Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

An employee of a Texas electric utility company testified before a legislative committee about technical problems with the company's new smart meters, attributing fire hazards to the meters and referencing specific service calls. He was also the chief spokesperson for the union representing workers at the company, and he testified the day after unsuccessful collective bargaining negotiations. In his testimony, he identified himself as both an employee and a union representative, but did not mention the ongoing labor dispute or the negotiations. After learning of his remarks, the company terminated his employment, citing a violation of its policy against providing misleading information to public officials.An administrative law judge found that the employee’s testimony was protected under federal labor law, specifically section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which protects concerted activities for mutual aid or collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Board agreed, concluding the company had committed unfair labor practices and ordering reinstatement and back pay. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit previously found the testimony was not “maliciously untrue” but remanded for the Board to determine whether the employee’s speech sufficiently indicated it was connected to an ongoing labor dispute. On remand, the Board again found the discharge unlawful, reasoning that the context and the employee’s identification as a union representative sufficiently communicated the labor dispute connection.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the employee’s statements were not protected because they did not disclose a connection to an ongoing labor dispute, as required by Supreme Court precedent. The court found the Board’s analysis legally erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. It therefore granted the company's petition for review, denied enforcement of the Board’s order, and vacated the finding of an unfair labor practice. View "Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A senior director was employed by a space exploration company from 2020 until his termination in 2022. Upon hiring, he signed an employee agreement containing a broad arbitration provision requiring most disputes with the company and its affiliates to be resolved by arbitration, with some exceptions. After his termination, the employee filed a lawsuit alleging, among other claims, sexual/gender discrimination, sexual/gender harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The company moved to compel arbitration under the agreement, while the employee argued that the arbitration provision was both unconscionable and unenforceable under federal law.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the motion and found that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) applied, concluding that the employee’s allegations sufficiently stated discrimination based on gender. On this basis, the court denied the company’s motion to compel arbitration, without reaching the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The company filed a timely appeal from the denial of its motion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the order de novo. The appellate court concluded that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability was established because the agreement was a contract of adhesion, presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no real opportunity for negotiation. Substantive unconscionability resulted from the agreement’s overbroad coverage, lack of mutuality, waiver of the right to a jury trial, and waiver of representative actions, including those under the Private Attorneys General Act. The court found that severance was not an appropriate remedy because the unconscionable provisions were pervasive and central to the agreement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC" on Justia Law

An employee brought a lawsuit against her former employer and related entities, alleging wrongful termination, unfair business practices, and Labor Code violations stemming from her work as a massage therapist. The plaintiff later sought to amend her complaint to add several new defendants, including the national franchisor associated with her workplace, after obtaining new information through discovery and depositions. The franchisor, Massage Envy, was added after the plaintiff learned it may have influenced employment practices and the sale of the business. However, the initial amended complaint lacked specific factual allegations against Massage Envy.After the plaintiff conceded the factual deficiencies regarding Massage Envy, she sought leave to amend her complaint again. Massage Envy filed a demurrer, arguing not only that the complaint was deficient but also that there was no viable legal basis for liability. The parties disagreed over the adequacy of their meet-and-confer efforts. The Superior Court of San Diego County sustained the demurrer but granted leave to amend, conditioning this leave on the plaintiff’s payment of $25,000 in attorney fees to Massage Envy, relying on section 473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter. It held that section 473 does not authorize a trial court to condition leave to amend a pleading on payment of attorney fees to the opposing party, absent a statutory provision or party agreement. The appellate court clarified that section 473 only allows for the shifting of costs, not attorney fees, and that attorney fee awards as sanctions require specific statutory authority and procedural compliance. The appellate court granted a writ of mandate directing the trial court to strike the payment condition for attorney fees and awarded costs to the petitioner. View "Amezcua v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Sarah Kingsbury, a pharmacy technician, suffered a workplace injury at Walmart in August 2021 and subsequently sought workers’ compensation benefits for injuries to her right lower extremity and right shoulder. She later amended her claim to include the Second Injury Fund of Iowa, citing a prior left lower extremity injury from 2009. Kingsbury and Walmart entered into a compromise settlement in which Walmart did not admit the extent of permanent disability, though it accepted responsibility for the injury itself. The settlement was for a lump sum and explicitly released Walmart from all further liability related to the injury, without specifying a degree of permanent disability.The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner granted summary judgment to the Fund, finding that Kingsbury’s settlement with Walmart precluded her from proving a compensable permanent disability necessary to trigger Fund liability. The commissioner affirmed this decision. Kingsbury sought judicial review, and the Iowa District Court for Polk County reversed the commissioner’s decision, concluding the settlement with Walmart did not bar her claim against the Fund.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and held that, under Iowa Code section 85.35(10), a compromise settlement with an employer that does not establish liability for permanent disability bars a subsequent claim against the Second Injury Fund for the same subject matter. The court reasoned that Fund liability is contingent upon first establishing the employer’s liability for permanent disability, which was not done here due to the nature of the compromise settlement. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case with instructions to affirm the commissioner’s dismissal of Kingsbury’s claim against the Fund. View "Kingsbury v. Second Injury Fund of Iowa" on Justia Law

