Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Millard Public Schools, and dismissing Plaintiff's action brought under the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act (NWPCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1228, holding that the district court did not err.Defendant underpaid Plaintiff, a public school teacher, for several years. In 2018, the salary error was discovered, and Defendant corrected Plaintiff's salary retroactive to the start of the 2018-19 year. Relying on a provision in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) stating that any errors found in salutary "shall only be corrected retroactive to the beginning of the year in which the error was discovered." Plaintiff brought this suit, alleging that he had an individual statutory right to payment under the NWPCA and that this right could not be waived. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the compensation sought by Plaintiff was not "wages" as defined under the NWPCA and that the terms of the CBA on which the district court relied were not against public policy. View "Hoagbin v. School District No. 28-0017" on Justia Law

Appellants (the brothers) appealed following a judgment affirming an arbitration award that resolves an employment dispute between the brothers, their former employer, defendant and respondent U-Haul Co. of California (U-Haul), and their former manager at U-Haul and Respondent. On appeal, the brothers challenge the court’s order compelling their dispute to arbitration, arguing that the arbitration agreement they signed with U-Haul is unconscionable and thus unenforceable.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order compelling arbitration. The brothers also challenged the court’s order, issued before the court ordered the matter to arbitration, denying them leave to amend their complaint. The proposed amendment includes a Labor Code cause of action against Sandusky for unpaid wages regarding work the brothers allegedly performed at Respondent’s residence solely for his personal benefit. The court saw no basis for which the trial court could deny the brothers leave to assert such a claim. The brothers’ proposed amendment also includes a claim for relief under California’s Private Attorney General Act (the PAGA) based on the Labor Code violations by U-Haul and/or Respondent reflected in the proposed amended complaint. But the brothers cannot establish PAGA standing to bring a claim based on Labor Code violations by U-Haul already alleged in the operative complaint, because the arbitrator found no such violations occurred, and that finding has issue preclusive effect. The arbitrator’s finding does not affect the brothers’ ability to establish PAGA standing based on the proposed alleged Labor Code violation by Respondent involving unpaid wages; however, the court saw no other fatal deficiencies in the proposed PAGA claim against Respondent. View "Rocha v. U-Haul Co. of Cal." on Justia Law

Tims filed a class-action lawsuit against Black Horse, his former employer, alleging violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(a)), concerning the retention and deletion of biometric information, and sections 15(b) and 15(d), concerning the consensual collection and disclosure of biometric identifiers and biometric information. The Cook County circuit court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely, reasoning that it was timely filed because the five-year limitations period (Code of Civil Procedure section 13-205) applied to the Act, which does not contain a limitations period. Tims subsequently amended his complaint to name an additional class representative. Black Horse moved to reconsider its motion to dismiss and to certify, for immediate appeal, the question of which limitations period controlled. The circuit court certified the question. The appellate court allowed the interlocutory appeal and held that the one-year limitations period (section 13-201) governs actions under section 15(c) and 15(d) of the Act and that the five-year limitations period governs actions under section 15(a), 15(b), and 15(e) of the Act.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the five-year default limitations period governs claims under the Act, noting the need to ensure certainty, predictability, and uniformity as to when the limitations period expires in each subsection. View "Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering summary judgment against Plaintiff, a police officer with the City of Somerville, and dismissing his wrongful discharge claim, holding that there was no error in the grant of summary judgment.Plaintiff was involved in an off-duty altercation with a civilian, who reported the matter. The Somerville police department conducted an internal investigation, during which Plaintiff lied about his conduct. After a hearing, the City determined that justice cause existed to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit, alleging that his discharge was based on his race in violation of Title VII and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. The district court entered summary judgment for the City. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly dismissed both claims on summary judgment. View "Diaz v. City of Somerville" on Justia Law

