Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A state trooper was hired in 2016 and terminated in 2019 after an internal investigation found he had altered his timecard to accommodate an additional extra-duty detail shift, violating department policy. The termination was also based on his conduct during the investigation. After his termination, the employee moved out of state and did not return to his position even after subsequent legal proceedings.The employee appealed his termination to the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB), which found the termination was not warranted by the conduct and was unjust. The PAB reinstated him with a twenty-day suspension without pay and found him credible, though it noted poor judgment and time management. The Division of State Police appealed the reinstatement to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, which affirmed the PAB’s decision. After reinstatement, the parties disagreed over whether the employee was entitled to back pay and benefits. The PAB clarified that the reinstatement included back pay, less mitigation and the suspension period. A further dispute arose over whether this back pay should include expected overtime; the PAB ultimately awarded the employee anticipated overtime back pay based on an average of prior overtime earnings. The Division’s motion for rehearing was denied, prompting this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the PAB had authority under RSA 273-D:3, V to award overtime back pay as part of “salary loss suffered.” The court held that the statute limits mandatory reinstatement awards to fixed compensation (“salary”) and does not include speculative amounts like overtime. Therefore, the PAB lacked authority to award overtime back pay. The Court reversed the PAB’s decision and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Appeal of N.H. Div. of State Police" on Justia Law

In this case, employees at two Starbucks locations in upstate New York initiated unionization efforts. At the Latham store, a shift supervisor and union organizer named James Schenk was terminated following several infractions, including using extreme profanity about a coworker in a group chat, failing to complete all tasks during a shift, and opening a letter addressed to Starbucks. At the Stuyvesant store, the district manager significantly increased her presence during the union campaign, which employees argued created an impression of surveillance.An Administrative Law Judge found that Starbucks did not violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by terminating Schenk at the Latham store, but determined that the district manager's actions at the Stuyvesant store did unlawfully create the impression of surveillance. The National Labor Relations Board agreed regarding the Stuyvesant store but reversed the ALJ as to the Latham store, concluding that Schenk would not have been disciplined or terminated but for his union activity. Starbucks petitioned for review, and the Board sought enforcement of its order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Board failed to adequately consider contradictory evidence, including whether Schenk's misconduct was sufficiently distinct from other employees' behavior and whether his opening of official mail was treated differently for a legitimate reason. The court found the Board’s reasoning insufficient and vacated the Board’s decision regarding Schenk’s termination, remanding the case for further proceedings. The petition for review was granted, and the case was remanded to the Board for further consideration consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Daniel Paris, an employee of MacAllister Machinery Company and member of the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 324, was terminated following a series of disciplinary issues, including performance deficiencies, attendance problems, and violations of company policy. After signing a “last chance” agreement, Paris’s employment was terminated when he violated its terms. Paris claimed he was discriminated against due to his union affiliation and age, and that he was subjected to harsher scrutiny than his peers. He also alleged that after reporting harassment and requesting information about taking leave for mental health issues, he was not properly supported by the Union and ultimately lost his job.Following his termination, Paris filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, asserting claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) against both MacAllister and the Union. The district court dismissed the LMRA claims against both defendants for failure to state a claim, finding Paris had not plausibly alleged that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the ELCRA claims. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for MacAllister on the remaining FMLA claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that Paris failed to establish a “serious health condition” under the FMLA because he did not seek treatment or provide required documentation. While it concluded that Paris’s inquiry about FMLA leave was a protected activity, it found MacAllister had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination, unconnected to FMLA retaliation or interference. The appellate court also affirmed dismissal of the LMRA claims, finding Paris did not plausibly allege breach of the Union’s duty or properly preserve related arguments on appeal. View "Paris v. MacAllister Machinery Co." on Justia Law

