Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

After serving in the United States Navy, Plaintiff became eligible to receive education benefits under the G.I. Bill, which he used to pursue a bachelor’s degree. Plaintiff also sought tuition assistance from his employer, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), under the company’s Employee Education Program, but OPPD denied Plaintiff’s request because his G.I. Bill benefits fully covered his tuition expenses. Plaintiff sued, claiming that OPPD’s denial of company-provided tuition assistance based on his receipt of G.I. Bill benefits amounted to unlawful discrimination under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The district court granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff y has “failed to present sufficient evidence to make” the requisite “threshold showing” that his status as a military veteran was “a motivating factor” in OPPD’s decision to deny him EEP benefits. His discrimination claim under USERRA thus fails, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor. View "Andrew Kelly v. Omaha Public Power District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed rom the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of TrialCard, Inc. (“TrialCard”) on employment claims she brought under Mo. Stat. Section 213.055.1 (“MHRA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (“Section 1981”), and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence is likewise insufficient to establish TrialCard’s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. This Court has noted that “me too” evidence of other discrimination victims can be relevant because “an employer’s past discriminatory policy and practice may well illustrate that the employer’s asserted reasons for disparate treatment are a pretext for intentional discrimination. Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence, however, is insufficient because she has not shown that these individuals received the same discipline under the same circumstances from the same person. Further, the court explained that Cigna repeatedly reached out to Plaintiff and her therapist about obtaining medical certification. Because Plaintiff failed to present evidence to support her FMLA claim, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of TrialCard. View "Lakeitha Boston v. TrialCard, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are food service managers employed by the Independent School District 191 in Burnsville, Minnesota. In 2015, Plaintiffs signed a contract to join the union that represents service workers in the school district, the School Service Employees International Union Local 284. These contracts authorized the school district to deduct monthly union dues from the union member’s paycheck and to send those dues to Local 284 on the union member’s behalf. The employees terminated their membership in the union in March 2020 and later sued the school district and Local 284. They alleged that the deduction of dues from their paychecks violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and also contravened Minnesota law. At issue on appeal is whether a school district and a labor union violated the free speech rights of union members by deducting union dues from employee paychecks.   The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that the school district’s employees failed to state a claim, and the court, therefore, affirmed the judgment dismissing the action. The court explained that the employees’ argument mischaracterizes their choice: they were “faced with a constitutional choice—whether or not to join” the union. They chose to join the union and authorize the school district to deduct dues from their paychecks. They did so in exchange for the benefits of union membership, and they “assumed the risk that subsequent changes in the law could alter the cost-benefit balance of their bargain.” View "Pollyanna Burns v. School Svc Emp Union Local 284" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal of the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the Nebraska Police Standards Advisory Council denying Appellant admission into the basic officer certification training at the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction, and therefore, so did this Court.Appellant sought judicial review of the decision of the Council upholding the denial by the Director of the Training Center of Appellant's application for entrance into basic training for failure to meet the minimum requirements for admission. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Appellant's petition because he failed properly to make the Director a party to the proceedings for review. View "Swicord v. Police Standards Advisory Council" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are three sales representatives who alleged that their employer, a food-products distributor, did not pay them the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”). Their employer defended on the ground that the plaintiffs fell within the Act’s “outside sales” exemption, which excuses overtime pay for employees who work outside the office and whose primary duty is making sales. The district court found that Plaintiffs were owed overtime pay because their employer had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that they came within the outside sales exemption. The court also awarded liquidated damages to Plaintiffs, finding that the employer had not shown objectively reasonable grounds for the challenged pay practices. The court concluded, the Plaintiffs had not shown that their employer willfully violated the Act. Both parties appealed: The employer challenged the district court’s liability finding and its award of liquidated damages, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed the court’s willfulness finding and attendant application of the two-year statute of limitations.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is ample evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that the defendants had only an “aspirational” and not a “concrete” sense of what their sales representatives did and, specifically, their ability to make sales at chain stores. Further, the court explained that the FLSA clearly contemplates as much, establishing as the default rule both the award of liquidated damages – predicated on the absence of objective reasonableness – and a two-year statute of limitations – predicated on a non-willful violation. View "Faustino Carrera v. E.M.D. Sales Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Air Force veteran, appeals from a decision of the Physical Disability Board of Review (“Board”) declining to increase his disability rating, which would entitle him to greater benefits. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that the Board was required to conduct a physical examination before making its decision and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that by arguing that he could not be taken off the List or have his temporary 50% rating lowered until the Air Force conducted a physical examination—an examination that necessarily could not occur until years after his retroactive placement on the List—Plaintiff pushes for an interpretation that would effectively grant a retroactive 50% rating for years to all individuals whose disabilities are reviewed by the Board and fall under Section 4.129. But that defies the purpose of the Board: to ensure accurate disability determinations at the time of a member’s discharge, “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented to the” Board. The court, therefore, rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Board was required to order a new physical examination before making its determination. Ultimately, the court concluded that its decision was supported by substantial evidence, with a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” View "Blair Coleman v. Frank Kendall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a Telecommunications Network Coordinator for the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC). After VDOC fired Plaintiff for declining a random drug test, Garrett sued, alleging that VDOC employees violated his Fourth Amendment rights by applying VDOC’s drug testing policy to him. Defendants asserted qualified immunity and moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, concluding that general constitutional principles clearly establish Plaintiff’s right to be free from suspicionless drug testing.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court wrote that based on the facts as alleged in the complaint here, VDOC has some degree of government interest in drug testing Plaintiff. Whether that interest amounts to a “special need” within the meaning of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a debatable legal question. By baking into its analysis the absence of a sufficient special need, the district court glossed over the central question for immunity purposes: whether every reasonable official in Defendants’ position would understand that VDOC’s proffered interests were not substantial enough to override Plaintiff’s privacy interest. In view of existing law, the constitutionality of Defendants’ drug testing is simply not “beyond debate.” View "Jacoby Garrett v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

