Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Texas Government Code Section 808. He contends that Section 808’s divestment requirement violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing and dismissed his claims against the Texas Comptroller and the Texas Attorney General (collectively, “Defendants”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claims. Article III grants jurisdiction to federal courts only over actions involving an “actual case or controversy.” The court concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged injury is—at most—speculative; he has wholly failed to allege that any risk of economic harm is “certainly impending.” Because Plaintiff cannot show how any investment or divestment decisions will affect his future payments, he cannot show that he has suffered an injury. Further, the court found that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Section 808 causes him an injury by violating his own personal Fourteenth or First Amendment rights. View "Abdullah v. Paxton" on Justia Law

In this appeal arising out of the application of a provision of the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act known as the "assault exception" the Supreme Court held that the assault exception applied and that Relator Deangelo Profit was not entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits under the circumstances of this case.Profit suffered serious injuries when he was attacked at his job site by a mentally ill acquaintance while he was performing his work injuries. Profit sought workers' compensation benefits under Minn. Stat. 176.021, subd. 1, which are to awarded in cases "of personal injury or death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment." The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals concluded that Profit was not entitled to recover benefits under the assault exception. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the assault exception did not apply where the assailant "intended to injure [Profit] because of personal reasons" and his acts were "not directed against the employee as an employee, or because of the employment." View "Profit v. HRT Holdings" on Justia Law

Dr. Bounds was hired for one year beginning in July 2019 as an at-will employee. In February 2020, Dr. Scott stated that Scott would recommend that Bounds's contract be renewed. Scott notified Bounds and others on March 24 that she would email approved contracts and that they had until March 31 to sign and return the contracts. Upon receiving the contract, Bounds noted that her vacation days had been reduced. Scott told Bounds to contact the Board. Later that day, Bounds became ill and was advised to quarantine for 14 days. Bounds testified that she made inquiries to the Board but never received a reply. On April 1, Scott telephoned Bounds, who had not returned the signed contract. Bounds replied that she wanted her attorney to review the agreement. Scott warned that the Board previously had released another administrator who did not sign her contract by the deadline. The following day, Scott advised Bounds that the Board had requested that her position be posted as vacant. On April 14, Bounds was notified that her position had been posted.Bounds filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the Board had deprived her of procedural due process by rescinding her contract and posting her position without notice or the opportunity to be heard. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Bounds did not have a property interest subject to due process protections. Bounds had no enforceable expectation as to her continued employment. View "Bounds v. Country Club Hills School District 160" on Justia Law

In 2015, Levine, an African-American woman, applied for the position of supervisor of customer services at the main post office in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Levine had then worked for USPS for over 27 years, in a variety of positions. USPS did not select Levine for the position. Instead, it hired a white employee, Peare, whom Levine alleges was significantly less qualified than Levine. USPS disputes Levine’s allegations that the failure to hire her was racially discriminatory under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting various factual disputes. Levine met her burden of producing enough evidence to convince a reasonable jury that USPS’s proffered reasons for not promoting her may have been a mere pretext for racial discrimination, so USPS was not entitled to summary judgment. The parties dispute the position’s requirements. Levine possesses three post-secondary degrees and has had seven different awards from USPS. Peare’s formal academic training ended with high school and she had worked for USPS for nearly eight years. Levine provided abundant evidence that she is arguably more qualified for the position than Peare. USPS’s reliance on Peare’s purportedly superior interview warrants similar scrutiny as does USPS’s contention that Peare had more relevant experience than Levine. View "Levine v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Brownsburg Community School Corporation requires its high school teachers to call all students by the names registered in the school’s official student database. Kluge, a teacher, objected on religious grounds to using the first names of transgender students to the extent that he deemed those names not consistent with their sex recorded at birth. After Brownsburg initially accommodated Kluge’s request to call all students by their last names only, the school withdrew the accommodation when it became apparent that the practice was harming students and negatively impacting the learning environment for transgender students, other students in Kluge’s classes and in the school generally, and the faculty.Kluge brought a Title VII religious discrimination and retaliation suit after he was terminated from his employment. The district court granted the school summary judgment, concluding that the school was unable to accommodate Kluge’s religious beliefs and practices without imposing an undue hardship on the school’s conduct of its business of educating all students and rejected Kluge’s retaliation claim.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Kluge’s accommodation harmed students and disrupted the learning environment. No reasonable jury could conclude that harm to students and disruption to the learning environment are de minimis harms to a school’s conduct of its business. View "Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp." on Justia Law

