Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's claim alleging that Respondents Frontier West Virginia, Inc. and its supervisory employees wrongfully discharged him after he reported conduct that he alleged violated W. Va. Code 61-3-49b, holding that harm to the public is not required to prove that the offense of crime against property has occurred.Petitioner filed this suit against Frontier for retaliatory discharge. The circuit court granted Frontier's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, ruling that Petitioner "failed to allege a substantial public policy supporting a wrongful discharge exception to a non-public employer termination of an employee." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 61-3-49b does not constitute a substantial public policy to support a Harless claim for wrongful discharge. View "Jarell v. Frontier W. Va., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court finding that the City of Morgantown had incorrectly calculated compensation for Petitioners, fifty-four current and former firefighters employed by the City, and finding that the compensation required by W. Va. Code 8-15-10a was not a "fringe benefit" or "wage" covered by the Wage Payment and Collection Act (WPCA), holding that the court erred in part.At issue was section 10a, which requires the City to provide extra compensation to firefighters for days designated by the Legislature as legal holidays. The circuit court granted summary judgment in part to the firefighters and in part to the City. In so doing, the court reduced the period of time that currently employed firefighters could recover improperly calculated compensation and imposed the doctrine of laches to deprive former firefighters of any past compensation. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the City incorrectly interpreted section 10a; and (2) section 10a created a fringe or wage benefit for firefighters that was protected by the WPCA. View "Nicewarner v. City of Morgantown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Board of Review affirming an ALJ's denial of Robert Hood's application for workers' compensation benefits, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Hood was making a delivery for his employer when he felt a pain in his right knee. The employer's claim administrator denied Hood's application for workers' compensation benefits after concluding that Hood did not sustain an injury in the course of and scope of his employment. An ALJ affirmed, as did the Board of Review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Hood's injury occurred while he was working, it did not result from his employment. View "Hood v. Lincare Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board granting the grievance brought by Respondent, a school bus driver, reinstating her to a modified bus run and an extracurricular bus run and awarding her back pay, holding that the circuit court erred in affirming the decision of the grievance board.Respondent, a bus driver hired to transport elementary and high school students on the same bus run at the same time, made a modified regular run and vocational run for thirty years. In 2017, Petitioner, the Board of Education of the County of Wyoming, changed Respondent's employment back to the arrangement originally contracted for. Respondent filed a grievance, which the grievance board granted, finding that Petitioner's action in restoring Respondent's regular bus run to its original parameters was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the grievance board and circuit court were clearly wrong in their determinations and that the circuit court should have found that Respondent did not meet her burden of proof. View "Bd. of Education of County of Wyoming v. Dawson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's claims for disability discrimination, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Mass Gen. Laws ch. 151B, and for age discrimination, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, holding that there was no error.The district court (1) concluded that Plaintiff had failed to carry her burden to make out a prima facie case that she was a "qualified individual" under the ADA and thus also failed to do so under chapter 151B; and (2) concluded that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B disability discrimination claims; and (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of age discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. View "Der Sarkisian v. Austin Preparatory School" on Justia Law

An administrative law judge (ALJ) working for the United States Department of Labor (DOL) ordered K & R Contractors, LLC to pay living miner’s benefits to its former employee pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act. K & R filed a petitioner for review challenging to the constitutionality of the ALJs' appointment.The Fourth Circuit found that both ALJs were constitutionally appointed and that, even if the dual good-cause removal protections were unconstitutional, K & R was not entitled to relief because it had not identified any harm resulting from those removal provisions. View "K & R Contractors, LLC v. Michael Keene" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lutter began working for Essex County, in a bargaining unit represented by JNESO. Under Supreme Court precedent (Abood), a public-sector union could charge fees from non-union members whom the union represented. New Jersey law permitted public-sector unions to deduct an "agency fee." Lutter joined JNESO and authorized payroll deductions of her union dues.In 2018, New Jersey enacted the Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act (WDEA): a union member could revoke authorization for payroll deductions only during the 10 days following the anniversary of his employment start date. Previously, union members could give notice of revocation at any time. A month later, the Supreme Court (Janus) held that the First Amendment prohibits public-sector unions from collecting agency fees from nonmembers without their clear and affirmative consent. Under WDEA Janus would have to wait nearly a year to revoke her payroll deduction authorization. In July 2018, she nonetheless requested that deductions of her union dues cease and resigned from JNESO. Essex County deducted Lutter's union dues for 10 months.Lutter filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. JNESO sent her a check in the amount of the contested union dues plus interest. She did not cash or deposit that check. The district court dismissed the case. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The check did not moot her damages claims against JNESO but Lutter, as a non-union member no longer subject to payroll deductions, lacks standing for her claims against the other parties and for her additional requests for relief against JNESO. View "Lutter v. Jneso" on Justia Law

