Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, who worked as a security supervisor for a company contracted to provide services at an industrial facility, was terminated from his position in June 2020. The employer cited alleged performance issues, including failures related to COVID-19 protocols and training, as the basis for the discharge. Shortly before his termination, the plaintiff had reported his direct supervisor for alleged favoritism toward female employees. The plaintiff argued that his termination was in retaliation for this report, rather than for the stated reasons.After the plaintiff’s termination, he filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming unlawful retaliation. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the employer. It found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the decisionmaker responsible for his termination knew about the protected activity, or that a supervisor with retaliatory animus influenced the decisionmaker (a “cat’s paw” theory). The district court concluded that, without such evidence, there was no causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker had knowledge of the protected activity or that an individual with retaliatory intent influenced the decision. The court found that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to show either scenario. The court also clarified that evidence suggesting pretext for the employer’s reasons does not substitute for the required showing of knowledge or causation. Thus, summary judgment for the employer was affirmed. View "Dominguez v. Weiser Security Services" on Justia Law

A construction company and several employee plaintiffs were involved in a labor dispute with a group of union-affiliated fringe benefit funds and their trustees. The company had employed members of a local union and, under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), was required to contribute to a set of employee benefit funds for each hour worked. When the CBA expired and was mutually terminated, the company and union failed to negotiate a new agreement. The company continued attempting to make contributions to the funds, but the funds’ trustees eventually refused to accept them unless the company provided written confirmation of its agreement to abide by the funds’ governing documents. The company declined, arguing that federal labor law required the funds to continue accepting contributions during negotiations. The funds then stopped accepting contributions, and the company placed the rejected payments into escrow.The company and employees filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, asserting that the funds’ trustees had breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by refusing the contributions, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the complaints, finding that the ERISA claims were preempted by the Garmon doctrine, which generally requires courts to defer to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on matters arguably subject to sections 7 or 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The district court also denied motions for a preliminary injunction and for leave to amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ ERISA claims were preempted under the Garmon doctrine because they were inextricably linked to labor law questions subject to the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction. The court also found that the district court properly denied the requests for preliminary injunctive relief and for leave to amend the complaint, as any amendment would have been futile. View "Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 324" on Justia Law

A former employee initiated a class action lawsuit against her prior employer, alleging violations of various California Labor Code provisions and other employment-related statutes. After the lawsuit was filed, the employer entered into individual settlement agreements with approximately 954 current and former employees, offering cash payments in exchange for waivers of wage and hour claims. The total settlement payments exceeded $875,000. The named plaintiff did not sign such an agreement, but many potential class members did.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County partially granted the plaintiff’s motion to invalidate these individual settlement agreements, finding them voidable due to allegations of fraud and duress. The trial court ordered that a curative notice be sent to all affected employees, informing them of their right to revoke the agreements and join the class action. The court, however, declined to require that the notice include language stating that those who revoked their settlements might be required to repay the settlement amounts if the employer prevailed. The court instead indicated that settlement payments could be offset against any recovery and that the issue of repayment could be addressed later.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the trial court’s order after the employer petitioned for writ relief. The appellate court held that, under California’s rescission statutes (Civil Code sections 1689, 1691, and 1693), putative class members who rescind their individual settlement agreements may be required to repay the consideration received if the employer prevails, but actual repayment can be delayed until judgment. The court instructed the trial court to revise the curative notice to inform employees that repayment may be required at the conclusion of litigation, and clarified that the trial court retains discretion at judgment to adjust the equities between the parties. The order of the trial court was vacated for reconsideration consistent with these principles. View "The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

