Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Respondents John Arvanites and Jonathon Burdette, both peace officers employed by the City of Las Vegas, were involved in a disciplinary investigation. A City employee lodged a complaint against Arvanites, and Burdette was notified as a witness. The City referred the complaint to its Human Resources Department, and a human resources analyst conducted the interviews. Respondents, including the Las Vegas Police Protective Association, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that NRS 289.060 required a ranked peace officer to conduct such investigations.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents. The court determined that the City violated the Nevada Peace Officer's Bill of Rights (POBR) by allowing a human resources employee to lead the investigation. The court declared that the City must ensure a peace officer conducts any interrogation or hearing in connection with such investigations and enjoined the City from using non-peace officers for these tasks.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that NRS 289.060(2)(d) requires a ranked peace officer to lead any investigation that could result in punitive action against another peace officer. The court found that the term "officer" in the statute refers to a peace officer, based on legislative history, statutory context, and public policy considerations. The court concluded that the City violated the statute by having a human resources employee lead the investigation and upheld the district court's order granting summary judgment for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "CITY OF LAS VEGAS VS. LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASS'N." on Justia Law

Dr. Zahra Shahrashoob, an Iranian woman, was hired by Texas A&M University (A&M) in 2018 for a non-tenure-track position in the Department of Chemical Engineering. Initially employed as a lecturer, she was later reclassified as an instructional assistant professor. Despite her satisfactory performance, she felt discriminated against due to her workspace, salary, and teaching load, leading her to file a discrimination charge in June 2020. In August 2020, A&M offered her a shortened four-and-a-half-month contract, which ended in January 2021. She filed a second discrimination charge, alleging that Dr. Mohammad Alam, an Indian man, was hired to replace her.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted A&M’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Dr. Shahrashoob’s claims. The court found that she failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as she did not show that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees. Additionally, the court concluded that she could not prove that A&M’s reasons for her nonrenewal were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Dr. Shahrashoob forfeited her arguments regarding Dr. Alam by not raising them sufficiently in the lower court. Even if she had not forfeited these arguments, she failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination as she did not provide sufficient evidence that Dr. Alam was similarly situated or that he replaced her. Regarding her retaliation claim, the court found that she could not show that A&M’s reasons for her nonrenewal were pretextual, as she did not provide significant evidence beyond temporal proximity. Thus, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of A&M. View "Shahrashoob v. Texas A&M University" on Justia Law

Pamela Pollock sued her supervisor, Michael Kelso, in 2018 for sexual harassment and racial discrimination, alleging that Kelso asked her for sexual intercourse in 2016 and, after she rejected him, promoted less qualified individuals of other races to positions she sought. The trial court initially ruled that Pollock’s suit was time-barred, a decision which was affirmed by the appellate court. However, in 2021, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the statute of limitations begins when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the adverse promotion decision, that the defense bears the burden on this issue, and that costs or fees on appeal cannot be awarded to a prevailing defendant without determining the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.Following the Supreme Court’s directions, the appellate court remanded the case and ordered costs for Pollock. Pollock then moved for attorney fees in the trial court, which awarded her $493,577.10. Kelso appealed this award. Before the trial date, Kelso and Pollock settled the bulk of their case, with Pollock moving to dismiss her underlying case with prejudice except for the attorney fee award, which Kelso was appealing. The trial court retained jurisdiction regarding the fee award.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court denied Pollock’s motion to dismiss Kelso’s appeal, affirming that Kelso was appealing from a final collateral order. On the merits, the court affirmed the fee award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Pollock as the prevailing party and in the amount awarded. The court found that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the fee award, including the use of a 1.8 multiplier, was reasonable. View "Pollock v. Kelso" on Justia Law

Spirit AeroSystems, Inc. implemented a reduction-in-force (RIF) that resulted in the termination of 271 employees. Several of these former employees filed a collective action lawsuit against Spirit, alleging age discrimination. To succeed, they needed to demonstrate a pattern or practice of age discrimination. They presented documentary evidence and testimony to support their claims, while Spirit contended that the RIF aimed to eliminate underperformers regardless of age.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment in favor of Spirit, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a pattern or practice of age discrimination. The court found that the evidence did not support the claim that Spirit's actions were motivated by ageism.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined the evidence, including lay testimony, documentary evidence, and expert opinions. The court found that the evidence, individually or collectively, did not support an inference of a standard operating procedure to eliminate older employees. The court noted that some evidence might suggest individual instances of age discrimination but did not establish a company-wide policy or practice.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact regarding an unlawful pattern or practice of age discrimination. The court also addressed the exclusion of expert declarations and found no error in the district court's decisions. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that Spirit's RIF or refusal to rehire older workers was motivated by age discrimination. View "Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings" on Justia Law

Kristen M. Barnett, a former registered nurse at INOVA Health Care Services, refused to receive the COVID-19 vaccine due to her religious beliefs. INOVA had a policy requiring vaccination unless an exemption was granted. Barnett initially received a medical exemption but later requested a religious exemption, which was denied. She was subsequently placed on administrative leave and then discharged for noncompliance. Barnett filed a lawsuit against INOVA, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII and the Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted INOVA's motion to dismiss Barnett's complaint in its entirety. The court found that Barnett failed to state a claim for reasonable accommodation under Title VII because her objection did not raise issues related to abortion or fetal cells. The court also dismissed her disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the VHRA, finding them duplicative and lacking a comparator.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Barnett had sufficiently alleged religious discrimination for all three claims at the motion to dismiss stage. The court found that Barnett's allegations demonstrated her sincere religious beliefs and that her refusal to receive the vaccine was religious in nature. The court also found that Barnett's allegations supported a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent by INOVA.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Barnett's claims to proceed. View "Barnett v. INOVA Health Care Services" on Justia Law