A long-serving and well-regarded police sergeant with the Des Moines Police Department experienced significant mental health difficulties after his close friend and fellow officer died by suicide. Several months later, following a night of heavy drinking at a family event, the sergeant drove while intoxicated and was arrested after engaging in belligerent and threatening conduct toward other officers. He subsequently sought psychological help and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) linked to his friend’s death. The police chief terminated his employment the day after he disclosed his PTSD diagnosis, despite his remorse and efforts to seek treatment.The sergeant brought suit in the Iowa District Court for Polk County under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, alleging that his termination constituted disability discrimination and that the city failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his PTSD. At trial, the jury found in his favor on both claims and awarded substantial damages. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff. The City appealed, arguing that the jury’s verdict was tainted by an erroneous jury instruction and that no reasonable accommodation was timely requested.On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals found that the evidence supported submitting the disability discrimination claim to the jury but determined that the jury instructions given—particularly one about stereotypes and unconscious bias—misstated the law and warranted a new trial on that claim. The appellate court also ruled that the failure-to-accommodate claim failed as a matter of law because the request for accommodation came only after misconduct occurred. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for a new trial on the disability-discrimination claim, holding that the instructional error required a new trial and that the failure-to-accommodate claim could not proceed. View "Hunter v. City of Des Moines, Iowa" on Justia Law

An individual applied for a position as a citizenship and immigration assistant with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which required a security clearance. After being tentatively selected, the applicant’s background investigation revealed concerns that led to a prolonged delay. When the security issues remained unresolved for over a year, the agency rescinded the job offer. The applicant alleged that the delay and ultimate rescission were not due to genuine security concerns but were instead a pretext for retaliation based on prior complaints and litigation against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for disability discrimination.Previously, the applicant had been terminated from a different DHS position following a work-related injury and a subsequent Inspector General investigation, which substantiated some misconduct but not the most serious allegations. After several unsuccessful attempts to regain federal employment, and following additional administrative complaints, the applicant filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, asserting retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The Secretary of Homeland Security moved to dismiss, relying on Department of the Navy v. Egan, which bars judicial review of security-clearance decisions. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and clarified that Egan’s rule is not jurisdictional but is instead a merits-based limitation, mandating judicial deference to executive security-clearance decisions. The appellate court held that the applicant’s retaliation claim required impermissible judicial scrutiny of the agency’s security-clearance reasoning and thus fell squarely within Egan’s bar. The court modified the district court’s dismissal to reflect a merits-based dismissal (for failure to state a claim) rather than a jurisdictional one and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Shiba v Mullin" on Justia Law

Three former employees of the Kentucky State Police alleged that their employer retaliated against them after they reported concerns regarding evidence irregularities and thefts at their post. Specifically, they claimed that they raised issues related to a fellow officer’s misuse of evidence and the improper handling of destruction forms, and further alleged that management covered up the misconduct instead of investigating it. The plaintiffs asserted that, as a result of these disclosures, they faced adverse actions such as threats of transfer, an internal affairs investigation initiated against one of them, and a constructive discharge.The Franklin Circuit Court conducted a jury trial, and the jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them a total of $900,000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied the employer’s motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court had issued erroneous jury instructions regarding the elements of a claim under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act. The plaintiffs sought discretionary review of this decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed whether the employer had preserved its challenge to the jury instructions and whether the instructions were erroneous. The court concluded that the employer properly preserved its objection by tendering alternative instructions and that the final instructions failed to require the jury to find that the employer took a “materially adverse” employment action—a necessary element under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that, in whistleblower retaliation cases, the jury must be instructed to determine whether the employer took or threatened to take a materially adverse employment action, and remanded the case for new trial consistent with this standard. View "SGT. KEVIN BURTON V. KENTUCKY STATE POLICE" on Justia Law

