Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Midsouth Paving, Inc. ("Midsouth"), and Christopher Nivert petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tallapoosa Circuit Court ("the trial court") to enter a summary judgment in their favor in an action commenced against them by Yvonne Mason. Mason worked for PeopleReady, a temporary staffing agency, at Midsouth jobsites. PeopleReady initially provided Mason with a hard hat, sunblock, water, and a vest with "Midsouth" printed on it, and Mason kept those items in her automobile. At the job site, Midsouth employees directed and supervised Mason's job duties. Mason was working at a Midsouth job site when Nivert unintentionally drove his pilot vehicle into Mason while he was making a three-point turn. Mason's leg was severely injured, and she received multiple surgeries and remained in a hospital and then a rehabilitation facility for over a month. PeopleReady began paying workers' compensation benefits to Mason after the accident and also paid or her continued medical care. Pursuant to the labor-supply agreement, Midsouth was an insured alternate employer under PeopleReady's workers' compensation insurance policy. Mason also filed the underlying lawsuit alleging claims of negligence; wantonness; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and negligence per se. Midsouth's motion for summary judgment was denied, leading to the mandamus relief requested in this case. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found Mason's claims against Midsouth and Nivert were barred by § 25-5-11, § 25-5-52, and § 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of Midsouth and Nivert. View "Ex parte Midsouth Paving, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs, former home-health aides, sued A&L under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), claiming that A&L had paid them less than the correct overtime rate and under-reimbursed their expenses. Plaintiffs may bring such claims on behalf of other “similarly situated” employees. 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The plaintiffs sought to facilitate notice of their action to three groups of other employees who had worked for A&L. The court adopted a two-step procedure under which it would facilitate such notice following “conditional certification,” which required a “modest factual showing” that the other employees are “similarly situated” to the original plaintiffs. When merits discovery is complete, the court must grant “final certification” for the case to proceed as a collective action. The court applied that “fairly lenient” standard, and “conditionally certified” two groups for receiving notice. The court declined to facilitate notice to employees who had left A&L more than two years before or who had signed a “valid arbitration agreement” with A&L.On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the lenient standard, vacated the notice determination, and remanded for redetermination of that issue under the strong-likelihood standard. The court noted that the decision to send notice of an FLSA suit to other employees is often dispositive, in the sense of forcing a settlement. As a practical matter, it is not possible to conclusively make “similarly situated” determinations as to employees who are not present in the case. View "Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and, as a condition of employment, was required to get a flu vaccine. Plaintiff sought an exemption based on a medically recognized contraindication, presenting a doctor's note that recommended she avoid the vaccine based on her history of cancer and general allergies. However, neither of these was a medically recognized contraindication, and Defendant terminated her employment.Plaintiff filed suit under the FEHA for disability discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in Defendnat's favor, plaintiff appealed.The Second Appellate District affirmed, finding that Defendant did not engage in disability discrimination and that Defendant's reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment was legitimate and lacked pretext. Further, the court rejected Plaintifff's retaliation claim. View "Hodges v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then a conductor and now an engineer for Union Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”), brought this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when Union Pacific refused Plaintiff’s requests that he be allowed to bring his Rottweiler service dog on board moving Union Pacific freight trains as a reasonable accommodation to ameliorate the effects of Plaintiff’s undisputed disabilities, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and migraine headaches resulting from his prior service in the military. At the end of a week-long trial, the district court denied Union Pacific’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury then returned a verdict for Plaintiff, awarding compensatory but not punitive damages. The district court granted Union Pacific’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed that “benefits and privileges of employment” (1) refer only to employer-provided services; (2) must be offered to non-disabled individuals in addition to disabled ones; and (3) does not include freedom from mental or psychological pain. Further, the court noted that mitigating pain is not an employer-sponsored program or service. As such, providing a service dog at work so that an employee with a disability has the same assistance the service dog provides away from work is not a cognizable benefit or privilege of employment. View "Perry Hopman v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a security guard, alleged that his employer set two different “regular rates” and that one of those rates was an artificial one that his employer designed to avoid complying with the FLSA’s overtime-compensation requirement. When Plaintiff became a security guard for Defendant Regional Security Services, Inc., his established regular rate was $13.00, and he typically worked a forty-hour week. But seven months after Regional Security first started scheduling Plaintiff to work overtime, it reduced his rate to $11.15 per hour. Regional Security then stopped scheduling Plaintiff to work overtime hours and, at the same time, restored his non-overtime pay rate to $13.00 per hour. At issue is whether Plaintiff’s “regular rate” was $13.00 per hour or $11.15 per hour during the year or so that he worked overtime hours and earned $11.15 per hour.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff’s allegations support his theory that Regional Security set an artificial $11.15 rate during the year that it scheduled him to work significant overtime hours so that it could avoid paying him $19.50 for his overtime hours. During the year that Plaintiff worked significant overtime hours, his reduced $11.15 rate caused him to earn on average $13.00 per hour for all sixty hours in a sixty-hour workweek. Plus, Regional Security immediately reverted to paying Plaintiff’s $13.00 rate when it stopped scheduling him to work overtime hours. Accordingly, the court held that these allegations plausibly support Plaintiff’s claims. View "David Thompson v. Regions Security Services, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer Xceed Financial Credit Union (Xceed) for wrongful termination and age discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The case was submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. The arbitrator granted summary judgment in favor of Xceed on the ground Plaintiff’s claims were barred by a release in her separation agreement. The arbitrator rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that the release violated Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits pre-dispute releases of liability in some circumstances. Plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing an illegal release. The trial court denied the motion to vacate and entered judgment confirming the arbitration award.