Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Privette doctrine limits a property owner’s potential liability for on-the-job injuries sustained by employees of an independent contractor. An exception to the Privette doctrine’s rule of nonliability in cases where: “(1) [the property owner] knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” Plaintiff-appellant Travis Blaylock argued the trial court erred by failing to recognize there was a triable issue of fact about whether DMP 250 Newport Center, LLC, the owner of the premises on which he was injured, and DMP Management, LLC, the owner’s property manager (collectively DMP) knew or should have known of the allegedly concealed hazardous condition — an access panel in the floor of the crawl space in which he was working—that he fell through. The Court of Appeal found no error: while the evidence submitted by Blaylock might be sufficient to demonstrate DMP should have known the access panel existed, there was no evidence it knew or should have known the panel was either concealed from a person in the crawl space above, or that it was hazardous. View "Blaylock v. DMP 250 Newport Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court in this declaratory judgment suit, holding that a corporate resolution did not authorize the law firm to redeem a departing shareholder's shares on terms unilaterally set by the firm's founders.Under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code 21.801 , a professional corporation may redeem corporate shares, which are personal property, if one of three conditions is met. After the firm in this case terminated a shareholder's employment the founders purported to redeem his shares at no cost. The trial court concluded that a resolution generally authorizing the founders to take affirmative action on behalf of the firm unambiguously encompassed redemption. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the resolution did not authorize redemption of the departing shareholder's shares on terms dictated by the founders. View "Skeels v. Suder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting no-evidence summary-judgment motions in this action alleging that Defendants negligently collected, transported, tested, and reported the results of Plaintiff's hair sample used for a drug and alcohol screening, holding that third-party testing entities hired by an employer do not owe a common-law negligence duty to their clients' employees.Plaintiff, a pipefitter, was directed to report to the Houston Area Safety Council to provide hair and urine samples for drug and alcohol screenings. The Safety Council collected the samples and delivered them to Defendant for laboratory testing. Defendant reported that Plaintiff's hair sample tested positive for cocaine and a cocaine metabolite. Subsequent samples tested positive, but Defendant was required to find work with a different employer. Plaintiff later brought this action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a legal duty. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed after considering the competing factors and well-established tort principles, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant owed him a legal duty under the circumstances of this case. View "Houston Area Safety Council, Inc. v. Mendez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in this wrongful discharge action, holding that the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the State but erred in denying the motion to dismiss the claims against the Governor and the Governor's communications director.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she was forced out of her employment with the Iowa Department of Public Health because she refused to stifle certain public records requests to the Department. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued, among other claims, that qualified immunity barred Plaintiff's claims. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly denied Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the claims against the State; but (2) erred in denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss her claims against the Governor and his communications director for wrongful discharge under Iowa Code 70A.28 and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. View "Carver-Kimm v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Idaho Industrial Commission issued an order denying Veronica Arreola’s petition for a declaratory ruling and motion for reinstatement of compensation. Arreola brought her petition and motion against the Granite State Insurance Co. (“the Surety”), when the Surety, without an order from the Commission invoked I.C. section 72-434 to suspend Arreola’s compensation payments. In the Surety’s unilateral and private determination, suspending Arreola’s compensation payments was appropriate because the Surety had purportedly scheduled Arreola’s Independent Medical Exam (“IME”) with its physician at a “reasonable” time, and Arreola “unreasonably” failed to submit to or had obstructed the scheduled IME by not appearing. Arreola’s petition and motion disputed these private conclusions by the Surety. Arreola also maintained that only the Commission has the authority to adjudicate the underlying medical exam dispute and determine whether there is a factual basis to execute the enforcement mechanisms in Idaho Code section 72-434. The Commission denied the petition and motion, instructing Arreola to instead proceed through a complaint for relief. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded its decision in Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab, 71 P.3d 458 (2003) interpreting Idaho Code section 72-434 was manifestly wrong. "Only the Commission has the authority to adjudicate medical exam disputes, and to enforce that adjudication through the enforcement mechanisms in section 72-434." In light of this, Arreola’s concern that the Surety’s unilateral execution of the enforcement mechanisms in section 72-434 also suspended her right to file a “complaint” to seek relief was now abated. