Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Alki David Productions, Inc. (ADP) appealed from the judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff after a jury found ADP liable for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 232.5, which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee who discloses information about the employer’s working conditions, and section 1102.5, subdivisions (b) and (c), which prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who refuses to participate in an activity that would violate the law or who discloses information the employee reasonably believes would disclose a violation of the law. The jury awarded Plaintiff $7,068,717 in damages (consisting of $368,717 in economic damages, $700,000 in non-economic damages, and $6 million in punitive damages). The jury further found that ADP terminated Plaintiff’s employment with malice, oppression, or fraud. The trial court denied ADP’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record contains substantial evidence of multiple other municipal code violations in the correction notice issued by a city inspector on September 25, 2017. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Plaintiff’s continued work at the theater would have violated the law, and the trial court’s finding in this regard was not legally erroneous. Further, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Plaintiff’s disclosure was a substantial motivating reason for his termination. View "Zirpel v. Alki David Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Plaintiff and declaring that the City of Woonsocket improperly terminated Plaintiff's employment with the Woonsocket Police Department in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 42-28.6-4 of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), holding that there was no error.The order appealed from declared that the city's termination of Plaintiff's employment was unlawful in violation of section 42-28.6-4 of the LEOBOR and that the City must comply with LEOBOR's procedural requirements if it wished to terminate Plaintiff's employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice properly determined that the City improperly terminated Plaintiff's employment and improperly deprived him of the requisite notice and hearing. View "Sosa v. City of Woonsocket" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald worked for Roncalli Catholic High School as a guidance counselor and Co-Director of Guidance for 14 years and earned years of stellar performance reviews. In 2018, the school declined to renew her one-year employment agreement, explaining that her same-sex marriage was contrary to the Catholic faith. Fitzgerald was placed on administrative leave. Her Co-director of Guidance, Starkey, informed Roncalli that she too was in a same-sex marriage. The school did not renew Starkey’s employment agreement. Fitzgerald and Starkey brought separate lawsuits, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.In both cases, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The school fired Fitzgerald because of her same-sex marriage and Title VII prohibits this kind of sex discrimination, but the Supreme Court has held that employment discrimination suits are barred “when the employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.” Fitzgerald played a crucial role on the Administrative Council, which was responsible for at least some of Roncalli’s daily ministry, education, and operations and “helped develop the criteria used to evaluate guidance counselors, which included religious components like assisting students in faith formation and attending church services.” Fitzgerald held herself out as a minister. View "Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High School, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2018, Anaheim voters approved a Living Wage Ordinance (LWO). The LWO applied to hospitality employers in the Anaheim or Disneyland Resort areas that benefited from a “City Subsidy.” In 2019, Kathleen Grace and other plaintiffs (“Employees”) filed a class action complaint against the Walt Disney Company, Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, U.S., Inc. (“Disney”) and Sodexo, Inc., and Sodexomagic, LLC (“Sodexo”) alleging a violation of the LWO (Sodexo operated restaurants in Disney’s theme parks). Disney moved for summary judgment and Sodexo joined. It was undisputed the Employees were not being paid the required minimum hourly wage under the LWO. However, Disney argued it was not covered under the LWO as a matter of law because it was not benefitting from a “City Subsidy.” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal disagreed: “A ‘City Subsidy’ is any agreement with the city pursuant to which a person other than the city has a right to receive a rebate of transient occupancy tax, sales tax, entertainment tax, property tax or other taxes, presently or in the future, matured or unmatured.” The Court determined that through a "reimbursement agreement," Disney had the right to a rebate on transient occupancy taxes (paid by hotel guests), sales taxes (paid by consumers), and property taxes (paid by Disney), in any years when the City’s tax revenues were sufficient to meet certain bond obligations. Consequently, the Court found Disney received a “City Subsidy” within the meaning of the LWO and was therefore obligated to pay its employees the designated minimum wages. View "Grace v. The Walt Disney Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that an appeals officer erred in denying benefits to the widow and child of an employee who died while on a work trip, holding that there is no requirement that an employee's activities be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits.Jason Buma died when he traveled from Nevada to Texas for a work conference and had an accident one evening while riding an ATV around a ranch owned by his coworker. Plaintiffs, Buma's wife and child, requested workers' compensation benefits, but the request was denied. An appeals officer upheld the denial. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appeals officer failed to apply the traveling employee rule. On remand, the appeals officer again denied benefits on the grounds that there was no evidence in the record that Jason's employer could have foreseen that Jason would be riding ATVs. The district court granted Plaintiffs' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer misinterpreted this Court's decision in Buma I and that this Court did not impose a requirement that an employee's activities need be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits. View "Providence Corp. Development v. Buma" on Justia Law

