Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns events at a Starbucks location in La Quinta, California, where employees began a union organizing campaign in December 2021. Two shift supervisors, Andrea Hernandez and Jazmine Cardenas, actively supported the unionization effort. After the union won the election to represent employees, the union filed charges alleging Starbucks engaged in unlawful conduct during the organizing campaign. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a complaint alleging that Starbucks had improperly restricted employees’ union discussions. To prepare its defense, Starbucks obtained Board-issued subpoenas directed to the two supervisors, seeking broad materials related to union activities.An administrative law judge (ALJ) found the subpoenas overbroad and granted petitions to revoke them, but allowed Starbucks to pursue narrower requests. The ALJ ultimately dismissed the underlying unfair labor practice complaint, with the NLRB affirming that decision. Separately, the Board initiated another unfair labor practice proceeding, alleging that Starbucks’ act of obtaining the subpoenas itself interfered with employees’ rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. The ALJ concluded Starbucks’ subpoenas violated Section 8(a)(1), using the standard from National Telephone Directory Corp., which balances confidentiality interests against an employer’s need for information. The Board adopted this reasoning and ordered Starbucks to cease the conduct and post a notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The Fifth Circuit held that the Board applied the wrong legal standard by relying on National Telephone’s discovery rule, rather than the required “totality of the circumstances” test for coerciveness under Section 8(a)(1). The court vacated the Board’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, clarifying that the proper inquiry is whether the employer’s conduct would tend to be coercive under all the circumstances. View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law

An employee of a company made formal complaints of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation while she was still employed. The company retained an outside attorney to investigate these complaints, who conducted interviews, reviewed documents, and produced two reports summarizing her findings and conclusions. The employee was later terminated and filed suit against the company and her former supervisors, alleging various employment-related claims. As part of its defense, the company asserted that it had thoroughly investigated the employee’s allegations by hiring an independent investigator, emphasizing the scope and adequacy of the investigation.After the Santa Clara County Superior Court initially denied the employee’s motion to compel production of the investigator’s reports and related materials, the employee sought mandamus relief. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, previously issued a writ ordering the trial court to permit discovery of the reports and materials, subject to in camera review to determine if any protection for core attorney work product was warranted. Following this, the trial court allowed the company to redact certain portions of the reports, including all factual findings, on the basis that they constituted attorney work product and thus were not discoverable.Reviewing the case again, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the company had waived attorney-client privilege and attorney work product protection as to all factual findings and any information relevant to the scope or adequacy of the investigations, because it put these matters at issue in its defense. The court clarified that the waiver extended specifically to the investigator’s factual findings and materials relevant to the adequacy of the investigation, but not necessarily to unrelated legal advice. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its prior acceptance of the redactions, conduct further in camera review, and disclose all materials within the scope of the waiver. View "Paknad v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A financial advisory employee of a large securities firm participated in a compensation program called the WealthChoice Awards, which provided annual contingent cash awards to select high-performing advisors. To earn these awards, an advisor had to meet certain revenue thresholds and remain employed at the company for eight years after the award was granted. A notional, unfunded account tracked a benchmark investment, but no funds were set aside for the advisor during the vesting period. If the advisor left the company before vesting, the award was typically forfeited. After vesting, payment was mandatory and made promptly, usually while the advisor was still employed. The stated purpose of the program was to incentivize retention and productivity, not to provide retirement income.After voluntarily resigning and forfeiting unvested awards, the employee filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. He alleged that the WealthChoice Awards program was an “employee pension benefit plan” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and that it violated ERISA’s vesting and anti-forfeiture rules. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, finding that the program was a bonus plan exempt from ERISA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the WealthChoice Awards program is a bonus payment plan and not an ERISA-covered pension benefit plan. The court reasoned that the program’s primary purpose was to enhance retention and productivity, eligibility was limited, the awards were not funded with deferred employee income, and payment was not systematically deferred until employment termination or retirement. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Milligan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns the termination of the General Counsel of the District of Columbia Retirement Board (DCRB), who had served in that role for nearly fourteen years. Following an internal investigation in 2021–2022, DCRB found that the General Counsel had failed to properly investigate and disclose conflict-of-interest allegations about a prior Executive Director. Based on these findings, DCRB initiated removal proceedings, ultimately deciding to terminate the General Counsel. The termination notice advised her of her right to appeal to the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA), where she argued, among other things, that her removal violated a regulatory “ninety-day rule.”Before OEA, the General Counsel claimed that she was a Career Service employee, which would entitle her to removal protections and OEA review. DCRB did not contest this characterization before OEA. OEA found in her favor and ordered her reinstatement, concluding that DCRB had violated the ninety-day rule. DCRB then petitioned the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for review, newly contending that the General Counsel was not in the Career Service but instead was a Senior Executive Attorney in the Legal Service—a category of at-will employees not entitled to OEA review or removal protections. The Superior Court found factual disputes regarding her employment status and remanded the case to OEA to determine its jurisdiction.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the statutory provisions governing DCRB and the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act unambiguously classified the General Counsel as a Senior Executive Attorney in the Legal Service, making her an at-will employee not entitled to OEA review. The court concluded that the Superior Court committed clear error by remanding for factual findings on this question. Accordingly, it reversed the Superior Court’s order and directed that Ms. Sampson’s OEA appeal be dismissed. View "District of Columbia Retirement Board v. Office of Employee Appeals" on Justia Law

