Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission (“CJTC”), the City of Spokane, and others (collectively, the “CJTC Defendants”) moved for summary judgment in the district court on Plaintiff’s state law claims, asserting that they are entitled to statutory immunity under Wash. Rev. Code (“RCW”) 43.101.390(1). The district court denied summary judgment, and the CJTC Defendants appealed.   The Ninth Circuit certified to the Washington Supreme Court the following question: What is the scope of immunity provided by RCW 43.101.390? Specifically, does the provision grant immunity for intentional torts committed in the course of administering the Basic Law Enforcement Academy? View "JOHN CRUZ V. CITY OF SPOKANE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Moore is a male Examination Manager at the SEC's Washington, D.C. headquarters. Two women Examination Managers in that office perform the same work as Moore under similar working conditions. In 2014, the SEC initiated a Pay Transition Program to recalibrate its employees’ pay so that they could receive credit for years of relevant work experience regardless of their SEC hire date. The Program was open to all SEC employees from September 14-October 14, 2014. The women applied for the Program during this open period. Moore did not, due to family-related issues occupying his attention. The SEC permitted 10 other employees with extenuating circumstances to apply for the Program in November-December 2014. Program pay adjustments began taking effect around June 2015; the women’s salaries were increased. In August-September 2016, Moore unsuccessfully tried to apply for the Program.Moore's Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), lawsuit argues that the SEC lacks justification for any Program-related pay differential between him and the women because the application process was unnecessary, given that the SEC always had the necessary information in its records and the SEC had no valid basis for creating, or not extending, an application deadline. The Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal of Moore’s complaint, first overruling its own 2009 decision, Yant, which added an element to the prima facie case–a showing that the pay differential “is either historically or presently based on sex.” The court remanded for consideration on non-Yant grounds. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was denied a bathroom break by his supervisor at a Dallas, Texas, warehouse until he was forced to defecate on himself at his workstation. Plaintiff sued his employer, UPS, for negligent supervision, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court dismissed the first two claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment on the third. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that the district court correctly held that Plaintiff has not met the standard for IIED claims. However, it erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim was preempted by federal law. Further, the court wrote that based on its Erie guess, the court also disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the alleged facts do not constitute an invasion of privacy. The court concluded that the invasion of privacy tort covers the alleged facts. In recent years, there have been troubling reports of industry practices that deny employees adequate bathroom breaks. It is important to clarify that such actions, or similar examples of public humiliation by an exhibition of intimate personal details or actions, are not immune from liability. View "Amin v. United Parcel Service" on Justia Law

While working for Adnet, Inc. (“Adnet”), Defendants learned of a subcontract that Adnet was attempting to win. Thereafter, Defendants, through their own company, submitted a bid for that same subcontract. After Defendants won the subcontract, Adnet brought claims against them for breach of the duty of loyalty, tortious interference with a business relationship, and business conspiracy. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendants did not compete against Adnet, that Adnet did not have a business expectancy in the subcontract, and that, without proof of an underlying tort, there was no business conspiracy. Adnet appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Adnet’s claims for breach of the duty of loyalty and tortious interference with a business relationship. Further, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Adnet’s business conspiracy claim and remanded. The court explained that there is sufficient evidence of a direct competition for the subcontract between Adnet and Defendants while they were working for Adnet to bar a grant of summary judgment to Defendants. A reasonable juror could conclude that employees, like Defendants, breach their duty of loyalty to their employer when they learn of a potential business opportunity through their employment and then participate in direct competition with their employer for that opportunity while still employed. View "Adnet, Inc. v. Rohit Soni" on Justia Law

Jam produces and hosts live events at Chicago-area venues. Over six years ago, Jam’s employees voted to certify the Union as their bargaining representative. Jam filed an objection to the election results, which the National Labor Relations Board overruled. In 2018, the Seventh Circuit instructed the Board to hold an evidentiary hearing on the objection. The Board did so, overruled Jam’s objection again, and again sought enforcement of its order compelling Jam to bargain.The Seventh Circuit granted the application for enforcement, upholding the Board’s approach to analyzing objectionable pre-election benefits. The Board carefully examined the statistical evidence and witness testimony and could reasonably require Jam to show something more than voters receiving a critical period hiring-hall benefit before inferring coercion. The Board properly held that Jam “failed to prove the union provided referrals to the [] voters to which they were not otherwise entitled” and, as a consequence, found it unnecessary to draw an inference of coercion and determined that “even if the increase in job referrals during the critical period were construed as a grant of benefits,” the union’s explanation for the referrals rebutted “any inference of