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not affirm: given the shift in the legal landscape with Brewer overruled, the Commission’s order denying the petition and motion was vacated, and the case remanded with instructions that the Commission: (1) order payment of prospective compensation payments that might be owed until such time as the Commission determines that payments are not required under section 72-434; (2) reconsider the appropriate procedural mechanism for adjudicating the underlying factual dispute; and (3) instruct the Surety what procedural mechanism it must use to obtain an order authorizing it to lawfully suspend compensation payments. View "Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury determined that the Broward County Sheriff’s Office discriminated and retaliated against helicopter pilot (Plaintiff) in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and awarded Plaintiff $240,000 in lost wages. The verdict form also asked whether the sheriff’s office “willfully violated the law,” and the jury answered, “Yes.” Based on a statutory provision that awards double damages for willful violations, Plaintiff moved to alter the judgment. But the district judge decided that the jury finding on willfulness was “advisory” and denied Plaintiff’s motion. The district judge also denied the sheriff’s office’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the sheriff’s office’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial and reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion for an altered judgment. The court held that there was sufficient evidence supporting the verdict against the sheriff’s office. But the court reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to alter the judgment because the parties consented to have the jury decide the issue of willfulness. View "Scott Thomas v. Broward County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court reversing an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision determining that Appellant was disqualified from receiving reemployment assistance benefits because he was discharged for work-connected misconduct, holding that this Court could not conduct a meaningful appellate review.The ALJ in this case determined that Appellant could not entitled to reemployment assistance benefits because he was discharged for work-related misconduct, as defined by S.D. Codified Laws 61-6-14.1. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Appellant's habit of hugging co-workers did not constitute misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the ALJ failed to enter findings on Appellant's alleged sexual misconduct, this Court could not conduct a meaningful appellate review. View "Bankston v. New Angus, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this age discrimination action, holding that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to create a dispute of fact regarding whether he was terminated due to discriminatory animus.Plaintiff sued Defendant, his former employer, after he was laid off in a reduction in force. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, determining that Plaintiff could not show that Defendant's stated justification for his termination was pretextual. The appeals court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings, holding that Plaintiff produced evidence from which a jury could find that he was selected for the reduction in force as part of a corporate strategy to lay off older workers. View "Adams v. Schneider Electric USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) suit against Rehab Synergies alleging violations of the federal overtime law. The district court, over Rehab Synergies’ objection, allowed the case to proceed as a collective action and a jury found Rehab Synergies liable. On appeal, Rehab Synergies contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the case to proceed as a collective action.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court applied the correct legal standards and that its factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The court explained that Plaintiffs’ adverse-inference argument does not suggest a “disparity” as a result of the case proceeding as a collective action; rather, the record shows that any “disparity” had other causes. Because the Plaintiffs were similarly situated, it would have been inconsistent with the FLSA to require 22 separate trials absent countervailing due process concerns that are simply not present here. View "Loy v. Rehab Synergies" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question of South Carolina Supreme Court to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Metal Recycling Services, LLC, hired an independent contractor - Norris Trucking, LLC - to transport scrap metal. A truck driver employed by Norris Trucking hit the car Lucinda Ruh was driving and injured her. Ruh sued Metal Recycling Services and its parent company, Nucor Corporation, in state court. The defendants removed the case to the federal district court, which granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding Ruh did not allege an employer-employee relationship between the defendants and Norris Trucking or its driver, nor did she otherwise allege any basis on which the defendants could be liable for the negligence of their independent contractor. The district court delayed entry of judgment to allow Ruh to seek leave to amend her complaint. Ruh then moved to amend her complaint to add a claim that Metal Recycling Services itself was negligent in selecting Norris Trucking to transport the scrap metal. The district court denied the motion to amend and dismissed the complaint. The federal appellate court asked the South Carolina Supreme Court whether an employer could be subject to liability for harm caused by the negligent selection of an independent contractor. The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative: an independent contractor relationship may be subject to liability for physical harm proximately caused by the principal's own negligence in selecting the independent contractor. View "Ruh v. Metal Recycling Services, LLC" on Justia Law