. Meridian Security Insurance Company established such a standard for Rule 60(b) motions. The appellate court vacated the district court’s denials of the plaintiff’s motions and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider the proper factors for excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). View "Deras v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought employment discrimination and retaliation claims against the defendants, his former employers, alleging violations of federal and state law. After initiating the lawsuit in July 2021, the plaintiff failed over several years to respond to the defendants’ discovery requests, despite multiple court orders and continuances. The plaintiff’s attorney repeatedly missed deadlines, did not answer interrogatories or produce documents, and failed to pay court-ordered attorney’s fees. Even after the court vacated its scheduling order, delayed the trial multiple times, and assessed additional attorney’s fees, the plaintiff’s counsel did not advance the case, leading to three continuances and a case that remained undeveloped.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana responded to the plaintiff’s ongoing lack of participation by granting the defendants’ motion to exclude all evidence when the fourth trial date approached with no discovery completed. The plaintiff’s counsel did not attend the status conference regarding the exclusion motion despite acknowledging notice. With no admissible evidence remaining, the court then granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both the exclusion of evidence and the dismissal with prejudice for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court correctly applied the standard four-factor test for exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction and was not required to apply a heightened standard for litigation-ending sanctions. The court further found that a clear record of delay existed, lesser sanctions had proven futile, and the defendants were prejudiced by the plaintiff’s failures. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. View "Savage v. LaSalle Management" on Justia Law

Several employees of United Airlines challenged the company's COVID-19 vaccine mandate, alleging that United failed to provide reasonable religious and medical accommodations, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). United required all U.S. employees to be vaccinated by specific deadlines unless granted a religious or medical exemption. Employees seeking a religious accommodation needed to provide a personal statement of belief and a third-party attestation; those seeking a medical exemption had to submit supporting medical documentation. United initially planned to place all exempted employees on unpaid leave but later revised its policy for non-customer-facing employees, allowing them to work with masking and testing requirements, while customer-facing employees remained on indefinite unpaid leave.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas considered and partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The district court rejected a class seeking injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and a subclass of employees subject to masking and testing requirements, finding that the proposed classes lacked commonality and predominance due to the individualized nature of harm and the need for separate inquiries into the circumstances of each member. The court certified a modified subclass under Rule 23(b)(3) consisting of religious-accommodation seekers who were placed on unpaid leave but excluded those with medical accommodations from the subclass.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the class certification order under an abuse of discretion standard. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the broader classes and subclasses due to the individualized nature of the claims and in certifying the subclass of religious-accommodation seekers placed on unpaid leave. The court found that common questions predominated and that a class action was a superior method of adjudication for that subclass. View "Sambrano v. United Airlines" on Justia Law

Employees at a Kentucky bourbon distillery, dissatisfied with stagnant and uncompetitive wages, began discussing unionization with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. After management learned that a significant portion of employees supported the union effort, the company announced and implemented a $4-per-hour pay raise, expanded merit-based salary increases, and allowed more flexible vacation policies. These benefits were conferred after management had previously stated no further raises would be given that year. As the union election approached, the company also distributed bottles of bourbon to employees. Support for the union declined, and the union lost the election.An Administrative Law Judge found that the employer’s actions, including the wage increases and gifts, constituted unfair labor practices that interfered with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act. The judge recommended ordering the company to bargain with the union, citing both the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. and the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) then-recent decision in Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC. The NLRB adopted the judge’s factual findings and issued a bargaining order but relied solely on the Cemex standard rather than the Gissel standard.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that while substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding of unfair labor practices, the Board exceeded its authority by issuing a bargaining order based solely on the Cemex standard. The court determined that the Cemex standard was an improperly promulgated rule of general applicability, not derived from the facts of the case or designed as a case-specific remedy, and thus could not serve as the legal basis for the bargaining order. The Sixth Circuit granted the employer’s petition for review, denied the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement, and remanded the matter to the NLRB for further proceedings under proper standards. View "Brown-Forman Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A former employee of a company signed a document as a condition of her employment that purported to shorten the period in which she could sue her employer for workplace disputes, including discrimination claims, to 180 days. This agreement included a tolling provision for the period when a charge was pending before an administrative agency. The employee was terminated and, after filing timely administrative charges with the EEOC and the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights, she received a right-to-sue letter. She then filed suit in federal court, alleging violations of Title VII, the ADEA, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practice Act (MFEPA).After the employer moved to dismiss on the grounds that the lawsuit was untimely under the agreement, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, treating the motion as one for summary judgment, ruled in favor of the employer. The district court concluded the parties had validly agreed to shorten the limitations period, making the employee’s claims untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, as to the Title VII and ADEA claims, private parties may not, by advance agreement, prospectively shorten the statutory time periods for filing suit provided by Congress. The court reasoned that judicial enforcement of such agreements would undermine the comprehensive and uniform remedial schemes established by those statutes. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Title VII and ADEA claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the MFEPA claims, finding that Maryland law permits reasonable contractual modifications of limitations periods and that the employee had not demonstrated the provision was unreasonably short or otherwise invalid under state law. View "Thomas v. EOTech, LLC" on Justia Law

Two companies that operate app-based delivery platforms challenged a Seattle ordinance enacted in 2023, which aims to protect gig economy workers from unwarranted account deactivations. The law requires “network companies” to provide workers with written deactivation policies and mandates that these policies be “reasonably related” to the companies’ safe and efficient operations. The ordinance also delineates examples of impermissible deactivation grounds, such as those based solely on customer ratings or certain background checks. The companies did not contest the general bar on unwarranted deactivations but argued that the notice and deactivation policy requirements violate the First Amendment and that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the companies sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the ordinance from taking effect. The district court denied their motion. It found that the ordinance regulates conduct (the act of deactivating accounts) rather than speech, and that any impact on expression is incidental. The court also concluded that the use of “reasonable” in the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague, pointing to statutory context and specific examples for guidance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. The court held that the ordinance regulates nonexpressive conduct, not speech, and thus does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Alternatively, if the ordinance were seen as regulating speech, that speech would be commercial in nature, and the law would satisfy the lower level of scrutiny applicable to compelled factual commercial disclosures. The court further held that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague, as it provides adequate notice of what is prohibited. The disposition by the Ninth Circuit was to affirm the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. View "MAPLEBEAR INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law