Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Two individuals, who were part-time police officers, submitted claims against a police protection district and associated personnel, alleging retaliation and harassment following their whistleblowing activities related to fiscal mismanagement and conflicts of interest involving a former police commissioner and chief of police. Their claim forms described various acts of misconduct but, instead of specifying when these actions occurred, stated that the “loss is ongoing” and provided no date or date range for the alleged conduct.The Superior Court of San Mateo County reviewed the claims and found them deficient for failing to comply with California Government Code section 910, which requires that a claim state the “date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.” Despite being notified of the deficiency and given an opportunity to provide date information, the petitioners did not amend their claims. The trial court sustained demurrers filed by the district and other defendants, concluding the forms neither complied nor substantially complied with the statutory requirements, and denied leave to amend for several causes of action.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the trial court’s orders after the petitioners sought writ relief. The appellate court held that claim forms stating only “Numerous—Loss is ongoing” without any specific dates or date ranges do not satisfy section 910’s requirements, nor do they substantially comply. The court emphasized that even in cases of continuing or ongoing misconduct, claimants must provide at least some date or date range to allow the public entity to investigate the claim. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the appellate court affirmed that the trial court correctly sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. View "Khedr v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A professor at Dartmouth College’s Thayer School of Engineering, who is Muslim and of Arab-Egyptian descent, applied for tenure after six years of employment, consistent with his offer letter. He alleged that he was discouraged from advising a Muslim student group, removed from a research project, and denied access to campus data, which he believed impeded his work. His tenure application was reviewed by faculty who cited concerns about inflated accomplishments, high self-citation rates, less competitive grant funding, and poor teaching evaluations. The faculty voted overwhelmingly to deny tenure. An internal review committee found procedural errors in how the consequences of tenure denial were explained, allowing him to reapply, but found no discrimination. Separately, a student accused the professor of research misconduct for not crediting him as an author on a collaborative paper. An investigation committee ultimately found no research misconduct but concluded the professor’s conduct was unethical and recommended he not be allowed to collaborate with Dartmouth in the future.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire granted summary judgment to Dartmouth on all claims of discrimination and retaliation, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The professor appealed, challenging both the discrimination and retaliation rulings, as well as a discovery order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of pretext or discriminatory animus under both Title VII and New Hampshire’s employment discrimination statute. The court determined that differences in qualifications and procedural issues did not support an inference of discrimination or retaliation. The summary judgment was affirmed, and the challenge to the discovery order was deemed moot due to the affirmed judgment. View "Farid v. Trustees of Dartmouth College" on Justia Law

John Buccieri, who is deaf and communicates primarily through American Sign Language, applied for a Chair Car Driver position with Brewster Ambulance Service, Inc., a medical transportation provider in Massachusetts. The job required frequent communications with dispatch, patients, and facility staff, as well as monitoring patients for emergencies. Buccieri requested to use Video Relay Services (VRS) and a phone holder as accommodations to facilitate communication with dispatch. Brewster considered his application and allowed him a ride-along in a Chair Car, but concerns arose about his ability to communicate and respond to emergencies, especially with patients and staff. Brewster ultimately declined to hire Buccieri, citing safety and operational concerns, and explored but rejected alternative positions for him.Buccieri sued Brewster in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging failure to hire and failure to engage in the interactive process required by the ADA. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which found for Brewster on the failure-to-hire claim, concluding that accommodating Buccieri would have imposed an undue hardship or posed a direct threat. However, the jury found for Buccieri on the interactive process claim, indicating Brewster had not sufficiently engaged in dialogue to identify reasonable accommodations.Following the verdict, Brewster filed a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion, setting aside the jury's finding on the interactive process claim, and entered judgment for Brewster on all counts. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s order. The court held that, based on the evidence, no reasonable jury could conclude that a reasonable accommodation existed that would have allowed Buccieri to perform the essential communications functions of the driver positions without undue hardship to Brewster. View "Buccieri v. Brewster Ambulance Service, Inc." on Justia Law

