Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

An airline operating among the Hawaiian Islands faced severe financial difficulties over several years, leading to its abrupt shutdown in November 2017. The airline had previously been owned by a trust affiliated with a prominent individual, then partially sold to entities controlled by other businessmen. When the airline closed, employees received only one day's notice and did not receive their final paychecks. Following the closure, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee was appointed. Together with two unions representing affected employees, the trustee initiated adversary proceedings against the airline’s former owners, directors, and lenders, alleging violations of Hawaii’s Dislocated Workers Act (DWA) and the federal WARN Act for failure to provide the required notice and compensation. Additional claims included breach of fiduciary duties and requests for equitable remedies such as veil piercing and equitable subordination.The proceedings began in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii, but the District Court for the District of Hawaii withdrew the reference, consolidated the cases, and conducted a jury trial. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for some claims and allowed others to proceed. The jury returned mixed verdicts, finding some defendants liable for statutory and fiduciary duty violations, but the court denied punitive damages and limited recovery to avoid double compensation. The court also ruled on equitable remedies, including piercing the corporate veil and equitably subordinating certain loans, and ordered contribution from a third-party defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. It held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The panel affirmed the trustee’s and unions’ Article III standing. It reversed in part on fiduciary duty claims, concluding that minority stakeholders and affiliated entities could owe fiduciary duties and be deemed “employers” under the DWA. The court clarified the statutory definition of “employer” and the scope of the DWA’s safe harbor defense, ruling it was unavailable absent a binding divestiture. The panel affirmed evidentiary rulings, vacated the nominal damages award due to erroneous jury instructions, affirmed the prohibition of punitive damages, and upheld the equitable remedies and contribution order. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KANE V. PACAP AVIATION FINANCE, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a dental assistant employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), alleged she faced retaliation after raising workplace safety concerns and filing complaints with Cal-OSHA. Over several years, she experienced actions which included unwarranted criticism, suspension without pay, obstacles to job advancement, and ultimately formal terminations. She filed government claims describing these incidents, and was reinstated after her dismissal was overturned by the State Personnel Board (SPB), but alleged further retaliatory conduct and a constructive discharge upon her return.The Solano County Superior Court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State of California, CDCR, and three individual defendants. The court found the plaintiff failed to satisfy the Government Claims Act’s claims presentation requirement for her retaliation claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 and did not exhaust administrative remedies for her Whistleblower Protection Act cause of action. All claims were dismissed without leave to amend. The plaintiff appealed, contesting only the rulings related to her retaliation and whistleblower claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the operative complaint sufficiently alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act for a constructive discharge theory under section 1102.5(b), allowing that claim to proceed against the State and CDCR. However, it found no facts showing exhaustion of administrative remedies for the Whistleblower Protection Act claim and denied leave to amend. The court also held, as a matter of first impression, that individual supervisors are not personally liable for retaliation under section 1102.5. The judgment was affirmed in favor of the individual defendants and partially reversed for the State and CDCR as to the section 1102.5 claim. View "Chaudhry v. State" on Justia Law

A white male employee of Seattle’s Human Services Department alleged that the City’s Race and Social Justice Initiative (RSJI) classified employees according to race, and that a series of workplace incidents—including racially aligned affinity groups, race-specific trainings, and racially offensive remarks from coworkers and supervisors—created a hostile work environment. He asserted that the RSJI and workplace conduct led to discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and violation of his equal protection rights. After resigning in September 2021, he filed suit alleging claims under Title VII, the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), and the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed as time-barred certain Title VII and WLAD claims based on acts predating statutory limitations periods. It granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims, finding insufficient evidence of actionable discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, or equal protection violations. The court partially granted the City’s evidentiary objections to exhibits offered by the plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the City on the constructive discharge, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims, and also affirmed summary judgment on the Equal Protection Clause claim for lack of Article III standing. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the hostile work environment claims under Title VII and WLAD, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was subjected to a racially hostile work environment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this determination. View "DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