USERRA Section 4316(b)(1) requires employers to provide employees who take military leave with the same non-seniority rights and benefits as their colleagues who take comparable non-military leaves. Plaintiff, a commercial airline pilot and military reservist, filed a class action brought under USERRA. Plaintiff alleged that because Alaska Airlines and Horizon Air Industries (collectively, the “Airlines”) provide paid leave for non-military leaves, including jury duty, bereavement, and sick leave, the Airlines are also required to pay pilots during short-term military leaves. The district court disagreed, granting summary judgment to the Airlines and concluding as a matter of law that military leave is not comparable to any other form of leave offered by the Airlines.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The panel held that the district court erred in concluding that no reasonable jury could find military leave comparable to non-military leave. In reaching this conclusion, the district court erred by comparing all military leaves, rather than just the short-term military leaves at issue here, with the comparator non-military leaves. The district court also erred by disregarding factual disputes about each of the three factors in the comparability analysis: duration, purpose, and control. The panel held that because factual disputes existed, comparability was an issue for the jury.   The panel, therefore, reversed and remanded. It instructed that on remand, the district court should consider in the first instance the issue of whether “pay during leave” was a standalone benefit that the airlines provided under their collective bargaining agreements to any employee on leave. View "CASEY CLARKSON V. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement (CBA), covered employees at United’s Indiana distribution center, prohibiting strikes and lock-outs during the life of the agreement. Negotiations over a successor agreement were ongoing when the existing agreement expired in September 2019. The agreement provided: So long as negations are ongoing, all terms and provisions of the existing CBA will continue to apply. However, “[i]n the event of a strike, the provisions of this section do not apply.” Bargaining over a new agreement came to a standstill on September 20. On December 12, Local 414 went on strike with a picket line at the Indiana facility. On December 17, Local 414 began additional picketing at United’s Minnesota and Wisconsin distribution centers. Workers there walked off the job. On December 18, Local 414 ended the strike and ceased picketing at the other sites. In July 2020, Local 414 engaged in another strike in Indiana.United filed suit under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, alleging that the strikes violated the CBA’s no-strike provisions. Local 414 moved to compel arbitration of the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the claims were not subject to arbitration. The arbitration procedure is focused exclusively on employee-initiated grievances and does not apply to employer-initiated grievances. The arbitration clause is not reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that includes an employer-initiated dispute regarding the CBA’s terms. View "United Natural Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 414" on Justia Law

Wirth was employed as an RLJ office manager, paid on an hourly basis, and required to clock in and out. RLJ closed its offices every day from 1−2 pm and did not schedule patients during that time. Employees were expected to take an hour-long unpaid lunch break during which they were free to leave the office. Wirth clocked out for less than 30 minutes 89 times during the nine months of her employment. Wirth’s supervisor repeatedly told her to take full lunch breaks. After Wirth was terminated, she filed suit, arguing that RLJ failed to compensate her for lunch breaks in violation of Wisconsin’s Wage Payment and Collection Laws, which requires employers to compensate employees for breaks less than 30 minutes, but not for meal periods of 30 minutes or more during which the employee is completely relieved from duty. Although RLJ paid her for the time she was clocked in during the lunch hour, Wirth argued that RLJ was also required to pay her for the time she was clocked out and admittedly not working.The Seventh Circuit affirmed that under Wisconsin law, RLJ was not required to compensate Wirth for the lunch periods as long as it consistently provided her with a break of at least 30 minutes. The court found that Wirth chose not to take the full lunch break even though her job duties did not prevent her from doing so “to increase her earnings.” View "Wirth v. RLJ Dental, S.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees at the Maid-Rite meatpacking plant, were exposed to COVID-19 in 2020. Maid-Rite issued masks and face shields but allegedly forced workers to work shoulder-to-shoulder. Plaintiffs sent OSHA an inspection request on May 19. Two days later, OSHA requested a response from Maid-Rite within a week, treating the inspection request as “non-formal,” so that it initially proceeded through document exchange. On May 27, Plaintiffs asserted that they continued to face an imminent danger of COVID-19; they also contacted OSHA on June 2, requesting Maid-Rite’s response and reasserting that conditions had not changed. They sent OSHA another letter on June 29th. On July 8, OSHA informed Maid-Rite that OSHA would inspect the plant the following day. OSHA acknowledged that advance notice of an inspection was not “typical,” but cited the need “to protect [OSHA’s] employees” from COVID-19. Plaintiffs claimed the notice allowed Maid-Rite to direct its employees to change their conduct and created the appearance of compliance with mitigation guidance. OSHA determined that the plant's conditions did not constitute an imminent danger and did not seek expedited relief.Plaintiffs sued under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 662(d), limited private right of action. While OSHA’s motion to dismiss was pending, OSHA concluded its standard enforcement proceedings and declined to issue a citation. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the Act mandated the dismissal of the claim once enforcement proceedings were complete. View "Doe v. Scalia" on Justia Law