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the arbitrator’s ruling for clear error. The arbitrator correctly ruled the release did not violate Civil Code section 1668. Plaintiff signed the separation agreement after she was informed of the decision to terminate her but before her last day on the job. At the time she signed, she already believed that the decision to terminate her was based on age discrimination and that she had a valid claim for wrongful termination. The alleged violation of FEHA had already occurred, even though the claim had not yet fully accrued. Accordingly, the release did not violate section 1668 because it was not a release of liability for future unknown claims. View "Castelo v. Xceed Financial Credit Union" on Justia Law

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) provides for collective bargaining between federal agencies and their employees’ unions and establishes the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to investigate and adjudicate labor disputes, 5 U.S.C. 7101. The Union represents federal civil-service employees (dual-status technicians) who work for the Ohio National Guard. After their prior collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) expired, the Guard, the Ohio Adjutant General, and the Ohio Adjutant General’s Department (petitioners) asserted that they were not bound by the FSLMRS. The Union filed a complaint with the FLRA. An ALJ concluded that the FLRA had jurisdiction over the Guard; the dual-status technicians had collective bargaining rights under the FSLMRS; and repudiating the CBA violated the FSLMRS. The Sixth Circuit upheld the decision.The Supreme Court affirmed. A State National Guard acts as a federal agency for purposes of the FSLMRS when it hires and supervises dual-status technicians serving in their civilian roles. When the Guard employs dual-status technicians, it exercises the authority of the Department of Defense, an agency covered by the FSLMRS. The statutory authority permitting the Ohio Adjutant General to employ dual-status technicians as civilian employees in the federal civil service is found in 5 U.S.C. 2105(a)(1)(F). Dual-status technicians are ultimately employees of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, and the petitioners are the Secretaries’ designees for purposes of dual-status technician employment. View "Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Meyer Electric Company on John Lisle's claim that Meyer Electric violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.780 by refusing to hire him because he exercised his chapter 287 rights during his prior employment relationship with the company, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Lisle argued that the circuit court misapplied the provisions of section 287.780 by requiring him to establish that he was an "employee" at the time Meyer Electric discriminated against him for exercising his workers' compensation rights. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) as strictly construed, section 287.780 gives an employee a civil action for damages against his or her employer for discharging or discriminating against the employee while employed because the employee exercised a right established under chapter 287; and (2) because it was an uncontroverted material fact that Lisle was not an employee of Meyer Electric when it refused to hire him, Meyer Electric established its right to judgment, as a matter of law. View "Lisle v. Meyer Electric Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Hazard Association (“NC OSHA”) issued several itemized citations to Industrial Services Group (“ISG”) following the on-site deaths of two ISG employees. Soon thereafter, ISG filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against two North Carolina state officials, Josh Dobson, the North Carolina Commissioner of Labor and acting Chief Administrative Officer for the North Carolina Department of Labor (“NCDOL”), and Kevin Beauregard, the Director of NCDOL’s Occupational Safety and Health Division, (collectively “Defendants”). ISG alleged that the issued citations were unlawful because they stemmed from North Carolina’s occupational health and safety plan, which in their view, violates 29 U.S.C. Section 657(h) of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”). The district court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for judgment on pleadings, holding that they were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity because ISG’s claims satisfied the Ex Parte Young exception.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Defendants Eleventh Amendment immunity and decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over Defendants’ newly-raised claims. Here, ISG’s Complaint alleges that the NC State Plan has and continues to violate the OSH Act. It also claims that Dobson and Beauregard, who in their official capacities are responsible for overseeing NCDOL’s implementation of the NC State Plan and its conformity with federal law, are accountable for the unlawful employee evaluation practices. Relying on that, the Complaint does not seek action by North Carolina but rather by the named Defendants who are at the helm of the NC State Plan’s operation. Thus, the individuals were properly named as such in this suit. View "Industrial Services Group, Inc. v. Josh Dobson" on Justia Law

On January 6, 2014, Defendant Genting New York LLC, d/b/a Resorts World Casino New York City ("Genting"), closed the Aqueduct Buffet (the "Buffet"), a restaurant located inside the Resorts World Casino (the "Casino") where Plaintiffs worked. Genting gave Plaintiffs no notice of the closure, which took effect the same day and resulted in 177 employees being laid off. The next week, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Genting, alleging that its failure to provide notice violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the "WARN Act"), and New York Labor Law Section 860 et seq. (the "New York WARN Act"). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied Plaintiffs' motion and granted Genting's. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Genting because, they claim, a reasonable jury could only conclude that the Buffet was either an operating unit or a single site of employment under the WARN Acts.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court explained that Genting is not entitled to summary judgment because a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the Buffet was an operating unit. Likewise, there is also evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the Buffet was not an operating unit. It will be for the finder of fact at trial to weigh the evidence comprising the "somewhat mixed" record in this case to answer the question. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Genting and in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims under the WARN Acts. View "Roberts v. Genting" on Justia Law