Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the determination of the Title III court, during the course of its confirmation of the Modified Fifth Amended Title III Plan of Adjustment (Plan) for the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA), that the Vazquez-Valezquez Group's claims for additional compensation made in a separate federal lawsuit were dischargeable, holding that there was no error.The Group, which was composed of sixty-nine current and former PRHTA employees who received extra compensation under PRHTA Regulation 12-2017, with which the PRHTA later broke. At issue was the Group's objection to the Title III court's determination that the Group's claims for additional compensation were dischargeable under the Plan. After the Title III court entered an order and judgment confirming the plan the Group appealed, arguing that its members' claims were nondischargeable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims for additional compensation were not exempt from discharge. View "Financial Oversight & Management Bd. v. Vazquez-Velazquez Group" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing Plaintiff's Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B claims, holding that tolling does not apply to the time limits established in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 5, including the requirement that claims be pursued by first filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) "within 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination."Approximately one year after his termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the MCAD alleging sexual harassment, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4 (16A), and retaliation, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to add his chapter 151B claims. The motion judge granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning that this Court's emergency orders issued during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic applied only to courts, not the MCAD, and that equitable tolling did not apply. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that tolling did not apply to the time limits in this case. View "Dunn v. Langevin" on Justia Law

Thai was an IBM employee. To accomplish his duties, he required, among other things, internet access, telephone service, a telephone headset, and a computer and accessories. On March 19, 2020, Governor Newsom signed the COVID-19 “stay home” order. IBM directed Thai and thousands of his coworkers to continue performing their regular job duties from home. Thai and his coworkers personally paid for the services and equipment necessary to do their jobs while working from home. IBM never reimbursed its employees for these expenses.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of a complaint under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA; Labor Code 2699). Section 2802(a)) requires an employer to reimburse an employee “for all necessary expenditures . . . incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties.” The trial court’s conclusion that the Governor’s order was an intervening cause of the work-from-home expenses that absolved IBM of liability under section 2802 is inconsistent with the statutory language. The work-from-home expenses were inherent to IBM’s business and the work performed was for the benefit of IBM. View "Thai v. International Business Machines Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a package delivery driver for United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), injured his hip and buttocks. He requested he be allowed to drive his route with a smaller truck that would have a softer suspension or, alternatively, that he be assigned to an “inside job.” However, UPS determined that Plaintiff's route required a larger truck and there were no openings for inside work; thus, UPS offered Plaintiff an unpaid leave of absence until he could return to work.Plaintiff filed a claim, asserting that UPS’s refusal to provide him with the accommodations he requested violated his rights under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS, concluding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff had not shown that the accommodations he requested were reasonable and that his unpaid leave of absence constituted a reasonable accommodation in the circumstances.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding Plaintiff failed to establish that UPS needed to allow him to drive a smaller vehicle on his existing route and that the leave of absence was not a reasonable alternative. View "Jay Hannah v. UPS" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an alien who challenges Exxon Mobil Corporation’s hiring policy as discriminatory. Petitioner received deferred deportation and eligibility for temporary work authorization under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival program. While a student at North Carolina State University, Petitioner was recruited by ExxonMobil for an internship. Petitioner told ExxonMobil that he is not a United States citizen, but erroneously represented that he had permanent work authorization under federal law. Petitioner was hired on this basis. However, when he presented his paperwork, it showed he lacked permanent work authorization, and ExxonMobil rescinded its offer.Petitioner claims that ExxonMobil’s policy discriminates against aliens as prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. ExxonMobil filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1981 only protects against intentional discrimination, and Petitioner failed to allege that ExxonMobil intentionally discriminates against aliens. While ExxonMobil’s policy requiring that applicants have permanent work authorization will only exclude aliens, discriminatory impact is not enough. And, given ExxonMobil’s policy, Petitioner did not plausibly allege that ExxonMobil intended to discriminate against aliens. View "Aldo De Leon Resendiz v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Oregon legislature intended to create an exception to ORS 656.018, the so-called “exclusive remedy” provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law, for injured workers whose claims have been deemed noncompensable on “major contributing cause” grounds. While employed by defendant Shore Terminals, LLC as a terminal operator, plaintiff Danny Bundy was assigned to stay and monitor the air quality from malfunctioning machinery without being given safety equipment, and he was exposed to dangerous levels of diesel, gasoline and ethanol fumes. After that incident, defendant initially accepted a workers’ compensation claim for "non-disabling exposure to gasoline vapors." Later, plaintiff asked defendant to accept and pay compensation for additional conditions arising out of the same incident, including "somatization disorder" and "undifferentiated somatoform disorder." Defendant specified that it was treating each of plaintiff’s subsequent requests as a "consequential condition claim" and was denying those claims on the basis that plaintiff’s work exposure was not the major contributing cause of the subsequent conditions. Plaintiff challenged those denials through the workers’ compensation system, but he was unable to establish that the work incident was the major contributing cause of his somatoform disorders. