Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A law firm filed a class action complaint in San Francisco Superior Court on behalf of an employee and similarly situated individuals, alleging wage and hour violations against several beverage distribution companies. This followed the same firm’s earlier, nearly identical class action complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court, with overlapping claims and parties. The San Francisco action was amended to add claims under the Private Attorneys General Act. After the defense raised concerns about duplicative litigation, the defendants moved to stay the San Francisco case, arguing that the later-filed action was duplicative and should be stayed under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.The San Francisco Superior Court found substantial overlap between the two cases and granted the stay. In its tentative ruling, the court identified significant misconduct by the plaintiff’s attorneys, including fabricated legal citations and misrepresentations in their opposition to the motion to stay. The court issued an order to show cause regarding sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 and the attorneys’ ethical duties. The firm’s attorneys and a contract attorney responded, denying intentional misconduct and attributing errors to reliance on the contract attorney’s work and alleged citation-checking issues with legal research software. However, the court found their explanations lacking credibility, emphasized their responsibility as counsel of record, and imposed monetary sanctions jointly and severally against the firm and three attorneys, payable to both the defendants and the court.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the attorneys’ appeal of the sanctions order. The court held that the attorneys had forfeited their procedural challenges by not raising them in the trial court and found no abuse of discretion in imposing sanctions for filing a pleading with fabricated authority and failing to meet ethical and professional obligations. The appellate court affirmed the sanctions order. View "Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing" on Justia Law

An employee of King County’s Department of Natural Resources and Parks, who is Latino and uses hearing aids, raised concerns about bias in a hiring policy and subsequently experienced several adverse events at work. After expressing his concerns about discrimination, he was reprimanded, received letters of expectation, was placed on administrative leave, given a poor performance review, suspended without pay, and reassigned to a position with less responsibility. The employee claimed these actions were retaliatory and discriminatory under the Washington Law Against Discrimination.The employee filed suit in the Superior Court for discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and disability, as well as retaliation. At trial, the jury was instructed using a single instruction that combined pattern jury instructions for “adverse employment action” from both discrimination and retaliation claims. The jury found that the county did not discriminate, but did retaliate against the employee. King County appealed, arguing that the combined instruction was misleading. The Washington Court of Appeals agreed, finding the instruction erroneous and remanding for a new trial on the retaliation claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether the jury instruction combining two definitions of “adverse employment action” was misleading and, if so, whether it constituted reversible error. The court held that while the instruction was ambiguous and potentially misleading, King County failed to establish that it suffered prejudice as a result. The ambiguity did not lower the employee’s burden of proof or prevent the county from arguing its theory of the case. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining appellate issues. The main holding is that a misleading jury instruction warrants reversal only if the challenging party demonstrates prejudice, which was not shown here. View "Verduzco v. King County" on Justia Law

Two hourly warehouse employees for a large national retailer, on behalf of a putative class, sought compensation for overtime hours spent undergoing mandatory pre-shift COVID-19 health screenings at their workplace during the pandemic. These screenings, lasting roughly 10 to 15 minutes per shift, were required before employees could clock in and begin paid work. The employees asserted that, over time, these unpaid screenings amounted to significant uncompensated overtime in violation of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed their claim, agreeing with the employer’s argument that the IMWL incorporated the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which excludes preliminary activities, such as pre-shift screenings, from compensable work. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified to the Illinois Supreme Court the question of whether the IMWL in fact incorporates these federal exclusions. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the IMWL does not incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act’s preliminary activities exclusion and that the relevant state regulations define compensable “hours worked” more broadly, including all time an employee is required to be on the employer’s premises.Upon receiving this answer, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the IMWL does not adopt either the preliminary activities exclusion of the Portal-to-Portal Act or the “benefit of the employer” test derived from federal law, except in two specific contexts outlined in state regulations (meal periods and travel). The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these interpretations. View "Johnson v Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

