Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the adverse grant of summary judgment on her claim under the Equal Pay Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Daugherty Systems, Inc. (“Daugherty”) on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case because almost all her alleged comparators were either paid less than she was or did not perform equal work.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the pay disparity was justified by a legitimate factor other than sex. The court explained that Daugherty’s explanation for the pay differential—the differences in skillsets and experience and the desire to incentivize Plaintiff to grow in the position—is sufficient to satisfy its burden of proving the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex. The court wrote that because “no reasonable jury” could find other than in Daugherty’s favor on the affirmative defense, Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute for trial, and Daugherty has shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Tamara O'Reilly v. Daugherty Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order issued by the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation classifying the in-home direct-care workers of Friendship Supported Living, Inc. as employees rather than independent contractors, holding that the Bureau abused its discretion.Friendship protested the findings of the Bureau in its 2017 premium audit for the 2014-2015 period, arguing that Friendship's in-home direct-care workers were independent contractors rather than employees. The findings were affirmed. Thereafter, Friendship filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the Bureau to classify its in-home direct-care workers as independent contractors and reimburse Friendship for premiums it had made as a result of the Bureau's classification. The court of appeals granted a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court reversed and granted a limit writ of mandamus ordering the Bureau to issue an amended order, holding that the Bureau abused its discretion by failing sufficiently to account for the pertinent factors bearing on the relationship between Friendship and its direct-care workers. View "State ex rel. Friendship Supported Living, Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's complaint stemming from the suspension of his hospital clinical privileges and medical staff membership under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioner, a self-employed physician, held clinical privileges and medical staff membership with Herbert J. Thomas Memorial Hospital Association and Thomas Health System, Inc. (collectively, Thomas Hospital) until they were suspended in 2019. Petitioner brought this action raising claims related to the suspension. The suspension, however, occurred before Thomas Hospital's Chapter 11 bankruptcy confirmation order and reorganization plan. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the complaint. View "Katrib v. Herbert J. Thomas Memorial Hospital Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Advance Auto Parts, claiming unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Advance Auto’s motion for summary judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that here, unlike Green v. Dillard’s Inc., there is no genuine dispute whether Advance Auto acted negligently or recklessly under Section 213. As for Section 213(a), Plaintiff does not allege that Advance Auto made improper orders or regulations. It had a written policy prohibiting discrimination based on any protected status; all employees had to read and familiarize themselves with this policy and complete annual training. The court further explained that Advance Auto is not liable under Section 1981 for discrimination based on its employee’s conduct. Plaintiff’s claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress fail under respondeat superior and ratification. View "Nicolas Tashman v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant for three years between 2017 and 2020. Initially, he was paid hourly and received overtime compensation, but in March 2018, despite no change in job responsibilities, Defendant converted him to a salaried position. In March 2020, Plaintiff gave his two-week notice to Defendant that he would be resigning. Three days later, Defendant terminated him.Plaintiff sued, claiming that Defendant failed to pay him overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 207(a). Defendant sought summary judgment, claiming Plaintiff was exempt from overtime compensation requirements under the Motor Carrier Act exemption as a “mechanic.” The district court agreed, granting summary judgment in Defendant's favor. Plaintiff appealed.Generally, the FLSA requires an employer to pay overtime compensation to any employee working more than forty hours in a workweek. However, as relevant here, under the MCA exemption, the overtime compensation requirement does not apply if “the Secretary of Transportation has [the] power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service” for the employee. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Motor Carrier Act exemption applied due to Plaintiff's position as a mechanic. View "Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Uber under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), claiming Uber willfully misclassified him as an independent contractor rather than an employee, which led to numerous other Labor Code violations. In response, Uber moved to compel arbitration under the “Arbitration Provision” in the “Technology Services Agreement” (TSA).The trial court denied Uber's motion and the Second Appellate District affirmed. However, in June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision when it granted Uber's petition for certiorari in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) ___ U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213 L.Ed.2d 179] (Viking River).Following this posture, the Second Appellate District held 1.) the TSA’s PAGA Waiver is invalid and must be severed from the Arbitration Provision; 2.) under the