Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court remanded an employment matter to the Second Appellate District to resolve two issues the parties addressed in their respective appeals, but that we did not reach based on our conclusion about the nature of missed-break premium pay: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (Spectrum) had not acted “willfully” in failing to timely pay employees premium pay (which barred recovery under § 203); and (2) whether Spectrum’s failure to report missed-break premium pay on wage statements was “knowing and intentional,” as is necessary for recovery under section 226.   After receiving supplemental briefing following remand, the Second Appellate District concluded as follows: (1) substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Spectrum presented defenses at trial—in good faith—for its failure to pay meal premiums to depart employees and therefore, Spectrum’s failure to pay meal premiums was not “willful” under section 203; and (2) because an employer’s good faith belief that it is in compliance with section 226 precludes a finding of a knowing and intentional violation of that statute, the trial court erred by awarding penalties, and the associated attorneys’ fees, under section 226. View "Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In May 2020 Rehm expressed concern that Haven was not doing enough to protect her and other employees from COVID. Dillett, Haven’s Director of Operations and co-owner, did not appreciate Rehm’s suggestions. Rehm sent a staff-wide email criticizing Dillett’s handling of COVID health risks. Dillett fired her. After Rehm complained to the NLRB, Dillett threatened legal action. An ALJ found that Haven had unlawfully terminated and threatened Rehm, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). The Board ordered Haven to compensate Rehm for lost pay and expenses, offer to rehire her, notify her that it had removed references to her unlawful termination from her employee file, post notices of employee rights, and file a sworn certification of compliance.The Seventh Circuit summarily enforced that order in September 2021. Haven did not comply. In December 2022, the Seventh Circuit directed Haven to respond to the Board’s contempt petition. Haven disregarded a subsequent “show cause” order. The Seventh Circuit entered a contempt order, requiring Haven to pay a fine of $1,000, plus a fine of $150 per day for every day of the next week that Haven fails to comply, beginning on February 28, 2023. The daily fine will increase by $100 each day that Haven fails to comply beyond the next week. The court will forgive the fines if Haven files a sworn statement within seven days demonstrating full compliance. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Haven Salon + Spa, Inc" on Justia Law

The Evergreen Association brought an action against New York officials, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of New York Labor Law Sec. 203-e, which prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees for their reproductive health decisions. Evergreen claimed that Sec. 203-e unconstitutionally burdens its right to freedom of expressive association, preventing it from employees who seek abortions. The district court granted the New York defendants' motion to dismiss, and Evergreen appealed.On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evergreen's claims that Sec. 203-e violates its right to freedom of speech, violates its right to the free exercise of religion, and is impermissibly vague. However, the court reversed Evergreen's claim that the statute violates its freedom of expressive association. More specifically, the panel held that the district court should have applied strict scrutiny. Because the state did not show that Sec. 203-e is the least restrictive means to achieve its governmental interest, the panel reversed on this issue alone. View "Slattery v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Johnson served as an Air Traffic Controller Watch Supervisor. The Air Force alleged that Johnson was at fault for a violation of FAA policy concerning the separation of aircraft during his watch in 2018 and that this was grounds for removal in light of his prior offenses. A notice of a removal decision was effective May 11, 2019. On May 7, 2019, the local Union initiated grievance procedures. When the dispute was not resolved, the Union invoked arbitration through the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. In November 2020, the Arbitrator upheld the removal decision.The Union appealed but withdrew from the appeal because its national union had placed the local Union in receivership and stripped its counsel of all authority to proceed. Without reaching the merits, the Federal Circuit dismissed Johnson’s motion (Federal Rule 43(b) of Appellate Procedure), to substitute the Union. A party may not substitute under Rule 43(b) where the original party to the appeal lacked standing; unions lack standing to initiate an appeal of an arbitration decision under 5 U.S.C. 7703(a). A party may not substitute under Rule 43(b) when the original party being substituted lacked standing to initiate the appeal. View "American Federation of Government Workers v. Department of the Air Force" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer, Dolgen California, LLC (Dollar General), to recover civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 for various Labor Code violations suffered by her or by other employees. Dollar General moved to compel arbitration, which the superior court denied. In November 2021, the Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order. That affirmance was vacated by the United States Supreme Court when it granted Dollar General’s petition for writ of certiorari and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed in part the order denying the motion to compel arbitration judgment. The court affirmed Plaintiff’s Type O claims. The court reversed as to Plaintiff’s Type A claims, and the court remanded the matter with directions that the trial court enters a new order requiring Plaintiff to arbitrate the Type A claims. The court concluded Viking River and the Federal Arbitration Act do not invalidate the rule of California law that a provision in an arbitration agreement purporting to waive an employee’s right to pursue representative actions is not enforceable as to representative claims pursued under PAGA. Second, the severability clause in the arbitration agreement allows the unenforceable waiver provision to be stricken from the arbitration agreement. Third, the surviving provisions of the agreement require arbitration of the PAGA claims that seek to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations suffered by Plaintiff. View "Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC" on Justia Law