Thrifty Payless, Inc., doing business as Rite Aid, seeks judicial review of the National Labor Relations Board’s decision that Rite Aid committed unfair labor practices. The Board has cross-applied for enforcement of its order. An Administrative Law Judge concluded that Rite Aid had committed unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act when it unilaterally implemented its proposal. The ALJ determined that Rite Aid violated its duty to bargain in good faith because it took unilateral action even though the parties had not yet reached an impasse. The main issue here is whether Rite Aid was entitled to implement its own proposal instead of continuing negotiations with the union.   The DC Circuit denied Rite Aid’s petition for review. The court denied the Board’s cross-application for enforcement and remanded the order. The court found that the record contains enough evidence to support the Board’s finding that the parties were not at an impasse. An impasse arises when neither side is open to compromise. Further, the court explained that any reasonable consideration of exigency must consider “an employer’s need to run its business” and the inherently uncertain task of making corporate decisions in the face of a potential crisis. Here, the Board acknowledged that it was “impossible” for Rite Aid “to predict what claims might come in and how that would impact the reserves.” Rite Aid asserts without contest that the reserves as of November 2019 could only cover a few weeks’ worth of healthcare coverage for Rite Aid employees. So Rite Aid’s concern that inaction could have had damaging consequences is understandable. View "Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Moranda Morley lost one of her two jobs due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. Morley applied for and received state unemployment compensation benefits and federal pandemic unemployment assistance through the Idaho Department of Labor. However, it was later determined that Morley was ineligible for benefits because she was still employed full-time at her other job. Morley appealed that determination to the Appeals Bureau of the Idaho Department of Labor, which affirmed her ineligibility. Morley then appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission (“the Commission”), which dismissed Morley’s initial appeal and later denied her request for reconsideration, finding both to be untimely. Morley then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, but her notice of appeal was timely only as to the denial of her request for reconsideration. Thereafter, the Supreme Court issued an order dismissing the appeal as to the issues that were determined to be untimely. What remains was a limited review of whether the Commission properly denied her request for reconsideration. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s denial of reconsideration. View "Morley v. IDOL" on Justia Law

Lai, an engineer, had access to Applied’s trade secrets and participated in highly confidential meetings. Mattson, Applied's direct competitor, recruited 17 Applied employees. Lai accepted a job with Mattson. Before his last day at Applied, Lai accessed proprietary information from Applied’s cloud-based storage system and sent e-mails attaching highly confidential Applied documents—many clearly marked as such—to his personal email accounts. He signed a separation certificate stating he had not retained any Applied information and confirmed this in two exit interviews. After starting his new job, Lai logged into his personal email accounts on his Mattson computer. Lai claims never disclosed any Applied information to Mattson. Mattson denies any knowledge of Lai’s actions.Applied sued Mattson and Lai, citing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Civ. Code 3426) and breach of Lai’s employment agreement. Lai then deleted the emails he had sent to one account, and, after communicating with Mattson’s lawyers, downloaded a confidential Applied document to his Mattson laptop, deleting it a moment later. Mattson put Lai on leave. cut off his access to his personal email accounts. and sequestered his iPhone and computers. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on a provision in the Applied-Lai employment contract. The court of appeal affirmed a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from accessing or using Applied’s confidential information and an order compelling arbitration as to Lai. Mattson, a non-party, is not entitled to arbitration. The litigation should be stayed pending arbitration. View "Mattson Technology, Inc. v. Applied Materials, Inc." on Justia Law