Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The trial court granted a motion by the Labor Commissioner to amend a judgment to add Plaintiff as an alter ego judgment debtor. Plaintiff appealed. He contends there was “virtually no evidence” he commingled his assets or operations with those of the judgment debtor; the original judgment was not renewed during the 10-year limitation period; the doctrine of laches bars the alter ego motion; and the denial of an earlier alter ego motion barred the current motion under res judicata principles.   The Second Appellate District affirmed finding no error in the court’s decision to add Plaintiff as an alter ego judgment debtor. The court reasoned that as the trial court observed, “no single factor is determinative, and instead, a Court must examine all the circumstances to determine whether to apply the [alter ego] doctrine.” The court cited Plaintiff’s complete control over Cahuenga, his control of the litigation, his sharing of attorneys, his transfer of the company, and his destruction of relevant records of assets. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff contended in the trial court that the motion to amend the judgment was barred by the doctrine of laches. The trial court implicitly concluded Plaintiff did not carry his burden of proof on that point when it granted the Commissioner’s motion. The evidence does not compel a finding in Plaintiff’s favor as a matter of law. View "Hacker v. Fabe" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)  (the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Statutory Ruling, dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal, and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. As a result, the court wrote it was obliged to dismiss Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacate the Constitutional Ruling. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

While Respondent was employed as a truck driver at Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC (“Greatwide”), he witnessed certain drivers receive additional driving assignments in violation of 49 C.F.R. Section 395.3, which regulates the maximum driving time for property-carrying vehicles. After collecting evidence related to the violations, Respondent submitted anonymous letters to management reporting his findings. Soon thereafter, Respondent revealed to management personnel that he was the author of the letters. The following month, Respondent was assigned to deliver two trailers filled with merchandise to two Nordstrom store locations in Manhattan, New York and Paramus, New Jersey. However, when Respondent returned from this assignment, he was suspended for—what Greatwide claimed to be—violations of company policy. Greatwide subsequently terminated and dismissed Respondent without a more explicit explanation. Respondent promptly filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). Following several lengthy delays, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in Respondent’s favor, ordering Greatwide to pay both back pay and emotional distress damages. The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) affirmed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the ARB’s conclusion that Respondent engaged in protected activity, that his activity was a contributing factor in his termination, and that Greatwide failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent would have been terminated absent his protected conduct. Nor was Greatwide prejudiced by the proceeding’s delays. Finally, the court declined to enforce the alleged settlement agreement because the company failed to challenge the ALJ’s decision before the ARB. View "Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the City and several members of the Inglewood City Council (the council), alleging that after she reported concerns about financial improprieties, the City and the individual defendants defamed and retaliated against her. She alleged causes of action for (1) defamation; (2) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivisions (b) and (c), which prohibit retaliation against an employee based on the employee reporting or refusing to participate in what the employee reasonably believes to be illegal activity by the employer (the section 1102.5 retaliation claim); and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), based both on the alleged retaliation and the alleged defamation. The City and the individual defendants filed a joint special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP, under the antiSLAPP statute. The court granted the motion in part but denied it as to the section 1102.5 retaliation claim and the retaliation-based IIED claim against all Defendants. Defendants appealed, arguing the court incorrectly denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to the retaliation-based claims against the individual defendants.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order on the Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to the extent it denies the motion as to Plaintiff’s Section 1102.5 retaliation claim against the individual Defendants and Plaintiff’s retaliation-based IIED claim against the individual Defendants. In all other respects, the order regarding the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. The court explained that it agrees with Defendants that the section 1102.5 retaliation claim is not legally sufficient because Plaintiff is not an “employee” for the purposes of that statute. View "Brown v. City of Inglewood" on Justia Law

Claimant Semir Mahmutovic appealed a Vermont Department of Labor decision concluding that claimant’s prior employer was not obligated to reimburse claimant for lost wages under 21 V.S.A. § 640(c), and that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to claimant. The Vermont Supreme Court determined that claimant conceded that the Commissioner properly interpreted § 640(c), and further concluded that claimant did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 640(c). View "Mahmutovic v. Washington County Mental Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Desira Johnson, a teacher at the West Des Moines Community Schools (the District), was not subject to individual liability under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) on Plaintiff's claim of constructive discharge, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a teacher's associate who worked with special education students in the District, sued the District and Johnson, alleging that Johnson engaged in racial discrimination, leading to Plaintiff's constructive discharge in violation of the ICRA. The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of the District. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district did not err in overruling Plaintiff's Batson challenge to Defendants' peremptory strike of the only Black potential juror; (2) the district court did not err in granting Johnson's motion for directed verdict for correction of errors at law; and (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error in the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "Valdez v. West Des Moines Community Schools" on Justia Law

