Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Dr. Mark Lee, age 59 at hiring, was appointed Chair of the Department of Neurosurgery at West Virginia University’s School of Medicine and also employed as a pediatric neurosurgeon by University Health Associates. By spring 2020, senior administrators raised concerns about Lee’s performance, including absenteeism and lack of engagement. In March 2021, Lee was offered a new position requiring him to step down as Chair, which he ultimately declined. Discussions about his removal continued, during which Lee was allegedly told the university sought a younger Chair. After Lee’s attorney raised age discrimination concerns in July and August 2021, Lee was informed he would be removed as Chair effective September 1, 2021, rather than the previously discussed later date. Lee subsequently resigned in January 2022 and pursued claims for age discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed claims against WVU defendants on sovereign immunity grounds and granted summary judgment to University Health Associates on all remaining claims. The district court found Lee’s age discrimination claim lacked direct and circumstantial evidence, noting Lee’s replacement and the decisionmaker were of similar age. Lee’s retaliation claims failed because the removal process began before his complaints, and the decision to accelerate his removal was attributed to his conduct at a July meeting rather than his protected activity. The breach-of-contract claims were rejected based on the employment agreement’s terms and integration clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for University Health Associates on Lee’s age discrimination, retaliation (removal and constructive discharge), and breach-of-contract claims. However, it vacated the judgment on Lee’s claim that the acceleration of his removal constituted unlawful retaliation, finding genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Lee v. West Virginia University Medical Corp." on Justia Law

A union representing over 100,000 current and former home healthcare workers in New York City entered into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with more than 40 employers. In 2015, the union and employers amended their CBAs with a Memorandum of Agreement (2015 MOA), mandating arbitration of statutory wage-and-hour claims, including those under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. The union subsequently initiated a class arbitration in 2019 for wage claims dating back to 2008. The arbitrator found for the union, ordering employers to create a $30 million fund for affected workers and established a rapid payout process. The union sought, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed, the arbitration awards, making them binding on virtually all covered workers, except for nine individuals named in ongoing state litigation.Prior to the arbitration, several former employees who had left their jobs before the 2015 MOA was executed sued their employers in New York State courts, asserting similar wage claims. State courts uniformly held that these individuals, no longer union members or bargaining unit employees at the time of the 2015 MOA, could not be retroactively bound to arbitrate their claims. Despite this, the district court denied intervention by these former employees in the confirmation proceedings, concluding they lacked standing and were adequately represented by the union.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether the union and employers clearly agreed to arbitrate these statutory claims. The Circuit Court found that the union and employers did not agree to mandatory arbitration for former employees’ accrued statutory claims until the 2015 MOA, and the union could not lawfully waive the rights of individuals who had already left employment. The Court vacated the district court’s orders as to the appellants and remanded for further proceedings, ruling these individuals are not bound by the arbitration awards and may pursue their claims in state court. View "1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST v. CHINESE-AMERICAN PLANNING COUNCIL HOME ATTENDANT PROGRAM" on Justia Law

A group of employees in the commercial aviation sector challenged their employers’ COVID-19 policies, which required vaccination unless a religious or medical exemption was obtained. Those with exemptions had to comply with periodic testing and mask-wearing. The plaintiffs objected to the requirements on religious and personal grounds, alleging that the accommodations for religious objectors were inadequate and burdensome. While the complaint did not claim anyone was terminated, it did allege some employees were assigned to less desirable flights due to these policies.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed all claims against Flight Services International and certain claims against Atlas Air for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court also dismissed the remaining claims against Atlas Air for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that there was no personal jurisdiction over Flight Services International because it was neither incorporated nor headquartered in Florida, and the alleged contacts with Florida were insufficient for either general or specific jurisdiction. Regarding Atlas Air, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim under Title VII, as there were no facts suggesting religious discrimination or hostile intent. The court held that the plaintiffs could not bring claims under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as enforcement is limited to the federal government. Constitutional claims under § 1983 and Bivens failed because Atlas Air is a private entity. Additionally, the state law tort claims for invasion of privacy, negligent disclosure, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were found insufficiently pleaded or unsupported by the alleged facts. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Estate of Caviness v. Atlas Air, Inc." on Justia Law