After the Governor of Nebraska issued an executive order in November 2023 generally prohibiting state executive branch employees from working remotely—with certain exceptions left to agency heads—a union representing state employees demanded to bargain with the State regarding this new policy. The State refused, asserting that the existing collective bargaining agreement already gave it the authority to determine work locations, so it had no further obligation to bargain over remote work. In response, the union filed a petition with Nebraska’s Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), alleging the State committed a prohibited labor practice by refusing to negotiate over a mandatory subject of bargaining.The CIR reviewed the petition and received evidence, including the relevant collective bargaining agreement and testimony about the parties’ negotiations. The CIR found that the agreement expressly gave the State the right to change the site of its workforce, which included the authority to require employees to work at assigned locations and discontinue remote work. The CIR also concluded that, even if remote work was a mandatory subject of bargaining, the matter was already “covered by” the agreement, so the State was not required to bargain further. Alternatively, the CIR found the union had waived its right to bargain by withdrawing a remote work proposal during contract negotiations. The CIR dismissed the union’s petition with prejudice and, finding the petition frivolous and brought in bad faith, ordered the union to pay over $40,000 in attorney fees and costs.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the CIR’s dismissal of the union’s petition, holding that the contract coverage rule applied: because the collective bargaining agreement authorized the State to change employees’ work locations, the State had no obligation to bargain further over the executive order. However, the court reversed the award of attorney fees, concluding that the union’s legal position was not frivolous under Nebraska law. The decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Nebraska Assn. of Pub. Employees v. State" on Justia Law

Roman Gonzales worked as a Security Police Officer for a government contractor managing a nuclear facility. He had a chronic back injury, for which he took prescription opiates. Battelle Energy Alliance, the contractor, was aware of his medical condition and medication. For several years, Gonzales performed his duties without incident, including after the Department of Energy began requiring more stringent security and medical certifications for such officers. Despite no change in his medication regimen or job performance, Battelle, after a change in medical staff and updated drug testing protocols, revoked Gonzales’s fitness-for-duty certification and subsequently terminated his employment. Gonzales then learned that management had informed coworkers he was being dismissed as an “opioid abuser,” which he reported to human resources.Gonzales filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, alleging discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). After a five-day trial, the jury found in his favor on claims of retaliation and “regarded as” disability discrimination. Battelle moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that decisions involving the revocation of security-related certifications, such as the one at issue, were not subject to judicial review because such decisions are reserved for federal agencies under national security regulations. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that revocation of Gonzales’s fitness-for-duty certification under 10 C.F.R. § 1046 was subject to judicial review because it involved medical and physical standards, not predictive national security determinations or security clearance decisions reserved to the Department of Energy. The court distinguished between non-justiciable security clearance decisions and fitness-for-duty certifications, ensuring ADA protections remain enforceable. View "GONZALES V. BATTELLE ENERGY ALLIANCE, LLC" on Justia Law

A nursing student was required to complete clinical rotations at local hospitals as part of her coursework in 2017. She alleged that her supervisor, the director of the nursing program, subjected her to severe sexual harassment and retaliated against her when she rejected his advances by giving her a failing grade and refusing to discuss it. After the student reported these incidents, the district placed the supervisor on administrative leave and initiated an independent investigation. The investigation confirmed inappropriate conduct by the supervisor, who did not return to his position. The student later withdrew from the program and completed her degree out of state. Through counsel, she notified the district of her intent to pursue claims and sought damages.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted summary judgment for the community college district, holding that the student lacked standing under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), failed to comply with the Government Claims Act for her non-FEHA claims, and that the district was not deliberately indifferent under the Education Code. The court also excluded the student’s attorney’s declaration due to a technical omission, and entered judgment for the district on all claims.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the judgment. The court found the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the attorney’s declaration to be corrected, which was a curable procedural defect. The appellate court held that a postsecondary student serving in a clinical capacity qualifies as an “unpaid intern” under FEHA, conferring standing. The court further found the student’s notice to the district satisfied the Government Claims Act requirements, and concluded that triable issues existed regarding whether the district acted with deliberate indifference. The court affirmed summary adjudication for the district only on the Civil Code cause of action, but otherwise denied summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District" on Justia Law