Brooke Mason, a hospital pharmacist employed by Cook County Health at John H. Stroger Jr. Hospital, was terminated after refusing to comply with a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy, citing her Christian beliefs. The County had implemented the vaccine mandate in August 2021 to reduce virus transmission among staff and vulnerable patients. Employees could seek religious exemptions, but only those whose jobs could be performed fully remotely were eligible. Mason requested an exemption but was denied, given her in-person role, and was subsequently fired after being unable to secure a remote position.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted summary judgment in favor of Cook County. The court assumed Mason could establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination under Title VII but concluded that no reasonable jury could find the County could accommodate her without undue hardship. The County provided evidence that allowing unvaccinated staff to work in-person during the pandemic would jeopardize safety and disrupt operations. The court also dismissed Mason’s disparate treatment claim, finding that the comparator employee (Sanitarian I) worked in a different department, location, and under different circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the County met its burden to show that granting Mason’s requested accommodation would have resulted in undue hardship, considering Mason’s in-person role and the heightened risks in a hospital setting. The court also determined that Mason failed to identify a similarly situated employee for her disparate treatment claim. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Mason v Cook County" on Justia Law

A registered nurse employed by a hospital system in Oregon requested a religious exemption from her employer’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. She objected on two grounds: concerns about vaccine safety for pregnant women and a religious objection to the use of fetal cells derived from abortions in vaccine development, citing her Christian beliefs and relevant biblical passages. After submitting her exemption request, the employer placed her on indefinite unpaid leave, leaving her without health insurance or income during her third trimester of pregnancy.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed her complaint, which referenced but did not attach the exemption letter. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint failed to plausibly allege a conflict between the vaccination policy and the nurse’s bona fide religious beliefs. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, finding the allegations sufficient at the pleading stage, but the district court disagreed. It dismissed the complaint as too conclusory, without leave to amend and without considering the exemption letter attached to the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss. Judgment was entered, and the plaintiff appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the exemption letter was central to the plaintiff’s claim and should have been considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Upon review of the letter, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged a prima facie Title VII religious discrimination claim. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "RIDINGS V. PEACEHEALTH" on Justia Law

Donnell Perry worked as a traffic control flagger for Safe Zone. On March 8, 2023, after working at three different sites that day, Perry was struck by a car while crossing Dixie Highway to return to his job after being permitted by his supervisor to go to a convenience store for a phone charger and cigarettes. Perry’s duties required him to keep his cellphone charged for work communications. At the time of the accident, Perry was wearing his required safety gear. He suffered serious injuries, including fractures and internal injuries, and was later found to have alcohol in his system, though below the legal driving limit.Following the incident, Perry sought workers’ compensation benefits. Safe Zone denied his claim, contending Perry was barred from recovery due to voluntary intoxication and a violation of pedestrian safety statutes. The Administrative Law Judge found that Perry’s injuries were compensable, rejected Safe Zone’s arguments regarding intoxication and safety violations, and awarded him various benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings but remanded for clarification on benefit calculations. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s decision, agreeing that the current statute did not bar recovery for alcohol intoxication.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the current version of KRS 342.610(4) does not exclude workers’ compensation benefits for employees injured while under the influence of alcohol, as the statute only refers to illegal or nonprescribed substances and prescribed substances taken in excess—not alcohol. The Court also held that Safe Zone did not provide compelling evidence to require a reduction of Perry’s benefits due to a safety violation under KRS 342.165(1), as the ALJ’s findings on Perry’s conduct and intoxication were supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the benefits award in Perry’s favor. View "SAFE ZONE V. PERRY" on Justia Law

Two individuals applied for employment with a public school district in Los Angeles. One applicant had a prior misdemeanor conviction for battery, and the other for misdemeanor grand theft; both convictions had been expunged under California’s statutory procedure. Despite the expungements, the school district rejected both applicants, asserting that its duty to protect students required it to consider nearly any criminal conviction, regardless of expungement.Each applicant brought a separate lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial courts, after considering motions for summary judgment, ruled in favor of the applicants. The courts found that the district had violated California Labor Code section 432.7 (the “Nondisclosure Statute”) by inquiring into and utilizing the expunged misdemeanor convictions as a basis for denying employment. The district appealed, and the cases were consolidated before the reviewing court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, undertook an independent review of the relevant statutes. The court determined that the basic prohibition of Labor Code section 432.7 barred the district from asking about or using expunged convictions, and that none of the statutory exceptions relied on by the district applied. Specifically, the court found that no law required the district to seek or act upon the types of expunged misdemeanor convictions at issue. The court rejected the district’s arguments that it was entitled to broader exceptions, explaining that the statutory text and legislative history supported a narrow reading of the exceptions. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments in favor of the applicants, holding that the district’s actions violated the Nondisclosure Statute and awarding costs to the respondents. View "A.S. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