Casandra Murrey, a single, 46-year-old female, worked for General Electric Company (GE) as a product sales specialist for ultrasound equipment. The complaint alleged GE hired Murrey in early 2018 and she was a “top performer.” In 2019, GE hired Joseph Gorczyca, III. In January 2020, he became Murrey’s direct supervisor, and he engaged in continuous sexual harassment in the workplace with Murrey and others. She alleged GE “never properly completed an immediate [n]or appropriate investigation or took any . . . corrective action. Instead, [GE] later informed [her] that Gorczyca was ‘no longer with the company.’” Thereafter, GE “commenced an illegal pattern of retaliatory behavior against Murrey because [she] engage[ed] in protective activity” that included “denying appropriate support for [her] sales position” and refusing to promote her. Eight months after Murrey filed the complaint, GE moved to compel arbitration. GE sent all new hires a “welcome e-mail” to the new hire’s personal e-mail address that contained a link to GE’s electronic onboarding system/portal. Each document was assigned a separate task and the new hire signed employment-related agreements using his or her electronic signature. Based on this process and GE’s other security measures, GE’s lead HR specialist Michelle Thayer concluded Murrey’s electronic signature on an Acknowledgment was made by Murrey that Murrey assented to an included arbitration in the onboarding materials. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, concluding:(1) GE met its burden of showing the arbitration agreement covered Murrey’s claims; (2) all of Murrey’s causes of action arose out of or were connected with her employment; and (3) Murrey met her burden showing procedural unconscionability because it was a contract of adhesion; but (5) Murrey failed to show a sufficient degree of substantive unconscionability to render the agreement unenforceable. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the arbitration agreement in this case contained a high degree of procedural unconscionability. "When we consider the procedural and substantively unconscionable provisions together, they indicate a concerted effort to impose on an employee a forum with distinct advantages for the employer." The Court issued a writ of mandate on the trial court to vacate the order compelling arbitration, and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Murrey v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nicholas Casson was a firefighter for the City of Santa Ana for 27 years. In 2012, he retired and began collecting a pension from California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS). He immediately started a second career with the Orange County Fire Authority (OCFA), where he was eligible for a pension under respondent Orange County Employees Retirement System (OCERS). He did not elect reciprocity between the two pensions, which would have allowed him to import his years of service under CalPERS to the OCERS pension. He started as a first-year firefighter for purposes of the OCERS pension and immediately began collecting pension payments from CalPERS. Five years into the job, he suffered an on-the-job injury that permanently disabled him. He applied for and received a disability pension from OCERS, which, normally, would have paid out 50 percent of his salary for the remainder of his life. However, because he was receiving a CalPERS retirement, OCERS imposed a “disability offset” pursuant to Government Code section 31838.5, the statute central to this appeal. This resulted in a monthly benefit reduction from $4,222.81 to $1,123.87. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Casson filed a petition for a writ of mandate; court denied the petition, finding that the plain language of section 31838.5 required a disability offset. The Court of Appeal reversed: Casson’s service retirement from CalPERS was not a disability allowance and thus should not have been included in the calculation of Casson’s total disability allowance. OCERS should not have imposed an offset, and the trial court should have issued a writ of mandate. View "Casson v. Orange County Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law