In March 2020, O’Brien was censured and suspended for one year from his employment as a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, for violating the Faculty Code of Conduct while attending an overseas conference in 2012 by directing unwanted sexualized conduct at a junior colleague attending the conference, a graduate student at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Although another student referred to the incident in a 2014 discussion with the administration, it was not until 2017 that the alleged victim made a report.O’Brien challenged the disciplinary decision, raising procedural, substantive, and due process objections. The trial court and court of appeal rejected O’Brien’s petition. The University’s rule requiring it to initiate disciplinary action within three years of receiving a report of misconduct does not bar discipline here. The earlier complaint by a different student only briefly touching on the alleged incident between O’Brien and an unidentified female MIT student was not a report of the wrongdoing for which he was disciplined. Substantial evidence supports a finding by the University and the trial court that the MIT student was a “colleague” of O’Brien’s, as the Faculty Code of Conduct uses that term. The disciplinary proceeding was fair and the committee’s findings supported the ultimate result. View "O'Brien v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Groff, an Evangelical Christian who believes that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest, took a mail delivery job with the Postal Service (USPS). USPS subsequently began facilitating Amazon’s Sunday deliveries. To avoid working Sundays on a rotating basis, Groff transferred to a rural USPS station. After Amazon deliveries began at that station, Groff received progressive discipline for failing to work on Sundays. He eventually resigned. Groff sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, asserting that USPS could accommodate his Sunday Sabbath practice “without undue hardship" to its business, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of USPS, reasoning that under Supreme Court precedent, “requiring an employer ‘to bear more than a de minimis cost’ to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.”The Supreme Court vacated. Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantially increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. After tracing Establishment Clause and Title VII jurisprudence, the Court concluded that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Undue hardship is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of the business–a fact-specific inquiry. Courts must consider all relevant factors, including the accommodations at issue and their practical impact, given the nature, size, and operating cost of an employer. Impacts on coworkers are relevant only to the extent those impacts affect the conduct of the business. Title VII requires that an employer “reasonably accommodate” an employee’s practice of religion, not merely assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation. An employer must do more than conclude that forcing other employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship; other options must be considered. View "Groff v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Alaska Airlines’ (AA’s) Collective Bargaining Agreement with its flight attendants required those flight attendants to schedule vacation days in advance. The Department of Labor & Industries (L&I) argued that RCW 49.12.270 displaced the CBA’s mandatory advance scheduling requirement term without explicitly saying so. AA argued that it did not. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with AA: "It takes more to displace a mandatory CBA term than RCW 49.12.270 contains. In fact, RCW 49.12.270 explicitly preserves non-choice-of-leave terms of the CBA and RCW 49.12.290 bars interpreting RCW 49.12.270 to 'reduce any provision in a [CBA].'" The Court therefore held that RCW 49.12.270 did not displace the advance scheduling requirement of the CBA. View "Alaska Airlines v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs' respondeat superior-related claims, holding that the district court correctly held that respondeat superior principles did not make the remaining defendants in this case vicariously responsible for the abuse committed by a physician assistant and that the Utah Physician Assistant Act did not change that conclusion.Plaintiff brought an action against Alta Pain Physicians; Oscar Johnson, a physician assistant; and Dr. Michael Chen, Johnson's supervising physician, alleging that Johnson subjected her to sexual harassment and abuse when she saw him for pain treatment at Alta Pain. After Plaintiff settled her claims against Johnson the district court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Chen and Alta Pain on Plaintiff's claims of sexual assault, sexual battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in entering summary judgment on Plaintiff's respondeat superior-based claims; and (2) Plaintiff did not met her burden of convincing the Court to overturn precedent and use a foreseeability test for plaintiffs to recover against employers of abusive employees. View "Burton v. Chen" on Justia Law