A group of current and former shuttle truck drivers who work exclusively within Illinois, transporting auto parts and custom storage racks between storage lots and a Ford assembly plant in Chicago, alleged that their employers failed to pay them overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as well as relevant state and municipal wage laws. The essential facts, which were stipulated by the parties, establish that the auto parts are manufactured out of state, delivered by interstate carriers to storage lots near the assembly plant, and then moved by the plaintiffs from these lots to the plant as needed. After unloading, the drivers return the empty trailers to the storage lots, where interstate carriers retrieve them for return to the manufacturing sites.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted summary judgment for the defendants. The district court determined that the plaintiffs’ work moving goods from the storage lots to the assembly plant was part of a continuous interstate journey, thereby qualifying for the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption to the FLSA’s overtime requirement. This exemption applies when employees are subject to the Secretary of Transportation’s authority over qualifications and maximum hours.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the transportation performed by the shuttle drivers was indeed a continuation of the interstate shipment, as the storage lots were not the final destination for the goods. Applying the legal standard articulated in Collins v. Heritage Wine Cellars, Ltd., the court found the relevant criteria for interstate commerce satisfied. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the storage lots and assembly plant should be considered a single destination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the MCA exemption applies and overtime pay was not required. View "Stingley v Laci Transport Inc." on Justia Law

Americare Healthcare Services, Inc., a third-party home care provider in Ohio, and its owner, Dilli Adhikari, hired live-in workers—most of whom cared for their own family members—to provide services to elderly or disabled clients. Between October 2018 and October 2021, Americare failed to pay overtime wages to these employees, claiming entitlement to exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): the “Companionship Services Exemption” and the “Live-In Exemption.” The Department of Labor, however, had promulgated a 2013 regulation that prohibited third-party employers from relying on these exemptions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the Department of Labor, finding Americare and Adhikari liable for willful violations of the FLSA’s overtime requirements. The district court further held that the 2013 Third-Party Regulation was valid, and that Americare and Adhikari lacked standing to challenge a related regulatory definition that narrowed the scope of “companionship services.” Americare and Adhikari appealed only the district court’s rulings on the regulation’s validity and their lack of standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case, applying the framework for agency rulemaking authority post-Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The Sixth Circuit held that the FLSA’s express statutory delegation allowed the Department of Labor to define and delimit the applicability of the companionship and live-in exemptions, including excluding third-party employers from their reach. The court further held that Americare and Adhikari lacked standing to challenge the definition of companionship services because the bar to their use of the exemption arose from the third-party regulation, not from the definition itself. The judgment of the district court was therefore affirmed. View "Department of Labor v. Americare Healthcare Services" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs, including a truck driver and employees, alleged that their employers or associated companies collected their biometric data, such as fingerprints or hand geometry, without complying with the requirements of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). Each plaintiff claimed that every instance of data collection constituted a separate violation, resulting in potentially massive statutory damages. Some claims were brought as class actions, raising the possibility of billions in liability for the defendants.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the district judges addressed whether a 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20, which clarified that damages should be assessed per person rather than per scan, applied retroactively to cases pending when the amendment was enacted. The district courts determined that the amendment did not apply retroactively and certified this question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the certified question de novo. The court considered Illinois’s established law of statutory retroactivity, which distinguishes between substantive and procedural (including remedial) changes. The Seventh Circuit held that the BIPA amendment was remedial because it addressed only the scope of available damages and did not alter the underlying substantive obligations or standards of liability. The court reasoned that, under Illinois law, remedial amendments apply to pending cases unless precluded by constitutional concerns, which were not present here.The Seventh Circuit concluded that the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 applies retroactively to all pending cases. The court reversed the district courts’ rulings and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its holding. View "Clay v Union Pacific Railroad Company" on Justia Law