A physician was employed by a medical group and its affiliated healthcare organization when they implemented a COVID-19 vaccination policy requiring employees to either be vaccinated or obtain a medical or religious exemption. The physician objected to the policy on scientific and religious grounds and engaged in internal advocacy, including meetings with leadership and organizing a petition among medical staff. She also communicated with a disbarred attorney who was promoting litigation against the vaccine mandate, forwarding confidential internal emails and documents to him to build his case. Although she was granted a religious exemption, she was subsequently terminated for cause, with the employer citing misappropriation of company property, policy violations, disruptive conduct, and breach of loyalty.After exhausting administrative remedies, the physician filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, asserting federal claims for retaliation under Title VII and the ADA, and state claims for retaliation, discharge against public policy, breach of contract, tortious interference, and declaratory relief from her non-compete clause. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, finding no violation of state or federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the physician did not engage in protected activity under Title VII or the ADA, as her conduct did not qualify under either the participation or opposition clauses. Her state retaliation claims failed for the same reasons. The court also ruled that Kentucky’s wrongful discharge tort applies only to at-will employees, and her contract employment precluded such a claim. Finally, it found no breach of contract, as her conduct violated company policies and justified termination for cause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "DiChiara v. Summit Medical Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Infosys Technologies Limited, Inc. and Infosys Public Services, Inc. are global consulting and technology companies with substantial operations in the United States. Four individuals of non-South Asian descent, either former employees or applicants, brought suit against Infosys alleging they faced discrimination based on race and national origin. The plaintiffs pointed to various employment actions: one was terminated after a poor performance review coinciding with a reduction in force, another was not hired after failing to demonstrate required technical skills, a third was discharged from a temporary position, and the fourth claimed harassment and ultimately resigned, alleging a hostile work environment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin reviewed the case. During discovery, plaintiffs relied heavily on an expert report by David Neumark, who used a “name-matching” methodology to identify South Asian employees and applicants in Infosys’s demographic data. The district court excluded Neumark’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, finding him unqualified and his methodology unreliable. The court denied class certification, summary judgment supplementation with late-discovered demographic data, and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Infosys on all claims, including pattern and practice, disparate treatment, and disparate impact.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed all district court decisions. The Seventh Circuit held that exclusion of Neumark’s expert testimony was within the district court’s discretion, given his lack of qualifications and unreliable methodology. Without that testimony, plaintiffs could not satisfy the requirements for class certification or prove disparate impact. The Seventh Circuit also held that plaintiffs failed to rebut Infosys’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the employment decisions in their individual disparate treatment claims, and that the evidence did not support a constructive discharge. The district court’s rulings were affirmed in full. View "Koehler v Infosys Technologies Limited, Inc." on Justia Law

A former Walmart employee alleged that he experienced discrimination based on his sexual orientation during his employment, which began in 2017. He described a workplace permeated by anti-gay slurs, derogatory remarks from coworkers and supervisors, and specific incidents such as being compared to a pedophile and bestialist, being subjected to false accusations of inappropriate conduct, and encountering offensive drawings and slurs in common areas. He was demoted from a supervisory position, briefly terminated and then reinstated, and ultimately resigned, citing ongoing harassment and disparate treatment in vacation approvals and work assignments.After the employee filed suit in New Mexico state court, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. His claims, brought under Title VII and the New Mexico Human Rights Act, included disparate treatment based on demotion and termination, retaliation for opposing unlawful conduct, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to Walmart on all claims. It found the demotion and termination claims lacking evidence of discrimination or harm, dismissed the retaliation claim for lack of protected activity, rejected the constructive discharge claim for insufficient severity of conditions, and held that the hostile-work-environment claim failed because the incidents were not sufficiently severe or pervasive, and some were improperly excluded as “discrete acts.”On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment on all claims except the hostile-work-environment claim. It held that the demotion-based disparate-treatment claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the temporary termination claim was not adequately appealed. It also found no evidence of protected opposition to support retaliation or intolerable conditions for constructive discharge. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the hostile-work-environment claim, holding that a reasonable jury could find the alleged conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive, and remanded that claim for further proceedings. View "Sharpe-Miller v. Walmart" on Justia Law

Several local iron workers unions and their associated trust fund boards sued a Tennessee-based company, alleging that the company failed to make required contributions for work performed by its employees within the unions’ territorial jurisdiction. The plaintiffs claimed the company was obligated to make these contributions under collective bargaining agreements with the unions, and they sought to recover the amounts they alleged were owed, including interest and damages.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri handled the case. During discovery, the defendant company moved to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs’ witness, Bradley Soderstrom, arguing he was an undisclosed expert and his damages calculations were speculative. The district court agreed, excluding Soderstrom’s expert opinions and associated audit reports because the plaintiffs had not disclosed him as an expert and his calculations relied on unsupported assumptions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the company on one claim after finding the company was not a party to the relevant agreement, and on the remaining claims due to lack of admissible evidence of damages. The court also awarded attorneys’ fees to the company but did not set an amount. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the exclusion of Soderstrom’s testimony, the grant of summary judgment, and the award of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s exclusion of Soderstrom’s testimony, noting that plaintiffs failed to contest the finding that his damages model was speculative. The appellate court also affirmed summary judgment for the company because plaintiffs had no admissible evidence of damages without Soderstrom’s expert analysis. The court dismissed the appeal regarding attorneys’ fees, finding it was not ripe since the district court had not yet determined the fee amount. View "Iron Workers STL Pension Fund v. Barnhart Crane & Rigging Co." on Justia Law