A Muslim woman of Pakistani origin worked as an economist at the Department of Energy from 2017 to 2021. She initially had a positive relationship with her supervisor, but after testifying in support of a colleague’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging race discrimination, her working conditions deteriorated. She experienced hostile treatment, was denied training and promotion opportunities, and was subjected to critical performance reviews. After requesting religious accommodations and reporting further discriminatory remarks from her supervisors, she was placed on multiple performance improvement plans and ultimately terminated.After her dismissal, she filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging discrimination based on race, gender, sex, religion, and national origin, as well as unlawful retaliation, all under Title VII. The Department moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding no facts sufficient to infer discrimination or retaliation; it emphasized that the key discriminatory remark was made by a supervisor not involved in her termination and concluded there was no causal link between her protected activities and the adverse employment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of the retaliation claim, agreeing with the district court’s reasoning on causation. However, it vacated the dismissal of the discrimination claims, finding that the district court failed to consider a material allegation in the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss: a supervisor’s alleged refusal to accommodate her religious observance and his discriminatory comment about her faith. The appellate court remanded the discrimination claims for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider this allegation in evaluating whether the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. View "Farah Naz v. Wright" on Justia Law

A former seasonal employee of a package delivery company filed suit against her employer, alleging violations of California labor laws, including wage-related claims and a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim. She had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, which included a class action waiver and a delegation clause assigning threshold arbitrability issues to an arbitrator. The agreement specified that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would govern unless it did not apply, in which case state law would control. After her work schedule was repeatedly changed or canceled with little notice, she was not given further work despite her inquiries and subsequently initiated legal action on behalf of herself and proposed classes.After the case was removed from state court, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the employer’s motion to compel arbitration of the individual claims and stayed class claims. The district court declined to decide whether the FAA or the California Arbitration Act (CAA) governed the agreement, reasoning that the result would be the same under either statute. The court also denied the employee’s motion for clarification, maintaining that the question of which law applied and whether the FAA’s “contracts of employment” exclusion was relevant could be resolved by the arbitrator rather than the court.On mandamus review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court committed clear legal error by failing to determine whether the FAA or state law governed the arbitration agreement before compelling arbitration. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that, under New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, the court—not an arbitrator—must decide whether the FAA applies, including any statutory exclusions. The Ninth Circuit granted the writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its prior order and to determine the statutory basis for its authority to compel arbitration before referring the parties to arbitration. View "ORR V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE" on Justia Law

A group of correctional officers was terminated by the Illinois Department of Corrections after an incident involving a wheelchair-dependent inmate who refused to comply with orders to place his hands through a cuffing port for removal of handcuffs. Instead of following certain established protocols, the lead officer decided not to activate the tactical team or notify a supervisor, but instead assembled additional officers to enter the inmate’s cell. The officers attempted to remove the handcuffs, leading to a physical altercation in which the inmate resisted, was dragged out of his cell, sprayed with pepper spray, and then left tethered in a shower area for two hours. Incident reports filed by the officers failed to accurately describe the use of force, omitting details such as dragging the inmate.Following an internal investigation, administrative hearings, and review by the Illinois Civil Service Commission, the officers were discharged for violating rules that require force to be used only as a last resort and for submitting false reports. The Commission found that the officers had other options available, had sufficient time to consider alternatives, and that the use of force was not justified as a first response. The Commission also concluded that the failure to report the incident accurately was egregious.The officers filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, contending that the Department’s use-of-force rules were unconstitutionally vague and thus their termination violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding the rules were sufficiently clear.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the “force as a last resort” rule was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the officers, providing fair warning of prohibited conduct, and that the truthful reporting requirements were also sufficiently clear. The grant of summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Hundley v. Brookhart" on Justia Law

An employee at a hotel was terminated after he displayed a knife in the workplace, prompting another employee to feel threatened. The worker’s union filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement, which specified that arbitration disputes would be resolved by an arbitrator chosen at random from a list of nine individuals. The union used a random selection website to designate an arbitrator, but the hotel objected, arguing the selected arbitrator was already handling another dispute between the parties and that the usual practice was to mutually agree on an arbitrator or strike names from the list.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, first ordered the hotel to proceed with arbitration using the contractually specified method. The arbitrator chosen by the union determined that the employee’s conduct warranted a suspension without pay but did not justify termination, ordering the employee’s reinstatement with back pay minus ten days’ wages. When the hotel refused to comply, the district court, upon the union’s motion, ordered the hotel to abide by the arbitrator’s ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the collective bargaining agreement’s method of selecting an arbitrator must be followed unless there was a demonstrable lapse in the process, which was not present here. The court also held that the arbitrator’s factual findings regarding the absence of workplace violence were binding and that Illinois public policy did not prohibit the remedy imposed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment confirming the arbitrator’s award, finding no error in either the selection of the arbitrator or the substance of his decision. View "Unite Here Local 1 v Magnificent Mile Hotel Management, LLC" on Justia Law