Ross worked as a sales representative for First Financial until 2018. Ross sued First Financial and two of its senior executives for sales commissions he claimed he was owed. Under the terms of his employment contract, Ross could earn a commission both when a customer first leased an item from First Financial and then at the end of a lease term, if the customer either extended the lease or purchased the equipment outright. In early 2017, First Financial acted to reduce future commission rates. Ross argued that First Financial breached his contract by applying the new, lower commission rates to end-of-lease transactions that occurred after the change took effect if the leases originally began before the change.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The company’s commission payments to Ross were correct because commissions on end-of-lease transactions are not earned until the customer actually agrees to and pays for the new transactions. Although Ross was reluctant to accept the new plan, he still accepted it by continuing to work for First Financial under its terms. View "Ross v. First Financial Corporate Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, respondent Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Kaiser). The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment. The court explained that as part of a round of employee layoffs, Kaiser planned, at least tentatively, to terminate Plaintiff before Plaintiff became disabled. Kaiser’s plan to terminate Plaintiff before she became disabled, by itself, was not discrimination against Plaintiff because of a disability. But Kaiser did not complete its layoff plans—or, a reasonable jury could find, make its final determination to terminate Plaintiff—until after Plaintiff had become disabled. On the record here, there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Kaiser’s ultimate decision to terminate Plaintiff was motivated, at least in substantial part, by concerns Kaiser had about Plaintiff’s disability. That allows Plaintiff’s complaint to survive summary judgment. View "Lin v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

The last clause of section 248.5 (e) of California’s Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014 (the Act) (Labor Code, § 245 et seq.) was the focus of this appeal. Plaintiff Ana Wood filed a Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA) action against her former employer Kaiser Foundation Hospitals seeking penalties for alleged violations of the Act. The trial court sustained Kaiser’s demurrer without leave to amend, determining that a PAGA action was one brought “on behalf of the public” and since it sought only civil penalties, was prohibited by section 248.5 (e). After its independent review, the Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion: the statute’s text and history provided compelling evidence that the phrase “on behalf of the public as provided under applicable state law” in section 248.5 (e) was intended to refer to actions prosecuted under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL)—not PAGA. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was reversed. View "Wood v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

Employees at C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. jumped ship to join Traffic Tech, Inc. C.H. Robinson then sued five of those former employees and Traffic Tech, raising various state-law claims, including tortious interference with a contractual relationship. After the case was removed to federal court, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the former employees and Traffic Tech. The district court also awarded attorney fees to the former employees and Traffic Tech   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, reversed the judgment in all other respects, and vacated the district court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs. The court held that Minnesota law applies to the interpretation and enforceability of Defendants’ employment contracts. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether C.H. Robinson’s claims or disputes against Peacock arose in California or elsewhere under Peacock’s employment contract. The court further remanded for the district court to substantively analyze whether all or part of the former employees’ contracts are unenforceable and, if not, whether the claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with a contractual relationship survive summary judgment. View "C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Traffic Tech, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Iowa Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) and the district court misinterpreted Iowa Code 20.32 by extending broader bargaining rights to nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit as public transit employees, holding that the plain meaning of the statute protects only transit employees, not nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit.The City of Ames sought guidance as to whether section 20.32 requires broader bargaining rights for nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit. PERB concluded that broader bargaining rights must be extended under the statute to nontransit employees in a bargaining unit consisting of at least thirty percent transit employees, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City was not required to provide broader bargaining rights to nontransit employees, regardless of the percentage of transit employees in the bargaining unit. View "City of Ames v. Iowa Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law