Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissing Appellant's appeal in this workers' compensation case for lack of a final, appealable order, holding that the ICA erred when it dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.These consolidated cases consisted of the decision of the Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DCD) determining that Appellant sustained compensable work-related injuries but denying her claim for compensation relating to her alleged neck injury and sleep disorder. Following years of proceedings before the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) and DCD, the LIRAB issued several orders, including an order granting Employer/Insurer's two motions to compel and denying Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment. The ICA dismissed Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ICA had jurisdiction to review the LIRAB's order granting the motions to compel and denying partial summary judgment as to the order compelling Appellant to undergo an independent medical examination. View "Suzuki v. American Healthways, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees of RingCentral, participated in RingCentral’s employee welfare benefits plan. The plan participated in the “Tech Benefits Program” administered by Sequoia Benefits and Insurance Services, LLC, a management and insurance brokerage company. The Tech Benefits Program was a MEWA that pooled assets from employer-sponsored plans into a trust fund for the purpose of obtaining insurance benefits for employees at large-group rates. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action on behalf of the RingCentral plan and other Tech Benefits Program participants, asserting that Sequoia owed fiduciary duties to the plan under ERISA because Sequoia allegedly exercised control over plan assets through its operation of the Tech Benefits Program. Plaintiffs alleged that Sequoia violated its fiduciary duties by receiving and retaining commission payments from insurers, which Plaintiffs regarded as kickbacks, and by negotiating allegedly excessive administrative fees with insurers, leading to higher commissions for Sequoia.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing as to either of their two theories of injury. The panel held, as to the out-of-pocket-injury theory, Plaintiffs failed to establish the injury in fact required for Article III standing because their allegations did not demonstrate that they paid higher contributions because of Sequoia’s allegedly wrongful conduct. And Plaintiffs failed to plead the third element, that their injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief. View "RACHAEL WINSOR, ET AL V. SEQUOIA BENEFITS & INSURANCE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant In-N-Out Burgers appealed a trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of the claims of plaintiffs Tom Piplack and Donovan Sherrod for penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Defendant argued Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S.Ct. 1906 (2022), rendered while defendant’s appeal was pending, required plaintiffs’ individual PAGA claims to be arbitrated and all remaining representative claims dismissed for lack of standing. Plaintiffs contended: (1) the agreement did not require arbitration of individual PAGA claims; (2) defendant waived its right to arbitration by participating in trial proceedings; (3) plaintiff Sherrod was not bound by the arbitration agreement because he entered it before reaching the age of majority and disaffirmed it after reaching that age; and (4) that plaintiffs had standing to pursue representative PAGA claims in court even if their individual claims were sent to arbitration. The Court of Appeal concluded the arbitration agreements required individual PAGA claims to be arbitrated and defendant did not waive its right to compel arbitration. Accordingly, as to plaintiff Piplack, the Court of Appeal reversed: his individual PAGA claim had to be arbitrated. As to plaintiff Sherrod, the Court remanded for the trial court to consider his arguments regarding disaffirmance in the first instance, as those arguments were not properly briefed or decided in the trial court because they were irrelevant under pre-Viking law. View "Piplack v. In-N-Out Burgers" on Justia Law

In a case in which federal civil immigration detainees— who are held in the Northeast ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”), a private detention center in Tacoma, Washington, operated by GEO Group—challenge GEO’s practice of paying them less than the State’s minimum wage to work at the detention center, the Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the Washington Supreme Court:1) In the circumstances of this case, are the detained workers at NWIPC employees within the meaning of Washington’s Minimum Wage Act (“MWA”)? 2) If the answer to the first question is yes, does the MWA apply to work performed in comparable circumstances by civil detainees confined in a private detention facility operating under a contract with the State? 3) If the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second question is no, and assuming that the damage award to the detained workers is sustained, is that damage award an adequate legal remedy that would foreclose equitable relief to the State in the form of an unjust enrichment award? View "UGOCHUKWU NWAUZOR, ET AL V. THE GEO GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