A federal employee serving as a Presidential Innovation Fellow at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was assigned to work on an artificial intelligence tool intended to reduce the processing time for veterans’ disability benefits claims. After reviewing the performance of the tool (CAAPI), the employee determined and communicated to agency leadership that, contrary to the agency’s public claims, the tool was producing inaccurate predictions and actually increasing the average processing time for claims. These findings were shared internally in March 2021, discussed in a blog post in April 2021 (approved and published by the VA), and elevated to higher-level management in May 2021. Despite the disclosures, the agency continued to use the tool with minor modifications, and eventually, the employee’s contract was not renewed, and he was terminated from his position.After filing a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel, the employee brought an individual right of action appeal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), alleging that his removal was in retaliation for whistleblowing. The VA moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Board’s administrative judge, and later the full Board, concluded that the employee had not made nonfrivolous allegations that his disclosures were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act, finding he lacked a reasonable belief that his disclosures evidenced gross mismanagement or waste.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the employee had sufficiently raised nonfrivolous allegations that his communications constituted protected disclosures of gross mismanagement under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The court found the employee’s allegations plausible and sufficiently specific to establish jurisdiction for his claim before the Board. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. Costs were awarded to the petitioner. View "OGUNTADE v. MSPB " on Justia Law

A police officer in Somerville, Massachusetts was terminated from his position following alleged misconduct connected to his use of an informant, which ultimately resulted in the informant attacking a third party. The officer did not initially disclose all relevant information during the investigation of the attack. After further internal investigation and public accusations, including statements made by city officials to the press, the officer was officially terminated. He challenged his termination by both pursuing arbitration under the police union’s collective bargaining agreement and by filing a civil suit, alleging his termination was retaliatory and violated his constitutional rights, as well as state law regarding interference with advantageous relations. While the lawsuit was pending, an arbitrator ordered his reinstatement but denied him back pay. Following this, the mayor placed the officer on paid administrative leave, which affected his ability to earn overtime and additional compensation.The case was first filed in Middlesex Superior Court and then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district judge allowed the officer to seek damages at trial not only for the termination but also for being placed on paid leave after reinstatement, even though the officer never amended his complaint to include this post-arbitration event as a basis for liability. The district court permitted the jury to award damages for both the termination and the paid-leave decision, over the defendants’ repeated objections.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the district court erred in allowing the jury to award damages based on the paid-leave decision. The appellate court held that, absent an amended complaint or the defendants’ consent, new factual bases for liability such as the paid-leave decision could not be considered at trial. The First Circuit reversed the damages awarded for the paid-leave decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "DiFronzo v. City of Somerville" on Justia Law

An attorney who began working for a luxury goods company in 2015 alleged that, soon after she was hired, a male colleague subjected her to repeated sexual harassment and, on one occasion, sexual assault. She reported the conduct internally but claimed that company officials failed to respond appropriately and, instead, retaliated against her. Over the years, she experienced alleged ongoing retaliation, including negative performance reviews, exclusion from work opportunities, and other adverse actions. In 2019, she filed a lawsuit in New York State Supreme Court alleging sexual harassment and retaliation under state and city law. The state trial court denied the employer’s request to compel arbitration, but the Appellate Division, First Department reversed and ordered the case to arbitration based on an arbitration agreement the plaintiff had signed before starting her employment.Following her termination in December 2022, the plaintiff filed a new federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against her former employer and a supervisor, asserting claims of retaliation in violation of federal, state, and local law. She also sought leave to amend her complaint to consolidate her federal claims with the earlier claims that were pending in arbitration, arguing that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable. The district court dismissed her federal retaliation claims under Rule 12(b)(6), finding she had not plausibly alleged protected activity linked to her termination, and denied her motion to amend, concluding the additional claims remained subject to the arbitration agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff’s initial complaint plausibly alleged retaliation: refusing to meet with her supervisor to discuss settling her discrimination claims pending in arbitration constituted protected activity, and the circumstances of her termination supported an inference of retaliation. However, the court affirmed the denial of leave to amend, explaining that the additional claims accrued before the EFAA’s effective date and thus remained subject to arbitration. The appellate court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Newton v. LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc." on Justia Law