Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

On August 4, 2014, Appellant Donna Javitz became the Director of Human Resources for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Her union-related responsibilities included participating in investigatory meetings for disciplinary matters involving union employees. In March 2015, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME” or “Union”) filed an unfair labor practice charge (“ULP Charge”) with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board against Luzerne County, raising allegations concerning Javitz’s conduct in two investigatory meetings. Paula Schnelly, an administrative assistant in the appellate division of the Luzerne County’s District Attorney’s Office and Union president, attended the investigatory meetings referenced in the ULP Charge as a representative for the Union members. Attached to the ULP Charge were documents in support of the allegations, among them were what appeared to Javitz to be transcripts of the investigatory meetings at issue. The highly detailed nature of the documents, as well as Javitz’s recollection that Schnelly did not take notes during investigatory meetings, gave rise to a suspicion on Javitz’s part that Schnelly recorded the investigatory meeting in violation of the Wiretap Act. Javitz took her concern to the Director of Administrative Services, David Parsnik. Together they took the matter to the Luzerne County District Attorney. The District Attorney stated that she would refer the matter to the Attorney General’s Office to investigate, as Schnelly’s employment in the District Attorney’s office created a conflict of interest. Javitz contended, she learned the County Manager, Robert Lawton, instructed the District Attorney to drop the matter. In October 2015, the Union and County settled the ULP Charge. A week later, Javitz was terminated from her position. Javitz filed suit in federal district court, naming Luzerne County, Lawton, and Parsnik as defendants. Her complaint raised federal and state claims, including a claim under the Whistleblower Law. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court related to the standard that a plaintiff must meet in order to establish a prima facie claim under Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law and whether the Commonwealth Court erred in its application of that standard. The Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court did so err. Its order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Javitz v. Luzerne Co., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying the Health and Human Services Commission's (HHSC) combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs' conduct was not protected by the Texas Whistleblower Act.Plaintiffs sued HHSC under the Act, alleging that they were terminated in retaliation for their good faith reports about violations of law by HHSC to various law enforcement agencies. HHSC responded by filing a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the plea and motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' reports of misconduct could not support a Whistleblower Act claim against HHSC. View "Tex. Health & Human Services Comm'n v. Pope" on Justia Law

On April 7, 2020, Matthew Wallace was hired by the Centreville Police Department, located in the Town of Centreville, Mississippi. In 2021, Wallace was dispatched with a Town of Centreville certified police officer, to a scene involving multiple juveniles riding all-terrain vehicles in the town limits. An altercation occurred; at some point during the altercation, Wallace went to the patrol unit to retrieve the police-issued pepper spray. Upon returning to the scene, Wallace released the pepper spray. Sometime following the incident, one of the juveniles and his mother filed charges against Wallace for simple assault on a minor. The issue presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered around a probable cause hearing pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28. Before the hearing, the State petitioned the circuit court to determine whether Wallace was entitled to a probable cause hearing, alleging Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer. At the hearing, the circuit determined that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing. Wallace moved the circuit court for a probable cause hearing for the same underlying incident. The circuit court denied the motion, finding, again, that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28. Wallace appealed. The Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer who is not certified pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 45-6-11(3)(a) is not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i). Further, the Court held Wallace was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i) because he was not a law enforcement officer as defined by Mississippi Code Section 45-6-3(c). View "Wallace v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint for malicious prosecution against his union, the local chapter, and several individuals associated with the union, holding that Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts for a court to conclude that the dismissal of his criminal case was a favorable termination.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the union's leadership accused him of misusing union funds after he publicly criticized the union's financial waste, leading to his indictment on two felony charges. The State successfully moved to retire the charges for one year, after which the charges were dismissed. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim on the basis that the retirement and dismissal of the criminal charges was not a favorable termination on the merits. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused; and (2) under this standard, Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39" on Justia Law