Sarah Budd, employed by SkyWest Airlines at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, was subjected to severe and persistent sexual harassment by coworkers and a supervisor, including degrading comments, sexual jokes, and references to prostitution and rape. Despite reporting these incidents to her supervisor, the harassment continued and escalated, resulting in significant emotional distress and physical symptoms for Budd. Following an internal investigation by SkyWest that resulted in minimal disciplinary action, Budd elected to take early retirement during the COVID-19 pandemic, fearing the work environment would not improve.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit on Budd’s behalf in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging violations of Title VII. After trial, a jury found that Budd had been harassed based on her sex and that SkyWest had failed to take prompt remedial action, but did not find retaliation. The jury awarded Budd both compensatory and punitive damages. SkyWest moved for a new trial based on evidentiary objections, challenged the jury instructions regarding mitigation of emotional damages, and sought judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages. The district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the text messages admitted at trial were properly admitted as present sense impressions or statements of then-existing mental and physical condition under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court further held that Title VII plaintiffs are not required to mitigate damages for emotional distress, as neither statutory text nor well-established common law supports such a requirement. Finally, the court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s punitive damages award, as at least one manager acted with malice or reckless indifference and SkyWest failed to demonstrate a good-faith effort to address the harassment. View "EEOC v. SkyWest Airlines" on Justia Law

A general manager at a car rental business located within a hotel near Orlando International Airport was shot multiple times by an unknown assailant while moving from an indoor kiosk to an outside office late at night. The attack, which did not include robbery, was recorded on surveillance video. The manager had been working an unusual shift to train new employees after firing others, and often carried cash and rental agreements between locations. The motive and identity of the assailant remain unknown. The manager survived and sought workers’ compensation benefits, arguing the attack was related to risks inherent in his employment, such as carrying cash late at night and the potential for retaliation from recently terminated employees.A Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found the injuries compensable, relying in part on precedent from the Supreme Court of Florida and determining that the employment and work environment substantially increased the risk of attack. The JCC found that the risk was more likely related to work duties or job-related issues, rather than a purely personal dispute. Normandy Insurance Company appealed, arguing that the injuries did not arise out of employment as required under Florida’s workers’ compensation statute.The First District Court of Appeal vacated the JCC’s order, holding that the injuries did not arise out of the “work performed,” narrowly interpreting the statutory language to require that the specific work activity at the time of injury must itself cause the injury. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case, rejected the First District’s narrow interpretation, and clarified that an employee may receive compensation for injuries from a third-party assault if the claimant can establish that the employment or work environment exposed them to an increased risk of such injury. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings using the correct legal standard. View "Bouayad v. Normandy Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A group of caregivers lived and worked at adult family homes operated by AssureCare in Washington State. Their duties included assisting residents with daily activities, preparing meals, cleaning, and administrative tasks. The caregivers worked long hours, often exceeding 24-hour shifts, and their sleep, meal, and rest breaks were regularly interrupted by residents’ needs. In exchange for their work, they received a flat daily wage and room and board, with no additional compensation for overtime or breaks. AssureCare did not keep records regarding hours worked, breaks, or leave.The caregivers filed a lawsuit against AssureCare in 2023, alleging violations of the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA) and arguing that the statutory exemption for “live-in” workers under former RCW 49.46.010(3)(j) was unconstitutional. The Superior Court for King County initially denied the caregivers’ motion for partial summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence that their occupation was dangerous. After submitting additional expert evidence, the caregivers renewed their motion. The superior court then granted partial summary judgment, holding that the live-in exemption violated article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution, as it denied a fundamental right to health and safety protections under article II, section 35. The court found no reasonable grounds for the exemption and certified the ruling for immediate review.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case, considering only whether the live-in exemption violated the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution. The court held that live-in caregiving at adult family homes is a dangerous occupation requiring statutory protections. The exemption granted a privilege to employers at the caregivers’ expense without reasonable grounds. The court affirmed the superior court’s grant of partial summary judgment, holding that former RCW 49.46.010(3)(j) is unconstitutional as applied to live-in caregivers at adult family homes. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bolina v. AssureCare Adult Home LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff accepted a job at the defendant company in May 2017, signing an employment agreement that included an arbitration clause covering all employment-related disputes. Over several years, the plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a sexually charged work environment and specific instances of sexual harassment. She repeatedly complained internally to supervisors and management from 2017 through 2021, but claims her concerns were ignored and that no corrective action was taken. The plaintiff further alleges she experienced retaliation, humiliation, and targeted harassment following her complaints, culminating in her termination by the defendant in December 2021, allegedly in retaliation for reporting the workplace environment.After her termination, the plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing in August 2023 and received a right-to-sue letter. In July 2024, she initiated a lawsuit in California state court raising claims of discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California based on diversity jurisdiction and moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the employment agreement. The district court granted the motion, finding that the dispute between the parties arose and the plaintiff’s claims accrued before the effective date of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which was March 3, 2022.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo. The court held that the EFAA applies only to disputes or claims that arise or accrue on or after March 3, 2022. Because the plaintiff’s dispute with the defendant arose and her claims accrued before that date, the statutory exception to arbitration in the EFAA did not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "COMBS V. NETFLIX, INC." on Justia Law

