Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Terrence Richard, a brakeman for Union Pacific Railroad Company, fell from a train and broke his leg while working. He sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). Richard claimed that the locomotive engineer’s mishandling of the train caused a surge that led to his fall. Union Pacific argued that Richard fell because he was improperly positioned on the train. The trial court excluded the testimony of Richard’s expert, Richard Hess, a retired Union Pacific engineer, who would have testified that the engineer’s actions caused the surge.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Union Pacific’s motion in limine to exclude Hess’s testimony, finding that Hess lacked the necessary qualifications. The jury returned a special verdict for Union Pacific, finding the company was not negligent. Richard appealed, arguing that the exclusion of Hess’s testimony was erroneous and prejudicial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Hess’s testimony. Hess had extensive experience relevant to the subject matter and his testimony would have been helpful to the jury. The exclusion of Hess’s testimony was prejudicial because it left Richard without a witness to testify about the locomotive engineer’s actions and their potential danger.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment for Union Pacific and remanded the matter for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Hess’s expert testimony and that the error was prejudicial to Richard’s case. View "Richard v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Eva Osborne, the plaintiff, sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct by Slap during her four years as his executive assistant. The claims included discrimination, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent harassment and retaliation, and wage and hour violations. Slap later filed a cross-complaint against Osborne, alleging libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with contractual relations, and negligence based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that her statements were protected activity and rejecting Slap’s arguments that they were extortionate and illegal. The court held that Slap could not establish minimal merit in his claims because Osborne’s statements were both absolutely and conditionally privileged under Civil Code section 47, and Slap failed to show malice to overcome the conditional privilege. Slap appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court rejected Slap’s attempt to invoke an exception to the anti-SLAPP statute for activity that is illegal as a matter of law. The court concluded that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims, preventing him from meeting his burden under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to show his claims had minimal merit. The court did not address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding the conditional privilege, malice, or the prima facie showing on Slap’s claims. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jeannine Bedard, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer, refused to comply with the City of Los Angeles’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate and did not sign a “Notice of Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination Policy Requirements.” Consequently, the Chief of Police sought to terminate her employment. The LAPD Board of Rights reviewed the proposed discipline, found Bedard guilty of failing to comply with conditions of employment, and upheld her discharge. The Board also found that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not providing sufficient time to respond to the charges, awarding her back pay, which the City did not pay.Bedard filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the disciplinary action was procedurally and legally invalid and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The trial court found the termination justified but agreed that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not giving her enough time to respond. The court awarded her back pay but upheld her termination.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bedard’s termination was justified due to her refusal to comply with the vaccination mandate, which was a condition of her employment. The court found substantial evidence supporting that Bedard’s refusal to vaccinate, not just her refusal to sign the Notice, was the basis for her termination. The court also held that the penalty of termination was not an abuse of discretion given the public health implications of her refusal to vaccinate. Additionally, the court agreed that the Skelly violation entitled Bedard to back pay but did not warrant reinstatement. The judgment was affirmed. View "Bedard v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Julian Rodriguez, an hourly machine operator for Lawrence Equipment, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit in December 2015 alleging various wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor Code. Rodriguez claimed that Lawrence failed to pay for all hours worked, provide adequate meal and rest breaks, issue accurate wage statements, and pay final wages timely. In July 2014, Rodriguez had signed an arbitration agreement with Lawrence, which led to the arbitration of his non-PAGA claims. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Lawrence, finding that Rodriguez failed to prove any of the alleged Labor Code violations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment in favor of Lawrence. Rodriguez appealed the judgment, but it was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Subsequently, Lawrence moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Rodriguez's remaining PAGA claim was barred by issue preclusion because the arbitrator had already determined that no Labor Code violations occurred. The trial court initially denied the motion but later granted it after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, which influenced the court's interpretation of PAGA standing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the arbitrator's findings precluded Rodriguez from establishing standing as an aggrieved employee under PAGA. The court concluded that issue preclusion applied because the arbitrator's decision was final, the issues were identical, actually litigated, and necessarily decided, and the parties were the same. Consequently, Rodriguez lacked standing to pursue the PAGA claim, and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Rodriguez v. Lawrence Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law

Marlon Quesada, a deputy sheriff with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, was not promoted to sergeant despite taking the sergeant's examination in 2017 and 2019, scoring in band two and band one respectively. Quesada had a mixed employment record, including two suspensions for misconduct and a 2015 investigation that was terminated due to the statute of limitations. Quesada claimed the Department improperly considered this time-barred investigation during the promotion process.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Quesada's petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department to promote him and provide back pay and other damages. The trial court rejected Quesada's argument for a burden-shifting approach and found that Quesada did not establish that the Department's decision was illegal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Quesada argued that the trial court should have applied a burden-shifting approach similar to that used in discrimination cases under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. The appellate court declined to adopt this approach, noting that Quesada's case did not involve discrimination based on race or membership in a historically oppressed group. The court emphasized that the standard approach to civil litigation, where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, was appropriate.The appellate court also found substantial evidence supporting the Department's decision not to promote Quesada, citing his mediocre performance evaluations and past misconduct. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Quesada's policy arguments did not justify a departure from the standard legal approach. View "Quesada v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