A correctional officer employed by Prince George’s County, who had a foot amputation, alleged that the County discriminated against him based on his disability and retaliated against him for seeking accommodations and raising discrimination concerns. He claimed violations under both the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA) and Prince George’s County Code § 2-222, as well as retaliation under MFEPA. A jury found in his favor on both disability discrimination and retaliation, awarding him $1.7 million in damages.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County reduced the award by applying the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA) damages cap, entering judgment for $400,000, plus costs and attorney’s fees. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that the LGTCA cap did not apply because the injuries arose from statutory violations rather than “tortious acts or omissions” as contemplated by the LGTCA.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to determine whether the LGTCA damages cap applies to state statutory claims under MFEPA and claims under State Government § 20-1202 for violations of the local anti-discrimination code. The Court held that MFEPA is a comprehensive statutory scheme that expressly addresses the scope of local government liability, including its own damages caps, which take precedence over the LGTCA. Therefore, claims under MFEPA are not subject to the LGTCA cap. However, claims under State Government § 20-1202, based on violations of local ordinances, do not include any legislative indication of how local government liability is to be treated; thus, the LGTCA damages cap applies to such claims.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Court’s judgment, remanding for recalculation of the judgment in accordance with these holdings. View "Prince George's Cnty. v. Watts" on Justia Law

Dr. Mark Lee, age 59 at hiring, was appointed Chair of the Department of Neurosurgery at West Virginia University’s School of Medicine and also employed as a pediatric neurosurgeon by University Health Associates. By spring 2020, senior administrators raised concerns about Lee’s performance, including absenteeism and lack of engagement. In March 2021, Lee was offered a new position requiring him to step down as Chair, which he ultimately declined. Discussions about his removal continued, during which Lee was allegedly told the university sought a younger Chair. After Lee’s attorney raised age discrimination concerns in July and August 2021, Lee was informed he would be removed as Chair effective September 1, 2021, rather than the previously discussed later date. Lee subsequently resigned in January 2022 and pursued claims for age discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed claims against WVU defendants on sovereign immunity grounds and granted summary judgment to University Health Associates on all remaining claims. The district court found Lee’s age discrimination claim lacked direct and circumstantial evidence, noting Lee’s replacement and the decisionmaker were of similar age. Lee’s retaliation claims failed because the removal process began before his complaints, and the decision to accelerate his removal was attributed to his conduct at a July meeting rather than his protected activity. The breach-of-contract claims were rejected based on the employment agreement’s terms and integration clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for University Health Associates on Lee’s age discrimination, retaliation (removal and constructive discharge), and breach-of-contract claims. However, it vacated the judgment on Lee’s claim that the acceleration of his removal constituted unlawful retaliation, finding genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Lee v. West Virginia University Medical Corp." on Justia Law

A union representing over 100,000 current and former home healthcare workers in New York City entered into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with more than 40 employers. In 2015, the union and employers amended their CBAs with a Memorandum of Agreement (2015 MOA), mandating arbitration of statutory wage-and-hour claims, including those under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. The union subsequently initiated a class arbitration in 2019 for wage claims dating back to 2008. The arbitrator found for the union, ordering employers to create a $30 million fund for affected workers and established a rapid payout process. The union sought, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed, the arbitration awards, making them binding on virtually all covered workers, except for nine individuals named in ongoing state litigation.Prior to the arbitration, several former employees who had left their jobs before the 2015 MOA was executed sued their employers in New York State courts, asserting similar wage claims. State courts uniformly held that these individuals, no longer union members or bargaining unit employees at the time of the 2015 MOA, could not be retroactively bound to arbitrate their claims. Despite this, the district court denied intervention by these former employees in the confirmation proceedings, concluding they lacked standing and were adequately represented by the union.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether the union and employers clearly agreed to arbitrate these statutory claims. The Circuit Court found that the union and employers did not agree to mandatory arbitration for former employees’ accrued statutory claims until the 2015 MOA, and the union could not lawfully waive the rights of individuals who had already left employment. The Court vacated the district court’s orders as to the appellants and remanded for further proceedings, ruling these individuals are not bound by the arbitration awards and may pursue their claims in state court. View "1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST v. CHINESE-AMERICAN PLANNING COUNCIL HOME ATTENDANT PROGRAM" on Justia Law