Arbitration Provision’s remaining terms, Plaintiff must resolve his claim for civil penalties based on Labor Code violations he allegedly suffered in arbitration, and his claims for penalties based on violations allegedly suffered by other current and former employees must be litigated in court; and 3.) under California law, Plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue his non-individual claims in court simply because his individual claim must be arbitrated. View "Gregg v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff opposed a new collective-bargaining agreement that passed by a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff sued the union for breach of its duty of fair representation and a violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. At their core, these claims are about whether the union hoodwinked members into ratifying the new collective-bargaining agreement by concealing what would happen to the 30-and-out benefit. The district court dismissed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act claim, denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification, and granted summary judgment to the union on the fair-representation claim. On appeal, Plaintiff alleged that the union concealed key information, but only nine members said it would have made a difference.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide other evidence that the outcome of the vote would have changed. The court reasoned that the ratification vote was overwhelmingly in favor: 228 to 109, a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff offers only nine members who would have voted “no” if they had known about the elimination of the 30-and-out benefit. Even assuming each would have voted the way he thinks, the agreement still would have passed by a wide margin. The court wrote that no reasonable jury could conclude that the union’s alleged bad-faith conduct was the but-for cause of the union’s ratification of the collective-bargaining agreement. View "Matthew Nagel v. United Food and Com. Workers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employers, Rowley Memorial Masonic Home and Rowley Masonic Assisted Living Community, LLC (collectively, Rowley), as well as the Administrator, and Director of Nursing, for age discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by denying her motion to compel and granting summary judgment to Defendants. She also moved to certify a question of law to the Iowa Supreme Court and to supplement the record under seal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, denied the motion to certify, and granted the motion to supplement. The court held that Plaintiff provided no basis for her speculation that Lemke’s additional answers would yield evidence of age discrimination. In light of the likely minimal relevance of the investigator’s additional answers and the fact that at least some of the information Plaintiff seeks was discoverable from other sources, the court wrote it perceives no abuse of the district court’s discretion and cannot say that its denial of the motion resulted in fundamental unfairness to her. Further, the court held that because Plaintiff cannot create an inference that Defendants’ decisions were motivated by her age, she has failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination View "Inge Smothers v. Rowley Mem. Masonic Home" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fired by John Deere & Co.; he sued Deere for failing to accommodate his disability and discriminating against him in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The district court granted summary judgment to Deere. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment on his disability and failure to accommodate claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case for failure to accommodate because he never requested an accommodation at the relevant time. In fact, Deere encouraged Plaintiff to request accommodations and accommodated him before when he asked. And when Plaintiff returned to work in September 2019, he had been cleared of all restrictions. Because Plaintiff has not shown that Deere knew he needed an accommodation on his return to work, his claim fails. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff has not provided any direct evidence of discrimination that “shows a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.” Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s suggestion that his actions weren’t serious enough to merit his termination “merely questions the soundness of [Deere’s] judgment, and does not demonstrate pretext for discrimination.” View "Michael Winters v. Deere & Company" on Justia Law

Walton filed a class-action complaint against his former employer, alleging that Roosevelt’s collection, use, storage, and disclosure of Walton’s and similarly situated employees’ biometric data violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b), (d). Roosevelt required those employees to enroll scans of their hand geometry onto a biometric timekeeping device as a means of clocking in and out of work. Walton alleged that he was never provided with nor signed a release consenting to the collection, storage, or dissemination of his biometric data; he had never been informed of any biometric data retention policy developed by Roosevelt; and he had never been informed of the specific purpose or length of time for which his biometric information was being stored. Roosevelt argued that Walton’s Privacy Act claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, because Walton was a member of a collective bargaining unit with a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court holding that section 301 preempts Privacy Act claims asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a CBA. Noting federal precedent, the court stated that although there was no reference to biometric information in the CBA, “[t]he timekeeping procedures for workers are a topic for negotiation that is clearly covered" by the CBA and "requires the interpretation or administration of the agreement." View "Walton v. Roosevelt University" on Justia Law