An employee of the United States Postal Service (USPS) worked as an Operations Industrial Engineer beginning in 2013. He alleged that, shortly after starting, he was harassed by a mentor on the basis of his national origin, race, and religion, and that after he complained, his work environment became more hostile. He also claimed to have faced retaliation for whistleblowing about safety violations and wastefulness. Over time, he received a Letter of Warning, was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan, and issued a Letter of Concern, all of which he believed were retaliatory. The situation resulted in medical issues, leading him to take medical leave, request reasonable accommodation, and ultimately remain on leave for several months. During this time, he filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint, and while it was pending, he resigned, attributing his departure to the intolerable environment and alleged retaliation.The EEOC eventually granted summary judgment in favor of USPS, finding no evidence of unlawful discrimination or that the employee suffered an adverse employment action. Nearly four years after resigning and shortly after the EEOC’s decision, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), asserting that his resignation was involuntary due to duress and coercion by USPS. The Board’s administrative judge found that he failed to non-frivolously allege that his resignation was coerced, misinformed, or otherwise involuntary, noting he could have continued to pursue remedies instead of resigning. The Board affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the employee had made non-frivolous allegations of involuntary resignation that would entitle him to a hearing. The court held that he had not, emphasizing that the facts did not show the agency effectively imposed his resignation or deprived him of reasonable alternatives. The court affirmed the Board’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "TAVAKKOL v. MSPB " on Justia Law

An art teacher with progressive hearing and vision loss, caused by Usher syndrome, sought approval from her Ohio school district to use paid sick leave for a mandatory three-week out-of-state training course required to obtain a guide dog. The district denied her request for paid leave, reasoning that the training did not qualify as “personal illness” under its sick-leave policy, but allowed her to take unpaid leave as an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She attended the training using unpaid leave, obtained the guide dog, and then, after unsuccessful further communication with the district, brought suit alleging violations of the ADA and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the school district. The court found that her ADA disparate treatment claim failed due to a lack of evidence that nondisabled employees were treated more favorably in similar circumstances. The court also found that the district’s offer of unpaid leave constituted a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, as the law does not require the employer to provide the employee’s preferred accommodation if another reasonable one is offered. Regarding the FMLA claim, the district court concluded that paid sick leave was not required because the school district would not “normally” provide paid sick leave for this type of absence under its policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that the plaintiff could not prevail on her ADA disparate treatment claim because she failed to show that similarly situated nondisabled employees received paid sick leave for comparable non-illness-related absences. Her failure-to-accommodate claim failed because unpaid leave was a reasonable accommodation, and the ADA does not mandate provision of the employee’s preferred form of leave. The FMLA claim failed because the district’s policy did not normally allow paid sick leave for guide dog training, and the plaintiff did not sufficiently challenge the district court’s interpretation of the policy. View "Tumbleson v. Lakota Local Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

A former court reporter who worked for nearly four decades for a California county discovered, as she approached retirement, that the county had failed to enroll her in the state retirement system (CalPERS) for several years early in her employment. Upon learning this, she attempted to secure a complete employment record from the county, which CalPERS required to adjust her retirement benefits. The county failed to provide complete records, reportedly due to records being lost or destroyed, and provided only incomplete information to CalPERS. This left her unable to purchase prior service credit or receive full retirement benefits, causing her financial harm and forcing her to delay retirement.After filing a claim with the county and receiving no response, the plaintiff brought multiple causes of action in the Humboldt County Superior Court, including alleged violations of statutory duties and negligence against the county and individual employees. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrers, dismissing all statutory claims without leave to amend and granting leave to amend only the negligence claim. When the plaintiff submitted an amended complaint limited to negligence, the trial court again sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding no statutory duty supported the claim.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff had stated valid causes of action against the county for violation of mandatory statutory duties to maintain personnel records and to enroll eligible employees in CalPERS under Government Code section 815.6. The court also held, in an unpublished portion, that the plaintiff stated a viable negligence claim against the individual defendants, with the county potentially vicariously liable. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of these claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gibbs v. County of Humboldt" on Justia Law

