Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Sharhea Wise worked as a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service. When she got pregnant, she asked to avoid handling heavy items. The Postal Service agreed to provide help when items were too heavy, but Wise needed to tell someone when she needed help. On two occasions, Wise allegedly had to handle items that were too heavy. Both times, she blamed the Postal Service for failing to accommodate her need for help. The Postal Service argued in response that Wise hadn’t asked for help. Days after Wise allegedly had to handle the heavy items, she walked off the job and the Postal Service fired her. Wise claimed retaliation, attributing the firing to her requests for help. The Postal Service denied retaliation, explaining that it had fired Wise because she walked off the job. Wise characterized this explanation as pretextual. The district court granted summary judgment to the Postal Service, and Wise challenged the rulings. The Tenth Circuit agreed with her challenge on the failure-to-accommodate claim. "On this claim, a reasonable factfinder could find that the Postal Service had failed to accommodate Ms. Wise’s need to avoid handling heavy items." But the Court agreed with the grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claim because: (1) the Postal Service presented a neutral, nonretaliatory explanation for the firing; and (2) Wise lacked evidence of pretext. View "Wise v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the opinion and award filed by the North Carolina Industrial Commission in favor of Plaintiff following a tractor-trailer accident in which Plaintiff, an employee a trucking company, sustained injury, holding that the agency's decision should not have been disturbed by the lower appellate court.After the accident, Plaintiff provided notice to her employer and its insurance carrier of the accident and of the injury her husband received in the accident but did not report injury to herself. The Commission concluded that Plaintiff's injury was causally related to the accident, that Plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for not providing notice of her injury until two years later, that Defendants were not prejudiced, and that Plaintiff was totally disabled as a result of her injury. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no error in either the Commission's findings of fact or in its conclusions of law. View "Sprouse v. Turner Trucking Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Thomas L. Cardella & Associates' (Cardella) motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in this case alleging common law negligent supervision or retention, holding that the claim was barred by the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act (IWCA), Iowa Code ch. 85.Plaintiff sued Cardella two years after she quit her employment there. Because she missed the deadline for bringing a hostile work environment claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code ch. 216, Plaintiff sued for common law negligent supervision or retention and presented her claim to the jury seeking emotional distress damages related to her mental health as a negligent supervision claim premised on Cardella failing to protect her from assault and battery. After a trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $400,000 in emotional distress damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as presented to the jury, Plaintiff's claim was barred by IWCA. View "McCoy v. Thomas L. Cardella & Associates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lieutenant in the Kankakee Fire Department (“KFD”)—was attacked by another firefighter while responding to a fire at a senior living facility. The City suspended the other firefighter for twenty-four hours without pay, ordered him to complete an anger management course, and directed him to avoid working on the same shift as Plaintiff for three months. Plaintiff experienced ongoing physical and mental injuries from the incident, causing her to take leave from work and apply for workers’ compensation. She returned to work six months later but permanently left her position shortly after. She then filed a lawsuit, alleging that Defendants, among other things, retaliated against her for certain protected activities under Title VII and condoned aggressive and inappropriate behaviors as part of a “code of silence” that resulted in her attack. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and this appeal followed.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that on the merits, Plaintiff’s claim fails because none of her evidence, separately or taken together, creates a genuine dispute regarding whether Defendants had a practice of condoning aggressive behavior, resulting in a constitutional injury. Further the court wrote that the record does not support Plaintiff’s contention that there was such a high risk of constitutional injury from the other firefighter that the “single incident” theory of municipal liability applies here. The court held Plaintiff failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment regarding her Fourth Amendment Monell claim and her Title VII retaliation claim. The district court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment to Defendants. View "Michelle Giese v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ requested by Petitioners prohibiting the Honorable David H. Wilmoth, Judge of the Circuit Court of Randolph County, from enforcing its order denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss certain claims set forth in the underlying wrongful termination complaint, holding that some of Respondents' claims should have been dismissed.On appeal, Respondents argued that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies through the state public employees grievance procedure, W. Va. Code 6C-2-1 to -8, and that other claims were subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in denying Respondents' motion to dismiss certain claims; and (2) the remaining claims were not barred by the exhaustion rule and were sufficiently pled to go forward. View "State ex rel. Devono v. Honorable Wilmoth" on Justia Law

Advantage Veterans Services of Walterboro, LLC (“AVSW”) and United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International, Local 7898 (the “Union”) dispute the legitimacy of an arbitration award, which stemmed from the discharge of a union-represented employee. The appeal centers on the provisions of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”). The CBA contains a number of provisions that govern the relationship between AVSW, the Union and the Union’s members who work at AVSW.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s order affirming the arbitration award and vacated the underlying award. The court explained that its deferential standard for determining whether an arbitrator erred substantively is rooted in the contractual nature of arbitration. If the parties agree to resolve disputes by arbitration, the court defers to the determinations made in the process the parties agreed to. Here, however, the CBA limits the arbitrator’s power. It requires that the arbitrator make the reasonable basis determination. And it premises the legitimacy of any arbitration award on the arbitrator’s compliance with that directive. It even provides that any award that is contrary to the CBA in any way—which includes that directive—“shall be deemed not to draw its essence from the [CBA] and shall be vacated.” The court explained that given this language, it would be paradoxical to use a highly deferential standard of review, which, once again, is rooted in principles of contract, to look past the arbitrator’s failure to follow contractually agreed-upon procedural rules for the arbitration. View "Advantage Veterans Services of Walterboro LLC v. United Steel Paper and Forestry Rubber" on Justia Law

