Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Nine female detention service officers sued Dallas County, alleging that this sex-based scheduling policy violates Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. Constrained by our decades-old, atextual precedent, a panel upheld the dismissal of the officers’ complaint, ruling that the discriminatory scheduling policy did not amount to an “ultimate employment decision.”   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that a plaintiff plausibly alleges a disparate-treatment claim under Title VII if she pleads discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, or the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of her employment. She need not also show an “ultimate employment decision,” a phrase that appears nowhere in the statute and that thwarts legitimate claims of workplace bias. Here, giving men full weekends off while denying the same to women—a scheduling policy that the County admits is sex-based—states a plausible claim of discrimination under Title VII. View "Hamilton v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

Hambrick, a black woman born in 1970, has worked at the Social Security Administration (SSA) for nearly 35 years. In 2016, her supervisor reassigned her. Hambrick remained a manager at the same pay scale and grade. Since her transfer, Hambrick alleges she has endured constant negative treatment from her supervisors and peers, amounting to harassment based on her age and race. Hambrick unsuccessfully applied for other roles. For one position, her supervisor hired a younger, white man, explaining that her collaborative skills needed work and her direct supervisor recommended her “with reservations.” Hambrick also complained of her heavy workload, and the quick rise of younger, non-black SSA employees and that her supervisors did not celebrate her lowering the backlog of cases. Hambrick filed Equal Employment Opportunity complaints that were resolved in the SSA’s favor.The district court determined that Hambrick had administratively exhausted the SSA’s failure to promote Hambrick; Hambrick’s lowered performance evaluation; and Hambrick’s non-selection to positions in 2021 as retaliation for her EEO complaints, then concluded that she failed to show unlawful discrimination. The court concluded that the “totality of undisputed facts … consisted of unremarkable workplace disagreements.” Hambrick’s “dissatisfaction with her supervisors, heavy workload, and lack of recognition,” did not create a hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the incidents that Hambrick challenged were severe or pervasive, nor does she show how they relate to the protected characteristics of her race or age. View "Hambrick v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Noncitizens can qualify for employment-based U.S. visas by investing in designated commercial enterprises that create jobs in the United States. After making a qualifying investment, a noncitizen must petition the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for the visa. In these two consolidated appeals, investors who have waited several years for USCIS to approve their petitions sue the agency for what they see as unreasonably delayed action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district courts in both cases granted USCIS’s motions to dismiss, holding that the investors’ allegations do not show USCIS’s delay to be unreasonable under the circumstances.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs do not state a claim of unreasonable delay. The availability-screened queue is a rule of reason, and the complaints do not allege that USCIS follows a process other than its officially stated policy. Ruling in favor of Plaintiffs would require USCIS to process Plaintiffs’ petitions ahead of those of other petitioners who have been waiting as long or longer for their EB-5 petitions to be adjudicated. Congress did not set a deadline for agency action, Plaintiffs allege primarily financial harm, and the allegations do not point to government impropriety. View "Adrian Da Costa v. Immigration Investor Program Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff painted two large murals directly onto the walls inside a building on the campus of Defendant-Appellee Vermont Law School, Inc. The work stirred controversy, which eventually prompted the law school to erect a wall of acoustic panels around the murals to permanently conceal them from public view. Kerson brought suit against the law school, alleging that obscuring his work behind a permanent barrier violated his rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), which creates a cause of action for artists to prevent the modification and, in certain instances, destruction of works of visual art.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that merely ensconcing a work of art behind a barrier neither modifies nor destroys the work, as contemplated by VARA, and thus does not implicate VARA’s protections. The court explained that this case presents weighty concerns that pin an artist’s moral right to maintain the integrity of an artwork against a private entity’s control over the art in its possession. On the facts presented here, the court resolved this tension by hewing to the statutory text, which reflects Congress’s conscientious balancing of the competing interests at stake.  Because mere concealment of the Murals neither “modifies” nor “destroys” them, the Law School has not violated any of VARA’s prohibitions. As such, VARA does not entitle Plaintiff to an order directing the Law School to take the barrier down and continue to display the Murals. View "Kerson v. Vermont Law School, Inc." on Justia Law

The statute at issue in this appeal, 19 Del. C. § 2322F, provided a mechanism for employers and their workers’ compensation carriers to challenge proposed or provided health care services relating to compensable work injuries. An employer sought review of a superior court opinion reversing a decision by the Industrial Accident Board (the “IAB” or “Board”) regarding the reasonableness of a prescribed course of treatment. The IAB initially dismissed this case as moot, but the superior court reversed and remanded that decision in 2019. On remand, the IAB held that the claimant-employee’s ongoing narcotics treatment after June 2017 was unreasonable, unnecessary, and therefore not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The superior court then reversed the IAB again, holding there was no justiciable issue before the Board because the claimant employee had not submitted any medical claims to his employer for ongoing treatment. The employer argued the superior court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the IAB could not consider the compensability of an employee’s ongoing narcotics treatment until the employee submitted invoices for payment to the employer and the employer disputed those invoices in the statutory review process. Because the superior court incorrectly interpreted 19 Del. C. § 2322F with respect to the justiciability of the employer’s petition, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, vacated the attorneys’ fees award, and reinstated the IAB’s determination. View "This and That Services Co. Inc. v. Nieves" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed with prejudice a suit brought by Plaintiff against the Louisiana Twenty-First Judicial District and its former Chief Judge Robert Morrison, concluding that: (1) the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity to be sued; (2) McLin failed to plausibly allege that she was treated differently from anyone else; and, (3) Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her Section 1981 and Title VII claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff sought to meet the racial causation element with the comments made by Brumfield that her “hands are tied” as well as the Chief Judge’s tone and comment stating, “in today’s world that we live in, I have no other choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.” The court wrote that these speculative allegations do not carry the day. Plaintiff issued the public statement “#IWillrunYouOver” in reference to driving her truck over peaceful protestors. Taking all the factual allegations as true, a more reasonable and obvious interpretation than the one put forth by Plaintiff is that her termination had to do with her public threat to run over people. While the district court erred in requiring Plaintiff to make allegations that satisfy the McDonnell Douglas standard, Plaintiff still failed to plead one ultimate element a plaintiff is required to plead: that the termination was taken against her because of her protected status. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not asserted plausible facts meeting the elements of this claim. View "McLin v. Twenty-First Judicial Dist" on Justia Law