The case involves the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) challenging the County of Los Angeles and its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) over the implementation of Penal Code sections 13670 and 13510.8. These sections, effective January 1, 2022, prohibit law enforcement gang participation and authorize revocation of peace officer certification for serious misconduct, including gang participation. On May 12, 2023, the OIG sent letters to 35 Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) deputies, directing them to participate in interviews about law enforcement gangs and to display and provide photographs of certain tattoos. ALADS filed an unfair labor practice claim and sought injunctive relief, arguing that the interviews violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Ordinance (ERO).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the OIG from conducting the interviews until the County completed its meet-and-confer obligations under the MMBA or until the unfair labor practice claim was adjudicated. The court found that the interview directive had significant and adverse effects on the deputies' working conditions, thus triggering the duty to meet and confer.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the OIG’s interview directive, which required deputies to disclose their own and their colleagues' gang affiliations under threat of discipline, had significant and adverse effects on working conditions. The court held that these effects necessitated bargaining under the MMBA. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the interim harm, noting the lack of compelling need for immediate investigation and the potential irreparable harm to ALADS from the County’s failure to meet and confer. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

In 2013, Dr. Johnathan Slone began working as a general surgeon at El Centro Regional Medical Center (Center) on a locum tenens basis. Despite not being board-certified, he was granted full staff privileges in January 2015. In April 2016, Slone became an employee of the Imperial Valley MultiSpecialty Medical Group (IVMSMG) and later entered into a contract with Community Care IPA (IPA) to provide healthcare administrative services. By July 2017, Slone had not been paid by IVMSMG for several months and subsequently resigned, citing financial reasons and the Center's requirement for future board certification. He then began working full-time for IPA and did not perform any surgeries thereafter. In September 2017, the Center suspended his privileges for failing to complete medical records, and by March 2018, his suspension was deemed a voluntary resignation.Slone filed a lawsuit against the Center in February 2021, alleging unlawful retaliation under Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 after he reported concerns about patient care. The case proceeded to a bench trial on this cause of action. The trial court found in favor of the Center, concluding that Slone did not suffer retaliation and had not proven any economic or noneconomic damages.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Slone did not meet his burden on appeal. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings that the Center did not retaliate against Slone for his complaints about patient care. The court also upheld the trial court's findings that Slone voluntarily resigned from his surgical practice to pursue a full-time administrative role with IPA and did not suffer any damages as a result of the alleged retaliation. View "Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Dustin Clover sustained injuries while removing irrigation drip tape from a seed field while working for Crookham Company in 2018. Clover filed a complaint against Crookham, alleging that his injuries fell within an exception to the exclusive remedy rule under the Worker’s Compensation statutes, which allows for a separate civil action if the employer commits an act of “willful or unprovoked physical aggression.” Crookham moved for summary judgment, arguing that Clover failed to provide evidence supporting his claim. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Crookham. Clover’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading to this appeal.The district court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho found that Clover’s injuries occurred during the course of his employment and were covered by worker’s compensation. The court concluded that Clover did not present sufficient evidence to show that Crookham’s actions fell under the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The court noted that there were no prior incidents or complaints about the drip tape lifter’s safety and that Crookham had used the equipment for nine seasons without injury.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Clover failed to demonstrate that Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge that the drip tape lifter was unsafe. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence and denying Clover’s motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that Clover did not present new facts sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. Consequently, the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration were affirmed. Crookham was awarded costs as the prevailing party on appeal. View "Clover v. Crookham Company" on Justia Law

An employee of Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center–El Paso applied for the position of chief of staff to the university president but was not selected. Instead, a significantly younger candidate was chosen. The employee alleged that she was not selected due to age discrimination, in violation of Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The university argued that the president hired the more qualified candidate and that there was no evidence of pretext for discrimination.The trial court denied the university’s plea to the jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the age-discrimination claim. The court of appeals held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether age was a motivating factor in the university’s decision not to select the employee for the chief-of-staff position. However, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision regarding the retaliation claim, which the employee did not challenge further.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the employee did not present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the university’s stated reasons for not selecting her were a pretext for age discrimination. The court concluded that the university’s reasons for hiring the younger candidate were legitimate and nondiscriminatory, and the employee failed to show that these reasons were false or that age was a motivating factor in the decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals’ judgment regarding the age-discrimination claim and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER-EL PASO v. FLORES" on Justia Law

Christina Leeper entered into an independent contractor agreement with Shipt, Inc. to provide services as a Shipt shopper. The agreement included an arbitration clause requiring all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration. Leeper filed a complaint against Shipt and its parent company, Target Corporation, under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging that Shipt misclassified her and other workers as independent contractors, violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Leeper sought civil penalties and injunctive relief on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shipt and Target's motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that Leeper's PAGA action did not include any individual claims subject to arbitration under the parties' agreement. The court concluded that the action was solely a representative PAGA suit without any individual causes of action to compel to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that every PAGA action necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim based on the unambiguous statutory language and legislative history. Consequently, the court directed the lower court to issue a new order compelling arbitration of Leeper's individual PAGA claim and staying the litigation of the representative PAGA claim portion of the lawsuit. The appellate court awarded costs on appeal to Shipt and Target. View "Leeper v. Shipt, Inc." on Justia Law