California officials challenged a determination by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) that California’s meal and rest break (MRB) rules, as applied to drivers of passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles, were preempted by federal law. The MRB rules require employers to provide drivers with specified meal and rest periods during the workday. The FMCSA concluded that these state rules regulated commercial motor vehicle safety, were more stringent than federal hours-of-service (HOS) regulations, and imposed requirements not found in federal law.Previously, in 2019, the American Bus Association petitioned the FMCSA to preempt California’s MRB rules for passenger-carrying drivers. After public notice and comment, the FMCSA issued a final order in 2020 preempting these rules, finding they added no measurable safety benefit beyond federal HOS rules, were incompatible with federal regulations, and placed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. California officials petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the FMCSA’s preemption decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the FMCSA’s action under the highly deferential standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. It held that its earlier decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 2785 v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 986 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2021), foreclosed California’s main arguments and confirmed that the FMCSA had authority to preempt the MRB rules. The court also held that the FMCSA’s determination that the MRB rules imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce was supported by the administrative record and not arbitrary or capricious. The petition for review was denied, and the FMCSA’s preemption determination was upheld. View "PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. FMCSA" on Justia Law

Russell Jones was injured in a work-related auto accident, sustaining an acute lumbar disc herniation with underlying degenerative spinal changes. Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) accepted his claim for the herniation but denied coverage for the preexisting degenerative condition. Jones initially challenged only the denial of a left lower leg injury, a dispute resolved by an administrative law judge (ALJ) who upheld the denial. WSI continued paying benefits for the herniation until a subsequent medical review indicated that the acute injury had resolved, prompting WSI to terminate all lumbar benefits. Jones then argued that his work injury had accelerated his preexisting condition and sought continued benefits on that basis.After a hearing, an ALJ found in Jones’s favor, concluding that his work injury had substantially accelerated his preexisting condition. WSI appealed to the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, contending that Jones’s acceleration claim was barred by administrative res judicata because it could have been raised in the earlier proceeding concerning his left lower leg. The district court agreed with WSI, holding that res judicata precluded Jones from raising the acceleration claim and reversing the ALJ’s decision on that basis, without addressing the merits of the case.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that administrative res judicata did not bar Jones’s acceleration claim. The Court reasoned that the acceleration issue did not become a justiciable controversy until WSI terminated benefits for the acute herniation, and Jones was not required to anticipate or litigate that issue before then. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of Jones’s claim. View "WSI v. Jones" on Justia Law

Several municipal court and deputy city marshals, represented by a police association, alleged that the City miscalculated their longevity pay, resulting in underpayment. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the police association and the City required a four-step grievance process culminating in arbitration for disputes about the CBA’s application or interpretation. The marshals submitted grievances claiming underpayment since 2013. The City argued that these grievances were untimely, as they were filed years after the alleged underpayment was or should have been discovered, and insisted on a bifurcated arbitration process to resolve timeliness before addressing the merits of the longevity pay issue. Additional grievances were filed and rejected by the City as untimely.The police association filed two complaints in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, seeking declaratory relief: one to have the City pay alleged backpay and another to require the City to comply with the CBA’s arbitration provision and submit timeliness disputes to arbitration. The parties consolidated these actions, and the City moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, accepting the City's interpretation that it could unilaterally reject grievances as untimely and dictate the arbitration format, and it ruled on the merits of the longevity pay dispute.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. It held that, unless a contract specifies otherwise, procedural questions such as timeliness and the format of arbitration are reserved for the arbitrator, not a party or the court. The City was not entitled to unilaterally decide the timeliness of grievances or require a bifurcated arbitration process. Further, since the longevity pay dispute was arbitrable, the district court should not have ruled on its merits. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case. View "LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASSOC. VS. CITY OF LAS VEGAS" on Justia Law