While working an IT position at Enterprise Services LLC, Plaintiff said he was discriminated against because he has disability—an arthritic big toe. The company says the issues arose because Plaintiff didn’t work well with others, and actually, didn’t work much at all. Plaintiff says the issues arose because of his alleged disability. After he was fired, he brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act asserting that Enterprise Services discriminated against him because of his toe and retaliated against him for seeking toe-related accommodations. For the retaliation claim, the district court held that Enterprise Services’ only potentially retaliatory act was firing Plaintiff and allowed him to take that claim to trial. But Enterprise Services moved to strike Plaintiff’s jury-trial demand. The district court granted the motion. Following the bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Enterprise Services on the remaining claim because Plaintiff failed to prove he was fired because he asked for disability accommodations.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, while the district court did cite an outdated EEOC regulation when determining he is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he is not disabled under any reasonable reading of the ADA. So that disposes of every claim except retaliation. Second, Burlington Northern makes clear that only “significant” harm to an employee constitutes retaliatory adverse action. And only his termination met that threshold. Third, a straightforward reading of Section 1981a(a)(2) shows that an ADA-retaliation plaintiff is not entitled to legal damages and, therefore not guaranteed a jury trial by the Seventh Amendment. View "Jeffrey Israelitt v. Enterprise Services LLC" on Justia Law

Cenikor Foundation brought an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s determination that collective action of its drug rehabilitation patients may proceed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “the Act”).  Cenikor argued that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether Cenikor’s patients were FLSA “employees.” Appellees argue that the district court properly applied binding Supreme Court precedent to the facts of this case in finding that the employment question may be decided on a collective-wide basis.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the district court utilized Alamo in reaching its decision, it relied on the appropriate legal standard. Its threshold determination that the rehabilitation patients constitute “employees” under the Act because they worked in expectation of compensation was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the court wrote that the district court needed to consider the evidence relating to this threshold question in order to determine whether the economic-realities test could be applied on a collective basis. The court wrote that the district court properly did so based on ample evidence in the record from preliminary discovery. View "Klick v. Cenikor Foundation" on Justia Law

Following workplace-safety regulations, Precision requires its rig hands to wear flame-retardant coveralls, steel-toed boots, hard hats, safety glasses, gloves, and earplugs. The rig hands, wanting to be paid for the time they spend changing into and out of protective gear and for the time spent walking from the rigs’ changing house to safety-meeting locations, sued Precision under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206, 207.Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers need not pay workers for traveling to and from the actual place where they perform the principal activities for which they are employed or for “activities which are preliminary to or post-liminary to said principal" activities, section 254(a). A “principal activity” is “the productive work that the employee is employed to perform” and all activities that are an "integral and indispensable part of the principal activities.” To be integral, a task must be “intrinsic” to the principal activity; it is indispensable when a worker cannot dispense with doing it “if he is to perform his principal activities.”The district court ruled that the oil-rig hands need not be paid for changing gear. The Third Circuit vacated. To determine whether changing is integral and intrinsic, the district court should consider whether workers have the option to change at home, whether changing is required by law, what kind of gear is required, and whether it is reasonably necessary for doing the work safely and well. View "Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp." on Justia Law

Claimant Fran Rancourt appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision granting the request of the carrier, AIM Mutual — NH Employers Ins. Co., for a reduction of the claimant’s benefits from the Temporary Total Disability (TTD) rate to the Diminished Earning Capacity (DEC) rate. At the time of her injury, the claimant was employed as the “vice president of academic and community affairs” for the Community College System of New Hampshire (CCS). The injury occurred when the claimant slipped on ice, hitting her head. She was taken to the hospital where she received 11 staples to close a wound in her head. Three months later, the claimant was assessed by Dr. Glassman, an independent medical examiner, who recommended “partial duty modified work part-time” and physical therapy, and that the claimant see a concussion specialist. He concluded that claimant did “not have the ability to return to full duty work at this time,” but opined that “she could be evaluated for partial duty work, working three to four hours a day, two to three days a week.” In July 2019, claimant was visiting a friend in Maine when she fell stepping into a boat. As a result of the fall, the claimant severely injured her left hamstring, resulting in surgery. She reported that the fall was a result of problems with her depth perception related to her head injury. In March 2020, Glassman performed another independent medical examination to evaluate the extent of claimant’s continuing disability. Glassman reported that claimant continued to suffer from “postconcussion syndrome” as a result of the work injury in 2017. He concluded that claimant “has not returned to her pre-accident status” and “still has ongoing deficits and ongoing symptoms.” He reported that claimant feels about “60% improved,” and that, while “she is being seen by neuro-optometry and speech therapy,” she “has reached maximum medical improvement” for her post-concussion syndrome. It was his opinion that “no further treatment is indicated for the date of injury of November 20, 2017.” In May 2020, the carrier requested a hearing, pursuant to RSA 281-A:48 (2010), seeking to reduce or terminate the TTD indemnity benefits claimant had been receiving. The hearing officer granted the carrier’s request to reduce benefits as it related to claimant’s changed condition. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Rancourt" on Justia Law