A White male employee of the Colorado Department of Corrections was required to attend a racial sensitivity training program that addressed the historical mistreatment of racial minorities. He found the training offensive, alleging that it created a discriminatory and hostile work environment against White employees. The employee claimed that the training included materials and recommendations—such as a glossary and videos—that generalized about the role of all White people in perpetuating racial injustice. He also alleged that, following the training, there was an ongoing commitment to similar programs, that employees were required to endorse the training’s ideology, that supervisors used the training in disciplinary decisions, that the training compromised workplace security, and that the Department failed to investigate his complaints.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the employee’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The district court found that, even accepting the allegations as true, the facts pleaded did not plausibly show a workplace that was sufficiently hostile under the legal standard required for a hostile work environment claim. The court declined to liberally construe the complaint because it was drafted by counsel.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, assuming for argument’s sake that the complaint should be liberally construed. The appellate court held that the employee did not plausibly allege facts sufficient to show that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult that was severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment. The court also affirmed dismissal of the constructive discharge claim and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice, as the plaintiff failed to address the deficiencies after multiple opportunities to amend. The judgment was affirmed. View "Young v. Colorado Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Edward Beard, a participant in an employer-sponsored ERISA plan administered by Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, died after suffering a fall and subsequent subdural hematoma. Mr. Beard had stage IV pancreatic cancer and was taking a blood thinner due to an increased risk of blood clots. The fall occurred while he was rushing to the bathroom, and although an initial hospital visit revealed no issues, he was found unresponsive the following day and died after a second hospital visit revealed a large subdural hematoma. His wife, Tina Beard, filed a claim for accidental death and dismemberment (AD&D) benefits, asserting that his death resulted from an accidental injury.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the administrative record after Lincoln Life denied the claim. Lincoln Life concluded that Mr. Beard’s death was not solely the result of an accidental injury and invoked a plan exclusion since his blood thinner, used to treat his cancer-related clotting risk, contributed to his death. The district court granted judgment in favor of Lincoln Life, finding its interpretation of the plan reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, including medical reports indicating the blood thinner contributed to the fatal outcome.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the plan administrator’s decision for abuse of discretion, as the plan granted Lincoln Life discretionary authority to interpret its terms. The appellate court found that Lincoln Life’s interpretation of the plan terms and application of the exclusion were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The court held that Mrs. Beard failed to prove the loss resulted solely from an accident, and that Lincoln Life established the plan exclusion applied because the blood thinner contributed to Mr. Beard’s death. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Beard v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Spa workers including massage therapists, estheticians, nail technicians, fitness instructors, and hair stylists were employed at a hotel in South Maui. The hotel required them to work a minimum number of hours and shifts each week, but compensated them solely through commissions based on services provided to clients. When no clients were present, workers were still required to remain on-site and perform other tasks such as cleaning, laundering linens, sweeping floors, taking inventory, and staffing a retail store. Plaintiffs alleged that this unpaid work often comprised most or all of their scheduled shifts, and they received no compensation for those hours.Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaiʻi, alleging, among other claims, that the hotel failed to pay minimum wage as required by Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 387-2 and 387-12. The District Court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi, asking whether minimum wage compliance and damages under Hawaiʻi law should be assessed using a per-hour measure, as specified in the state statutes, or using a per-workweek unit, as under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi answered the certified question, holding that Hawaiʻi’s minimum wage law requires employers to pay at least the statutory minimum wage for each hour worked. The court found the statutory language “per hour” to be unambiguous and rejected the workweek-averaging approach used under the FLSA. Compliance and damages must be measured per hour, not averaged over a workweek. Workweek averaging is not permitted under HRS §§ 387-2 and 387-12. View "Bolos v. Waldorf=Astoria Management LLC." on Justia Law

Albert Hayes worked as an IT systems administrator for GStek, Inc., a contractor providing services for the U.S. Army at Fort Polk. After the COVID-19 pandemic, Hayes was required to return to in-person work. He subsequently received diagnoses of Autism, Major Depressive Disorder, and Social Anxiety Disorder. Hayes requested permission to telework as a reasonable accommodation for his disabilities. The Army, which controlled conditions for contractors at Fort Polk, determined that full-time telework was not in its best interests and denied the request. GStek allowed Hayes to telework two to three days per week, but after a mental health crisis and continued absenteeism, Hayes was terminated.Hayes pursued administrative remedies against the Army under the Rehabilitation Act, but his claims were dismissed because he was not an Army employee and had not timely pursued administrative procedures. He did not appeal that dismissal. Hayes then filed a charge of discrimination against GStek with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and, after receiving a right-to-sue notice, sued GStek in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, bringing claims for failure-to-accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted GStek’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Hayes received a reasonable accommodation, was not a qualified individual under the ADA, and failed to establish prima facie cases for discrimination or retaliation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that in-person attendance was an essential function of Hayes’s job and telework was not a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances. Hayes was not a qualified individual because he could not perform the essential functions of his position, even with accommodations. As a result, his claims for failure-to-accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation under the ADA all failed. View "Hayes v. GStek" on Justia Law