coercive, election-related timing or purpose.” View "National Labor Relations Board v. Jam Productions, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the opinion and order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) awarding permanent partial disability income and medical benefits to Claimant, holding that there was no error.Claimant alleged that his bilateral knee injuries had been caused by cumulative trauma while working exclusively for Employer as a firefighter and EMT paramedic. Following a final hearing, the ALJ determined that Claimant's bilateral knee condition was caused by work-related cumulative trauma and awarded him benefits. Employer appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ did not err in finding that Claimant had sustained an "injury" as defined under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(1); (2) the ALJ's findings regarding causation were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the ALJ's findings of fact were sufficiently specific. View "Lexington Fayette Urban County Government v. Gosper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the arbitrator concluding that the Green Bay Police Department had cause to discipline Andrew Weiss for violating several policies of the Green Bay Police Department and demoted him from his position as a detective to a patrol officer, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers.After an investigation, the Department issued a formal complaint alleging that Weiss violated four Department policies. The Department later issued its disciplinary action determining that Weiss violated several policies and demoting him to a position as a patrol officer. After Weiss's grievance was denied he sought arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that the discipline was warranted and did not violate Weiss's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law when he determined that Weiss was afforded the process he was due under law. View "Green Bay Professional Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting in part and denying in part Cultural Care, Inc.'s motion to dismiss this putative class action alleging violations of Plaintiffs' rights under various state and federal wage and hour laws, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiffs sued Cultural Care, a private company that places au pairs with host families in various states, alleging that the company qualified as an "employer" under the respective states' wage and hour laws and not only failed to pay Plaintiffs what they were owed but that Cultural Care violated the Family Leave Act and other laws. Cultural Care filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that it was shielded from immunity under the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity as set forth in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-22 (1940). The district court dismissed the state law deceptive trade practices claims under Connecticut and Washington law for lack of standing but otherwise denied the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Cultural Care was not entitled to protection under Yearsley at this stage of the litigation. View "Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African American woman, worked as a conductor for Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). During her employment, she belonged to a division of the Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART) union, which maintained a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Amtrak. Plaintiff brought the instant lawsuit pro se. She named Amtrak and the company’s director of employee relations as Defendants, along with three other Amtrak colleagues. Plaintiff asserted state-law claims of breach of contract and tort, as well as a federal claim of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. Defendants moved to dismiss, and Plaintiff moved for summary judgment as well as for leave to amend her complaint. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and denied Plaintiff’s two motions. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to arbitration under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it declines to unwind a statutory scheme without a clear congressional directive to do so. Plaintiff argued that at least her particular claim is not a minor dispute. The mere fact that Plaintiff’s claim arises under Title VII does not disqualify that claim from being a minor dispute within the RLA’s ambit. The thrust of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is that Amtrak deviated from its policies when dealing with her. While Plaintiff’s allegations as to her own treatment are factual, those concerning Amtrak’s policies directly implicate the relevant CBA between Plaintiff’s union, SMART, and Amtrak. That some of Plaintiff’s interpretive disagreements concern the Drug-Free Program does not alter the character of her claim. View "Dawn Polk v. Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a subcontractor for Forney Enterprises, a contractor working for the Pentagon. Forney Enterprises was bonded through the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland. Plaintiff worked as a project manager for Forney Enterprises, supervising others who engaged in manual labor. After Forney Enterprises’ work at the Pentagon was terminated, Plaintiff sued Fidelity to recover the value of the work he had not been paid for. The district court found that his supervisory work did not qualify as “labor” and granted summary judgment for Fidelity.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Under the Miller Act, contractors hired to work on government projects are required to furnish bonds to pay those who provided labor and were not paid as a result of a dispute. But not all work on a government project qualifies as “labor” under the Miller Act. And even when the work qualifies as labor, to claim his piece of the bond, a laborer must sue within one year of completing the labor to recover. Here, the court found that much of Plaintiff’s work was “labor,” the only work he performed within one year of filing suit, a materials inventory, was not “labor.” And no circumstances warrant estopping Fidelity from asserting the statute of limitations. View "Elliot Dickson v. Fidelity and Deposit Company" on Justia Law