Mr. Anthony W. Knox, a former Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and a member of the United States Air Force Reserves, brought reemployment and discrimination claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). He sought to retroactively correct the effective dates of a within-grade pay increase and a promotion. Knox was deployed on active duty from November 2002 to November 2003. During his deployment, his DEA supervisor indicated that his next within-grade increase should be effective February 23, 2003, but it was incorrectly set as April 20, 2003. Knox returned to the DEA in November 2003 and was eventually promoted to GS-13 in April 2016.The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) granted Knox’s within-grade increase reemployment claim but denied his promotion claims and his within-grade increase discrimination claim. The Board found that the delay in Knox’s within-grade increase was an administrative error unrelated to his military service and that his promotion was discretionary, not automatic.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s denial of Knox’s discrimination claims, finding substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the delay in his within-grade increase was not due to his military service. However, the court vacated and remanded the Board’s decision on Knox’s promotion reemployment claim, stating that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard by requiring Knox to prove he was entitled to an automatic promotion. The correct standard is whether Knox may have been entitled to the promotion, considering factors such as whether the promotion was generally granted to all employees and whether it was reasonably certain that the benefit would have accrued but for his military service. View "KNOX v. DOJ " on Justia Law

Gwendolyn Cunningham, a Black woman, alleged that the Department of Defense discriminated against her by not promoting her to a newly created GS-13 supervisor position. Cunningham, who had been with the Department since 1988 and held a GS-12 supervisor position, applied for the GS-13 role along with Emmanuel Griffin and two other employees. Griffin, a Black man with extensive experience and higher education credentials, was ultimately selected for the position by Andrew Hartz, the newly hired GS-14 Benefits Division Chief. Hartz cited Griffin's strategic vision and leadership skills as reasons for his selection, despite Cunningham's strong subject matter expertise.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of Defense. The court found that the Department had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for promoting Griffin over Cunningham and that Cunningham failed to offer evidence that these reasons were pretextual. Cunningham's belief that she was discriminated against based on her sex and race was deemed insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the Department's rationale for promoting Griffin was legitimate and nondiscriminatory, as it was based on Hartz's genuine belief in Griffin's superior qualifications and strategic vision. The court also found that Cunningham did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the Department's reasons were pretextual. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Cunningham's heartfelt belief in discrimination was not enough to defeat the motion for summary judgment. View "Cunningham v. Austin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, CompassCare, the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA), and First Bible Baptist Church, challenged the constitutionality of New York Labor Law Section 203-e, which prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s or a dependent’s reproductive health decision making. They argued that the law infringed on their First Amendment rights of expressive association, speech, and religion, and that the Notice Provision, which required employers issuing employee handbooks to include information about employees' rights under the Act, compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Plaintiffs' claims related to expressive association, speech, free exercise, religious autonomy, and vagueness. However, it permanently enjoined the enforcement of the Act’s Notice Provision. The case was then influenced by the Second Circuit's decision in Slattery v. Hochul, which held that an employer might have an associational-rights claim if the Act forces the employer to employ individuals acting against the organization’s mission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It vacated the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ expressive-association claim, the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs regarding the Notice Provision, and the permanent injunction. The Court remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether any Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an associational-rights claim under the precedent set by Slattery. The Court held that the Act’s Notice Provision is subject to rational basis review and is reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of employees regarding their statutory rights. It also affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ free speech and free exercise claims. View "CompassCare v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of the State of California providing dental care to inmates, sued the state seeking compensation for time spent on pre- and post-shift safety and security activities. These activities included going through security and handling alarm devices. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that these activities were not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their wage claims were viable and that the trial court improperly decided a disputed question of fact.The trial court, Solano County Superior Court, sustained the demurrer on the grounds that the activities in question were not compensable under the FLSA. The court did not address other grounds raised by the defendants, such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) precluding the claims, the inapplicability of the statutes to government employers, failure to exhaust contractual remedies, and the statute of limitations.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in not accepting as true the plaintiffs' allegation that providing security is among their principal activities. The appellate court found that the MOU precludes plaintiffs from seeking additional wages under general state wage laws, thus affirming the demurrer as to the first and second causes of action. However, the court held that plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of contract and that the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies could not be resolved on demurrer. The court also determined that the plaintiffs' contract claim was not time-barred.The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, allowing the breach of contract claim to proceed while dismissing the other claims. View "Bath v. State" on Justia Law

Blake Wentworth, a former professor at the University of California, Berkeley, sued the Regents of the University of California for various claims, including failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and invasion of privacy. Wentworth alleged that the Regents did not accommodate his bipolar II disorder and disclosed confidential information about him.The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Regents on Wentworth's claims for failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and invasion of privacy. The court found that the Regents had engaged in the interactive process and offered reasonable accommodations, such as stopping Wentworth's tenure clock. The court also ruled that the invasion of privacy claim failed because Wentworth did not demonstrate that the Regents disclosed any confidential information.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on the interactive process and reasonable accommodations claims, finding that the Regents had acted appropriately. However, the appellate court reversed the summary adjudication of the invasion of privacy claim, concluding that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the Regents disclosed Wentworth's personal information in violation of the Information Practices Act (IPA).The appellate court also reversed the trial court's denial of Wentworth's motion for attorney's fees and costs, remanding the case for further proceedings to determine whether Wentworth was entitled to fees under the catalyst theory or based on his success in obtaining his personnel file during the litigation. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Wentworth's motion for a retrial on the personnel file cause of action, finding that Wentworth had forfeited his challenge by failing to object to the verdict form before the jury was discharged. View "Wentworth v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law