Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Employees at a Starbucks store in Sylmar, California, engaged in union organizing activities during 2022. Several conversations between store managers and employees occurred regarding the unionization process, pay and benefit increases, and working conditions. Employees reported statements by managers suggesting that certain benefits would be paused or lost due to union negotiations, that unionization would not improve conditions, and that other jobs offered better pay. One employee, Untaran, was interrogated about his union support and subsequently terminated, with conflicting accounts regarding the reasons for his discharge.After a union election where a majority voted against representation, the union filed objections based on Untaran’s termination and management statements. An Administrative Law Judge for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including coercive threats, interrogation, and unlawful discharge, and ordered remedies such as reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and a new election. The NLRB adopted some findings and reversed others, particularly expanding the findings regarding coercive interrogation and threats.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings and enforcement orders regarding one coercive threat against Pichardo, the threat against Untaran, and Untaran’s coercive interrogation claim, finding these supported by substantial evidence. However, the court denied enforcement for the NLRB’s order regarding Untaran’s unlawful discharge claim and the coercive threat claims involving Sosa and Ramirez, as they lacked substantial evidence. The court dismissed Starbucks’s appeal regarding the order for a second union election, citing lack of jurisdiction over representation proceedings consolidated with unfair labor practice cases. View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Technicians employed by the defendant performed installation, maintenance, inspection, testing, repair, and replacement of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, and security system equipment under contracts with public entities in New York. These contracts varied in their language regarding the payment of prevailing wages: some disclaimed any obligation to pay prevailing wages, some were silent, and a few expressly based payment on prevailing wage rates. All contracts included a clause providing that any action against the defendant had to be brought within one year of accrual.The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging, among other claims, that they were owed prevailing wages as third-party beneficiaries of the contracts. The District Court granted the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the breach of contract claims were time-barred by the contractual limitation period, that the contracts did not expressly entitle plaintiffs to prevailing wages, and, in the alternative, that plaintiffs were not covered by the prevailing wage law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were covered by Labor Law § 220 but certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the implicit inclusion of prevailing wage promises in public works contracts and the enforceability of shortened contractual limitation periods.The New York Court of Appeals held that the promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract covered by Labor Law § 220, regardless of whether that promise appears in the contract’s text. As a result, employees may bring third-party beneficiary breach of contract claims to enforce the prevailing wage requirement. The Court further held that contractual agreements to shorten the statute of limitations for such claims are unenforceable. The Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. View "Walton v Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc." on Justia Law

A registered nurse, who is a black woman and naturalized U.S. citizen from Ghana, began working at a healthcare system in Texas and alleged frequent discrimination and harassment by co-workers, including mockery of her accent and food, derogatory comments about black employees, and preferential treatment of Filipino employees. She reported these incidents to supervisors, but claims their response was inadequate. After further complaints, she alleges retaliation through informal and formal disciplinary actions and the extension of her probation period. She was later injured in a car accident, took medical leave, and upon seeking treatment at a hospital operated by the same employer during a hurricane lockdown, had contentious interactions with staff, but ultimately received care. When she tried to return to work, she requested refresher orientation and additional training, but after further delays and lack of response, she resigned, citing discrimination and retaliation.She subsequently filed two charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The first charge, encompassing events through September 2017, was timely; the second, covering her resignation and later events, was untimely. In May 2021, she sued her employer for discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation under Title VII and Section 1981, and disability discrimination under the ADA. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation granting summary judgment to the employer on all claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed summary judgment for the employer on most claims. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Title VII and Section 1981 hostile-work-environment claims, holding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the conduct was severe or pervasive and whether the employer’s response was adequate. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings, limiting them to facts alleged in the plaintiff’s timely EEOC charge. View "Brenyah v. Columbia Hospital" on Justia Law