Three installers of window blinds sued FS Blinds, L.L.C., the company for which they worked. The district court granted summary judgment to FS Blinds, determining that Plaintiffs had not met their prima facie burden to show they worked overtime. The court dismissed the case, and Plaintiffs appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that Plaintiffs have met the lenient standard under Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–88 (1946), and therefore survive summary judgment, at least as to whether, if employees, Plaintiffs worked overtime. The court declined to reach whether Plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors and instead remand for the district court to consider that question anew. The court explained that, based on the record, Plaintiffs have presented enough to satisfy their “lenient” prima facie burden under Mt. Clemens. This is so even though Plaintiffs’ testimony offers only an estimated average of hours worked. In addition to their testimony, though, Plaintiffs offered supporting work orders and some corroborating testimony from FS Blinds. The court wrote that all told, this record evidence hurdles Plaintiffs’ Mt. Clemens burden. View "Flores v. FS Blinds" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the determination of the Title III court, during the course of its confirmation of the Modified Fifth Amended Title III Plan of Adjustment (Plan) for the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA), that the Vazquez-Valezquez Group's claims for additional compensation made in a separate federal lawsuit were dischargeable, holding that there was no error.The Group, which was composed of sixty-nine current and former PRHTA employees who received extra compensation under PRHTA Regulation 12-2017, with which the PRHTA later broke. At issue was the Group's objection to the Title III court's determination that the Group's claims for additional compensation were dischargeable under the Plan. After the Title III court entered an order and judgment confirming the plan the Group appealed, arguing that its members' claims were nondischargeable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims for additional compensation were not exempt from discharge. View "Financial Oversight & Management Bd. v. Vazquez-Velazquez Group" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing Plaintiff's Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B claims, holding that tolling does not apply to the time limits established in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 5, including the requirement that claims be pursued by first filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) "within 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination."Approximately one year after his termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the MCAD alleging sexual harassment, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4 (16A), and retaliation, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to add his chapter 151B claims. The motion judge granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning that this Court's emergency orders issued during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic applied only to courts, not the MCAD, and that equitable tolling did not apply. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that tolling did not apply to the time limits in this case. View "Dunn v. Langevin" on Justia Law

Thai was an IBM employee. To accomplish his duties, he required, among other things, internet access, telephone service, a telephone headset, and a computer and accessories. On March 19, 2020, Governor Newsom signed the COVID-19 “stay home” order. IBM directed Thai and thousands of his coworkers to continue performing their regular job duties from home. Thai and his coworkers personally paid for the services and equipment necessary to do their jobs while working from home. IBM never reimbursed its employees for these expenses.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of a complaint under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA; Labor Code 2699). Section 2802(a)) requires an employer to reimburse an employee “for all necessary expenditures . . . incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties.” The trial court’s conclusion that the Governor’s order was an intervening cause of the work-from-home expenses that absolved IBM of liability under section 2802 is inconsistent with the statutory language. The work-from-home expenses were inherent to IBM’s business and the work performed was for the benefit of IBM. View "Thai v. International Business Machines Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a package delivery driver for United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), injured his hip and buttocks. He requested he be allowed to drive his route with a smaller truck that would have a softer suspension or, alternatively, that he be assigned to an “inside job.” However, UPS determined that Plaintiff's route required a larger truck and there were no openings for inside work; thus, UPS offered Plaintiff an unpaid leave of absence until he could return to work.Plaintiff filed a claim, asserting that UPS’s refusal to provide him with the accommodations he requested violated his rights under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS, concluding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff had not shown that the accommodations he requested were reasonable and that his unpaid leave of absence constituted a reasonable accommodation in the circumstances.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding Plaintiff failed to establish that UPS needed to allow him to drive a smaller vehicle on his existing route and that the leave of absence was not a reasonable alternative. View "Jay Hannah v. UPS" on Justia Law