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately issued a final order determining that the disorders were not compensable conditions because plaintiff failed to establish that his work-related incident was the major contributing cause. Plaintiff acknowledged that the Workers’ Compensation Law generally immunized covered employers against civil liability for injuries arising out of a worker’s employment. Plaintiff argued, however, that his case fell within a statutory exception to that rule and that the trial court and Court of Appeals, both of which ruled in defendant’s favor on that legal question, erred in concluding otherwise. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff’s statutory argument failed, and that the trial court and Court of Appeals therefore did not err. View "Bundy v. NuStar GP LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit alleging that he suffered adverse employment action in retaliation for unpopular protected speech. Appellant’s complaint alleges that he has been outspoken in recent years concerning the focus on “so-called ‘social justice’ affecting academia in general” and “his concern that the field of higher education study is abandoning rigorous methodological analysis in favor of results-driven work aimed at furthering a highly dogmatic view of ‘diversity,’ ‘equity,’ and ‘inclusion.’” In this vein, Appellant identified three statements or communications he made between 2016 and 2018, which, in his view, are protected speech. According to Appellant, he was eventually subject to adverse employment actions in retaliation for these three communications. The district court dismissed Appellant’s complaint.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal finding that Appellant has failed to allege a causal connection between the only communication that is arguably protected under the First Amendment and the alleged adverse employment action. The court held that the survey question incident and the faculty hiring email were not protected speech. Even assuming the “Woke Joke” blog post was protected speech, Appellant has failed to allege that it was a “but for” cause for any alleged adverse employment action. View "Stephen Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the exclusivity provisions of the California Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), Cal. Lab. Code 3200 et seq., do not bar an employee's spouse's negligence claim against the employer when the spouse is injured by transmission of the COVID-19 virus but that an employer does not owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees' household members.The Supreme Court answered two questions of California law certified from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding the scope of an employer's liability when an employee's spouse is injured by transmission of the COVID-19 virus as follows: (1) the exclusivity provisions of the WCA do not bar a non-employee's recovery for injuries that are not legally dependent upon an injury suffered by the employee; and (2) employers do not owe a tort-based duty to non-employees to prevent the spread of COVID-19. View "Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc." on Justia Law

Williams was a Beaumont, Texas federal corrections officer beginning March 4, 2018. In 2016, Williams met Hayes. The two were engaged and had a child in September 2018. Hayes had been in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody from 2005-2013, including at FCC-Beaumont. He was on supervised release until July 15, 2018. Williams knew Hayes had been incarcerated but was unaware he had been in federal custody. In May 2019, after learning of the relationship, BOP placed Williams on administrative reassignment. Under the Standards of Employee Conduct, employees may not “become emotionally, physically, sexually, or financially involved with inmates, [or] former inmates.” If employees engage in improper contact, they must report the contact. A “former inmate” is an inmate for whom less than one year has elapsed since release from BOP custody or federal court supervision. Hayes met this definition until July 15, 2019. Williams learned, on June 3, 2019, that Hayes had been incarcerated in federal prison. She reported her relationship the next day. BOP issued a notice of proposed removal. The warden sustained the charges and removed Williams.An arbitrator sustained the charge of improper contact but did not sustain the charge of failure to report and upheld the removal, finding that the warden considered the relevant "Douglas" factors and exercised his discretion “within tolerable limits of reasonableness.” The Federal Circuit vacated. The arbitrator failed to independently analyze the appropriateness of alternative sanctions and accepted for sanctions purposes the warden’s fact findings which the arbitrator had rejected. View "Williams v. Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against Youngstown Mayo Jamael Tito Brown, Youngstown Fire Chief Barry Finley, and Youngstown Finance Director Kyle Miasek (collectively, the officials), holding that Appellant had a remedy in the ordinary course of the law.Appellant, a captain in Youngstown's fire department, and his union filed a grievance against the city alleging that he city had violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by not timely promoting him to battalion chief. The grievance was denied, and the union did not seek further relief. Appellant brought this complaint. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. View "State ex rel. Casey v. Brown" on Justia Law