A construction company with a longstanding union relationship entered into negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement in 2018, following the union’s withdrawal from a multiemployer contract. This led to protracted disputes, including strikes, litigation, and unfair labor practice charges. Amid negotiations, some employees sought to decertify the union, but the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) dismissed these decertification petitions, finding a causal nexus between the company's alleged unfair labor practices and employee dissatisfaction. During ongoing litigation, the company unilaterally raised employee wages in 2021 and 2022 without bargaining with the union, then later refused to bargain with the union or provide requested information, instead claiming a right to judicial review of the decertification petition dismissals.Administrative proceedings before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) resulted in findings that the company had committed several unfair labor practices: granting unilateral wage increases, withdrawing recognition from the union, refusing to bargain, and failing to provide information. The ALJ ordered the company to recognize and bargain with the union, cease unfair labor practices, and provide the requested information. The NLRB affirmed these findings and the remedial order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case, applying de novo review to legal conclusions and substantial evidence review to factual findings. The court held that the company failed to prove the union waived its right to bargain over wage increases, that the company's actions constituted an unlawful withdrawal of union recognition, and that the refusal to bargain and provide information were not justified as a “technical refusal to bargain” because the decertification petition dismissals did not alter the company's bargaining obligations. The court denied the company’s petition for review and enforced the NLRB’s order. View "Rieth-Riley Constr. Co., Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A privately held investment fund with ERISA plan investors (the Fund) contained provisions in its governing agreements granting indemnification and advancement rights to its general partner, management company, and their principals, all of whom served as ERISA fiduciaries. After these fiduciaries were removed in late 2023, the Fund sued them in the Delaware Court of Chancery, alleging breach of contract and violations of the fund’s governing documents for withholding information and assets. The defendants counterclaimed, seeking advancement of their litigation expenses, as provided in the fund’s agreements.The Fund argued that advancement from ERISA assets was barred by section 1110 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which voids contractual provisions that relieve fiduciaries from responsibility or liability for their ERISA duties. The Court of Chancery held that, even though advancement was permitted under Delaware law, ERISA section 1110 rendered these advancement provisions void because they would improperly relieve fiduciaries from ERISA liability. The court also noted that a bar on advancement was appropriate since the fiduciaries had not shown an ability to repay advanced funds. The defendants appealed this ruling.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. It held that advancement of litigation expenses for the defense of state-law claims, subject to a written undertaking to repay if indemnification is ultimately unwarranted, does not violate ERISA section 1110. The Court distinguished advancement from indemnification, emphasizing that advancement with an undertaking does not abrogate the fund’s right to recover from fiduciaries for ERISA breaches. The Court also found that neither statutory language nor relevant federal case law categorically barred such advancement under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision and remanded the matter. View "Invictus Global Management, LLC v. Invictus Special Situations Master I, L.P." on Justia Law

The dispute arose after the County of Los Angeles decided to outsource security work previously performed by members of the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association (PPOA). PPOA is the exclusive bargaining representative for certain county security officers under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the County. When PPOA learned of the County’s plan to contract out these services to a private company, it requested to meet and confer over the decision. The County refused, arguing that PPOA had waived its right to bargain over such decisions through provisions in the MOU, particularly a management rights clause and language addressing the transfer of functions to other entities.PPOA filed an unfair practice charge with the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM), alleging the County failed to meet and confer as required by statute. An ERCOM hearing officer found that while the County ordinarily would have a duty to bargain over outsourcing, the MOU’s language constituted a clear and unmistakable waiver of PPOA’s bargaining rights. ERCOM adopted this finding. PPOA then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking to compel the County to meet and confer. The superior court agreed with the County, ruling that the MOU’s reference to “reorganization” included outsourcing and thus waived PPOA’s right to bargain over the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the MOU did not clearly and unmistakably waive PPOA’s right to meet and confer over the County’s decision to transfer work to a private contractor. The court ordered the superior court to issue a writ of mandate requiring the County to meet and confer with PPOA regarding its outsourcing decision. View "L.A. County Professional Peace Officers Assn. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law