Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff received his third citation for Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”). As a term of his probation, Plaintiff, an alcoholic, was required to attend weekly substance abuse classes. Some of these classes conflicted with shifts that Plaintiff was scheduled to work as an operator at a plant owned by Defendant-Appellee La Grange Acquisitions, L.P. Plaintiff informed his supervisors that he was an alcoholic and that several of the court-ordered substance abuse classes would conflict with his scheduled shifts. When Plaintiff was unable to find coverage for these shifts, La Grange, citing this scheduling conflict, terminated Plaintiff. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Plaintiff sued La Grange under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), for intentional discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of La Grange on all three claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the evidence does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether the given reason for his termination was pretextual, that is, “false or unworthy of credence.” Nothing in the record supports such a finding. There is no dispute that, while La Grange may have been able to do more to find coverage for the shifts Plaintiff needed to miss, La Grange did attempt to coordinate coverage for him and, while partially successful, eventually, these efforts failed. It was only at this point when some of Plaintiff’s shifts were left uncovered, that La Grange dismissed Plaintiff. Given this context, no reasonable jury could find that La Grange’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason—the shift conflict—for Plaintiff’s suspension and termination was pretext for discrimination. View "Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions" on Justia Law

This is a putative class action by three truck drivers against their employer, Domino’s Pizza. The court previously affirmed the district court’s denial of Domino’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that because the drivers were a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” their claims were exempted from the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) by 9 U.S.C. Section 1.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Domino Pizza’s motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action brought by three Domino truck drivers, alleging violations of California labor law. The panel stated that its prior decision squarely rested upon its reading of Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020), which concerned Amazon delivery drivers. The panel found no clear conflict between Rittmann and Saxon and nothing in Saxon that undermined the panel’s prior reasoning that because the plaintiff drivers in this case, like the Amazon package delivery drivers in Rittmann, transport interstate goods for the last leg to their final destinations, they are engaged in interstate commerce under Section 1. View "EDMOND CARMONA, ET AL V. DOMINO'S PIZZA, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking to recover long-term disability benefits. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied Reliance’s cross-motion. Reliance appealed, and the Eighth Circuit reversed.   The court explained that the cases cited do not demonstrate that Reliance has a history of biased claims administration. Nor do they show some other systemic flaw in its claims review process that affected Reliance’s review of Plaintiff’s claim. On the other hand, Reliance does not argue that it maintained structural separations to minimize its conflict of interest. Therefore, the conflict of interest, in this case, deserves “some weight,” but the court concluded that it does not indicate that Reliance abused its discretion. The court wrote that substantial evidence supports Reliance’s decision, and neither the decisional delay in this case nor the purported conflict of interest leads us to conclude that Reliance abused its discretion. View "Melissa McIntyre v. Reliance Standard Life" on Justia Law

This case was the second round of appeals arising from Dalia Rojas’s lawsuit against HSBC Card Services, Inc. and HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (together, HSBC) for violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act . Rojas received hundreds of personal calls from her daughter Alejandra, an employee at an HSBC call center, which were recorded by HSBC’s full-time recording system. Rojas alleged HSBC intentionally recorded confidential calls without her consent. She also alleged HSBC intentionally recorded calls to her cellular and cordless phones without her consent. The trial court granted summary judgment to HSBC, and Rojas appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding HSBC had not met its initial burden to show there was no triable issue of material fact on intent. On remand, HSBC made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, which Rojas did not accept. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where HSBC relied, in part, on workplace policies that purportedly barred call center agents from making personal calls at their desks to show it did not intend to record the calls. The trial court ultimately entered judgment for HSBC. Pertinent here, the court found Rojas did not prove HSBC’s intent to record. The court also found Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded, and did not prove lack of consent. Rojas appealed that judgment, contending the trial court made several errors in determining she did not prove her Privacy Act claims and that the evidence did not support its findings. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court applied correct legal standards in assessing lack of consent and substantial evidence supports its finding that Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded. Although the Court determined the record did not support the court’s finding that HSBC did not intend to record the calls between Rojas and her daughter, that determination did not require reversal. "What it underscores, however, is that a business’s full-time recording of calls without adequate notice creates conditions ripe for potential liability under the Privacy Act, and workplace policies prohibiting personal calls may not mitigate that risk." View "Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc." on Justia Law

Bazemore, a Papa John’s delivery driver, sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that the company had under-reimbursed his vehicle expenses. Papa John’s moved to compel arbitration, attaching a declaration from its “Director of People Services” that Papa John’s requires all new employees to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. She asserted that Bazemore signed the agreement electronically on October 10, 2019, by signing in using a user ID and password, then scrolling through the entire agreement and checking a box in order to sign. Bazemore swore under penalty of perjury that he “had never seen” the agreement and that he had seen his manager login for Bazemore and other delivery drivers “to complete training materials” for them. The court denied Bazemore’s request for targeted discovery as to whether he had actually signed the agreement and granted the motion to compel arbitration.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4, the party seeking arbitration must prove that such an agreement exists. Kentucky law governs whether Bazemore entered into an agreement and provides that an electronic signature is legally valid only when “made by the action of the person the signature purports to represent”—which is a question of fact. Bazemore’s testimony that he never saw the agreement was enough to create a genuine issue as to whether he signed it. View "Bazemore v. Papa John's U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

