Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants– the former secretary-treasurer and president, respectively, of a District Lodge of the International Association of Machinists – appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. They sued the international union, its president, and its general secretary-treasurer. The controversy concerns the suspensions of Appellants’ and the international union’s imposition of a trusteeship on their District Lodge. Appellants’ first amended complaint alleged one count under Title I and five counts under Title III of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (the “LMRDA”). They sought equitable relief along with compensatory and punitive damages. A month after they filed their first amended complaint, they filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion. It held that Appellants had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. It also held that the other factors did not favor them.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that Appellants’ request under Title III to end the trusteeship is moot. A case becomes moot when a party obtains the relief they sought. Here, the disputed trusteeship has been lifted. Further, the court explained that Appellants seek to invalidate an officer election. It is impossible to reinstate Appellant as secretary-treasurer or allow the District Lodge to elect new members to other positions unless the court invalidates the officer election that just occurred. Thus, the court rejected the Title I claim. View "Ian Scott-Anderman, et al. v. Robert Martinez, et al." on Justia Law

The State of Vermont appealed a decision of the Vermont Labor Relations Board sustaining a grievance filed by the Vermont State Employees’ Association (VSEA) on behalf of several classified employees. The Board determined that the State violated the employees’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when it appointed another employee to a vacant position before the application deadline for that position had expired. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the Board correctly interpreted the CBA and therefore affirmed. View "In re Grievance of Marc Abbey et al." on Justia Law

Cothron. employed by a White Castle restaurant in Illinois since 2004, filed a class action on behalf of all Illinois White Castle employees. White Castle required its employees to scan their fingerprints to access their pay stubs and computers. A third-party vendor verified each scan and authorized the employee’s access. The complaint alleged that White Castle implemented this biometric-collection system in violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d), which became effective in 2008 and provides that a private entity may not “collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain” a person’s biometric data without first providing notice to and receiving consent from the person; a private entity may not “disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate” biometric data without consent. White Castle did not seek her consent to acquire her fingerprint biometric data until 2018.White Castle argued that the action was untimely because her claim accrued in 2008 when White Castle first obtained her biometric data after the Act’s effective date. The district court agreed with Cothron. The Seventh Circuit certified an interlocutory appeal, then certified a question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that a separate claim accrues under the Act each time a private entity scans or transmits an individual’s biometric identifier or information in violation of section 15(b) or 15(d). View "Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the compensation court concluding that a claimant who sustains injuries along the same extremity sustains an injury to a single member for workers' compensation purposes, holding that the compensation court's decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3).Claimant injured her right wrist and right elbow upon falling at work. Claimant filed a claim for benefits, asserting that the workers' compensation court should award her permanent disability benefits based on her loss of earning capacity. At issue was section 48-121(3), which provides for discretionary loss of earning capacity where there is a "loss or loss of use of more than one member of parts of more than one member[.]" The compensation court refused to consider an award based on the loss of earning capacity because "an injury to the wrist and the elbow of the same arm is still an injury to a single member and does not entitle an employee to a loss of earning power.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred in its interpretation of section 48-121(3). View "Espinoza v. Job Source USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Stryker develops, manufactures, and sells spinal implants and products, and employed Abbas from 2013-2022. Abbas purports to have worked exclusively within Stryker’s finance department. Stryker claims that Abbas worked in various roles, including in sales. Abbas regularly used significant amounts of Stryker’s confidential information and trade secrets and supported Stryker’s litigation efforts. Abbas entered into confidentiality, noncompetition, and nonsolicitation agreements with Stryker when he commenced his employment, and again in 2022.Alphatec competes with Stryker. Stryker alleges that Alphatec "systematically misappropriate[s] Stryker[’s] confidential information, trade secrets, customer goodwill, and talent” and is litigating against Alphatec and former Stryker employees in several cases. Abbas resigned from Stryker to take a newly-developed position with Alphatec, a sales role, “crafted to protect Stryker’s confidential information.” Stryker sued for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction on behalf of Stryker. The district court crafted the injunction to preserve the status quo, reserving the possibility that other prospective jobs might be consistent with Abbas's employment agreement. It is not an impermissible industry-wide ban. Stryker is likely to succeed on the merits, based on findings that Abbas worked for Stryker in both sales and finance; Abbas had unfettered access to Stryker’s most sensitive sales and financial information, Stryker’s sales representatives, and key customer decision-makers; the Alphatec position involved work similar to the work Abbas performed for Stryker; and Abbas supported Stryker on litigation matters. View "Stryker Employment Co., LLC v. Abbas" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded $58,240 in damages, plus post-judgment interest, Plaintiff sought attorneys’ fees in the amount of $701,706, litigation costs in the amount of $43,089.48, and additional filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45. The district court ultimately awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $570,771 and filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45 but denied the request for litigation costs. Defendant BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion with respect to the award of attorneys’ fees.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reduced the award of fees by $103,642.50. BNSF first argued that the award of fees is unreasonable because Plaintiff only achieved limited success. The court reasoned that Plaintiff undisputedly prevailed at trial on his FRSA claim. As this claim was at the heart of Plaintiff’s case, his degree of success is significant, regardless of the fate of his FELA claim or another theory of liability underlying his FRSA claim.   However, the court found that BNSF’s request for the reduction of fees related to the first trial, however, has merit. The court wrote that Plaintiff undisputedly offered the jury instruction that contained a legal error based on Eighth Circuit precedent, which required vacatur of the judgment. The court agreed with BNSF that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees that were unreasonably caused by his own legal error. View "Edward Blackorby v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, the Supreme Court vacated the ALJ's determination that Defendant was correct to deny Plaintiff benefits on the ground that he was an independent contractor, not an employee, holding that this Court hereby adopts the economic realities test to safeguard the protection afforded by workers' compensation.Plaintiff was working as a taxi driver for Defendant when he was shot in the shoulder and became permanently paralyzed from the waist down. Plaintiff sought workers' compensation to pay for his extensive medical care, but Defendant denied the claim due to Plaintiff's status as an independent contractor. An ALJ also determined that Plaintiff was an independent contractor. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the ALJ's opinion. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the ALJ, holding that this Court's holding in Mouanda v. Jani-King International, 635 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2022) adopting the economic realities test is extended to the workers' compensation context. View "Oufafa v. Taxi, LLC" on Justia Law