Former employees of a travel-nursing agency brought a putative class action against the agency, alleging wage-related violations. Each employee had signed an arbitration agreement with the agency that contained a delegation clause requiring an arbitrator—not a court—to decide on the validity of the agreement. Four initial plaintiffs had their disputes sent to arbitration: two arbitrators found the agreements valid, while two found them invalid due to unconscionable fee and venue provisions.After these initial arbitrations, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California confirmed three out of four arbitral awards. At this stage, an additional 255 employees joined the action as opt-in plaintiffs under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The agency moved to compel arbitration for these additional plaintiffs under their individual agreements. However, a different district judge raised the issue of whether non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel barred the enforcement of the arbitration agreements. After briefing, the district court denied the agency’s motion, concluding that the two arbitral awards finding the agreements invalid precluded arbitration for all 255 employees, effectively rendering their agreements unenforceable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements is incompatible with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court reasoned that such an approach undermined the principle of individualized arbitration and the parties’ consent, which are fundamental to the FAA. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the FAA does not permit using non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to invalidate arbitration agreements and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "O'DELL V. AYA HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term employee of a company in Virginia, reported concerns to his supervisor about violations related to overtime compensation. After raising these concerns and authoring a letter outlining managerial failures that affected employee compensation, the plaintiff was terminated by his supervisor and the plant manager. He then brought suit in Virginia state court against both individuals, who he alleged were Virginia citizens, claiming they violated public policy as set forth in Virginia law prohibiting retaliation for discussing wage information.The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, asserting diversity jurisdiction. They argued that one defendant was not a Virginia citizen and that the other, the supervisor, was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court agreed, finding there was no possibility that the plaintiff could state a viable claim against the supervisor under the relevant public policy exception to at-will employment recognized in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville. On that basis, the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. It held that the standard for finding fraudulent joinder was not met because it was not impossible for the plaintiff to establish a claim against the nondiverse defendant under state law; there was uncertainty in Virginia law as to whether a Bowman claim could be brought on these facts. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of remand and its dismissal of the complaint, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court’s main holding was that the district court erred in finding fraudulent joinder and retaining jurisdiction. View "Skidmore v. Schinke" on Justia Law

After being employed by the City of St. Louis as a corrections officer for over two decades, the plaintiff was transferred to a clerk typist position in the City’s towing division following an injury. In her new role, she uncovered and reported numerous instances of apparent misconduct and fraud involving the unlawful sale or transfer of vehicles by employees at the tow lot. She conveyed her concerns to various city officials, including her supervisors, the mayor’s office, and the comptroller’s office, and ultimately disclosed the information to the media. Following these disclosures, she experienced workplace retaliation and was ultimately terminated by the Director of the Department of Streets the day after a news story, which included information she had provided, was broadcast.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the First Amendment claim against the City but allowed the First Amendment retaliation claim against the Director, in his individual capacity, to proceed to trial. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that her protected speech was a motivating factor in her termination, and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The district court denied the Director’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the Director failed to preserve his qualified immunity defense for appeal and found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the plaintiff’s protected speech motivated her termination. The court further determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting contested evidence or in denying a new trial, and that there was enough evidence for punitive damages. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Woods v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

A teacher employed by a school district in a remote Alaska village rented housing from the district. After the district removed a railing from the stairs of the teacher’s residence and did not repair it despite complaints, the teacher fell while taking out the trash and was injured. The teacher notified the school principal of his injury, but she declined to assist or allow him to seek medical help. There were additional conflicts between the teacher and the principal, including disciplinary actions and allegations of policy violations. The teacher later reported the principal to her supervisors and the state’s Professional Teaching Practices Commission. Following these events, the district decided not to rehire the teacher for the following school year.The teacher filed a negligence lawsuit against the district and the principal, later amending his complaint to add claims for whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and workplace safety violations. The Bering Strait School District, after being sued, reported the injury as work-related to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board and moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the teacher’s exclusive remedy was through workers’ compensation. The Superior Court for the Second Judicial District, Nome, dismissed the case in its entirety, concluding that the teacher failed to state a claim, and later awarded attorney’s fees to the district.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that, taking the teacher’s allegations as true, it was not clear that his injury was within the course and scope of his employment or that workers’ compensation was his exclusive remedy. The court reversed dismissal of the negligence, whistleblower, wrongful termination, IIED, and defamation claims, finding the complaint stated viable claims. The court affirmed dismissal of the workplace safety claim and vacated the attorney’s fees award, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Mitchell v. Bering Strait School District" on Justia Law