A special education administrator was employed by a Wisconsin state agency that facilitated educational services across multiple school districts. After a couple years, her supervisors, following directives from the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, pushed staff to adopt an “equity mindset,” which involved examining personal biases and working to disrupt systems influenced by white supremacy. The administrator disagreed with the perceived ideological requirements and refused to fully embrace the equity mindset, leading to concerns from the Department of Public Instruction, pressure on the agency, and her eventual demotion to a lower-paying job.The administrator filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, alleging violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, claiming discrimination and retaliation based on her race. She also asserted a First Amendment claim, alleging retaliation based on her speech and beliefs. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Title VII and Equal Protection claims, finding no evidence that race was a motivating factor in her demotion, as the ideological requirements were applied to employees of all races. The court rejected her First Amendment claims regarding her speech and insufficiently pleaded her beliefs-based claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the Title VII and Equal Protection claims, holding that no reasonable jury could find her race was the cause of her demotion and that she did not engage in an objectively reasonable protected activity for retaliation purposes. However, the Seventh Circuit determined she adequately pleaded a First Amendment claim based on retaliation for her beliefs and remanded that claim for further proceedings. View "Spengler v Cooperative Educational Service Agency 7" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought suit against multiple former employers and individual defendants, alleging eleven causes of action under California state law, including sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The plaintiff asserted that he was subjected to severe and pervasive harassment based on his sexual orientation by a coworker, who repeatedly made derogatory remarks about his homosexuality and engaged in threatening and unwanted physical conduct. The plaintiff further alleged that he reported this behavior to supervisors and human resources, but no corrective action was taken, and that the harassment adversely affected his emotional well-being.The defendants moved to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration agreement signed at the start of the plaintiff’s employment and arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) required arbitration of all employment-related claims. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a sexual harassment claim under FEHA, which triggered the exemption provided by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA). The defendants timely appealed from the denial of the motion to compel arbitration.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. The court held that harassment based on sexual orientation qualifies as sexual harassment under FEHA. It further found that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded facts showing severe or pervasive harassment, thus invoking the EFAA’s exemption from compelled arbitration under the FAA. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, awarding costs on appeal to the plaintiff. View "Decloedt v. Radnet Management" on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked for over twenty years in various administrative roles for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Puerto Rico, eventually becoming Secretary to the Assistant Special Agent in Charge. In 2016, after suffering a foot injury, she requested workplace accommodations, some of which were denied. She filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging discrimination based on disability and national origin. Subsequently, other DEA agents filed an EEO complaint against her, and she filed a retaliation complaint with the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General. A series of workplace conflicts followed, including a verbal altercation, revocation of outside work permission, and eventual suspension. After further absence and issues with communication with supervisors, she was reassigned to another office. An internal investigation led to her termination for insubordination and alleged lack of candor.She appealed her termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), arguing it was retaliatory and unsupported by evidence. The MSPB found no lack of candor, but upheld the insubordination charge and her termination. She then sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which denied her discovery motions and granted summary judgment to the government, finding no prima facie case of retaliation and holding that the MSPB’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the denial of the plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion for additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion, as she did not show good cause for her delay. On the merits, the court concluded that the MSPB’s finding of insubordination was supported by substantial evidence and that the plaintiff failed to show the employer’s stated reasons for termination were pretext for retaliation under Title VII. View "Hernandez v. Blanche" on Justia Law