An employee who had been working remotely due to a pandemic-related order was instructed by her employer to return to the office and begin a new hybrid work schedule. On the day she was to return, she packed her work equipment, which she had been using at home, and attempted to load it into her car earlier than her usual departure time so she could set up her workstation before her normal shift began. During this process, she fell and injured her back. She reported the injury, received medical care, and subsequently sought workers’ compensation benefits for her injury.A workers’ compensation judge initially heard her claim and determined that her injury was not compensable. The judge reasoned that the injury occurred during her commute and did not fall under the special-errand exception, relying on precedent from the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) in a prior case. The judge found that transporting the equipment was a routine part of her return-to-work commute and thus not a special errand.The employee appealed to the WCCA, which reversed the compensation judge’s decision. The WCCA found that, unlike the prior case, her employer had implicitly required her to return the work equipment before her shift began, and there was no evidence of backup equipment at the office. This, the WCCA determined, qualified her trip as a special errand.The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case and affirmed the WCCA’s decision. The court held that the WCCA did not err in making a factual finding that the employer’s directive included an implied request to return equipment before her shift, nor was this finding manifestly contrary to the evidence. The court also held that, as a matter of law, the employee’s injury was compensable under the special-errand exception to the general rule barring compensation for injuries sustained during a commute. View "Ludwig vs. Dakota County, Self-Insured by SFM Risk Solutions" on Justia Law

Two former pilots for a major airline, who also served as reservists in the United States Air Force, brought suit against their employer. They claimed that the airline forced them out of their jobs because of their military service obligations, and that the company’s handling of their pension contributions and vacation accrual during military leave violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The pilots had been investigated by the airline for abusing military and sick leave policies, including instances where they claimed sick leave from the airline but performed military duties on those days, and for reporting false military obligations to avoid work.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment to the airline on all claims. The court found that, while the pilots established a prima facie case that their military service was a motivating factor in their resignations, the airline demonstrated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions: the pilots’ abuse of sick-leave benefits. Regarding the pension-contribution claim, the district court determined that the pilots’ rates of compensation were not reasonably certain and that the airline’s method of calculating pension contributions during military leave exceeded statutory requirements. For the vacation-time claim, the court held there was no evidence showing that pilots on comparable non-military leave accrued vacation time, as required by USERRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all counts. The appellate court held that the airline’s actions were justified by the pilots’ misuse of sick leave, the pension calculations met or exceeded legal obligations, and the vacation accrual policy did not violate USERRA because no comparable leave existed. View "McLean v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Keisha Lewis worked for the Indiana Department of Transportation, handling federal relocation claim vouchers for those displaced by highway projects. After receiving a remote-work accommodation due to a kidney condition, Lewis began experiencing conflicts with her supervisors over her work responsibilities, performance, and compliance with job duties. Issues escalated when she refused to process certain vouchers and failed to comply with supervisor instructions, resulting in a backlog of over 400 parcels. Despite being warned that failure to perform her job duties would be considered insubordination, Lewis continued to dispute her work obligations and was eventually terminated for poor performance and insubordination.After her dismissal, Lewis filed suit against the Department and two supervisors, asserting claims of disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, as well as race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Some claims were voluntarily dismissed, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment for the defendants on the remaining claims, concluding that no reasonable jury could find in Lewis’s favor.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The appellate court held that the Rehabilitation Act requires plaintiffs to show that disability was the sole cause of an adverse employment action, a standard Lewis did not meet. The court further found no evidence of pretext or retaliatory intent in her termination, and that her race discrimination and retaliation claims failed due to lack of supporting evidence and waiver of arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants. View "Lewis v Indiana Department of Transportation" on Justia Law