Travis Iversen appealed a judgment entered in favor of appellee, Larson Latham Huettl, LLP (hereafter “LLH”), and an order denying relief from judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j). Iversen was an attorney employed by LLH from February 2019 until July 2021. Iversen asserts that Tyrone Turner, an LLH partner, told Iversen that “you can only do the work that we give you.” After Iversen terminated his employment with LLH, LLH requested that Iversen refund it $35,772.63 for overpayment. LLH argues that Iversen owes this debt to LLH because he had not been credited with sufficient billable hours to justify the compensation he received under the employment agreement. Iversen refused to pay the deficiency, and LLH then sued Iversen. The district court issued a memorandum opinion granting LLH’s motion for summary judgment. Before judgment was entered, Iversen filed a “motion for reconsideration” citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j). The district court denied Iversen’s motion. Iverson argued that several genuine issues of material fact remained, precluding summary judgment. He also argued the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion under Rule 59(j). Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and the order denying Iversen’s Rule 59(j) motion. View "Larson Latham Huettl, LLP v. Iversen" on Justia Law

Jesse Keidel appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision denying Keidel permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits. In May 1996, Keidel suffered a work-related injury to the meniscus of his left knee. Keidel had surgery in December 1996. In October 1997, Keidel underwent a second surgery to his left knee, a high tibial osteotomy. The doctor performing an independent medical evaluation in May 1998 opined that Keidel’s left knee condition was a “combination of his significant preexisting left knee degenerative joint disease and the work-related permanent aggravation.” Following a permanent impairment evaluation, WSI denied Keidel a PPI award because Keidel’s 15% whole body impairment was below the statutory 16% threshold for an impairment award. In January 2019, Keidel had left total knee replacement surgery. In June 2020, Keidel underwent a second permanent impairment evaluation. The evaluating doctor, Dr. Redington, determined Keidel had a 24% whole person impairment for the left total knee replacement. "Giving [Keidel] the benefit of the doubt, I will apportion 50% of the impairment rating of the left knee to pre-existing conditions." In November 2020, WSI denied an impairment award for Keidel’s left knee because his overall impairment rating after apportionment after the second evaluation was 12%, which was below the 14% threshold for an impairment award under then current version of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2. At a hearing, Keidel argued the apportionment of his left knee impairment due to preexisting arthritis was litigated and decided in a 2000 hearing. Keidel argued administrative res judicata prohibited WSI from litigating whether his permanent impairment could be apportioned to a preexisting condition. The ALJ and district court concluded administrative res judicata did not apply. Finding no error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Keidel v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering Judge John P. O'Donnell of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to stop exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and to dismiss the underlying case, holding that the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation was entitled to the writs.The City of Cleveland and the City of Parma sued the Bureau in separate actions. The Supreme Court held that the court of claims had exclusive jurisdiction over Cleveland's action. Judge O'Donnell then dismissed Parma's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, Parma filed the underlying lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment. Judge O'Donnell denied the Bureau's motion to dismiss. Parma also filed an action against the Bureau in the court of claims, which dismissed the complaint on limitations grounds. The Bureau then brought this action against Judge O'Donnell, arguing that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the underlying case. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding that the Court of Claims Act, Ohio Rev. Code 2743.01 et seq., patently and unambiguously divested the common pleas court of jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law