This case is one of many arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff was hospitalized with a severe case of COVID-19 in the summer of 2020. She and her husband, Robert Kuciemba, claim he was exposed to the virus while working for Victory Woodworks and that he sickened Mrs. Kuciemba in their home. Plaintiffs sued Victory, alleging that the company’s actions “were a substantial factor in causing” Mrs. Kuciemba’s illness and that Victory is liable for negligently failing to protect its employees from the virus and flouting the public health regulations in place at the time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a diversity action. The panel certified two questions to the Supreme Court of California, which accepted certification and held that (1) California’s derivative injury doctrine—under which workers’ compensation benefits generally provide the exclusive remedy for third-party claims if the asserted claims are collateral to or derivative of the employee’s workplace injury—did not bar Mrs. Kuciemba’s tort claims against Victory; but (2) an employer does not owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees’ household members. Because Victory owed no duty of care to Mrs. Kuciemba, the panel affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the complaint. View "CORBY KUCIEMBA, ET AL V. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a police officer at the Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) in Honolulu, Hawaii. Prior to his termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office alleging sexual and race discrimination, retaliation, and a proposed and later a formal termination. After he was terminated, Plaintiff attempted to file a mixed case appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), seeking to appeal the Army’s termination decision based on the affirmative defense of sexual orientation discrimination. The MSPB upheld Plaintiff’s termination and he filed suit in district court. He alleged that he had been subjected to discrimination based on his sexual orientation (bisexual) and race (Caucasian), retaliated against for protected conduct, and ultimately terminated from his employment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part and remanded. The panel held that the MSPB lacked jurisdiction to consider the pre-termination claims. Neither the text nor the structure of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) supports the theory that the MSPB has pendent jurisdiction to decide factually related claims of discrimination associated with personnel actions outside the list of “particularly serious” actions set forth in 5 U.S.C. 7512. The panel affirmed the district court’s (1) determination that Plaintiff failed to exhaust before the MSPB any other theories of discrimination for his termination besides sexual orientation; (2) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim; and (3) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s CSRA claim, finding that substantial evidence supported the MSPB’s finding that Plaintiff regularly had sex at TAMC during work hours. View "STEVEN CROWE V. CHRISTINE WORMUTH, ET AL" on Justia Law

The owner and CEO of Southern Pines (Pat) recruited Kairys as Vice President of Sales to grow the company’s cryogenic trucking services. Soon after he started the job, Kairys required hip replacement surgery. Kairys had surgery and missed seven days of work. Southern was self-insured. Kairys’s surgery caused its health insurance costs to rise markedly. According to Kairys, after he returned to work, Pat’s brother (the VP) told him to “lay low” because Pat was upset. Four months later, Pat fired Kairys, claiming that Southern had “maxed out” its sales potential in cryogenic trucking. Weeks later, Souther hired a part-time worker in a hybrid role that included work that had been done by Kairys.Kairys sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and state laws. A jury rejected Kairys’s ADA and ADEA claims and returned an advisory verdict for Southern on the ERISA claim.The district court independently considered the ERISA claim and found that Kairys had proved retaliation for using ERISA-protected benefits and interfered with his right to future benefits. The court awarded Kairys $67,500 in front pay and $111, 981.79 in attorney fees. The Third Circuit affirmed. The judgment for Kairys on the ERISA claim was not inconsistent with the jury’s verdict on the other claims and was supported by sufficient evidence. View "Kairys v. Southern Pines Trucking, Inc" on Justia Law