Robert Cocom, a former airport janitor, brought a putative class action against his previous employer, ABM Aviation, Inc., alleging wage and hour violations. When he was hired, Cocom signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA) requiring employment-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration. The MAA included waivers of class, collective, and representative actions, as well as a provision stating that arbitration awards would not have preclusive or precedential effect in other proceedings. Cocom’s lawsuit was originally filed in state court but was removed to federal court by ABM, which then moved to compel arbitration and strike the class claims.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied ABM’s motion, finding the arbitration agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court relied heavily on the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Cook v. University of Southern California, interpreting the MAA as having an overly broad scope, indefinite duration, and lack of mutuality, and concluding that certain waivers violated California law. Finding multiple provisions unconscionable, the district court declined to sever them and refused to enforce the MAA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the MAA’s provisions were distinguishable from those in Cook, noting that the MAA was limited to employment-related disputes, thereby avoiding the overbreadth, indefinite duration, and mutuality issues identified in Cook. The Ninth Circuit also found that any potentially unconscionable waivers (such as those related to representative actions or public injunctive relief) were severable. The main holding was that the MAA was not substantively unconscionable and should be enforced, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC." on Justia Law

A charter city in California employs attorneys who are classified as at-will, exempt employees under its city charter. During negotiations for a new memorandum of understanding, the union representing these attorneys made two proposals: one requiring that any discipline, including termination, be for just cause and subject to arbitration, and another requiring layoffs to be conducted by seniority. The city refused to submit these proposals to binding interest arbitration, maintaining that such changes conflicted with its charter, which specifies that exempt employees serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority and can be terminated without cause. The union filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), arguing the city violated its obligations under state law and the city charter by refusing to arbitrate these proposals.Before the Court of Appeal’s review, an administrative law judge found for the union, concluding that the city’s charter provision was superseded by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) because the proposals addressed matters of statewide concern. PERB affirmed the ALJ’s decision, but on different grounds, finding that the charter could be harmonized with the MMBA and that the proposals were eligible for arbitration. PERB held the city had engaged in bad faith bargaining by refusing to submit the proposals to arbitration and ordered the city to allow arbitration, as well as to compensate the union for related costs.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, granted review and reversed PERB’s decision. The court held that, under the city’s charter and civil service commission rules, the at-will status of exempt attorneys is not subject to binding interest arbitration. The court found that the proposals sought to alter matters specifically carved out from arbitration by the charter. Consequently, the court vacated PERB’s findings and orders, concluding that the city did not violate its duty to bargain in good faith by refusing to arbitrate these proposals. View "City & County of S.F. v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Employees participating in a 401(k) plan offered by their employer, a clinical laboratory company, brought a class action alleging that the plan’s fiduciaries breached their duties under ERISA by retaining two particular investment options: the Fidelity Freedom Funds and the Invesco Global Real Estate Fund. The plaintiffs argued that these funds underperformed compared to alternatives, were riskier, and that the plan’s managers failed to remove them despite subpar performance. They also claimed that internal policy statements required the funds’ removal and that the plan’s managers failed in their duty to monitor investments and breached trust obligations.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied a motion to dismiss the case, allowing discovery to proceed. After discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the plan’s fiduciaries had fulfilled their obligations by hiring investment advisors, regularly reviewing investment performance, seeking relevant training, and following up on concerns regarding the challenged funds. The court concluded there was no breach of fiduciary duty or related failures.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, considering all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. The Third Circuit held that ERISA’s fiduciary standard is process-oriented, not outcome-based. The Court found that the fiduciaries had used a prudent process—hiring advisors, critically assessing their recommendations, meeting with fund managers, and maintaining regular oversight—even if the investments did not always outperform alternatives. The Court further held that internal policy statements were nonbinding and that the fiduciaries did not abuse their discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. View "Johnson v. Quest Diagnostics Inc" on Justia Law

A locomotive engineer had longstanding concerns about her employer’s train scheduling practices, believing they led to unsafe conditions by pressuring employees to cut corners. Over a two-year period, she reported these concerns to her union, federal and state agencies, and the Governor’s office. Following a fatal train crash, she raised the issue again at a safety meeting attended by Liberty Mutual Insurance and New Jersey Transit employees. The specifics of this meeting, including which company personnel attended or knew about her participation, remained unclear.After the safety meeting, the engineer committed two significant infractions: first, she operated a train at a speed well above the limit, resulting in suspension after a disciplinary hearing. Her suspension was upheld by internal review boards. Later, she ran a train through a stop signal, leading to her termination after another disciplinary process. The identities of those responsible for the disciplinary decisions were uncertain, and testimony indicated that the signatory on her termination notice was absent at the time. A review board subsequently upheld the termination. After exhausting administrative remedies, the engineer filed suit under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, alleging retaliation for her whistleblowing. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment for the employer, finding insufficient evidence of retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the employee failed to provide evidence that any person involved in the decision to discipline or terminate her knew of her protected activity. The court clarified that, under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, a plaintiff must show knowledge of protected activity by an agent who influenced the adverse action. Because such evidence was lacking, the court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer. View "Asay v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations Inc" on Justia Law