Out-of-work residents of Michigan may claim unemployment benefits if they meet certain eligibility criteria. The State’s Unemployment Insurance Agency oversees the benefits system. In 2011, with the help of private contractors, the Agency began to develop software to administer the unemployment system. The Agency sought to equip the software to auto-adjudicate as many parts of the claims process as possible. The Agency programmed software that used logic trees to help process cases and identify fraud. A claimant’s failure to return the fact-finding questionnaire, for example, led to a fraud finding, as did the claimant’s selection of certain multiple-choice responses. In August 2015, problems arose with some features of the system, prompting the Agency to turn off the auto-adjudication feature for fraud claims.Plaintiffs are four individuals who obtained unemployment benefits, which were terminated after the Agency flagged their claims for fraud. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against three government contractors and nineteen Agency staffers, raising claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6402(f), and Michigan tort law. In a previous proceeding, the court held that plaintiffs’ due process rights clearly existed because they had alleged a deprivation of their property interests without adequate notice and without an opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing.At this stage, because the remaining plaintiffs have failed to show that these procedures violate any clearly established law, the supervisors of the unemployment insurance agency are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court also found that an intervening plaintiff was properly prevented from joining the case, based on her untimely filing. View "Patti Cahoo v. SAS Institute, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that the Department of Workers' Claims had jurisdiction to hear the claim of Roger Hall, who suffered a work-related injury after being exposed to asbestos-containing material while working for the Letcher County Board of Education, that he was permanently and totally disabled and was entitled to medical benefits, holding that there was no error.As to jurisdiction, the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that nothing in Ky. Rev. Stat. 49.020 prevents an employee with proceeding on a claim against his or her employer pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department of Workers' Claims had jurisdiction over Hall's case. View "Letcher County Bd. of Education v. Hall" on Justia Law

Appellant, a fired employee, sued his former employer, alleging a pattern or practice of race discrimination against non-South Asians in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The employee had previously attempted to join another class action against the company, but after that case was stayed, he filed this suit – years after his termination. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely. In response, the employee conceded that the relevant statutes of limitations had expired, and instead, he resorted to two forms of tolling: wrong-forum and American Pipe. The district court concluded that American Pipe tolling did not allow the employee to commence a successive class action, and the employee does not contest that ruling. But the district court dismissed the complaint without considering the applicability of wrong-forum tolling.   The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether wrong-forum tolling applies and/or whether Appellant has plausibly pleaded a prima facie pattern-or-practice claim. The court explained a class plaintiff’s burden in making out a prima facie case of discrimination is different from that of an individual plaintiff “in that the former need not initially show discrimination against any particular present or prospective employee,” including himself. As a result, Appellant was not required to plead but for causation on an individual basis to avoid dismissal, given the availability of the pattern-or-practice method of proof at later stages of the case. View "Lee Williams v. Tech Mahindra Americas Inc" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal arose from personal injuries Adrian Carillo Alcala (“Carillo”) suffered at a potato packaging plant, SunRiver of Idaho, Inc. (“SunRiver”), after his head and shoulders were crushed by a box palletizer designed, manufactured, delivered, and installed by a Dutch company, Verbruggen Emmeloord, B.V. (“VE”), along with its United States affiliate, Verbruggen Palletizing Solutions, Inc. (“VPS”). The box palletizer was one of seven machines SunRiver purchased in a transaction with Volm Companies, Inc. (“Volm”). Because this was a workplace injury, Carillo received worker’s compensation benefits through his employers, SunRiver, Employers Resource Management Company, and Employers Resource of America, Inc.—and the surety American Zurich Insurance Company (collectively “the SunRiver Plaintiffs”). Afterwards, the SunRiver Plaintiffs jointly with, and in the name of Carillo, sued Volm, VE, and VPS. Pursuant to a stipulation and compromise agreement, Volm was dismissed from this suit before this appeal. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents and dismissed all claims after concluding that VE and VPS were Carillo’s statutory co-employees immune from common law liability under Richardson v. Z & H Construction, LLC, 470 P.3d 1154 (2020). On appeal, the SunRiver Plaintiffs and Carillo argued that the transaction between SunRiver and Volm did not make Carillo, VE, and VPS statutory co-employees because it was a “hybrid” transaction consisting of goods with incidental services under Kelly v. TRC Fabrication, LLC, 487 P.3d 723 (2021). VE and VPS cross-appealed the district court’s denial of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the SunRiver Plaintiffs and Carillo. VE and VPS were “third parties” and were not entitled to immunity from suit in tort under the Worker’s Compensation law. The district court’s judgment dismissing all claims was vacated, the grant of summary judgment to VE and VPS was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court also rejected VE’s and VPS’s argument that the SunRiver Plaintiffs’ subrogation interest was barred at summary judgment. The Court found evidence in the record sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact over whether the SunRiver Plaintiffs had any comparative fault for Carillo’s accident. As for the cross-appeal, the Court vacated the district court’s decision denying attorney fees under section 12-120(3) below because there was not yet a prevailing party. View "Alcala v. Verbruggen Palletizing Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law