Hawaiian Dredging Construction Company and a Hawaiian chapter of the Boilermakers union failed to renew a collective bargaining agreement. Hawaiian Dredging then discharged Boilermakers welders who were covered by the now-expired agreement. The Boilermakers thought those discharges were an “unfair labor practice” under the National Labor Relations Act and asked the National Labor Relations Board to weigh in. Originally, the Board sided with the Boilermakers. But Hawaiian Dredging asked the DC Circuit to review that decision, and the court remanded it to the Board to reconsider. The Board then changed its view and concluded that no unfair practice occurred. Then the Union petitioned for review.   The DC Circuit denied the petition finding that the Board’s new decision was supported by substantial evidence and correctly applied established law. The court agreed with the Board that Hawaiian Dredging demonstrated “a legitimate and substantial business justification for” discharging the welders. The court explained when a prehire agreement expires, a construction employer has no continuing obligation to maintain a bargaining relationship with a union. So, absent other evidence, there is nothing discriminatory about a policy that suspends work and discharges all employees when an agreement expires. If anything, Hawaiian Dredging’s policy promotes collective bargaining by ensuring that all of its welding work is done pursuant to a pre-hire agreement. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual finding that Hawaiian Dredging discharged the welders because of its policy and not for some discriminatory reason. View "International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff asked the Foreign Service Grievance Board to review the Foreign Service’s decision to deny her tenure. While the Board was considering her grievances, Plaintiff asked the Board to grant “interim relief.” That relief would have let Plaintiff keep working for the Foreign Service until her case was decided. But the Board refused to grant it. So Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the Board should have given her relief. After Plainitff in lost in the district court and appealed to this court, the Board reached final decisions on her grievances. 
 The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s backpay claim, and the court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal of her interim-relief claims as moot. The court explained backpay is not an available remedy on judicial review of the Board’s orders. Nothing in the Foreign Service Act authorizes a court to issue backpay. Plus, under the Act, judicial review is adjudicated “in accordance with the standards set forth in [the Administrative Procedure Act].” Here, the Board found no merit to four of Plaintiff’s grievances. As for the fifth grievance, the Board held that Plaintiff’s claim had merit, but it still denied her backpay. And because Plaintiff has not petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision to deny backpay in that grievance, the court wrote it cannot direct the Board to reconsider it. View "Julie Beberman v. Antony Blinken" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (Rockland County Probation Department employees and their union) brought a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants (the County of Rockland and its Director of Probation). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants retaliated against them for writing a letter to the Rockland County Legislature by holding department-wide emergency meetings and issuing a “Memorandum of Warning.” The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the Plaintiffs on two liability issues: (1) whether the Plaintiffs’ letter had spoken on a matter of public concern and (2) whether the Plaintiffs had spoken as private citizens. A jury trial was held on liability issue (3): whether the Defendants had engaged in an adverse employment action. After the jury entered a verdict for the Defendants, the district court granted the Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. It later granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from retaining the Memorandum of Warning or using it against any Plaintiff. Defendants appealed the district court’s decision to grant judgment as a matter of law on Issues (2) and (3). They also challenged the permanent injunction.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remand the case with directions to enter judgment for the Defendants. The court explained that the trial record contains evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the test for adverse action was not met. Indeed, the evidence below could support a conclusion that the Memorandum and the meetings were no more than a “‘petty slight,’ ‘minor annoyance,’ or ‘trivial’ punishment.” View "Bennett v. County of Rockland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint brought by Plaintiff for injuries he sustained in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant, holding that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to dismiss.Plaintiff severely injured his left leg while he was employment at a pipeline construction project and received workers' compensation benefits for his injury. Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging negligence, vicarious liability, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim on the ground that it was entitled to workers' compensation immunity. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the common law tort claims alleged in Plaintiff's complaint fell within the scope of immunity afforded by West Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act, W. Va. Code 23-2-1 et seq. View "Precision Pipeline, LLC v. Weese" on Justia Law

The International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL-CIO (“the Union” or “IOM”), has been the lawful bargaining agent for the Licensed Deck Officers (“LDOs”) on four container ships that carry goods between ports in California and Hawaii. The Pasha Group purchased the ships, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sunrise Operations, LLC (“Sunrise”), now operates the vessels and is the most recent successor employer of the LDOs. The Union filed unfair labor practice (“ulp”) charges with the National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or “NLRB”). The Board’s General Counsel then filed a complaint alleging that Sunrise had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”), when it failed to provide information to the Union and declined to participate in arbitration proceedings in Maryland.   The DC Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration. The court held that it is clear that the majority opinion for the Board purports to decide the case without regard to the parties’ principal claims presented to the ALJ, and it rests on a position that was never advanced by Sunrise either before the ALJ or in its exceptions to the Board. Sunrise never argued that the disposition of this case should turn on the employer’s subjective beliefs about whether the LDOs were supervisors. Thus, the court found that the Board’s holding, in this case, lacks support in the record, defies established law, and creates a new rule without reasoned justification. It thus fails substantial evidence review and is arbitrary and capricious for want of reasoned decision-making. View "International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL-CIO v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff served as the Chief of Police for the Sneads Police Department from March 2006 until October 2018. On October 9, 2018, the five-member Town Council terminated Plaintiff’s employment by a 4-to-1 vote. The Town Council did so under the charge that Plaintiff was disrespectful at best and insubordinate at worst. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims his firing was in retaliation for things he said, disclosed, and reported, all regarding various matters related to the newer Councilmembers with whom he had a contentious relationship.   Plaintiff filed an eight-count action against the Town of Sneads, the Town Manager, Town Councilmembers, Town Council President, and Town Clerk (collectively, “Defendants”). He brought unlawful-retaliation claims against the Town of Sneads under the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act (“FWA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and the First Amendment. And he brought identical retaliation claims under the First Amendment against each of the five individual defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all eight counts, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not established that he satisfied all three of these requirements for each instance of his speech that he claims were protected under the FWA. Further, the court wrote that because the record evidence shows that the Town of Sneads terminated Plaintiff for insubordination, not his invocation of the FMLA, the court concluded that the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim was also proper. View "John "Burt" McAlpin v. Town of Sneads Florida, et al" on Justia Law