After being fired by his employer, Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC, Intervenor filed suit in federal district court, alleging that his termination reflected racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Anheuser-Busch filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration of Intervenor’s district court claims, asserting that at the time when he was hired, Intervenor had agreed to be bound by the company’s Dispute Resolution Policy. Intervenor disagreed that he was required to arbitrate his claims. After Anheuser-Busch asked the district court to compel arbitration, Intervenor filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, arguing that Defendant’s efforts to enforce its arbitration agreement contravened the collective bargaining agreement and constituted a unilateral change to the terms of Intervenor’s employment, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the Board’s order dismissing the complaint, vacated the decision of the Board, and remanded for consideration of whether enforcement of the Dispute Resolution Policy against Intervenor would violate the NLRA. The court held that the Board applied an erroneously narrow standard for determining whether Anheuser-Busch’s motion had an illegal objective. The court explained that on remand, the Board should instead determine whether the outcome sought by Anheuser-Busch’s motion— the compelled arbitration of Brown’s Title VII claims under the Dispute Resolution Policy—would violate the NLRA. If the Board decides that the answer to that question is “yes,” it should then order all relief that is appropriate based on Anheuser-Busch’s unlawful conduct. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 947 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Defendant Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the "Company"), which does business as National Grid, is an electric and natural gas utility that operates throughout New York State. According to Plaintiff Local Union 97, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (the "Union"), Defendant agreed to provide to certain retired employees, former members of the Union. The Union filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a). The same day, the Company filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint. The district court granted the Union's motion to compel arbitration, denied the Company's motion for summary judgment, and ordered that the case be closed.   The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the agreement covers the dispute. The court explained that when it negotiated the Agreement, the Union bargained both for health insurance benefits for retired employees and for a grievance procedure that included, where necessary, access to arbitration. The court explained that it expressed no view on the merits of the Union's grievance; that is a question for the arbitrator. But interpreting the collective bargaining agreement in light of the principles the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Granite Rock, it is clear that the parties intended to arbitrate this dispute. View "Local Union 97, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Niagara Mohawk" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sylvester Wince, who is Black, began work as a Hospital maintenance mechanic. In 2010 the Hospital contracted with CBRE. Wince kept his job under the title of Stationary Engineer. Wince is a licensed Stationary Engineer, has a bachelor’s degree, and holds certificates in electricity, air quality, and refrigeration. Collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) governed Wince’s employment. Wince alleges that CBRE denied him a promotion because of his race. Wince’s application for the job was outside CBRE’s usual hierarchy for promotions; the job went to a white man with similar credentials who had gone through that hierarchy. Wince claimed he was the subject of racist slurs and a discriminatory nickname, “Sly.” After Wince told his coworkers he disliked the nickname, they stopped using it. Wince claimed CBRE’s management made comments that revealed racial bias. Wince also alleged that he filed grievances accusing CBRE of denying him holidays, overtime, promotions, and paid time off and that CBRE failed to address them. In 2018 Wince filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which was dismissed. In 2019, Wince quit CBRE for a position at another hospital.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of his claims of racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII; breach of the CBA, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act; and constructive discharge. View "Wince v. CBRE, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's default judgment in a tort action brought against the owner of a boat that Plaintiff was working on at the time of his injury, holding that the district court did not err in granting default judgment and denying Appellant's request for leave to file a late claim under Supplemental Rule F of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.Appellant, a commercial fisherman, filed a complaint in a Massachusetts state court alleging that he was injured while working on a vessel owned by G&J Fisheries, Inc. and that G&J was liable for unseaworthiness and negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104. G&J filed a complaint in the federal district court seeking exoneration from liability under 46 U.S.C. 30501-12 and Supplemental Rule F. The district court enjoined all other lawsuits against G&J pursuant to Supplemental Rule F(3) and then granted default judgment for G&J on the grounds that Appellant failed to file a claim as required under the rule. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting default judgment and in denying Appellant's request to file a late claim under Supplemental Rule F(4). View "G&J Fisheries, Inc. v. Costa" on Justia Law

In these actions to recover underinsured motorist benefits allegedly due under certain automobile insurance coverage provided by the State pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement the Supreme Court held that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the trial court should have reduced one appellant's award by the sums received in settlement of a claim under Connecticut's Dram Shop Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 30-102.The trial court found for Appellants on liability but awarded only a fraction of the damages sought, due in part to the court's rejection of Appellants' PTSD claim. The appellate court reversed in part, concluding that the trial court's failure to reduce Appellants' damages by their dram shop recovery violated the common-law rule against double recovery. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the appellate court (1) properly affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Appellants were not entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits for alleged PTSD; and (2) improperly reversed the judgments insofar as the trial court determined that the State was not entitled to a reduction in the awards for sums received by Appellants in settlement of a dram shop claim. View "Menard v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Board of Review (BOR) affirming the finding of the Office of Judges (OOJ) that Respondent's claim for occupational pneumoconiosis benefits against Petitioner was timely, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.The claims representative for Petitioner's worker's compensation insurance carrier found that Respondent's claim for benefits was filed outside of the pertinent three-year statute of limitations and therefore denied it. The OOJ reversed, ruling that Respondent was not time-barred from filing his claim. Thereafter, the Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board found that Respondent had a ten-percent impairment. The BOR affirmed on the timeliness issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BOR did not clearly err in finding that Respondent filed his occupational pneumoconiosis claim within the three-year limitations period. View "Argus Energy, LLC v. Marenko" on Justia Law