An employee suffered significant hand injuries while working for Wyoming Waste Systems when his hand was caught in the pinch point of a garbage truck’s lift arms. The injured employee, who was being trained by a more experienced colleague, exited the truck to vomit while the lift arms were lowered. The colleague, seated in the passenger seat, engaged the controls to raise the lift arms without knowing the injured employee’s location, resulting in the injury.The injured employee brought suit against his co-worker, alleging liability under the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act, claiming the co-worker acted willfully and wantonly to cause the harm. The District Court of Fremont County granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding him immune under the Act. The court determined there was insufficient evidence to show the defendant had “knowledge of the hazard or serious nature of the risk involved,” or that he acted with willful and wanton misconduct.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. It applied established precedent and the statutory standard for co-employee liability, requiring proof of intentional or reckless conduct with knowledge of a specific, high-probability risk. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff did not present evidence that the defendant had particularized knowledge of the specific danger to the plaintiff at the moment of the incident, nor that the risk was obvious or highly probable. The court held that violations of general safety rules and evidence of negligence do not meet the threshold for willful and wanton misconduct required to overcome co-employee immunity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. View "Courtney v. Meyer" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff sergeant was terminated from his employment after an incident where he encountered two individuals with active “time pay” warrants for failure to pay fines. Despite confirming the existence and validity of the warrants, which were issued by a county court and directed to any law enforcement officer, he told the individuals that he would not arrest them because he believed doing so would be pointless. The interaction was recorded on his body camera. After the sheriff’s office conducted an internal investigation, the sergeant was found to have violated standard operating procedures by neglecting his duty.The sergeant appealed the termination to the county sheriff’s merit commission, which upheld the decision after a hearing. He then filed a petition in error with the District Court for Lancaster County, arguing that the evidence did not support his termination, that due process was denied because he was not given notice regarding issues of credibility or prior investigations, that the commission’s decision was void for untimely delivery, and that he had not waived any objections by failing to object during the administrative hearing. The district court found sufficient evidence supported the commission’s decision, determined the procedures were constitutionally adequate, rejected the argument about untimely delivery because no specific deadline for notification was violated, and concluded there was no prejudice regarding any waiver issue.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the sergeant neglected his statutory duty to execute the warrants, which justified termination under the governing procedures. The court also held that due process requirements were satisfied, as the sergeant received notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to be heard. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding no prejudicial error in the proceedings. View "Schmuecker v. Lancaster County" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sued his former employer for multiple Labor Code violations, including overtime wage, rest period, separation earnings, wage statement, and recordkeeping violations, under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The employer conceded liability for certain violations, and the parties stipulated to most relevant facts, leaving the amount of civil penalties as the main issue for trial. The plaintiff argued for maximum PAGA penalties totaling over $55 million, while the employer argued for substantial reductions based on the technical nature of the violations and corrective actions taken. The plaintiff also sought over $1.5 million in attorney fees, including a lodestar multiplier.The Superior Court of Orange County, after summary adjudication and trial briefs, awarded $515,965 in civil penalties, applying reductions based on factors such as the absence of unpaid wages for some violations, the employer’s good faith efforts to correct issues, and the relatively small amounts of lost wages. For the wage statement issue, the court found substantial compliance and imposed a reduced penalty. For rest period and overtime-related issues, penalties were further reduced due to the technical nature of violations and corrective actions. The court awarded full penalties for the bonus pay issue. Regarding attorney fees, the court accepted the lodestar but applied a negative multiplier to account for inflated billing rates and the relatively straightforward nature of the litigation, awarding $733,440 in fees.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the Labor Code does not mandate any particular method for reducing PAGA penalties, allowing trial courts discretion to apply reductions on a per employee or per pay period basis. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s calculation of penalties or application of a negative fee multiplier. The final judgment and fee award were affirmed. View "Taduran v. James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics" on Justia Law