Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are two women, Elwood Staffing Services, Inc., placed at a job site working for Schlumberger, Ltd. A senior coworker at their site was a lesbian who sexually assaulted one of the women and harassed the other. Plaintiff submitted a complaint about sexual harassment, and Schlumberger terminated her. The other Plaintiff later resigned. Together, the women filed suit in federal court alleging violations of Title VII. The district court entered a mixed summary judgment order, finding the women had viable claims against Schlumberger but releasing Elwood from the suit. Schlumberger subsequently settled with Plaintiffs at mediation. The women challenged the order to the extent it granted summary judgment in Elwood’s favor on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff does not provide evidence that Elwood knew what was happening to her in the gun shop. She did not report the discrimination and abuse she experienced to Elwood. And a report would not have been and was not a wasted action. Nor does she provide evidence that Elwood should have linked the other Plaintiff’s complaints to other employees. At best, she has shown that Elwood had good reason to ask Schlumberger some questions, which, of course, it did. But that does not meet the applicable knowledge element in her cause of action. The court concluded that Elwood did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the hostile work environment experienced by Plaintiff. The court concluded that Plaintiffs sought to hold the wrong party liable for their injuries. They cannot establish why Elwood should be held responsible for the misconduct of Schlumberger’s employees. View "Arredondo v. Elwood Staffing Svc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment on his claims that his former employer, ADESA Missouri, LLC (ADESA), discriminated against and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court concluded that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether ADESA’s reasons for terminating him were pretext for disability discrimination and retaliation. The court agreed with Plaintiff’s assertion that a reasonable jury could determine that the company’s VP made the decision to terminate Plaintiff  because of his medical restriction and only retroactively claimed a performance-based concern after HR advised her that terminating an employee due to his disability could be “an issue.” The evidence shows that the VP sent an email to HR about an employee with a “medical restriction” who had been “identified” for termination, asking if this could be “an issue.” Only after she learned that it could be a problem did the VP respond with specific criticisms of his performance. ADESA argues that because Plaintiff does not dispute he was underperforming compared to his peers, there can be no pretext. But neither the sales director nor the VP was able to say when they took these performance assessments into consideration. Thus, the court concluded that Plaintiff has raised genuine doubt as to ADESA’s proffered reasons for his termination. View "Roby Anderson v. KAR Global" on Justia Law

In this collective action, a group of 2,519 EMTs and paramedics allege that their employer, the City of New York, willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by requiring them to perform work before and after their shifts without paying them for that work unless the plaintiffs specifically requested overtime compensation from the City. The district entered a $17.78 million judgment against the City. The City appealed, raising four arguments: (1) the jury’s liability verdict cannot stand because plaintiffs failed to request overtime pay for the work at issue; (2) the jury’s willfulness finding was not supported by the evidence; (3) due to an erroneous instruction, the jury failed to make a necessary factual finding regarding the calculation of damages; and (4) the district court incorrectly forbade the jury from considering whether one component of the plaintiffs’ post-shift work was de minimis and therefore noncompensable. The City accordingly asked that the court reverse the jury’s verdict or remand for a new trial on damages.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, each factor weighs against deeming plaintiffs’ post-shift work de minimis. First, post-shift work was very easy to record: CityTime already does, recording to the minute each post-shift sliver an EMT or paramedic spends at the station. Second, the court explained that the size of the claim favors plaintiffs. The City focuses exclusively on how much time the claimed work takes per day, but the proper inquiry is the amount of time claimed “in the aggregate.” Finally, plaintiffs’ post-shift work occurred regularly—the tasks had to be performed every day. View "Perry v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Director of the Arkansas Division of Workforce Services (“DWS”) in her official capacity, alleging discrimination on the ground of national origin under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Director.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff insists her prima facie case is strong enough to establish pretext. However, the court wrote that even if Plaintiff had presented a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, she has nonetheless failed to carry her burden under McDonnell Douglas of showing the reasons for her bureaucratic troubles were a pretext for intentional discrimination. Plaintiff also argued the district court erred by rejecting her alternative request to apply a deliberate indifference standard when analyzing her Title VI claim. However, the court wrote that even assuming for the sake of argument that the deliberate indifference standard applies, in light of the court’s conclusion under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact under the “high standard” of deliberate indifference. View "Maria Murguia v. Charisse Childers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award of $21,643.65 in attorney fees and costs to DAPCPA RPO, a full-service public accounting firm, after the court concluded that Defendant breached a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) and a covenant not to solicit, holding that there was no error.Defendant, a former employee of DAPCPA RPO, formed a new firm and provided services to former DAPCPA RPO clients. DAPCPA RPO filed suit, alleging several claims. The district court granted summary judgment for DAPCPA RPO in part, concluding that the parties' PSA and covenant not to solicit were valid and enforceable contracts and that Defendant breached them. Ultimately, the Court awarded DAPCPA RPO a total of $21,643.65 in attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that DAPCPA RPO was entitled to its fees and costs. View "Hensel v. DAPCPA RPO LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this administrative appeal brought by Brittain Kovac from a final decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor of Regulation's Reemployment Assistance Division (RAD) determining that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over this administrative appeal.An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Kovac was ineligible to have received $20,278 in federal pandemic unemployment benefits and ordered her to repay them. Kovac attempted to filed notices of appeal, but the pleadings were returned unfiled for not meeting the requirements set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 1-26-31. Kovac then appealed with assistance of counsel. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Kovac's failure to timely perfect an appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a notice of appeal is considered filed under section 1-26-31 on the date of receipt by the clerk of courts' office, regardless of the date the office formally accepts notice of appeal; and (2) Kovac's notice of appeal was sufficient to constitute a timely "filing" under the statute. View "Kovac v. S.D. Reemployment Assistance Division" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by UPS Supply Chain Solutions and United Parcel Services, Inc. and dismissing this wage-and-hour class action, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether Kentucky should adopt the federal law contained in 19 U.S.C. 254, which exempts from compensation certain activities, and engraft it into the state's wage and hour law. Specifically at issue was what impact the law will have an UPS workers who undergo security screenings at the beginning and end of their shifts. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals and circuit court in this case, holding that preliminary and postliminary security screenings required by UPS were not compensable under Ky. Rev. Stat. 337. View "Hughes v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the administrative law judge's (ALJ) conclusion that medical providers did not have to submit their medical billing statements until after a determination of liability, holding that the statute is unambiguous.At issue was whether P&P Construction, Inc. and, by extension, the company's insurer, Kentucky Employers Mutual Insurance (KEMI), was responsible for payment of medical billings statements submitted outside of the forty-five-day period set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.020(4). The ALJ and Board determined that medical providers do not have to submit their billings until after a determination of liability. The court of appeals reversed, holding that medical providers are required to submit their billings within forty-five days of service, regardless of whether a determination of liability has been made, and therefore, employers and their insurance carriers are not responsible for payment of billings submitted after the forty-five day period. The Supreme Court, holding that under the unambiguous language of the statute, medical service providers must submit their billings within forty-five days of treatment, and such requirement applies both pre- and post-award. View "Farley v. P&P Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

North Coast Village Condominium Association (the Association) filed a workplace violence restraining order in support of its board president, Neil Anderson, and 46 other employees and board members seeking to restrain resident, defendant-appellant Nancy Phillips. At the conclusion of a three-day hearing, the trial court denied the Association’s request. It then sua sponte and absent a request to amend the pleadings by either party, awarded Anderson a civil harassment restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 against Phillips “in the interest of judicial efficiency and conforming pleadings to proof.” In so doing, it impliedly amended the pleadings to add Anderson as a party. Phillips appealed, requesting that the Court of Appeal reverse the order granting the civil harassment restraining order and enter judgment dismissing all restraining orders with prejudice. The Association filed a cross-appeal seeking reversal of the order denying the workplace violence restraining order. It also requested that the Court reverse and remand with instructions to enter a restraining order that included stay-away orders. The Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte amending the cause of action and petitioning party without adequate notice. Regarding the cross-appeal, the Court further concluded the trial court erred in interpreting and applying section 527.8. The order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "North Coast Village Condominium Assn. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Allstates, a full-service industrial general contractor, employs people throughout the country, subject to the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act. Allstates must comply with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) workplace safety standards. It has been the subject of enforcement actions, including a $10,000 fine for a 2019 catwalk injury. In a facial challenge to the OSH Act, Allstates argued that, because the only textual constraint on setting workplace-safety standards is that they be “reasonably necessary or appropriate,” 29 U.S.C. 652(8), OSHA does not have the constitutional authority to set those standards and employers do not have a duty to comply with OSHA’s standards. Allstates sought a permanent nationwide injunction. The district court granted the government summary judgment, reasoning that the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” standard provided an “intelligible principle” to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine because the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld similar delegations.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding OSHA’s delegation constitutional. The Act provides an overarching framework to guide OSHA’s discretion, and the Act’s standards comfortably fall within limits previously upheld by the Supreme Court. “To require more would be to insist on a degree of exactitude which not only lacks legal necessity but which does not comport with the requirements of the administrative process.” View "Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC v. Su" on Justia Law