In 2012, Trahanas began working as a technologist in Dr. Schwulst’s laboratory at Northwestern's School of Medicine. Trahanas claims Schwulst made demeaning remarks about her work, mental health, and sexual orientation and that her lab coworkers harassed her. Trahanas did not report the incidents. Trahanas received positive performance reviews from Schwulst, who recommended Trahanas for raises and promotion.Trahanas had been diagnosed with ADHD, depression, and anxiety and decided to take time off. She did not provide advance notice. On February 16, 2015, Trahanas did not report to work. She later emailed Schwulst. Trahanas was granted 12 weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), When her leave expired, Northwestern informed Trahanas that failure to return to work or extend her leave would result in termination. She did not extend leave or return to work. Northwestern terminated her employment.Trahanas sued, asserting a hostile work environment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Trahanas’s voluntary decision not to return to work or extend leave does not amount to a tangible employment action. The court noted Northwestern’s anti-harassment policy and that Trahanas “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities” to avoid harm. Trahanas cannot show that her leave played a motivating factor in Northwestern’s decision to terminate her employment. The court also rejected state law claims. View "Trahanas v. Northwestern University" on Justia Law

Shemran, Inc. (Shemran) appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration of a Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) action brought by a former employee, Blaine Nickson. The motion was based on Nickson’s agreement to arbitrate all individual claims arising from his employment. At the time of the trial court’s ruling, a predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims was unenforceable under Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014). But during the pendency of this appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S.Ct. 1906 (2022), holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted Iskanian in part. The issue before the California Court of Appeal was whether the trial court’s ruling survived Viking River. To this, the Court held it did not: Nickson’s individual PAGA claims are arbitrable. Further, the Court held Nickson's nonindividual PAGA claims should not be dismissed, and remained pending at the superior court. The Court left management of the remainder of the litigation during the pendency of arbitration "to the trial court's sound discretion." View "Nickson v. Shemran, Inc." on Justia Law

The Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) is an agency within the Department of Labor whose mission is to administer the provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (“Mine Act”). The Mine Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”), acting through MSHA, to promulgate mandatory safety and health standards, inspect mines, issue citations and orders for violations of the Act or mandatory standards, and propose penalties for those violations. An inspector for MSHA discovered a crane at Westfall operating on-site with no working service brakes. Eight years after the sentence was deemed a final order, and only after MSHA had begun enforcement proceedings against the operator for failing to pay its delinquent penalties, Westfall filed a motion to reopen the matter. A two-member majority of the Commission granted the motion. The DC Circuit granted the Secretary’s petition for review, reversed the Commission’s decision dismissing Westfall’s motion to reopen as moot, and remanded the case for a prompt disposition. The court explained that the Commission’s decision relies on a ground not raised or addressed by the parties, lacks substantial evidence to support its principal findings, and ignores the potential applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) covering motions to reopen. View "Secretary of Labor v. Westfall Aggregate & Materials, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court reversing the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner denying the claim filed by the husband of a deceased employee for burial expenses and death benefits as the surviving spouse, holding that the district court did not err.Approximately two and a half years into her marriage Wife left her marital home with Husband, accepted a job in a different city, and moved in with a family friend. Husband and Wife never divorced. Wife was subsequently permanently and totally disabled as a result of a work injury and was awarded workers' compensation benefits. Four years later, Wife died from an overdose. Husband filed a claim for burial expenses and death benefits as the surviving spouse. Employer/Insurer denied the claim. The commissioner upheld the denial, concluding that Husband had willfully deserted Wife without any fault by her and thus was not entitled to benefits under Iowa Code 85.42(1)(a). The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was not substantial evidence to support the commissioner's finding that Husband deserted Wife without fault by her under section 85.42(1)(a). View "Blasdell v. Linnhaven, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part an order of the court of appeals in this jurisdictional dispute, holding that the Corporate Defendants intentionally reached out to North Carolina to conduct business activities in the state, and the claims at issue in this case arose from or were related to those activities.After Plaintiff was officially terminated from his employment he brought an action against Individual and Corporate Defendants alleging, inter alia, fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Defendants moved to dismiss the action. The trial court denied the motions. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Corporate Defendants' activities alone were not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction and that Plaintiff's claims did not arise out of, or even relate to, the alleged contacts between Defendants and North Carolina. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision as to Corporate Defendants, affirmed with respect to Individual Defendants, and remanded, holding that the trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants pursuant to the Due Process Clause. View "Schaeffer v. SingleCare Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law