A company providing crane services, TNT Crane & Rigging, Inc., petitioned the Fifth Circuit to overturn the final orders of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Those orders reversed decisions by an administrative law judge that were favorable to the company. The principal dispute is whether regulations applicable to the disassembly of a crane apply to the tragic accident that occurred here.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that substantial e supports the Commission’s determination that TNT did not have a work rule designed to prevent violations of Section 1926.1407(b)(3). Second, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determination that TNT did not adequately monitor employee compliance with its power line safety rules. Finally, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determination that TNT did not prove it effectively enforced its power line safety rules when it discovered violations. View "TNT Crane & Rigging v. OSHC" on Justia Law

The Bert Company, dba Northwest Insurance Services (“Northwest”), was an insurance brokerage firm with clientele in northwestern Pennsylvania and western New York. From 2005 to 2017, Matthew Turk (“Turk”) was employed as an insurance broker with Northwest. First National Insurance Agency, LLC (“FNIA” or "First National") was an insurance brokerage firm. To grow its business in that region, First National developed a plan to takeover Northwest, initially by convincing key Northwest employees to leave Northwest for FNIA and to bring their clients with them. Through the fall and winter of 2016, Turk repeatedly met with First National about the plan with the hope that First National could gut Northwest by hiring the bulk of its highest producers, acquiring their clients, and ultimately forcing that company to sell its remaining book of clients. Pursuant to the plan, Turk remained at Northwest to convince the company to sell its remaining business to First National. Northwest refused, choosing instead to fire Turk and initiate legal action. In this appeal by permission, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opined on the jurisprudence of the United State Supreme Court addressing the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages by a civil jury in the Commonwealth. The Pennsylvania Court's grant of allowance addressed the narrow issue of the appropriate ratio calculation measuring the relationship between the amount of punitive damages awarded against multiple defendants who are joint tortfeasors and the compensatory damages awarded. The superior court calculated the punitive to compensatory damages ratio using a per-defendant approach, rather than a per-judgment approach. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court generally endorsed the per-defendant approach as consistent with federal constitutional principles that require consideration of a defendant’s due process rights. Further, the Court concluded that under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was appropriate to consider the potential harm that was likely to occur from the concerted conduct of the defendants in determining whether the measure of punishment was both reasonable and proportionate. View "The Bert Company v. Turk, et al." on Justia Law

Appellees worked as non-emergency medical transportation drivers. In July 2017, they brought a putative class action and Fair Labor Standards Act collective action against Medical Transportation Management, Inc. (“MTM”). Their complaint alleged that MTM is their employer and had failed to pay them and its other drivers their full wages as required by both federal and District of Columbia law. MTM appealed the district court’s certification of an “issue class” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) and its denial of MTM’s motion to decertify plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act collective action.   The DC Circuit remanded the district court’s certification of the issue class because the court failed to ensure that it satisfies the class-action criteria specified in Rules 23(a) and (b). The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s separate decision on the Fair Labor Standards Act collective action. The court explained that because the resolution of the action will bind absent class members, basic principles of due process require that they be notified that their individual claims are being resolved and that they may opt out of the action if they so choose. So if the district court certifies the issue class under Rule 23(b)(3) on remand, it must direct “the best notice that is practicable” as part of any certification order. View "Isaac Harris v. Medical Transportation Management, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee alleged that her employer, White Castle, introduced a system that required its employees to scan their fingerprints to access their pay stubs and computers. A third-party vendor then verified each scan and authorized the employee’s access. In a suit under the Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d), White Castle argued that the action was untimely because her claim accrued in 2008 when White Castle first obtained her biometric data after the Act’s effective date.The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that section 15(b) and 15(d) claims accrue each time a private entity scans a person’s biometric identifier and each time a private entity transmits such a scan to a third party, respectively, rather than only upon the first scan and first transmission. The court “respectfully suggested” that the legislature address the policy concerns inherent in the possibility of awards of substantial damages. View "Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc." on Justia Law

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA” or “the Act”), Plaintiff appealed the district court’s entry of judgment, after a jury trial, in favor of Defendant Spring Independent School District (“Spring ISD”). Plaintiff asserted that the district court gave the jury improper instructions and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. He also contends that he is entitled to front pay and attorney’s fees in addition to compensatory damages because he was the “prevailing party.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the jury's instructions were not erroneous, and the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Plaintiff failed to properly raise his asserted errors in the district court and therefore did not preserve them for appeal, and, in any event, his arguments lack any basis in case law and are inconsistent with the text of USERRA. The court explained that Plaintiff acknowledged, as he must, that USERRA provides employers with an affirmative defense, yet contends, without supporting authority, that the court should disregard the statute here. But the text of USERRA clearly provides employers with a mixed-motive defense. There is no carve-out for constructive discharge claims. Thus, it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury on the defense, and it was proper for the jury to answer Questions 4 and 5. View "Garcia-Ascanio v. Spring Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law